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Abstract
This habilitation thesis presents advancements in machine learning for computer security,
arising from problems in network intrusion detection and steganography.
The thesis put an emphasis on explanation of traits shared by steganalysis, network in-
trusion detection, and other security domains, which makes these domains different from
computer vision, speech recognition, and other fields where machine learning is typically
studied. Then, the thesis presents methods developed to at least partially solve the iden-
tified problems with an overall goal to make machine learning based intrusion detection
system viable. Most of them are general in the sense that they can be used outside intru-
sion detection and steganalysis on problems with similar constraints.
A common feature of all methods is that they are generally simple, yet surprisingly
effective. According to large-scale experiments they almost always improve the prior art,
which is likely caused by being tailored to security problems and designed for large vol-
umes of data.
Specifically, the thesis addresses following problems:
• anomaly detection with low computational and memory complexity such that effi-
cient processing of large data is possible;
• multiple-instance anomaly detection improving signal-to-noise ration by classifying
larger group of samples;
• supervised classification of tree-structured data simplifying their encoding in neural
networks;
• clustering of structured data;
• supervised training with the emphasis on the precision in top p% of returned data;
• and finally explanation of anomalies to help humans understand the nature of anomaly
and speed-up their decision.
Many algorithms and method presented in this thesis are deployed in the real intrusion
detection system protecting millions of computers around the globe.

Anotace
Cı´lem te´to habilitacˇnı´ pra´ce je uceleneˇ prezentovat aplikaci a zejme´na adaptaci metod
strojove´ho ucˇenı´ v detekci u´toku˚ na pocˇı´tacˇe prˇes pocˇı´tacˇovou sı´tˇ a ve steganografii.
Pra´ce se snazˇı´ shrnout vlastnosti spolecˇne´ steganaly´ze a detekci u´toku˚ na pocˇı´tacˇe prˇes
pocˇı´tacˇovou sı´tˇ, ktere´ tyto dveˇ aplikace odlisˇujı´ od aplikacı´ typicky rˇesˇeny´ch ve strojove´m
ucˇenı´, jaky´mi jsou naprˇı´klad pocˇı´tacˇove´ videˇnı´, rozpona´va´nı´ rˇecˇi, cˇi jine´ proble´my ucˇenı´ s
ucˇitelem. Pra´ce souhrneˇ prˇedstavuje metody, ktere´ se snazˇı´ identifikovane´ proble´my rˇesˇit
s du˚razem na rychle´ zpracova´nı´ velky´ch objemu˚ dat. Veˇtsˇina prezentovany´ch metod je
obecna´ ve smyslu jejich pouzˇitı´ mimo zamy´sˇlenou dome´nu pocˇı´tacˇove´ bezpecˇnosti.
Spolecˇnou vlastnostı´ te´meˇrˇ vsˇech metod je du˚raz na jejich prakticˇnost (nı´zke´ vy´pocˇetnı´
na´roky). Prˇestozˇe je veˇtsˇina z nich jednoducha´, prˇi experimenta´lnı´ch oveˇrˇenı´ na velky´ch
datech cˇasto pora´zˇejı´ doposud zna´me´ a cˇasto mnohem komplikovaneˇjsˇı´ metody.
Tato pra´ce konkre´tneˇ resˇı´ na´sledujı´cı´ proble´my:
• detekce anomaliı´ s du˚razem na nı´zkou vy´pocˇetnı´ na´rocˇnost tak, aby velke´ objemy
dat mohly by´t efektivneˇ zpracova´ny;
• multi-instancˇnı´ detekce anoma´liı´ zvysˇujı´cı´ odstup signa´lu od sˇumu aggregacı´ vzorku˚
do veˇtsˇı´ch skupin;
• ucˇenı´ s ucˇitelem strukturovany´ch dat zjednodusˇujı´cı´ reprezentaci dome´ny v neu-
ronovy´ch sı´tı´ch;
• shlukova´nı´ strukturovany´ch dat;
• ucˇenı´ s du˚razem na prˇesnost v hornı´m kvantilu;
• a vysveˇtlova´nı´ nalezeny´ch anomaliı´ pro lepsˇı´ pochopenı´ jejich odlisˇnostı´ lidmi.
Veˇtsˇina algoritmu˚ popsany´ch v te´to pra´ci je pouzˇita ve skutecˇne´m syste´mu chra´nı´cı´m
milliony pocˇı´tacˇu˚ na cele´m sveˇteˇ.
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1. CYBERSECURITY: IMPORTANCE AND CHALLENGES
1 Cybersecurity: Importance and challenges
Computers and related infrastructure have in recent years penetrated our daily life. Most
of us now carry a mobile phone, tablets, or personal computers equipped with general-
purpose operating systems and processors so powerful that a few years back they would
be considered a super-computer. Our homes feature wireless routers to provide internet
connectivity, some of us are getting used to personal assistants such as Amazon Alexa
or Apple Siri, heating can be controlled electronically by a thermostat connected to the
internet (e.g. Google’s Nest), televisions stream movies from the internet (through e.g.
Netflix service), kids play with game consoles, light system can be connected to internet
as well (e.g. Phillips Hue), etc.. Some people trust electronics so much that they replaced
analog locks on their front doors with electronic counterparts connected to the internet
(e.g. August Smart Lock Pro). Houses can be equipped with cameras connected to the
internet storing images remotely in the cloud. Our cars are filled with computers and
newspapers report about improvements in their self-driving capability.
This ubiquity of connectivity and availability of computational power represents threat
surface of such size, that developers of individual devices cannot anticipate, what hap-
pens when their devices or software are connected into the network and how miscreants
can exploit it. A prototypical example is a compromise of home routers. Even though
their CPUs are of relatively low computational power, large number of poorly protected
routers have been recently used in largest coordinated denial of service (DOS) 1. More-
over, routers are gateways to the home intranet. If a geeky house is equipped with Sonos
speaker, Amazon Alexa home assistant, and a Smart lock mounted on the main door,
voice-synthesis of Sonos speaker can be to remotely ordered to pronounce ”Alexa: open
the main door”, and the main door magically opens? How? Alexa assistant is not tied
to the voice of any person and it simply obeys commands of any voice. From the point
of view of individual vendors of devices in the attack vector, they probably did not do
anything wrong, but the chain of devices can have unexpected consequences.
The above example is not common at the moment, but other forms of network attacks
are widespread [2]. For example, personal and sensitive data of large enterprises and their
customers stored in big data centers (or in the cloud) are frequently stolen either by in-
dividuals or by professional hackers supported by governments. Personal computers are
hacked in order to: be remotely operated to serve as proxies to launch attacks against
other computers; steal bank, e-mail and other credentials of owners; harvest virtual cur-
rencies; send spam; trick owners to pay for fake antivirus; or to encrypt the data stored on
the computer and demand ransom for decryption.
Few above examples sufficiently demonstrate the need for keeping computers and the
related infrastructures (computer network) secure. This can be achieved either by improv-
ing the security of individual devices or by improving defense mechanisms for detecting
and preventing general classes of attacks. An example of the former approach is a deci-
sion of Apple to forbid users (even those with super-user privileges) to modify certain
parts of the filesystem in order to protect the integrity of core part of the OS. An example
of the latter approaches is the anti-virus scanning filesystem and files downloaded from
1Interestingly, these attacks have been carried by provider of DOS defense solutions to attract more cus-
tomers [35].
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Alice Bob
Eve
Figure 1: Prisoner’s problem in steganography and steganalysis.
the internet (or elsewhere) for known viruses or intrusion detection systems deployed on
the network perimeter to detect traces of attacks.
This thesis summarizes the work of the candidate in detection of attacks carried over
the network (network intrusion detection) and in steganalysis. Although many presented
methods rely on machine learning, the thesis aims to demonstrate that to achieve practi-
cally usable results, methods cannot be used as is and they need to be heavily adapted to
fit the specifics of the domain.
2 Problem definition
Figure 1 depicts a prisoner’s problem [14], which is a scenario used to introduce Steganog-
raphy and Steganalysis. Alice and Bob, two prisoners in solitary cells want to agree on an
escape plan. Despite being in solitary cells, they can exchange messages, but all of them
are intercepted by a warden Eve, who scans them for any illicit content, such as the escape
plan. It is obvious that in this case Alice and Bob cannot use cryptography to prevent Eve
seeing their plans because Eve would immediately see that they are trying to hide some-
thing and forbid them to write to each other. Consequently, their plan will be ruined.
Since Alice and Bob are smart, they hide their messages into an innocuous looking object
by slightly perturbing it, for example slightly changing pixels in an innocuous looking
image. To a non-educated Eve, such image would look perfectly normal and let it pass
to Bob. Educated Eve would scrutinize the image for traces of hidden messages and in
case of a positive alarm (detector outputs image contains a message, further called stego
image), she stops the communication.
Proper mathematical formulation of prisoner’s problem is outlined in Figure 2. Stegano-
graphic algorithm consists of two functions: femb takes as an input image x ∈ X (or other
cover objects), message m ∈ M, and key k ∈ K shared by Alice and Bob and produces
stego image y ∈ X ; fext takes as an input stego object y and key k and outputs the mes-
sage m. Notice that Bob is generally not interested in the original image, which is just a
message carrier used as a decoy. Probability distributions on cover objects Px, keys Pk,
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Figure 2: Steganographic channel.
and message Pm together with embedding function femb implicitly defines probability
distribution on stego objects Py.
The steganographic algorithm is considered secure, if probability distribution of cover
and stego objects are identical, i.e. Px = Py. The rationale behind is that in this case,
the best detector Eve can ever have is equal to random guessing. Cachin [14] defines
steganographic algorithm to be -secure, if
DKL(Px, Py) ≤ .
The rationale behind this definition is that Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence provide up-
perbound on the best detector Eve can obtain. Recently, Ker [28] has shown that KL di-
vergence exhibits pathological behaviors in special type of covers and suggest to replace
it by total variation
sup
A⊂X
|Px(A)− Py(A)|,
which is a tight bound on the best detector Eve can ever obtain.
How does intrusion detection relate to the steganographic scenario? In NIDS, observed
legitimate traffic can be viewed as a cover object x, the attack can be viewed as a mes-
sage m, and the specifics of attack execution as an embedding function femb (the stegano-
graphic key is not used in this likening). The traffic modified by the attack can be there-
fore viewed as a stego object y. Naturally, the attacker wants to be as little detectable
as possible while the goal if NIDS is to detect as many attacks as possible. Similarly to
steganography, the attack would be theoretically undetectable if probability distributions
of the network traffic with and without the attack would be equal, i.e. Px = Py with Px/Py
being a probability distribution of the traffic without/with an attack. Therefore the defi-
nition of the steganographic security can be readily used to define undetectable attacks.
Moreover, a vast prior art in scaling of steganographic capacity with the size of the cover
objects can be used as well [19, 27]. Noteworthy to say that in steganalysis scenario the
receiver is used only to impose constraints on the embedding functions (message has to
be recoverable from the stego image). In the network intrusion detection, this condition is
made implicit by the attack meeting criterions qualifying it to be an attack of a particular
type.
It is important to realize that in both above scenarios probability distributions are de-
fined directly on the set of objects of interest. When objects are projected to a new space
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through some set of features, this projection can alter the probability distributions and
decrease its entropy. This means that if two probability distributions are equal in the pro-
jected space, there might not be equal in the original space. Therefore conclusions about
security done in projected spaces can be misleading.
Let’s identify important properties shared by both and other security scenarios
1. Whichever party (Alice/attacker or Eve/NIDS) have a better model of the environ-
ment (images/network traffic)2 should win in the long term (or in the expectation).
This is a consequence of the fact that if the attacker has a better model than the
defender, he can modify the attack to be invisible and vice versa [26].
2. If attackers are rational, the attack signal to be detected (image modification or traces
of the attack) is weak. Although in other domains such as in astronomy detected
signals are weak as well, in security domains the weak signal is actively trying to
avoid being detected.
3. Practical algorithms should be lightweight, as volumes of data that needs to be pro-
cessed are enormous. For example, the number of images uploaded daily to Face-
book is 350 millions [4]. The numbers of logs from network traffic are even one
magnitude higher, as according to [3] the number of HTTP requests processed by
Cisco’s CTA cloud service is more than 10 billion a day.
4. The enormous amount of data makes the detection problem highly imbalanced in
the sense that the number of benign objects is much higher than that of malicious
ones. This means that any practically usable detector should have extremely low
false positive rate, 10−4 in case of NIDS when the subject of the classification is a
network host3 to 10−10,4 otherwise the operators performing further investigations
would be flooded by false positives. This would render the system useless because
the trust in its decisions will be lost.
5. In both scenarios entities (players) have antagonistic goals, therefore both scenarios
should be formulated by means of Game Theory. Although this has been identified
more than twenty years ago, its use is rare due to the computational complexity and
domains lacking clear structure.
The network intrusion detection domain posses further properties making application
of machine learning methods more difficult.
1. Unlike computer images, the conversion of a traffic into a fixed dimensional vector
can be complicated, as the data does not have a fixed size. An example is HTTP
request
http://www.example.com/res/index.php?action=welcome.
The request has three parts (hostname, path, and query) each consisting of several
tokens and their number can be anywhere from zero to n, where n is such that the
URL has at most 2000 characters. Another example can be a chain of certification
authorities provided during TLS handshake.
2In the case of the steganography the model of the noise within the image is more important than the
model of the image content
3This number stems from the internal estimate that in corporate networks, approximately one out of 1000
network hosts are infected by malware or it is under some kind of attack.
4Apart from the malware recently starting to use steganograhy, uses of steganography is covered by in-
formation embargo imposed by government agencies.
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2. The network traffic is non-stationary for example due to the differences between
day and night, or due to applications (frameworks) becoming popular and phasing
out.
3. The ground truth is expensive and difficult to obtain, sometimes impossible even for
experienced security investigator. Imagine for example HTTP request to google.com,
which can be due to a legitimate user searching for something on the web, or due
to malware verifying connectivity to the internet. Therefore any methods to acquire
ground truth at lower costs or creating learning algorithms that require less training
samples is of great need.
4. Since detections are typically investigated further by humans (network operators),
the ability to explain the decision made by the IDS is valuable since it can cut down
the time to investigate the incident.
In the rest, contributions of the candidate to solve some of the above problems are
briefly described, while a detailed description is left to the appendix with reproduction of
original papers. Contributions are presented in logical blocks reflecting the above prob-
lems, though the division is not strict, as solutions one can easily span more than one
block due to their entwining.
3 Non-stationarity and large volume of data
To process a large volume of data many real-world NIDS are implemented like a fun-
nel [50]. Upon ingesting the data set of lightweight detectors are used to remove 95–99% of
the samples, by which the system decreases its computational and storage requirements.
These detectors are required (i) to be continuously updated due to non-stationarity of the
traffic and (ii) to be general in the sense that they are able to detect novel attacks because
only filtered data are stored.
Anomaly detectors are popular choice meeting the above requirements [38, 36, 46].
They do not need labeled data since they presume attacks will be different from the ma-
jority of the traffic and therefore they should be anomalous. This makes them the dar-
ling of security researchers due to their ability to detect new types of attack (zero-day
attacked). Yet, their deployment in NIDS is rare mainly due to their excessive false pos-
itive rate caused by the fact that every anomaly does not need to be the violation of a
security policy.
To make anomaly detectors practically useful, single all-purpose anomaly detector is
frequently replaced by a large number of relatively simple anomaly detectors [50]. This
construction has a many-fold benefit and meets requirements identified in the first para-
graph: (i) it decreases the computational complexity, since many of these detectors are
implemented as a simple histograms over discrete values or use only a few features; (ii) it
facilitates inclusion of the domain knowledge, because attacks tend to be anomalous in a
few features;5 (iii) it allows to combine features with widely different semantics, e.g. vis-
iting certain server hosted in certain autonomous system with a fraction of dns requests
5This is related to the problem of anomaly detection in subspaces, where anomalies are visible in a partic-
ular sub-space and they are shadowed by the noise in the full space.
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to newly observed IP addresses.6
In [42](see Appendix 1 for details) we have investigated an extreme case, where an
ensemble of very weak detectors implemented as a histogram of data projected on a single
vector has been constructed. Similarly to supervised cases [10, 20], the ensemble leads to
a strong anomaly detector with a performance equal to or better than state of the art
methods. It also allows to ingest data with missing variables (practical in domains with
sensor outages) and identification of features in which the scrutinized sample deviates
from the majority.
The main drawback of the use of an ensemble is that it requires a function aggregating
their outputs. This is typically solved using unsupervised methods, such as taking an
average of outputs of detectors for a given sample [37]. Due to the constraint on the low
false positive rate and the fact that not every anomaly is interesting the candidate believes
that it is better to solve this using supervised learning as detailed in Section 7.
To further cope with non-stationarity of the data, Ref. [51] has proposed so-called
”trust models”. Although the original publication has convincing experimental results,
the theoretical justifications were not provided. Our analysis [22](see Appendix 2 for de-
tails) revealed that ”trust models” are in its essence local adaptive multivariate smoothing
(LAMS) . In the same same work we have identified two types of false positives (alarms)
in network traffic analysis. Unstructured false positives are short-term events distributed
uniformly over all network hosts proportionally to the traffic volume typically triggered
by widespread, uniformly distributed behaviors (such as web browsing). Structured false
positives are caused by a (long-term) legitimate behavior of a small number of network
hosts different from the background. Because they are found only at a very small portion
of network hosts, they are reported as anomalies. Typical examples of these false posi-
tives are domain name servers (DNS) , licensing servers, etc. Our work has shown how
LAMS decreases the number of unstructured false positive while leaves the structured
false positives mostly intact, which is optimistic since structured false positives can be
easily white-listed as they occur in small numbers.
4 Weak signal
The change of the probability distribution of observed data caused by the attack made by
a rational attacker is small. In steganography Ker [26] proposed to deal with this prob-
lem by aggregating the evidence from multiple measurements (this corresponds to the
number of images in steganalysis and the length of the observation window in network
intrusion detection). This line of research led to ”square-root-law” stating that if the length
of message hidden in images increases faster than the square root of the number of pixels
(proxy-measure for capacity which is more understandable) then the attacker will be in
the limit detectable with arbitrary precision.
The practical application of the above assumption has steered our attention to multi-
instance learning (MIL) and to the Maximum mean discrepancy [21] (MMD), which is a
measure of discrepancy between two probability distributions observed through a set of
samples.
6This fraction is a good indicator of malware that uses domain-name generation algorithm to identify the
valid address of command and control server for a given day.
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In steganalysis this means that the subject of the detection is an actor sending multiple
images instead of a single image as is the common practice. In [29, 30] (see Appendix 3
for further details) we have proposed to calculate the distance between actors using an
MMD between images they have communicated, and use this distance in the local out-
lier factor [11] (LOF) anomaly detector. It has been therefore assumed that actors using
steganography will be anomalies in the space of observed actors. The resulting detector is
universal in the sense that it can detect any steganographic algorithm. With respect to the
prior art [44, 43, 39] the proposed multi-instance learning detector significantly improves
the accuracy in identifying actor guilty by using steganography.
In its essence, we have proposed in the previous paragraph (references [29, 30]) multiple-
instance anomaly detector. To that date, the only work explicitly solving this problem
was [40], where MMD has been used in Gaussian kernel (instead of the usual L2 distance)
in one-class Support Vector Machines (SVM) as was proposed in [16]. The resulting algo-
rithm, called support-measure machines has unfortunately high computational require-
ments due to the O(b2) complexity of calculating MMD distances between two sets each
containing b vectors, and O(l3) complexity of training one-class SVM with l samples.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the calculation of MMD has a quadratic com-
plexity with respect to the number of measurements (each measurement corresponds to
one vector and is called an instance) of each sample (called bag). This prevents to use
MMD in domains, where the number of instances per bag is high. To alleviate this com-
plexity, in [33] (see Appendix 4 for further details) we have proposed to approximate
MMD by representing each bag by a single vector equal to the mean of instances projected
by an inverse of a Cholesky decomposition of the kernel matrix. This representation offers
several advantages for practical applications:
1. it decreases the storage requirements and makes it predictable. Each sample is rep-
resented by a vector of a fixed size, which is sparse;
2. mean vectors representing bags can be calculated and updated online and the expo-
nential moving window allows to deal with concept drift;
3. the MMD distance is then equal to L2 distance between sparse vectors representing
bags.
While the first two advantages have consequences for practical use, that of the third prop-
erty implies that any algorithm (supervised, unsupervised, clustering, etc.) can be con-
verted to an algorithm for multi-instance learning problems. The main limitation is that
the method is practical for problems of small intrinsic dimensions because it is based on
an explicit representation of the kernel space.
This approach has been practically verified in [32, 32, 33] on three problems: inferring
the infrastructure of the network service, anomaly detection of command and control
servers of malware campaigns, and supervised detection of computers infected by mal-
ware on basis of their communication with external servers. In all these problems the
proposed approach exceeded the prior art.
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b =

(x1,1, . . . , x1,d)
(x2,1, . . . , x2,d)
...
(xb,1, . . . , xb,d)
 f(b) =
{
+1
−1
send to
classifier
Figure 3: Multi-instance learning problem. Each sample b is called bag and individual
vectors {xi}bi=1 are called instances.
5 Structured models
In the previous section it has been demonstrated that multi-instance learning (see Fig-
ure 3) is suitable for domains, where subjects of classification are described by a set of
vectors (the terminology of multi-instance learning call each sample a bag and individ-
ual vectors instances). Although the technique described in previous section is suitable for
unsupervised and supervised variants of MIL problems [33], it was mainly developed for
unsupervised learning problems with instances of low intrinsic dimension. Moreover, the
author does not believe isotropic Gaussian to be well suited for all applications.
To tackle these challenges, we have written the embedding function of a bag b =
{xi}li=1, xi ∈ Rd as an aggregation of instances projected by some function h(xi; θh) :
Rd 7→ Rk with θh being vector of parameters. By writing a classifier taking the vector rep-
resentation of a bag as an input as f(b; θf ) : Rk 7→ {−1,+1}, where θf is again vector of
parameters, the complete classifier can be written as
f
(
{xi}li=1
)
= f
(
1
l
l∑
i=1
h(xi; θh); θf
)
,
where mean is used as an aggregation function. If f and h are chosen such that gradient
with respect to θf and θh exists, than all parameters can be optimized using gradient
descend techniques popular in neural networks (see Appendix 5 for further details).
An important aspect of the above solution is that parameters of function h are opti-
mized using labels, whereas most prior art uses unsupervised techniques [6]. Scenarios
for which this approach excels is outlined in Figure 4, where probability density functions
(pdf) of instances of bags from two different classes are similar on most part the space and
differ only little on areas of low probability. The unsupervised methods used in the prior
art will mostly fail here because they will model areas where pdfs are high, which is pre-
cisely where pdfs of both classes are equal. This scenario seems to be relevant in security,
where the attack signal cluttered by the signal of legitimate use.
The prior art on MIL [6] contains many different algorithms stemming from diverse
applications. On the suite of 20 benchmark problems from [5], 13 different algorithms are
the best at least on one problem. This means that one algorithm from prior art typically
works well one to two problems. The approach described in previous section [48] has
excelled on 10 problems, which demonstrates its generality and superiority. Needless to
say that on problems, where the prior art was better, the algorithm described here has
typically over-fitted.
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Figure 4: Probability density functions of instances of bags from two classes.
The above approach can be viewed as a building block and applied recursively. This
has been demonstrated in [47] (see Appendix 6 for details), where the host has been mod-
eled by servers it has visited and each server has been modeled by messages it has ex-
changed with the host (see Figure 5). Again, the important part of the approach is that
function ψ projecting vectors describing messages is optimized using labels on the level
of the host. The consequence is that ψ is sensitive in parts of the message space, where
infected hosts behave differently to the normal ones. This knowledge can be utilized fur-
ther to speed-up forensic analysis, as messages typical of infected hosts can be identified
faster.
Also, the fact that the classifier is trained from labels on the level of hosts rather than
on the level of individual messages [7] is important in network security, where labels
are expensive to obtain a can be ambiguous. Consider for example HTTP request to
google.com. This request can be caused by a user visiting a search engine or by a mal-
ware checking network connection and it is impossible to attach a correct label to this
single flow.
The above framework is general and allows to model any tree-structured data, poten-
tially any data stored in JSON format. 7 To assess the generality of the proposed models,
the above user traffic has been extended by a hierarchical model of URL in HTTP request
shown in Figure 6. The URL is viewed as having three separate MIL blocks, where the
first MIL corresponds to a hostname (each part separated by a dot of the hostname is one
instance ), second corresponds to a path and the third corresponds to the query.
7JSON stands for Javascript object notation and it is a popular method to store structured data).
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Figure 6: Hierarchical model of the HTTP request.
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6 Clustering of structured data
Despite the progress in decreasing the false positive rates of anomaly detection methods,
accurately labeled data are still needed, be it for evaluating the accuracy of detectors,
determining detection thresholds, finding the right combination of detectors in an ensem-
ble, or finally for assigning anomalies to classes of known malware to shorten the incident
response time.
Nevertheless, labeling of samples by humans requires trained experts and even for
them, it is challenging due to ambiguities listed at the end of the previous section. There-
fore any improvement in simplifying the labeling or making it more effective is important.
A natural approach to increase the number of labeled samples is to first cluster them
and then to present the expert with a cluster of samples. Besides increasing their number,
a large number of similar samples helps to estimate similarities and variations in malware
communication, which eases the writing of indicators of compromise (IOC) rules .
The efficacy of clustering depends on the used metric, which needs to be correlated
with human expectations in the sense that samples in a cluster exhibit similarities the hu-
man expect. In [24] (see Appendix 7 for details) we have proposed to cluster hostnames by
means of three metrics: first based on timing and sizes of network requests [32] described
in Section 4, second based on a Jaccard index of a sets of tokens in queries, and finally
the third measuring similarity of directory trees of domains as observed from URLs in
HTTP requests [24]. The last metric has been inspired by kernels over graphs, but it has
embraced the domain knowledge. Note that here the problem can be viewed as a multi-
instance multi-domain clustering, where each observed HTTP request is one instance and
the clustering is done in three sets of features (domain).
Once clusters are created, they need to be ordered and presented to analysts. The rank
is based on the consistency of clusters in all three metrics (consistent clusters are easier to
label) and relation to already known malicious hostnames with the relation estimated by
probabilistic threat propagation [15].
A similar approach has been used to cluster malware binaries on basis of their inter-
action with resources during execution in sandboxed environment [56](see Appendix 8
for further detail), such that each cluster will contain one malware family. The assump-
tion is that while it is relatively easy to change the structure of URL in HTTP requests or
hide it using HTTPS, masking the intent is difficult due to the required interaction with
resources. For example, if ransomware wants to encrypt the hard-drive, it needs to inter-
act with the file system. Similarly, if malware wants to prevent multiple infections of the
same host, it needs a mark indicating the host being already infected, which is typically
done using windows registry or mutexes.
Since the malware typically uses resources multiple times and it uses multiple differ-
ent types of resources (external servers, file-system, mutexes, and windows registry), the
problem can be again framed as a multi-instance multi-domain clustering. Due to the un-
supervised nature of the problem and instances being strings rather than vectors of fixed
length, none of the above-described approaches were usable.
The core problem was therefore how to convert strings from each domain (URL, file
path, registry keys, and mutexes) to a vector of fixed length. The approach proposed
in [55] (see Appendix 9 for further detail) starts by defining similarity function for each
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domain and optimize its parameters using Centered Kernel Target Alignment [17] from
a couple examples of strings showing what should be similar and dissimilar. Using this
function, strings from each domain were clustered and these cluster centers were used
for one-hot encoding of each string from each domain. Note that typically used distances
over strings like edit distance do not work well here since they do not exploit specifics of
domains.
Once instances were represented by a binary vector, binaries were represented using a
hierarchical Bayesian model with parameters optimized using expectation maximization
algorithm. The main advantage of the used Bayesian model was that it has enabled to
estimate the purity of founded clusters. This was used to rank founded clusters such that
large and pure clusters will be presented to the analyst first.
Experimentally comparison has used a corpus of 130 000 malware binaries and com-
pared to the state-of-the-art approaches for behavior clustering. The statistical tests of
significance deemed our solution based on Bayesian models and tuned string similarities
better.
7 Low false positive rate
The imbalance in benign and malicious samples, which in reality can span from 10−3
for the intrusion detection to 10−10 for steganography means that any detector for prac-
tical purposes has to have a very low false positive rate, ideally controlled by hyper-
parameters with a clear meaning to the user. Needless to say that training of classifiers
when the false positive is bounded (called Neyman-Pearson classification) remains an
unresolved problem due to the high complexity of the problem [52, 53]. Therefore prac-
tical algorithms have to relax conditions such that the solution is found efficiently yet it
remains usable.
Neyman-Pearson classification is not only important for bounding the false positive
rate, but also for positive-unlabeled classification [8], where available samples are divided
into two parts: positive set containing samples certainly being positives and unknown set
with mostly negative samples, but some of them can be positive.
In [45](see Appendix 10 for details) we have postulated that the steganographer will
send more than one message. This means that the attack rarely consists from a single ma-
licious event, but more likely it will be repeated. We have therefore decided that it should
be sufficient to detect 50% of malicious events (samples) as the overall performance mea-
sured on the level of attackers should not be decreased.
Fixing the detection threshold at 50% means that for sufficiently symmetric probability
distributions the estimate of median can be safely replaced by a mean, and constraining
the set of classifiers to linear and using convex surrogates (exponential, hinge, logistic re-
gression) of indicator loss, the resulting optimization problem solved during training is
convex. The proposed solution has been experimentally compared on a large dataset of
almost 4.5 million images to an established prior art, which is to put different weights
on errors on positive and negative classes. The experimental results have confirmed su-
periority of the proposed solution. Yet, recall that the solution is restricted only to the
operating point at 50% detection accuracy.
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In Section 4 it has been mentioned that combining outputs of anomaly detectors is
non-trivial. When tight restrictions on false positive rate need to be met, we believe that
the right combination cannot be learned unsupervisedly. Since anomaly-detectors can be
viewed as feature extractors, the problem of learning the combination function using la-
beled samples can be framed as an accuracy at the top problem, where the goal is to learn
classifier maximizing accuracy in top 1% of samples.
The accuracy at the top problem has been approached by modifying the approach
in [9]. The modification consists from the use of gradient descend method, where the
step in gradient descend algorithm is alternated with a shift of the threshold to be exactly
at 1% quantile, which enforces the desired operating point. Although this algorithm [22]
(see Appendix 11 for details) seems to be very naive, an extensive comparison revealed
this solution to perform better than the state of the art, especially in conditions where
samples are not accurately labeled. This aspect is important for network intrusion detec-
tion, where samples are rarely fully labeled. These findings are on par with the theoretical
analysis in [8]. Compared to the original solution [9] with computationally complexity
O(n4), the proposed one scales gracefully to large data with millions of samples.
8 Explainability
Almost all samples (events) considered suspicious in network security are passed to a
human operator, who investigates them and performs an appropriate action (not inves-
tigating and doing nothing is considered as an action). To help her to decide, what to do
(in the parlance of network security to act), she needs to understand causes of the alarm
and to estimate the risk. This is even more important in the case of a large system with
multiple alarms, where she needs to prioritize which alarms to resolve first. Therefore any
additional information about alarms is valuable, as it can cut down the incident response
time.
It is rather surprising that despite the practical implications of explanations of classi-
fier’s decisions, the prior art is scarce. In [34] (see Appendix 9 for details) we have pro-
posed a general method to provide the user with an explanation of the anomaly in the
form:
”The alarm has occurred because ith feature is bigger than t1, jth feature is smaller than
t2, etc.”
If this simple explanation takes as an input features anomaly detectors and is combined
with a sub-system grouping hosts and servers into logical units, then the resulting expla-
nations for the network officer can be meaningful. They can look like
”Computer aaaa belonging to a group of administrating staff uploaded more than
1000Mb to box.com service.”,
which is well understood by a human. If use of box.com service violates company’s
security policy, the owner of the device can be immediately contacted.
To explain the anomaly, the system trains a large number of trees, where the set of
positive samples has size one containing only the to be explained anomaly and the set of
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negative samples contain remaining unknown samples or their randomly selected sub-
set. From all trained trees, rules along paths from roots to lists with positive samples are
extracted and the most frequent ones are assembled into the explanation.
The system, albeit being conceptually simple, provides shorter and sounder expla-
nations than the prior art, which has been demonstrated a large set of 36 problems for
anomaly detection. Moreover, it is general in the sense that it can be used to explain
anomalies of a wide range of anomaly detectors operating over Euclidean space.
9 Future work
Although above sections have presented some solutions to problems identified in Intro-
duction, they are not solved at all. Quite contrary, many questions remained unanswered
and new question have been raised.
Structured domains and learning from unlabeled data
Section 5 have described a practical and general approach to reflect the structure of the
data in an architecture of a neural network. The main advantage is its simplicity and
generality, as almost any data with a tree structure (e.g. JSON documents) can be without
much thinking encoded in the architecture of a neural network. Moreover, any progress
within the field of neural networks, such as new optimization methods, layers, transfer
functions, etc. can be readily applied.
Presently, the solution is applicable only to supervised training problems. For simple
data represented by vectors8 there exist works trying to decrease dependency on labeled
samples, e.g. semi-supervised learning [31, 49] or one-shot learning [54, 58, 25]. At the moment
the candidate is not aware of any similar solution for structured data. Similarly, prior
art on anomaly detection for structured data is missing, except works restricted to the
simplest case of multi-instance learning [40, 33, 30].
The simplicity with which the presented framework allows to encode the structured
data is so impressive that it motivates us to further work in this area, mainly along the
lines of decreasing the number of needed labeled samples. But there are also interesting
theoretical questions. It is not known, how general is the framework and what are its lim-
itations. For example, the selection of aggregation function (mean, maximum, learned
function) is not entirely clear. From the theory behind MMD it seems like that mean
should be sufficiently general to be able to differentiate any probability distribution func-
tion, yet for some applications, maximum is clearly more efficient in the finite sample and
finite computational resources setting. Similarly it is not known if the solution would not
suffer from vanishing gradients or forgetting similarly to recurrent neural networks when
the tree grows taller. Some of these questions can be answered by applying the model to
as many problems as possible, but some theoretical justifications would be in place.
8The candidate does not see a conceptual difference between vectors, matrices, and tensors.
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Game theory in security domains
Game theory (GT) is by no means a correct mathematical tool to describe the adversarial
nature of intrusion detection systems, but it is rarely used. Candidate’s own experience
suggests that it is because GT is computationally expensive, an improvement over non-
GT models is hard to measure, GT frequently uses simplified and inaccurate models of
the environment, and the attackers not being always rational.
Why is it difficult to assess improvement of GT models? Supervised classifiers are de-
veloped over data collected and labeled in the past and these data are frequently used
for the evaluation. This corresponds to the scenario, where defender (detector) knows at-
tacker’s strategy, which seems to be bizarre, yet it is used in all antivirus and intrusion
detection solutions. The reason for this is the presence of many attackers employing sim-
ilar tools on many different targets. Therefore detecting already known attacks is a good
strategy, because a detector not detecting them would be considered useless. Moreover,
the detector will be evaluated on known attacks by third-party evaluators and if it fails
to detect known attacks, its vendor will quickly go out of the business. This implies that
the success of GT solutions have to be measured in the long term mainly on attack of new
type, which is rarely done.
Solving the problem using Game Theory means that the detector has to be optimized
with respect to all possible attacks. Putting for a moment aside, how these attacks can be
found, the detector has to make a trade-off between false positive rate and detection accu-
racy. Increasing detection accuracy on unknown attacks causes either increasing the false
positive rate or decreasing detection accuracy on known attacks, which is again against
the usual evaluation framework.
Although solving GT models can be complex, the complexity depends on the assump-
tions and the chosen type equilibrium. Experimental results in [18] implies that if the
attacker has a full knowledge about the domain, the solution can be found quickly and it
works well enough for the case when an attacker does not have a full knowledge, where
the solution is expensive to find. Similarly, finding Stackelberg equilibrium [12] might be
easier than finding other types of equilibria while the loss of performance might not be
dramatic. Finally, there remains open question, if it is better to have sub-optimal solution
of a precise model or optimal solution to an imprecise one. Superiority of neural networks
over support vector machines (or Gaussian processes) suggests the former approach to
lead to more interesting solutions.
Finding a game-theoretic optimum is also interesting from the point of view of anomaly
detectors, as it converts the problem of anomaly detection to that of supervised classifi-
cation, which is a more researched area. Moreover, it would change the paradigm of the
intrusion detection system, as instead of detecting attacks similar to already seen in the
wild and identified by a security analyst, it would be able to detect never seen attacks.
Finding new attacks
An important aspect limiting the use of Game-Theory in computer security is that the
space of all attacker’s strategies is not fully known. This problem can be tackled by meth-
ods automatically finding new attacks undetectable by the current detector. The impor-
tance of this problem is demonstrated by Darpa’s grand cybersecurity challenge [1].
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Although in recent years several methods to create adversarial samples have been pub-
lished [13, 41, 57], they are restricted to simple domains without complicated constraints.
These constraints can be for example practical feasibility of the attack and satisfaction of
requirements on the attack (e.g. the number of tried passwords in brute-force password
cracking). Solutions to this problem will probably combine tools from many fields, such
as planning, reinforcement learning, supervised learning, constraint satisfaction, automa-
tion of test development. Benefits of automatically finding new attacks go beyond Game
Theoretic optimization. It can help to secure critical systems by identifying security holes,
or it can guide the representation of the application domain, as it can reveal, which parts
are not modeled yet they are important for the security.
Neyman-Pearson classification
Neyman-Pearson classification paradigm [53, 52] seems to be more appropriate for secu-
rity domains than the usual Bayesian approach because it is easier to limit the number
of false alarm (or the total number of alarms) than to define costs for all types of error
and know the class ratio between malicious and benign use. Moreover, as identified in [8]
Neyman-Pearson classification is important for learning from positive-unlabeled data,
which is found in security domains.
Solutions presented in Section 7 have been developed and experimentally evaluated
with linear classifiers. It is not known yet, how to extend them to non-linear classifiers.
Generally, there seem to be few works dealing with this problem especially in conjunction
with non-linear classifiers such as neural networks. The optimization problem there is
not convex, therefore there will be no guarantees on optimality, yet the solution might
lead to more understandable hyper-parameters and more precise classification around
the operation point of interest.
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Abstract In supervised learning it has been shown that a collection of weak classifiers can
result in a strong classifier with error rates similar to those of more sophisticated methods.
In unsupervised learning, namely in anomaly detection such a paradigm has not yet been
demonstrated despite the fact that many methods have been devised as counterparts to super-
vised binary classifiers. This work partially fills the gap by showing that an ensemble of very
weak detectors can lead to a strong anomaly detector with a performance equal to or better
than state of the art methods. The simplicity of the proposed ensemble system (to be called
Loda) is particularly useful in domains where a large number of samples need to be processed
in real-time or in domains where the data stream is subject to concept drift and the detector
needs to be updated on-line. Besides being fast and accurate, Loda is also able to operate
and update itself on data with missing variables. Loda is thus practical in domains with sen-
sor outages. Moreover, Loda can identify features in which the scrutinized sample deviates
from the majority. This capability is useful when the goal is to find out what has caused the
anomaly. It should be noted that none of these favorable properties increase Loda’s low time
and space complexity. We compare Loda to several state of the art anomaly detectors in two
settings: batch training and on-line training on data streams. The results on 36 datasets from
UCI repository illustrate the strengths of the proposed system, but also provide more insight
into the more general questions regarding batch-vs-on-line anomaly detection.
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1 Introduction
Imagine identifying anomalous users in a social network (Šourek et al. 2013), where user’s
behavior constantly changes and their numbers are enormous, detecting weirdly behaving
computers (frequently an indication of an infection bymalware) in a network of large corpora-
tion with hundreds of thousands of computers, whose traffic constantly changes (Pevný et al.
2012), or identification of fraudulent card transactions (Akhilomen 2013) realized thorough
big credit providers. These domains share similar features, which is processing of enormous
number of samples with constantly changing characteristics. Most fast versions of existing
anomaly detectionmethods, especially those based on indexing techniques, require the data to
be available in one single batch and to fit in the memory, which is in aforementioned domains
clearly impossible. Moreover, data’s non-stationarity forces detector’s models to be contin-
uously updated, which is again very difficult with indexing techniques, as created indexes
would need to be recalculated, which is usually expensive. Other methods, such as Bay and
Schwabacher (2003) assumes some additional knowledge which might not be available. The
presented anomaly detector has been designed with respect to these constraints, and it has
been shown to achieve state of the art accuracy measured by area under ROC curve.
The definition of an anomaly, outlier, or novelty is not unified in the literature. Recent book
(Aggarwal 2013a) considers all these terms to be equivalent, and defines them as follows:“An
outlier is an observation which deviates so much from the other observations as to arouse
suspicions that it was generated by a different mechanism.” According to this definition,
outliers are generated by the same probability distribution as normal samples, but they are
very rare. In this text, we define anomalies to be samples generated by a different probability
distribution than normal ones, and their presence in the data to be rare, less than 1–10% of
the data. One-class problem is similar to the anomaly-detection problem with the difference
that training set contains samples exclusively from the normal class and testing set contains
may contain samples from other classes at any rate.
An ideal detector would model joint probability of data-generating processes. Although
this goes against the principle of never solving amore difficult process than is needed (density
estimation vs. classification), the knowledge of the probability of observed samples is useful1
information in making a decision about their anomalousness. Modeling joint probability is
generally difficult in spaces of many dimensions and in practice some simplifications have to
be made. The detector presented here, further called Loda, approximates the joint probability
by using a collection of one-dimensional histograms,where every one-dimensional histogram
is constructed on an input space projected onto a randomly generated vector. The rationale
behind the use of one-dimensional histograms is that they can be efficiently constructed in one
pass over data and the query operation needed during classification is simple. Consequently,
Loda’s complexity is linearwith respect to the number of training samplesn and the dimension
of the input space d .
Although one one-dimensional histogram is a veryweak anomaly detector, their collection
yields to a strong detector. This phenomenon (collection of weak classifiers result in a strong
classifier) is already awell established paradigm in supervised classification (Kuncheva 2004;
Freund and Schapire 1996), but has not been demonstrated in unsupervised anomaly detec-
tion, as most ensemble systems used in anomaly detection (Aggarwal 2013b; Lazarevic and
Kumar 2005; Tan et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2008) use individual detectors of much higher com-
plexity than that of a one-dimensional histogram. The comprehensive experimental section
1 The hypothetical knowledge of the probability function generating the data would allow to formulate the
problem as a hypothesis test.
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(see Sect. 4) demonstrates that the proposed ensemble of one-dimensional histograms has
accuracy measured by the area under ROC curve competitive with established solutions of
much higher complexities. Loda therefore achieves a very good accuracy to complexity ratio
and therefore it is well suited for processing large data.
Besides being fast, Loda is able to deal with missing variables and can rank features
according to their contribution to sample’s anomalousness. Both of these capabilities are
important for practitioners. For example, the knowledge of which features caused the anom-
aly can serve as guidance for further investigation and can decrease overall cost of anomaly
investigation. This knowledge can also be used to cluster similar anomalies together which is
again useful during investigation. Interestingly, none of these abilities substantially increase
Loda’s computational complexity. Note that both abilities can be achieved with any homoge-
nous ensemble-based anomaly detector, where individual detectors within are diversified
by sub-space sampling. Detectors with sub-space sampling were recently proposed (Keller
et al. 2012; Nguyen et al. 2010; Muller et al. 2011) but neither the robustness against missing
features or the explanation of the cause of a sample’s anomalousness had been mentioned.
Loda is controlled by two hyper-parameters: number of one dimensional histograms and
number of histogram bins. Because the hyper-parameter setting is particularly cumbersome
in most anomaly detection methods where few or no anomalous samples are available (most
anomaly detection), a method to determine these parameters solely on the basis of observed
samples is presented. This makes Loda hyper-parameter free.
Loda’s accuracy is firstly extensively compared to the prior art trained in the batchmode on
36 problems downloaded from the UCI database (Frank and Asuncion 2010) in the category
of classification problems with numerical attributes. The reason, why Loda is compared to
detectors processing only data presented in one batch is that we wanted to compare Loda to
state of the art detectors, even though they are not applicable for intended scenario. The exper-
imental results reveal that Loda’s measured by area under ROC curve is equal to and many
times better than that of other algorithms with higher computational complexity requiring
batch training (we expect algorithms trained in batch to perform better than on-line algo-
rithms). Consequently Loda provides a good alternative to the already established solutions
on problemswith a large number of features and samples that need to be processed efficiently.
Secondly, Loda is compared to the prior art on streaming problems and it is shown when
it is better to continuously update histogram and when to do so in batches. Finally, Loda’s
capability to efficiently process big datasets is demonstrated on the WEB UCI dataset (Ma
et al. 2009) with 2.4 million samples and 3.2 million features.
The contribution of this paper is threefold: (i) it demonstrates that an ensemble of very
weak anomaly detectors can lead to a strong anomaly detector; (ii) it presents a lightweight
anomaly detector suitable for data-streams robust to missing variables and identifying causes
of anomalies; (iii) it extensively compares existing and the proposed anomaly detector, which
sheds some light on conditions in which a particular anomaly detector excels.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews relevant prior art, shows its
computational complexity, and discusses issues related to on-line learning and classification.
Loda is presented in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, Loda is experimentally compared to the prior art,
its low computational requirements are demonstrated on artificial data, and its efficiency is
demonstrated on a large-scale dataset (Ma et al. 2009). The same section also demonstrates
Loda’s ability to handle data with missing values and explain a sample’s anomalousness.
Finally Sect. 5 concludes the paper.
For better reproducibility, all source code, results, datasets, and their creation is available
at http://agents.cz/~pevnak.
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2 Related work
The recent book (Aggarwal 2013a) and survey (Chandola et al. 2009) contain many methods
for anomaly and outlier detection. Below, those relevant to this work are reviewed.
2.1 Model-centered detectors
Basicmodel-centered anomaly detectors assume that data follow a knowndistribution.Detec-
tors (Shyu et al. 2003) based on principal component analysis (PCA) assume that the data fit
a multi-variate normal distribution. Despite this being rarely true in practice, they frequently
outperform more complicated detectors. The complexity of their training is O(nd3), where
d is the dimension of the input space and n is the number of samples used for training.
A One-Class Support Vector Machine (Schölkopf et al. 2001) (1-SVM) does not make
any assumptions about the distribution of data. It finds the smallest area where 1− ν fraction
of data are located (ν is parameter of the method specifying desired false-positive rate). This
is achieved by projecting the data to a high-dimensional (feature) space and then finding a
hyperplane best separating the data from the origin. It has been noted that when 1-SVM is
used with a linear kernel it introduces a bias to the origin (Tax and Duin 2004), which can be
removed by using a Gaussian kernel. The Support Vector Data Description algorithm (Tax
and Duin 2004) (SVDD) removes the bias in 1-SVM by replacing the separation hyperplane
by a sphere encapsulating most of the data. The complexity of both methods is super-linear
with respect to the number of samples, n, being O(n3d) in the worst-case.
Isolation Forest (Liu et al. 2008) (IForest) relies on a collection of Isolation Trees grown by
using unlabeled data. During growth of a tree, its internal nodes are added until the terminal
leafs contain one sample or themaximumdepth is reached. The anomaly score is proportional
to the level of leaf reached by the sample, as the idea is that anomalies will reach leafs at the
base of the tree (close to the root), while legitimate samples reach leafs closer to the root.
The complexity of training one tree is O(n log n) and of classification O(log n), where the
authors recommend subsampling of training samples to increase diversity in the ensemble,
robustness against anomalies within the data, and simultaneously decrease complexity of the
training and classification.
The recently proposed FRAC (Noto et al. 2012) aimed to bridge the gap between super-
vised and unsupervised learning. FRAC is an ensemble ofmodels, each estimating one feature
based on other features (for data of a dimension d , FRAC uses d different models). The ratio-
nale behind this is that anomalous samples exhibit different dependencies among features,
which can be detected from prediction errors modeled by histograms. FRAC’s complexity
depends on the algorithm used to implement individual models, which can be large, consid-
ering that a search for possible hyper-parameters needs to be undertaken. Because of this, an
ordinary linear least-square regression is used here leading to the complexity O(nd4). FRAC
is not well suited for on-line learning since an update of models changes the distributions of
errors that cannot be estimated from one sample.
The on-line training of model-centered detectors is generally difficult as the algorithms
used to create the model have non-trivial complexity with respect to the dimension, or models
cannot be updated incrementally (e.g. principal component analysis). The on-line adaptation
of 1-SVM is discussed in Kivinen et al. (2004), but the solution is an approximation of the
solution returned by the batch version. The exact on-line version of SVDD is described in Tax
and Laskov (2003), but the algorithm requires substantial bookkeeping thereby increasing
the complexity. The proposed Loda is also model-based detector and as will be shown in
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Sect. 4, its one dimensional histograms can be easily updated based on upcoming samples
which makes the whole algorithm friendly to on-line learning.
2.2 Data-centered detectors
Data-centered detectors do not have any built-in model. A sample’s anomalousness is deter-
mined according to its distance to all previously observed samples. Consequently, there is
no training phase as new samples are just added to the set of already observed samples.
However, this increases the complexity of the classification phase, which is a linear function
of the number of samples n.
A k-nearest neighbor (Knorr and Ng 1999) (KNN) is a popular method to identify outliers
inspired by the corresponding method from classification. It ranks samples according to their
distance to kth-nearest neighbor. It has been recently shown that a variant of KNN (Sricharan
and Hero (2011)) converges to the optimal density-level detector for a given false positive
rate. Nevertheless KNN has been criticized for not being able to detect outliers in data with
clusters of different densities (Breunig et al. 2000). The local outlier factor (Breunig et al.
2000) (LOF) solves this problem by defining the outlier score as a fraction of sample’s
distance to its kth-nearest neighbor and the average of the same distance of all its k nearest
neighbors. True inliers have a score around one while outliers have much greater score. We
refer to Zimek et al. (2012) for a comprehensive review of the prior art.
The complexity of the classification phase of nearest-neighbor based detectors is driven
by the nearest-neighbor search, which is an O(n) operation in the worst case. More efficient
approaches based on bookkeeping (Pokrajac et al. 2007), better search structures like KD-
trees (Bentley 1975), or approximate search (Andoni and Indyk 2006) have been adopted.
Nevertheless, the complexity of all methods depends in some way on the number of training
samples n, and better search structures are usually useful only in low dimensions.
2.3 On-line anomaly detectors
There are fewworks in on-line anomaly detection. The closest work to this is Half-Space trees
(Tan et al. 2011) (HS-trees), which is a method similar to Isolation Forest with the difference
that decision rules within tree-nodes are generated randomly. The output of each HS-tree
can be interpreted as a crude estimate of the probability density function, which is further
refined by taking a sufficient number of them. It is worth noting that HS-trees assume that the
data is scaled such that values of features are bounded in [0, 1]. This is in a sharp contrast to
Loda only requiring features to have approximately the same scale, which is a more relaxed
condition, especially if concept drift occurs. HS-trees handle concept-drift by dividing data-
streams into sample batches of size 256, where HS-trees trained on a previous batch are used
to scrutinize samples in a given batch. Simultaneously new HS-trees are learned on a current
batch and once all samples from the current batch are processed, new HS-trees replaces the
old one.
OLINDDA (Spinosa et al. 2009) uses standard k-means clustering to group previously
observed samples into clusters called concepts. Anomalies not belonging to any cluster are
grouped into candidate clusters, which based on cohesiveness criteria are either promoted as
a new cluster and novel concept is reported, or evicted. Thus OLINDDA focuses on detection
of a novel concepts in streams rather than on identification of anomalies.
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2.4 Ensembles and random projections
Ensembles have so far been underutilized in anomaly detection. A significant portion of the
prior art focuses on a unification of anomaly scores (Gao and Tan 2006; Schubert 2012),
because different detectors within one ensemble may provide anomaly scores of different
magnitudes (Nguyen et al. 2010). Diversifying detectors by random subsets of features was
presented (Lazarevic and Kumar 2005; Keller et al. 2012) to improve the accuracy, especially
on high dimensional problems.
Projections of the input space onto the arbitrary sub-space have been utilized mainly in
distance-based outlier detection schemes to speedup the search of nearest neighbors. de Vries
et al. (2010) performs the kth-NN search in the LOF first in the random sub-space on a larger
neighborhood and then it is refined by the search in the original input space. Similarly, Pham
and Pagh (2012) estimates the distribution of angles between samples in the input space
from the distribution of angles in the sub-space (distribution of angles has been proposed
in Kriegel and Zimek (2008) as a good anomaly criterion). In experiments in Sect. 4.3 the
similar approach is used on prior art to compare it to Loda.
Most prior art employs ensembles and random projections with data-centered detectors,
which have high computational complexity and are not well suited for real-time processing.
Exceptions are Isolation Forest (Liu et al. 2008) and Half-Space Trees (Tan et al. 2011)
relying on an ensemble of trees, each having a relatively low accuracy. This is similar to Loda
which uses even simpler model (one-dimensional histogram) with even lower complexity,
but their combination is similarly powerful. Random projections in Loda are used to project
the input space into a single dimension, which simplifies the complexity of all operations
over it. Loda’s sparse random projections can be considered as a sub-space sampling method.
Unlike the prior art, the sub-spacemethod is not used only to increase efficacy, but also to gain
robustness againstmissing variables and the ability to find causes of anomalousness of a given
sample.
Interpreting the decision in anomaly detection is very important in practice since it can
reduce the cost of subsequent analysis and increases trust of the detector. The work of Knorr
and Ng (1999) has focused on finding a minimal sub-space in which a given sample is an
outlier. Algorithms presented therein are data-centered and suitable only for low-dimensions.
HiCSalgorithm (Keller et al. 2012) and the algorithmofDang et al. (2013) both aim to identify
a sub-space in which a scrutinized sample is an outlier. Both are data-centered algorithms
and consequently their computational complexity is prohibitive for processing data-streams.
Loda’s method to identify relevant features bears similarity to HiCS algorithm. But unlike
HiCS, Loda’s method is general and can be used on all ensembles diversified by random
sub-space sampling. Finally, contrary to all prior art, the identification of relevant features
does not increase Loda’s computational complexity in big O notation.
3 Description of Loda
Loda is comprised of a collection of k one-dimensional histograms {hi }ki=1, each approx-
imating the probability density of input data projected onto a single projection vector
{wi ∈ Rd}ki=1. Projection vectors {wi }ki=1 diversify individual histograms, which is an essen-
tial requirement for ensemble systems to improve performance of a single classifier / detector.
Their initialization is described in detail below in Sect. 3.1.
Loda’s output, f (x), on a sample, x , is an average of the logarithm of probabilities esti-
mated on individual projection vectors. Adopting pˆi to denote the probability estimated by
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Algorithm 1: Loda’s training (update) routine.
input: data samples {xi ∈ Rd }ni=1 ;
output: histograms {h1, . . . , hn}, projection vectors {wi }ki=1. ;
initialize projection vectors with
[
d−
1
2
]
non zero elements {wi }ki=1;
initialize histograms {hi }ki=1 ;
for j ← 1 to n do
for i ← 1 to k do
zi = xTj wi ;
update histogram hi by zi ;
end
end
return {hi }ki=1 and {wi }ki=1.
i th histogram and wi to denote the corresponding projection vector, Loda’s output f (x) can
be written as
f (x) = −1
k
k∑
i=1
log pˆi (x
Twi ), (1)
which can be reformulated as
f (x) = − log
(
k∏
i=1
pˆi (x
Twi )
) 1
k
(a)∼ − log p(xTw1, xTw2, . . . , xTwk), (2)
where p(xTw1, xTw2, . . . , xTwk) denotes the joint probability of projections. Equation (2)
shows that Loda’s output is proportional to the negative log-likelihood of the sample, which
means that the less likely a sample is, the higher the anomaly value it receives. This holds
under a strong assumption (a) in (2) that probability distributions on projection vectorswi and
w j are independent ∀i, j ∈ k, i = j . Even though this is almost never true in practice, Loda
still delivers very good results. We believe that the reasons are similar to those in naïve Bayes
classifiers theoretically studied by Zhang (2004), which give conditions under which the
effects of conditional dependencies cancel out. These conditions depend on the probability
distribution of both classes and they are difficult to be verified in practice as they require an
exact knowledge of conditional dependencies among features. Due to Loda’s similarity to the
Parzen window detector (Yeung and Chow 2002), the similar argumentation might explain
Loda’s surprisingly good performance.
In high-dimensional spaces Loda can be related to a PCA based detector (Shyu et al.
2003), because projection vectors wi and w j , i = j will be approximately orthogonal (this
is due to their random construction described below). Assuming again the independence of
xTwi and xTw j , the projected data are orthogonal and uncorrelated, which are properties of
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Loda’s histogram on random projections are therefore
similar to histograms on principal components.
Loda’s training and classification routines are summarized in Algorithms 1 and 2, respec-
tively. Loda is initialized by generating a set of sparse random projections {wi }ki=1, wi ∼
N (0, 1d) with d
1
2 non-zero components and initializing the corresponding set of histograms
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Algorithm 2: Loda’s classification routine on sample x .
input: sample x , set of histograms {hi }ki=1 and projection vectores {wi }ki=1.;
output: anomaly value f (x);
for i ← 1 to k do
zi = xTwi ;
obtain pˆi = pˆi (zi ) from hi ;
end
return f (x) = − 1k
∑k
i=1 log pˆi (zi ) ;
{hi }ki=1. Each histogram is updated by a training sample by projecting the sample onto a
vector and then the corresponding histogram bin is updated. The classification procedure
follows similar steps, but instead of updating histograms, they return probabilities whose
logarithms are averaged and returned. Notice that the construction requires only one pass
over the data and can be used on data-streams by first classifying a new sample and then
updating all histograms.
The rest of this section describes creation of and rationale behind sparse projection vectors
wi , presents how sparse projections enable robustness against missing variables and allow
explanation of sample’s anomalousness, and closes by commenting issues related to building
on-line histograms.
3.1 Random projections
Each sparse projection vector {wi }ki=1 is created during initialization of the corresponding
histogram by first randomly selecting d− 12 non-zero features (d is the dimension of the input
space) and then randomly generating non-zero items according to N (0, 1). The choice of
normal distribution of non-zero items comes from the Johnson–Lindenstrauss (1984) lemma
showing thatwith this choice, L2 distances between points in the projected space approximate
the same quantity in the input space. The d− 12 sparsity is due to Li (2007) showing that
L2 distances can be preserved with random projections with only d−
1
2 non-zero elements.
Another justification for the use of sparse random projections is to increase diversity among
histograms bymaking themwork on different sub-subspaces. This is a popular diversification
technique used for example in Random Forest (Ho 1998).
One can ask a question, are randomprojections actually needed?Would a detector based on
an ensemble of histograms of individual features (in this section called per-feature detector)
have similar accuracy? According to the experimental results on problems used throughout
this paper (described in Sect. 4 in detail), random projections consistently improve the per-
formance (see Fig. 10 in “Appendix”). On four out of five rate of anomalies Loda was better
than the per-feature detector. Wilcoxon signed-rank test assessing if both detectors delivers
the same performance was rejected with a p-value 0.028.Whichmeans that the Loda is better
and the difference is statistically significant. For more details see comments under Fig. 10.
3.2 Missing variables
Sparse projections enable Loda to handle missing variables by calculating the output only
from those histograms whose projection vector has a zero on the place of missing variables.
To formalize the approach, assume that x ∈ Rd is a sample with missing variables, and
J is the index-set of missing variables. Let I(x) be a set of indices of histograms whose
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projections have all entries in J zero, i.e. (∀i ∈ I(x)) (∀ j ∈ J ) (wi j = 0), where wi j is j th
element of the projection vector of i th histogram. Then, the anomaly score for the sample x
is calculated as
f (x) = − 1|I(x)|
∑
i∈I(x)
log hi (x). (3)
Since the output of all histograms within Loda have the same meaning there is no need for
calibration as in Nguyen et al. (2010). The final output is reliable even if several histograms
are omitted. Notice that by using the same mechanism, Loda can be also trained on data with
missing variables, as only detectors from I(x) are updated upon observing sample x .
3.3 Explaining the cause of an anomaly
Two independent works (Rondina et al. 2014; Somol et al. 2011) propose a feature selection
method for a binary classification based on the comparison of scores (e.g. classification of
error) of classifiers on randomly generated sub-spaces. Recognizing that each histogram
with sparse projections in Loda provide an anomaly score on a randomly generated sub-
space, this method can be used to rank features according to theirs contribution to sample’s
anomalousness.
Let pˆi denote the probability estimated by i th histogram on a sample x , and I j/I j denote
index sets of histograms that use/do not use j th feature. Formally (∀i ∈ I(x)) (wi j = 0)
and
(∀i ∈ I(x)) (wi j = 0), where wi is the projection vector of i th histogram. The score
function proposed in the prior art calculates the difference of means of − log pˆi over I j and
I¯ j , which means that if an anomaly score with a feature being present is much higher than
that of without, the feature is important for identification of outliers. We improve this score
function by recognizing that it’s main goal is to assert if the contribution of j th feature is
statistically significant, for which we use one-tailed two-sample t test with a test statistic
t j = μ j − μ¯ j√
s2j
|I j | +
s¯2j
|I¯ j |
, (4)
where μ j/μ¯ j is the mean and s2j /s¯
2
j variance of − log pˆi calculated with i ∈ I j/ i ∈ I¯ j .
The higher the t j the more important the j th feature is. Since the complexity of the contrast
function (4) is linear with respect to the number of projections k and number of features d ,
the calculation of a feature’s contrast increases Loda’s complexity by a constant in big O
notation. Experiments demonstrating the feature selection are presented in Sect. 4.6.
3.4 Histogram
The one-dimensional histogram on random projections is an important design element in
Loda, as it determines its learning mode (batch vs. on-line). The prior art on histogram
construction and the optimal number of bins is very rich. In the following only the tiny subset
relevant to on-line construction on streams is recapitulated.
The most common approach for batch data are equi-width or equi-depth histograms with
bins having either the same length or containing the same number of samples. In data-
base research, V-Optimal histograms (Poosala et al. 1996) minimizing weighted variance of
estimated frequency are popular, but their construction has prohibitive complexity O(n2).
Moving to data-steams, approximations of V-Optimal histograms have been studied in Guha
et al. (2006), but the algorithms therein are quite complex. Simpler Partition Incremental
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Discretization (Gama and Pinto 2006) constructs a histogram in two steps: (i) create an
equi-width histogram with small bins in a single iteration through the data; (ii) use this fine
histogram to return either equi-width or equi-depth histogram with a given number of bins.
The advantage is that user-provided partition in step (i) is only indicative, as bins can be split
if they already contain too many samples. The disadvantage for Loda is that the second step
needs to be triggered before classifying a sample if the fine histogram was updated. DADO
algorithm (Donjerkovic et al. 2000) constructs incremental histograms close in quality to
V-optimal histograms. The key idea behind this technique is to internally represent every
bin by two sub-bins. Counts in sub-bins are used for bin-split and bin-merge operations and
for their triggering. DADO’s biggest advantage for Loda is a fixed number of buckets which
implies fixed memory requirements. An interesting alternative was proposed in Ben-Haim
and Tom-Tov (2010) originally for determining splitting points in decision trees. Unlike all
previous approaches it does not require any knowledge about the range of values in histogram
(see Appendix “On-line histogram” for its recapitulation), but according to our results Loda
with equi-width histogram is better.
With the exception of the last algorithm, all above approaches require knowledge of the
range of modeled values in advance. This can be usually estimated from a sample of data,
but in the case of severe non-stationarity, the histogram’s support can shift outside the initial
range. A simple solution for equi-width histograms is to specify bin width and store bin
counts in a hash-map structure with keys κ = ⌊ x
Δ
⌋
, where κ is an integer key, Δ is the
bin width, and x is the value to be inserted. This approach has O(1) time complexity and if
coupledwith count-min-sketch (Cormode andMuthukrishnan 2005) its space complexity can
be upper bounded. It also allows the modeling fixed length windows in a stream by keeping
samples (indexes of bins) to be later removed in memory. This can have potentially large
memory footprint, which can be decreased by using exponential buckets proposed in Datar
et al. (2002). Alternatively, two histograms as in HS-Trees (Tan et al. 2011) can be used,
where the older one is used for classification while the newer one is being constructed on
newly arrived samples. Once the construction of the new one is finished, it replaces the old
one and the construction of the new one is started. Both constructions are experimentally
compared in Sect. 4.2 with interesting conclusions.
The determination of an optimal number of histogram bins b is an important design
parameter. For an equi-width histogram, there exists a simple method to determine optimal
number of histograms (Birgé and Rozenholc 2006), which is used in Loda. The method
of Birgé and Rozenholc (2006) maximizes penalized maximum likelihood in the form
b∑
i=1
ni log
bni
N
−
[
b − 1 + (log b)2.5
]
,
where ni is the number of samples that falls in i th bin and N = ∑bi=1 ni is the total number
of samples. Penalization factor b − 1 + (log b)2.5 penalizes histograms with too many bins.
3.5 Computational and storage complexity
Loda’s complexity is mainly determined by the type of the histogram. Assuming equi-width
histogram and sparse random projections the time complexity of learning is O(nkd− 12 ),
where n is the number of training samples, d is the dimensionality of the input space, and k is
the number of histograms. The time complexity of classification is O(kd− 12 ). As discussed
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Table 1 Time and space complexity of the anomaly detection algorithms compared in this paper
Time complexity Space complexity
Batch training Classification
Batch
FRAC n · d4 O(d2) d2b
KNN O(1) O(nd) O(nd)
LOF O(1) O(knd) O(nd)
PCA O(nd4) O(kd) O(kd)
1-SVM O(n2d) ∼ O(n3d) O(nd) O(nd)
IForest O(kl log l) O(k log l) O(kl)
On-line
HS-Trees – O(k(h + l)) O(kh2)
Loda two hist. O(nkd−
1
2 ) O(k(d−
1
2 + b)) O(k(d− 12 + b))
Loda cont. O(nkd−
1
2 ) O(kd−
1
2 ) O(k(d−
1
2 + b + l))
The classification times for on-line detectors (HS-Trees, Loda with continuous histograms and Loda with two
alternating histograms) include time to update the detector. The time to train Loda on batch data is included
for comparison purposes. n is the number of samples in the training set, d is the number of features, k in LOF
is the number of nearest-neighbor points, k in PCA is the number of components retained after the projection,
k in IForest, HS-Trees, and Loda is the number of trees or histograms, h in HS-Trees is a maximal height
of the tree, l in IForest is the number of samples used to construct one tree, l in HS-Trees and Loda with
continuous histogram is the length of observation window, and finally b in FRAC and Loda is the number of
histogram bins. The FRAC implementation assumes ordinary least-square regression as features predictors.
“Loda cont.” denotes Loda with naïve implementation of continuously updated histogram. “Loda two hist.”
denotes Loda with two alternating histograms
in the previous sub-section the space complexity can be made O(k(d− 12 + b)) with b being
number of histogram bins.
For a floating window histogram over a length of l the space complexity can be made
O(k(d− 12 + b log l)) by using the algorithm of Datar et al. (2002) if space is constrained,
otherwise O(k(d− 12 + b + l)) for a naïve approach storing all l values for discounting them
on expiration.
Alternatively, on-line histogram can be implemented by using two alternating histograms
as in Tan et al. (2011), where the older histogram is used for the classification while the new
one is constructed. Once the construction of the new one is finished (it has accommodated l
samples), it replaces the older one for the classification and the new construction of the new
histogram one is started. The advantage is possibly smaller space complexity O(k(d− 12 +b))
and according to the experimental results in Sect. 4.2 better robustness to clustered anomalies.
Table 1 shows the time and space complexity of Loda with continuous and two equi-width
alternating histograms and the prior art used in the experimental section.
4 Experiments
Below Loda is compared to relevant state of the art in three different scenarios. The first
scenario simulates anomaly detection on stationary problems, where all detectors are first
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trained on a training set and then evaluated on a separate testing set. This scenario is included
because it enables the comparison of Loda to other anomaly detectors, which are designed
for batch training and their accuracy should be superior due to more sophisticated training
algorithms. The second scenariomimics streamed data, where anomaly detectors first classify
a sample and then use it to update their model. The third scenario uses a dataset with millions
of samples and features to demonstrate that Loda is able to efficiently handle big data. The
section is concluded by an experimental comparison of detectors time complexity in classify
and update scenarios and by the demonstration of robustness against missing variables and
the identification of causes of anomalies.
4.1 Stationary data
Loda has been compared to the following anomaly detectors chosen to represent differ-
ent approaches to anomaly detection: PCA based anomaly detector (Shyu et al. 2003),
1-SVM (Schölkopf et al. 2001), FRAC (Noto et al. 2012), δ-version of kth-nearest neighbor
detector (Harmeling et al. 2006) (KNN) which is equivalent to Sricharan and Hero (2011)
with γ = 1 and s = d (in notation of the referenced work) if the area under ROC curve
(AUC) is used for evaluation, LOF (Breunig et al. 2000), and IForest (Liu et al. 2008).
Benchmarking data were constructed by the methodology proposed in Emmott et al.
(2013) converting real-world datasets (Frank and Asuncion 2010) to anomaly detection
problems. The methodology produces set of normal and anomalous samples, where sam-
ples from different classes have different probability distribution, which is aligned with our
definition of anomalous samples. Created problems are divided according to (i) difficulty
of finding an anomaly (easy, medium, hard, very hard), (ii) scatter / clusteredness of the
anomalies (high scatter, medium scatter, low scatter, low clusteredness, medium clustered-
ness, high clusteredness), (iii) and finally with respect to the rate of anomalies within the
data {0, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1}. The training and testing set were created such that they have
the same properties (difficulty, scatter/clusteredness, and rate of anomalies)2 with clustered
anomalies located around the same point. Note that the total number of unique combinations
of problem’s properties is up to 120 for each dataset. The construction of individual problems
is recapitulated in Appendix “Construction of datasets”.
The quality of the detection is measured by the usual area under ROC curve (AUC).
Since from every dataset (out of 36) up to 120 problems with different combinations of
problem’s properties can be derived, it is impossible to present all 7 × 4200 AUC values.
Tables with AUCs averaged over difficulty of detecting anomaly are in the supplemental
and cover 15 pages. They are therefore presented in an aggregated form by using critical
difference diagrams (Demšar 2006) which show average rank of detectors together with an
interval in which Bonferroni–Dunn correction of Wilcoxon signed ranks test cannot reject
the hypothesis that the detectors within the interval have the same performance as the best
one. The average rank comparing AUC is calculated over all datasets on which all detectors
provided the output, following Demšar (2006) lower rank is better. AUCs used for ranking
on each dataset are an average over all combinations of problem parameters with fixed
parameter(s) of interest. For example, to compare detectors on different rates of anomalies
within the data, for each rate of anomalies the averageAUC is calculated over all combinations
of difficulty and scatter. Average AUCs of different detectors on the same dataset are ranked,
and the average of ranks over datasets is the final average rank of a detector on one rate of
anomalies within the data.
2 The dataset with no anomalies contained no anomalies in the training data and 10% of anomalies in the
evaluation data, which captures the case the case when the anomaly detector is trained on clean data.
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Table 2 Summary of detectors
hyper-parameters used in
experiments on stationary data in
Sect. 4.1.2
Detector Hyper-parameters
FRAC –
PCA Used all components with eigenvalues greater than 0.01
KNN k = max{10, 0.03 × n}
LOF k = max{10, 0.03 × n}
1-SVM ν = 0.05, γ = inverse of median of L2 distances of
samples
IForest 100 trees each constructed with 256 samples
Loda All hyper-parameters optimized automatically
To decrease the noise in the data caused by statistical variations, experiments for every
combination of problem properties were repeated 100 times. This means that every detector
was evaluated on up to 100× 120× 35 = 4.32× 105 problems. Benchmark datasets created
as described in Appendix “Construction of datasets” were varied between repetitions by
randomly selecting 50% of normal samples (but maximum of 10,000) to be in the training
set and putting the remaining data to the set. Similarly, anomalous samples were first selected
randomly from all anomalous samples to reach the desired fraction of outliers within the data,
and then randomly divided between training and testing set. The data in the training and testing
set have the same properties in terms of difficulty, clusteredness, and fraction of anomalies
within.
4.1.1 Settings of hyper-parameters
Setting hyper-parameters in anomaly detection is generally a difficult unsolved problem
unless there is a validation ground truth available for the parameter tuning.Wrong parameters
can cause an otherwise well designed anomaly detector to fail miserably. Nevertheless, in
this context we do not aim to solve the problem as our intention here is primarily to compare
multiple detectors against each other. For this purpose we follow hyper-parameter setting
guidelines given by the authors of the respective methods. Note that our proposed method
does not require manual hyper-parameter setting. Employed parameter settings are detailed
below and in Table 2.
Settings of the number of nearest neighbors in our implementations of LOF and KNN
algorithms followed (Emmott et al. 2013; Breunig et al. 2000) and was set to max{10, 0.03×
n}, where n is the number of samples in the training data. 1-SVMwith a Gaussian kernel used
ν = 0.05 andwidth of the kernel γ equal to an inverse ofmedian L2 distance between training
data. SVM implementation has been taken from the libSVM library (Chang and Lin 2011).
Our implementation of the FRACdetector used ordinary linear least-square estimators, which
in this setting does not have any hyper-parameters. Our implementation of PCA detector
based on principal component transformation used top k components capturing more than
95% variance. IForest [implementation taken from Jonathan et al. (2014)] used parameters
recommended in Liu et al. (2008): 100 trees each constructed with 256 randomly selected
samples.
The number of histograms in Loda, k, was determined similarly to the number of probes
in feature selection in Somol et al. (2013). Denoting fk(x) Loda’s output with k histograms,
the reduction of variance after adding another histogram can be estimated as
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σˆk = 1
n
n∑
i=1
| fk+1(xi ) − fk(xi )| .
Although σˆk → 0 as k → ∞, its magnitude is problem-dependent making it difficult to set
a threshold on this quantity. Therefore σˆk is normalized by σˆ1, and the k is determined as
argmin
k
σˆk
σˆ1
≥ τ,
where τ is the threshold. In all experiments presented in this paper, τ was set to 0.01.
Unless said otherwise, Loda used equi-width histogram with the number of histogram bins,
b, determined for each histogram separately by maximizing penalized maximum likelihood
method of Birgé and Rozenholc (2006) described briefly in Sect. 3.4. With b being set, width
of histogram bins in equi-width histograms was set to 1b (xmax − xmin).
Setting of hyper-parameters is summarized in Table 2.
4.1.2 Experimental results
Figure 1a–e shows the average rank of detectors plotted against rate of anomalieswithin the
training set for different clusteredness of anomalies (AUCs were averaged only with respect
to the difficulty of anomalies). Since highly scattered anomalies could not be produced from
the used datasets, the corresponding plot is omitted. The number of datasets creating problems
with medium scattered anomalies is also low, and we should not draw any conclusions as
they would not be statistically sound.
For problems with low number of low-scattered and low-clustered anomalies the data-
centered detectors (KNN and LOF) are good. With increasing number of anomalies in data
and with their increasing clusteredness, however, the performance of data-centered detectors
appears to deteriorate (note LOF in particular). Additional investigation revealed that this
effect can be mitigated by hyper-parameter tweaking, specifically by increasing the number
of neighbours k. In practice this is a significant drawback as there is no way to optimize k
unless labeled validation data is available.
Themodel-centereddetectors (Loda, IForest aswell as 1-SVM)appear to be comparatively
more robust with respect to the increase in number of anomalies or their clusteredness, even
if used with fixed parameters (see Sect. 4.1.1. ).
In terms of statistical hypothesis testing the experiments do not show marked differences
between the detectors in question. Note that in isolated cases FRAC and 1-SVM perform
statistically worse than the respective best detector.
Figure 1f shows the detectors time to train and classify samples with respect to the size
of the problem measured by the dimension multiplied by the number of samples.3 On small
problems KNN, LOF, and 1-SVM are very fast, as their complexity is mainly determined by
the number of samples, but Loda is not left behind too much. As the size of problems gets
bigger Loda quickly starts to dominate all detectors followed by PCA. Surprisingly IForest
with low theoretical complexity had the highest running times. Since its running time is
almost independent of the problem size, it is probably due to large multiplication constant
absorbed in big O notation.
Comparing detectors by the performance/time complexity ratio, we recommend KNN
for small problems with scattered anomalies, while for bigger problems and problems with
3 Because all algorithms have not used any search for hyper-parameters, Loda used fixed number of histogram
being equal to
√
n, where n is the number samples.
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Fig. 1 a–e The average rank of detectors with respect to the rate of anomalies within the training data for
various levels of clusteredness. The average rank is calculated by averaging rank of detectors over datasets,
where the rank of detectors on a single dataset compares AUCs. The small number in parentheses shows the
number of datasets from which benchmarking problems with a given combination of clusteredness and rate
of anomalies were created. Critical difference is shown as a light grey—it is the area in which a in which
Bonferroni–Dunn correction of Wilcoxon signed ranks test cannot reject the hypothesis that the detectors
within has the same performance as the best detector. f The time to train the detector and classify all testing
samples
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Fig. 2 Isolines at false positive rates {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4} of Loda and k-nearest neighbor detector on a
banana dataset, a Loda, b k-nearest neighbor
clustered anomalies we recommend the proposed Loda, as its performance is similar to
IForest but it is much faster.
The investigation of problems on which Loda is markedly worse than KNN revealed that
Loda performs poorly in cases where the support of the probability distribution of nominal
class is not convex and it encapsulates the support of the probability distribution of the
anomalous class. A typical example is a “banana” dataset in Fig. 2 showing isolines at
false positive rates {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4} of Loda and KNN. Isolines show that Loda has
difficulty modeling the bay inside the arc. Although the adopted construction of problems
from UCI datasets (see Appendix “Construction of datasets” for details) aimed to create
these difficult datasets, Loda’s performance was overall competitive to other, more difficult
detectors.
Breunig et al. (2000) has criticized KNN, which has performed the best on clean training
data, for its inability to detect local outliers occurring in datasets with areas of very different
densities. Figure 3 shows again isolines at false positive rates {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4} of
Loda and LOF (designed to detect local outliers) on a data generated by two Gaussians with
very different standard deviations (a typical example of such data). Loda’s isolines around
the small compact cluster (lower left) are very close to each other, whereas isolines of the
loose cluster (upper right) are further away which demonstrates that Loda is able do detect
local outliers similarly to LOF. LOF’s wiggly isolines also demonstrates the over-fitting to
the training data.
Figure 4 visualizes the average rank of Loda with equi-width, equi-depth, and on-line
(Ben-Haim and Tom-Tov 2010) histograms on different rates of anomalies within the data.
Although on almost all rates Friedman’s statistical test accepted the hypothesis that all three
versions of Loda performs the same, Loda with equi-width histograms is obviously better.
This is important because equi-width histograms can be efficiently constructed from a stream
of data if the bin-width is determined, for example by using sample data.
4.2 Streamed and non-stationary data
This section compares Loda with floating-window histogram and two alternating histograms
(see Sect. 3.4) to Half-Space Trees (HS-Trees) (Tan et al. 2011) [implementation taken
from Tan (2014)]. On-line version of 1-SVM was omitted from the comparison due to the
difficulties with hyper-parameter setting and inferior performance when algorithms were
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Fig. 3 Isolines at false positive rates {0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4} of Loda and Local Outlier Factor on a dataset
composed of two Gaussians with different SD, a Loda on Two Gaussians, b Local outlier factor on Two
Gaussians
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Fig. 4 Average rank of Loda with different types of histograms with respect to the rate of anomalies within
the training data. The rank of three compared detectors is calculated for each problem separately, and then the
average over all problems with a given rate of anomalies in the training data is shown in the graph
compared in the batch learning. The comparison is made on seven datasets: Shuttle, Cover-
type, HTTP and SMTP data from kdd-cup 99. HTTP and SMTP data are used in two variants:
(i) with all 41 features (called HTTP-full and SMTP-full) and (ii) with 3 features (called
HTTP-3 and SMTP-3) used in Tan et al. (2011).4
In every repetition of an experiment the testing datawere created by replacingmaximumof
1% of randomly selected normal samples by randomly selected anomalous samples. Order
4 The original publication (Tan et al. 2011) does not specify which three features from kdd-cup dataset were
used, but datasets used in the publication are available at Tan (2014).
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Table 3 AUCs of Loda and HS-Trees (Tan et al. 2011) on streaming problems with various levels of clus-
teredness
Dataset Continuous Two histograms HS-Trees
AUC Time AUC Time AUC Time
Clusteredness = 1 Covertype 0.987 4.36 0.985 3.04 0.980 19.00
http-3 0.995 7.42 0.989 5.91 0.993 37.82
http 0.998 7.84 0.983 5.68 0.995 35.30
shuttle 0.992 0.54 0.992 0.39 0.999 4.90
smtp 0.994 1.25 0.989 1.01 0.998 8.25
smtp-3 0.890 1.52 0.883 1.27 0.915 8.38
smtp+http 0.992 6.51 0.987 5.88 0.998 42.56
Clusteredness = 4 Covertype 0.972 4.42 0.989 3.00 0.980 19.05
http-3 0.992 7.51 0.994 5.24 0.983 40.17
http 0.991 8.40 0.993 6.00 0.990 34.87
shuttle 0.980 0.49 0.994 0.41 0.999 5.02
smtp 0.970 1.34 0.994 1.06 0.996 8.58
smtp-3 0.871 1.35 0.886 1.11 0.914 8.31
smtp+http 0.989 9.65 0.993 7.99 0.998 42.70
Clusteredness = 16 Covertype 0.937 4.42 0.989 3.01 0.980 19.33
http-3 0.987 6.71 0.996 4.95 0.980 40.84
http 0.982 8.43 0.993 6.27 0.987 34.52
shuttle 0.943 0.51 0.994 0.42 0.999 5.12
smtp 0.947 1.34 0.993 1.06 0.995 8.63
smtp-3 0.863 1.38 0.882 1.17 0.915 8.35
smtp+http 0.983 7.99 0.995 4.80 0.998 42.20
Bold-faced values are the best values for a given dataset and clusterdness
of normal samples has not been permuted in order to preserve data continuity. Thus, the
variation between repetitions comes from (i) the position to where anomalous samples were
inserted and (ii) from the selection of anomalous samples to be mixed in. To study the effect
of clustered anomalies, anomalies were first selected to form clusters in space (as in the
previous section) and then they replaced sequences of normal data of the same size. By this
process data-streams contained anomalies clustered in time and space of sizes {1, 4, 16} (this
quantity is hereafter called clusteredness). Experiments on each dataset for every value of
clusteredness of anomalies were repeated 100 times.
HS-Trees used recommended configuration of 50 trees of depth 15 with minimum of 20
samples in leaf node. Loda’s configuration, namely number of histograms and bins were
optimized on first 256 samples in every repetition, thus there were no parameters to be set
manually. Both algorithms used a window of length 256 samples, which is the hard-coded
length in implementation of HS-Trees provided by authors.
Table 3 shows AUCs and average time to process samples of Loda and that of HS-Trees.
We can see that both algorithms deliver nearly the same performance, while Loda is on
average 7–8 times faster (the time complexity is treated in more detail in the next subsection).
Figure 5 shows AUCs on segments of 120,000 continuous samples on datasets Covertype,
HTTP, HTTP-3, and SMTP+ HTTP with clusters of 16 anomalies (omitted datasets did not
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Fig. 5 AUCs of Loda with continuous histogram, Loda with two alternating histograms, and HS-Trees on
segments of continuous 12,000 samples from the stream. AUCs in every segment is an average from 100
repetitions
contained enough samples). Since all AUCs of all three detectors remains stable, it can be
concluded that all detectors equally well combat the concept drift in datasets.
Further investigation of results reveals that Loda with two alternating histograms (con-
struction similar to that in HS-Trees) is more robust to clustered anomalies than Loda with
continuous histogram. Our explanation of this phenomenon is that clustered anomalies are
classified most of the time by histograms built on clean data without anomalies, while pol-
luted histograms classify most of the time clean data, which is not influenced by anomalies in
training data. These results demonstrate that the right choice of histogram for non-stationary
data should depend on the type of anomalies (time and space clustered vs. scattered).
4.3 Big data
The demonstration of Loda’s ease of handling big data is done on a URL dataset (Ma et al.
2009) containing 2.4 million samples with 3.2 million features. Normal samples contain
features extracted from random URLs, while anomalous samples have features extracted
from links in spam e-mails during 120 days at rate 20,000 samples per day (see Ma et al.
2009 for dataset details). Due to the high number of “anomalous” samples and cleanliness
of normal samples, the dataset belongs to a category of one-class problems where the goal
is to separate class of legitimate URLs from others.
Since the data are presented in batches of 20,000 samples per day, all methods evaluated in
Sect. 4.1 can be theoretically applied by training them on normal samples from the previous
day, i.e. detectors classifying samples from lth day are trained on normal samples from
the (l − 1)th day. The problem is that the computational complexity effectively prevents a
direct application of FRAC, 1-SVMs, PCA, LOF, and KNN, as methods would not finish
in reasonable time. The only methods that can be used without modification is Loda and
IForest. Their settings were same as in Sect. 4.1 with the difference that (i) Loda used 500
projections and histograms bins were optimized on data from day zero and then stay fixed;
(ii) number of trees within IForest was increased to 1000. Rows labeled 3.2× 106 in Table 4
show AUCs, average rank over 120 days, and the average time to classify new samples and
retrain the detectors. We can see that Loda was not only significantly better (AUC of IForest
is close to the detector answering randomly), but also more than 15 times faster.
To reduce the computational complexity such that other algorithms can be used, the origi-
nal data of dimension 3.2millionwere projected onto 500 dimensional spacewith a randomly
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Table 4 Average rank (caption
rank), average AUC (caption
AUC), and average time to
classify and update detectors on
20 000 samples (caption time) on
the full problem (d = 3.2 × 106)
and on the reduced problem
(d = 500)
The average rank is an average of
detector’s rank over 120 days
d Detector Rank AUC Time
500 KNN 1.596 0.818 140.5s
PCA 2.758 0.803 1.4s
Loda 3.067 0.795 1.16s
FRAC 3.958 0.789 283.8s
IForest 4.733 0.776 6.4s
LOF 4.987 0.771 307.5s
1-SVM 6.900 0.528 711.4s
3.2 × 106 Loda 1.025 0.795 21.6s
IForest 1.975 0.488 369s
Fig. 6 AUCs of detectors on
URL dataset with respect to time.
AUCs of PCA, KNN, IForest,
and 1-SVMs is on dataset
projected to 500 dimension.
AUCs of Loda are on the full
dataset of dimension 3.2 million
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generatedmatrix W ∈ R3.2×106,500, Wi j ∼ N (0, 1). According to the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
lemma, L2 distances between points should be approximately preserved, therefore most
detectors should work. Hyper-parameters of all detectors were set as in Sect. 4.1.1. AUCs of
all detectors on every day are shown in Fig. 6, and their summaries again in Table 4. On this
new dataset the best algorithm was the KNN algorithm followed by PCA and Loda. These
results are consistent with those in Sect. 4.1.2, where KNN detector was generally good if
trained on clean data. The good performance of PCA can be explained by projected data
being close to multivariate normal distribution, although the Lilliefors’ test has rejected the
hypothesis that marginals follow the normal distribution with 85% rate. Notice that Loda’s
execution time was more than 100 times faster than KNN, as its time to classify and update
on samples from one day was 1.16s on average, while that of KNN was 140s.
4.4 Time complexity
Loda was primarily designed to have low computational complexity in order to efficiently
process large data and data-streams. This feature is demonstrated below, where times to
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Fig. 7 Average time of classification and update of PCA, KNN, LOF, and Loda detectors against number of
observed samples. Left and right figures show times for the problem of dimension 100 and 10,000 respectively
classify one sample with simultaneous update of the detector is compared for PCA, KNN,
LOF, HS-Trees, and Loda with continuous histogram.5 All settings of individual algorithms
were kept the same as in previous experiments. Loda’s time includes optimization of hyper-
parameters on the first 256 samples of the stream as described in Sect. 4.1.1 (Loda used on
average 140 projections with histograms having 16 bins and sliding window of length 256).
The comparison was made on 100,000 artificially generated samples of dimensions 100
and 10,000. As the interest here is on throughput, the details of data generation are skipped
as not being relevant for the experiment. The results are summarized in Fig. 7 showing the
average time to classify and update one sample against the number of observed samples.
The experiment was stopped if the processing of 1000 samples took more than half an hour
causing some graphs to be incomplete. The graph for the PCA detector is missing entirely
in the left Fig. 7, because processing of 1000 samples took more than 15h (109s per one
sample). Both graphs demonstrate that Loda’s efficiency is superior to all other detectors,
as it is two order of magnitudes faster than the fastest algorithms from the prior art. This
experiment highlights Loda’s suitability for efficiently handling data-streams.
4.5 Robustness to missing variables
Asmentioned inSect. 3,Lodawith sparse projections can classify and learn fromsampleswith
missing variables. This feature was evaluated under the “missing at random” scenario, where
missing variables are independent of the class membership. In every repetition of an experi-
ment, before the datawas divided into training and testing sets, {0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.04, . . . , 0.20}
fraction of all variables in data matrices weremademissing (set toNaN). Consequently, miss-
ing variables were equally present in sets on which Loda were trained and evaluated. The
robustness was evaluated on datasets created in the same way as in Sect. 4.1 with clean train-
ing sets and 10% of anomalies in the test sets. Loda’s hyper-parameters were determined
automatically as described in Sect. 4.1.1.
The effect of missing features on detector’s AUC is summarized in Fig. 8 showing the
highest missing rate at which Loda had the AUC higher than 99% of that on the data without
5 SVM and FRAC were omitted, as their on-line adaptation is not straight-forward. Although the imple-
mentation of HS-Trees is in Java, the binary (jar) reports time to process samples, which was used in this
comparison.
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Fig. 8 Light grey bars show the maximum rate of missing variables at which Loda had AUC greater than
0.99×AUC on data without missing variables. Dark grey bars show the maximum rate of missing variables at
which Loda provided answers for all samples. If dark grey are covered by light grey bars, then both maximum
rates were equal. The dashed line shows AUC of Loda on data without missing variables
missing variables (light grey bars). For a large set of problems the tolerance is high and more
than 10% of missing variables are tolerated with negligible impact on the AUC. There are
also exceptions, e.g. magic telescope, page-blocks, wine, etc, where the robustness is very
small, but we have failed to find a single cause for this fragility. Interestingly, the robustness
is independent on the dimension of the problem and the success with which outliers are
detected. The exception is datasets on which the detection of outliers is poor (AUC is around
0.5), which is caused by the fact that missing some variables cannot generally improve or
decrease already bad AUC. The same figure also shows the rate of missing variables at which
Loda stops to provide output (dark grey bars).We can see that this rate is usually much higher
than the rate at which Loda retains its AUC.
4.6 Identification of features responsible for an outlier
Explaining the causes of an anomaly detection is relatively new field and there is not yet an
established methodology to evaluate and compare the quality of algorithms, hence, the fol-
lowing is adopted here. It starts by calculating the average of Loda’s feature scores according
to (4) over all anomalous samples in the testing set. Once the scores of individual features are
known, they are sorted in decreasing order, which means that features in which anomalous
samples deviates the most should be the first. Then, Loda with dense projections utilizing
only first d ′ features is used and its AUC is recorded (d ′ has varied from 2 to min(100, d)). If
the feature relevance score (4) is meaningful, then Loda that uses first couple features (low
d ′) should have the same or better AUC than Loda that uses all features. This is because all
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Fig. 9 AUC of Loda with dense projections on features selected according to relevance provided by Loda
(captioned “AUC on explained fea.”) and AUC of Loda with sparse projections on all features (caption “all”).
The curve traversing bars shows the relative number of features selected according to Loda’s relevance
testing problems were originally classification problems which means that anomalous sam-
ples were generated by the same probability and hence similar features should be responsible
for their anomalousness. Experiments were performed on clean training datasets and all other
experimental settings were kept same as in Sect. 4.1.
Figure 9 shows the average AUC of Loda with dense projections using the most important
dmin features, where dmin is the least such that AUC by using only first dmin features is higher
than 0.99 times the best AUC.On average only 25% of features are needed to identify outliers
with AUC comparable or better than that of Loda with all features. This result confirms that
Loda is able to identify features causing the anomaly.
It is interesting that for some problems (e.g. cardiotocography, glass, spect-heart, yeast,
etc.) the improvement in the AUC is significant. This can be explained by the curse of
dimensionality as anomaly detectors are, by their nature, more sensitive to noise generated
by non-informative features.
5 Conclusion
This paper has focused on creating a detector of anomalous samples being able to quickly
process enormous amounts of data produced in many contemporary domains. Although the
presented detector (Loda) was aimed to process streams of data with a constantly changing
behavior, it has been compared to the state of the art in settings where all data are avail-
able at once and they can fit into the memory. The rationale behind was to compare Loda
under various conditions differing by the rate of anomalies within the data, their clustered-
ness/scatterness to state of the art detectors, even though they are not applicable for intended
scenario. This comparison, which scale is to our knowledge the biggest so far published has
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shown that Loda’s accuracy measured by area under ROC curve does not lag behind more
sophisticated detectors. Moreover, it has revealed conditions under which particular type of
detectors with the recommended setting of its parameters excels. Based on it we can con-
clude that data-centered detectors such as kth-nearest neighbor or Local Outlier Factor with
recommended setting for k are good for problems with a few number of scattered anomalies.
Contrary, for problems with clustered anomalies and/or with higher rate of anomalies within
the data (more than 1%), the model-centered detectors such as the proposed Loda, 1-SVM,
and Isolation Forest are more suitable. Loda was also the only evaluated method capable to
process data with 3.2 millions features in a reasonable time without any modification. Last
but not least, it was shown that Loda is well suited for intended domains, where data are in the
form of non-stationary streams with samples observed just once, classified, and the detector
is updated. The comparison to state of the art Half-Space Trees method on seven problems of
this type showed that both detectors have nearly the same detection performance, but Loda
is on average 7–8 times faster.
Loda has practically demonstrated that an ensemble of anomaly detectors as weak as one-
dimensional histograms yields to a strong anomaly detector. Loda’s diversification of weak
anomaly detectors relies on sparse random projections, which can be viewed as a random
sub-space sampling. It is shown that this type of diversification gives the ensemble capability
to explain why a scrutinized sample is anomalous and to be robust against missing values.
A thorough evaluation showed that detectors employing only features explaining anomalies
have equal or better performance than detectors using all features, which shows that features
explaining anomalies were selected correctly (on average 25% of features explained the
anomaly). The similar evaluation showed that the ensemble keeps on most problems its
detection performance even if more than 10% of features are missing.
To conclude, this paper has shown that there is no single detector excelling on all type
of problems, as different detectors are suitable for different types of problems. The biggest
advantage of the proposed Loda with respect to others is its overall good performance and
very good speed to detection performance ratio, as it is order of magnitude faster than prior
art on big problems while its detection performance is comparable to them. Besides, it can
explain causes of anomalies and it is robust to missing variables in data.
Appendix: On-line histogram
The on-line histogram from Ben-Haim and Tom-Tov (2010) approximates the distribution of
data by using a set of pairs H = {(z1, m1), . . . , (zb, mb)}, where zi ∈ R and mi ∈ N, where
b is an upper bound on the number of histogram bins. It is assumed that every point zi is
surrounded bymi points, of which half is to the left and half is to the right to zi . Consequently,
the number of points in the interval [zi , zi+1] is equal to mi +mi+12 , and the probability of point
z ∈ (zi , zi+1) is estimated as a weighted average.
The construction of the set H is described in Algorithm 3. It starts with H = {} being an
empty set. Upon receiving a sample, z = xTw, it looks if there is a pair (zi , mi ) in H such
that z is equal to zi . If so, the corresponding count mi is increased by one. If not, a new pair
(z, 1) is added to H. If the size of H exceeds the maximal number of bins b, the algorithm
finds the two closest pairs (zi , mi ), (zi+1, mi+1), and replaces them with an interpolated pair(
zi mi +zi+1mi+1
mi +mi+1 , mi + mi+1
)
. Keeping zi sorted makes all the above operations efficient.
The estimation of the probability density in point z = xTw is described in Algorithm 4.
Assuming the pairs in H are sorted according to zi , the algorithm starts by finding i such
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm constructing approximation of the probability distribution of
the data {xi ∈ Rd}ni=1 projected on the vector w ∈ Rd .
Input: sample x ∈ Rd , w ∈ Rd ;
Output: set of pairs H = {(z1, m1), . . . , (zb, mb)},
initialize H = {}, zmin = +∞, zmax = −∞. ;
for j ← 1 to n do
z = xTj w;
zmin = min{zmin, z};
zmax = min{zmax, z};
if ∃(zi == z) then
mi = mi + 1;
continue
else
H = H ∪ {z, 1}
end
if |H| > b then
Sort pairs in H such that z1 < z2 < . . . < zb+1;
Find i minimizing zi+1 − zi ;
Replace pairs (zi , mi ), (zi+1, mi+1), by the pair
(
zi mi + zi+1mi+1
mi + mi+1 , mi + mi+1
)
end
H = H ∪ {(zmin, 0), (zmax, 0)};
Sort pairs in H such that zmin < z1 < z2 < . . . < zmax;
Algorithm 4: Algorithm returning approximate of probability density in point x pro-
jected on the vector w.
Input: sample x ∈ Rd , w ∈ Rd , set of pairs H = {(z1, m1), . . . , (zb, mb)} ;
Output: return estimate of the probability density p(x).;
H = H ∪ {(zmin, 0), (zmax, 0)};
Sort pairs in H such that zmin < z1 < z2 < . . . < zmax;
z = xTw;
if ∃(i |zi < z ≤ zi+1) then
return p(x) = zi mi +zi+1mi+12M(zi+1−zi ) ;
else
return invalid;
end
that zi < z ≤ zi+1. If such i exists, then the density in z is estimated as zi mi +zi+1mi+12M(zi+1−zi ) , where
M = ∑bi=1 mi . Otherwise it is assumed that z is outside the estimated region.
Construction of datasets
Benchmark problems for the evaluation of batch anomaly detectors were constructed fol-
lowing the process in Emmott et al. (2013). It advocates the creation of anomaly detection
benchmarks from real data, since artificial problems can be too far from realistic problems.
36 source datasets from which all benchmark problems have been created were downloaded
123
Appendix 1 - Pevny´, T. : Loda: Lightweight on-line detector of anomalies [42]
47
300 Mach Learn (2016) 102:275–304
from Frank and Asuncion (2010) from a category of classification problems with numeri-
cal attributes and without missing variables. The list of downloaded datasets together with
informations about the number of normal / anomalous samples is in Table 5
If the source dataset was a binary problem, the larger class was used as a normal class
and the smaller as the anomaly class. Multi-class datasets were converted to binary ones as
follows:
1. Train a random forest classifier to solve the multi-class problem in the original source
dataset using all samples.
2. Estimate the confusion matrix C with Ck, j = P( j |xi , k), where the conditional proba-
bility is the probability returned by random forest that the sample xi belongs to the class
j when k is true.
3. Create a complete graph with vertices being classes from the datasets and edges having
weights from confusion matrix as Ck, j + C j,k .
4. Compute the maximum weight spanning tree of the graph to identify “most-confusable”
pairs of classes.
5. Two-color the maximum spanning tree such that no adjacent vertices has the same color.
Each color determines set of classes that make the normal and anomalous class.
Notice that the above construction aims to maximize the difficulty (confusion) between
normal and anomalous class.
Anomalous samples were divided into four groups according to the probability that a
sample from the anomaly class is assigned to an anomaly class estimated the by the kernel
logistic regression with a Gaussian kernel (Zhu and Hastie 2005). Based on this score, all
anomalous pointswere assigned a difficulty category as: easy ([0.84, 1),medium ([0.7, 0.84),
hard ([0.5, 0.7), very hard (0, 0.5].
A concrete benchmark problem with a given fraction of anomalies (experiments used
fractions 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1) and difficulty (easy, medium, hard, very hard) was created
as follows:
1. Randomly divide samples into training a testing set allowingmaximum of 10000 samples
in each set.
2. If anomalies should be clustered, select randomly a pivot and find sufficient number of
nearest points in chosen difficulty category such that the final training and testing sets
have the desired number of anomalous samples. If anomalies are not clustered, select
anomalous samples randomly.
3. Divide the selected anomaly samples into training a testing set and mix with normal
samples.
The final benchmark problem is attached a clusteredness category according to a fraction of
sample variance of normal samples to the sample variance of anomalous samples as: high
scatter (0, 0.25), medium scatter [0.25, 0.5), low scatter [0.5, 1), low clusteredness [1, 2),
medium clusteredness [2, 4), and high clusteredness [4,∞).
Created benchmark problems have three basic properties (rate of anomalies within data,
difficulty of anomalies, and clusteredness) according to which they can be divided.
Experimental results
See Fig. 10.
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Table 5 Datasets used to create benchmarking problems
Dataset Dimension Number of samples
Normal Easy Medium Hard Very hard
Abalone 10 2153 7 44 955 1018
Blood-transfusion 4 384 7 9 49 84
Breast-cancer-wisconsin 30 357 188 18 5 –
Breast-tissue 9 66 17 5 3 15
Cardiotocography 27 1831 143 86 48 18
Ecoli 7 205 81 27 9 14
Gisette 4971 3500 – 1471 2029 –
Glass 10 114 75 20 3 2
Haberman 3 225 4 11 19 47
Ionosphere 33 225 36 86 3 –
Iris 4 100 44 2 2 2
Isolet 617 4497 40 3260 – –
Letter-recognition 617 4197 35 3565 – –
Libras 90 216 115 28 – –
Madelon 500 1300 – 1300 – –
Magic-telescope 10 12, 332 2808 1074 1079 1727
Miniboone 50 93,565 17,744 6179 5703 6873
Multiple-features 649 1200 63 737 – –
Musk-2 166 5581 604 212 105 96
Page-blocks 10 4913 315 69 77 99
Parkinsons 22 147 31 13 4 –
Pendigits 16 5539 5286 99 36 32
Pima-indians 8 500 101 76 45 46
Sonar 60 111 55 42 – –
Spect-heart 44 212 7 46 2 –
Statlog-satimage 36 3594 2520 111 84 126
Statlog-segment 18 1320 866 73 30 21
Statlog-shuttle 8 57,769 10 19 26 176
Statlog-vehicle 18 629 46 86 65 20
Synthetic-control-chart 60 400 197 3 – –
Vertebral-column 6 410 – – 68 142
Wall-following-robot 24 2923 1841 380 170 142
Waveform-1 21 3304 1204 279 147 66
Waveform-2 21 3304 1203 269 150 74
Wine 13 107 65 6 – –
Yeast 8 752 177 214 211 130
The number of samples is after the dataset has been converted to a two-class problem as described in Appen-
dix “Construction of datasets”. Columns captioned easy, medium, hard, very-hard shows the number of
anomalous samples with a given level of difficulty. Column captioned normal shows the number of normal
samples
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Fig. 10 The figure shows average rank of Loda and detector based on an ensemble of histograms modeling
individual features on different rates of anomalies within data. The small number in parentheses shows the
number of datasets used to create benchmarking problems. Notice that only 22 datasets had enough normal
samples such that the problemswith rate of anomalies 0.005 can be created.Wilcoxon signed rank test assessing
that both detectors delivers the same performance on each rate of anomalies separately accepted hypothesis
with p values 0.053, 0.44, 0.11, 0.16, and 0.31 in order of increasing rate of anomalies. The same test on results
from all experiments rejected the hypothesis with a p value 0.028, which means that Loda’s performance is
statistically better
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Network intrusion detection systems based on the anomaly detection paradigm have high 
false alarm rate making them diﬃcult to use. To address this weakness, we propose to 
smooth the outputs of anomaly detectors by online Local Adaptive Multivariate Smoothing 
(LAMS). LAMS can reduce a large portion of false positives introduced by the anomaly 
detection by replacing the anomaly detector’s output on a network event with an aggregate 
of its output on all similar network events observed previously. The arguments are 
supported by extensive experimental evaluation involving several anomaly detectors in 
two domains: NetFlow and proxy logs. Finally, we show how the proposed solution can 
be eﬃciently implemented to process large streams of non-stationary data.
© 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Increasing number and sophistication of attacks against critical enterprise computing infrastructure drives the need to 
deploy increasingly more sophisticated defense solutions. An essential component of the defense is Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) [1] analyzing network traﬃc that crosses the defense perimeter and looking for evidence of ongoing malicious 
activities (network attacks). When such activity is detected, an alarm is raised and then analyzed by network administrator 
who determines the existence and scope of the damage, repairs it and improves the defense infrastructure against future 
attacks.
IDS can be categorized according to different criteria: by the location (on a host, a wired network, or a wireless network), 
detection methodology (signature matching, anomaly detection, or stateful protocol analysis), or capability (simple detection 
or active attack prevention) [1]. In context of our work, the most important criterion is the categorization by detection 
methodology, which is described in more detail below.
Signature matching techniques identify attacks by matching packet contents against speciﬁc attack signatures. The signa-
tures are created using already identiﬁed and well-described attack samples, which are time consuming and can take from 
couple of hours up to several days, which gives attackers plenty of time for their criminal activities. The biggest weakness of 
this solution is that it detects only known attacks, which can be due to smart evasion techniques used by malware limiting. 
With the growing proportion of encrypted traﬃc, use of self-modifying malware and other evasion techniques, the use of 
detection techniques tailored to catch predeﬁned known set of attacks is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
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Anomaly-based detection tries to decrease the human work (e.g. manual creation of signatures) by building statistical 
model of a normal behavior and detect all deviations from it. This enables to detect new, previously unknown attacks pro-
vided that their statistical behavior is different from that of the normal traﬃc. While anomaly-based methods are attractive 
conceptually, they have not been widely adopted. This is because they typically suffer from high false alarm rate (not every 
anomaly is related to the attack) rendering them useless in practice, since network operator can analyze only few inci-
dents per day [2,3]. Decreasing the false positive rate is therefore important to make anomaly-based IDS competitive with 
signature matching based solutions.
Rehak [4] divides false positives of anomaly-based IDS into two classes: unstructured false positives are essentially a 
random noise caused by the stochasticity of the network traﬃc and structured false positives caused by a persistent but a 
very different behavior of a small number of network hosts, for example mail or DNS servers (the precise deﬁnition is left 
to Section 2).
This work proposes a method designed to decrease the rate of unstructured false positives by smoothing anomaly values 
with respect to time. This causes similar anomalies1 occurring at different times to receive similar anomaly score, even 
though one would be otherwise ﬂagged as anomaly. The rate of structured false positives is either decreased or remains 
the same, which depends on circumstances discussed in detail in Section 3. The method is evaluated with two different 
anomaly detection based IDSs, in both cases improving their accuracy.
The contribution of the paper is threefold.
• First, it mathematically formulates structured and unstructured false positives and argues why unstructured false posi-
tives are more diﬃcult to white-list or remove.
• Second, it proposes a theoretically sound method to decrease the rate of unstructured false positives.
• Third, it shows how the method can be implemented to eﬃciently process data-streams.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section ﬁrst properly deﬁnes classes of false positives, describe the proposed 
solution and mathematically proofs its correctness under mild assumptions. The same section also discusses the modiﬁcation 
to eﬃciently process data-streams. Section 4 shows, how the method was deployed in two Intrusion detection systems. The 
related work is discussed in Section 5 while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Classiﬁcation of false positives
Hereafter it is assumed that the network anomaly detection system (AD) observes a stream of network events (e.g., 
NetFlow [5], HTTP connections, etc.) produced by a set of hosts within the network. Anomaly detection system maintains 
internal model(s) to assign a score in range [0, 1] to each observed event with zero indicating the normal event and one 
indicating possible attack, as it is assumed that malicious activities have statistical characteristics different from the normal 
ones [6–8] making them rare. As mentioned in the introduction the anomaly detection systems produce false alarms since 
an overwhelming majority of rare events are not caused by any attack. Rehak [4] divides these false positives into following 
two classes:
• Unstructured false positives are short-term events distributed uniformly over all the network hosts proportionally to the 
traﬃc volume. They are typically triggered by widespread, uniformly distributed behaviors (such as web browsing) and 
we model them as white noise (zero mean and ﬁnite variance) added to the anomaly detector’s output. Therefore, the 
observed anomaly score yi of an event xi is equal to
yi = g(xi) + ηi, (1)
where g(xi) is the true anomaly score on event xi and ηi is the additive white noise. The ηi therefore hides the true 
value g(xi).
• Structured false positives are caused by a (long-term) legitimate behaviors of a small number of network hosts. These 
behaviors are different from the background, and because they are found only at a very small portion of network hosts, 
they are reported as anomalies. Examples are rare applications performing software update, regular calls of unusual 
network APIs, etc. Since this type of false positive is typically limited to a small number of network hosts and its 
behavior is very regular, it can be quickly identiﬁed and ﬁltered out using white-lists. Nevertheless, these white-lists 
are speciﬁc for a given network and are diﬃcult to create before deployment. We deﬁne the structured false positives 
to be generated by a mixture of distributions
xsf p ∼
∑m
j=1 β j j(xi)∑m
j=1 β j
, (2)
where  j represent structured false positive with weight β j . Each component  j has small variance comparing to that 
of the unstructured false positives, but means of the components are typically far from each other.
1 Similarity can be an arbitrary function k :X ×X → [0, 1].
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Fig. 1. Visualization of score provided by HTTP anomaly detection engine (described in Section 4.2) without (left) and with (right) LAMS models in LAMS 
3 context space (see Table 4 for details). Each point represents one HTTP request observed in the network, where its position is deﬁned by the context 
features (deﬁned in Table 4) and the color denotes the anomaly score, red being the most anomalous and blue the less. The larger the circle the more 
events share the same context position and anomaly score. The anomaly scores of the anomaly detection engine are shown in the left ﬁgure. As can be 
seen there are regions of the context space where most of the points have high anomaly scores and regions of low anomaly scores with additional noise. 
The right ﬁgure shows the same points but the anomaly score is smoothed by the LAMS model effectively reducing the unstructured false positives via 
smoothing. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
3. Proposed method
The idea behind the proposed local adaptive multivariate smoothing (LAMS) method is to replace the output of the 
anomaly detector by average anomaly score of similar events observed in the past, where the similarity between two events 
is deﬁned as Kh :X ×X → [0, 1] (further also called context). This effectively smooths the output of the anomaly detector 
and therefore reduces unstructured false positives. This smoothing can be mathematically formulated as
gˆnw(x) =
∑n
i=1 Kh(x, xi)yi∑n
i=1 Kh(x, xi)
, (3)
where {xi}ni=1 is the set of observed network events, gˆnw(x) is the expected anomaly of event x, and {yi}ni=1 is the set 
of corresponding AD outputs. The space X on which it is deﬁned can be arbitrary (e.g., space of all strings, graphs, etc.), 
but Gaussian kernel Kh(x, x′) = exp
(
−‖x−x′‖2h
)
on Euclidean space is the most common combination (h parameterizes the 
width of the kernel). Estimator (3) is known as a Nadaraya–Watson estimator [9,10] which is a non-parametric estimator of 
the conditional expectation of a random variable.
How does the above smoothing remove false positives according to the division introduced in Section 2?
• Unstructured false positives are reduced by the Nadaraya–Watson estimator that performs local averaging of the events. 
Since the unstructured false positives are of the form yi = g(xi) +ηi , it is proven by Devroye et al. [11] that it converges 
to the true value g(xi) under fairly general assumptions. More formally, Devroye has shown
E|gˆnw(x) − g(x)| ≤ c√
nh
, (4)
assuming h is chosen in terms of n, with h → 0, nh → ∞ as n → ∞; c > 0 is a constant; the kernel K is absolutely con-
tinuous and differentiable, with K ′ ∈ L1; g is differentiable and the Var(yi) is bounded. Since we are using a Gaussian 
kernel and the anomaly scores yi are bounded to [0, 1] the estimate converges to the underlying true anomaly score 
g(x) with a rate of (nh)−1/2, when only unstructured false positives are present. However, setting the h → 0 requires 
inﬁnite computation and memory resources, therefore we restrict the estimator to ﬁxed h.
The smoothing effect is shown in the Fig. 1 where the left ﬁgure shows the input to LAMS and right ﬁgure the output. 
It is apparent that the left ﬁgure is noisier, as points with different colors are close to each other.
• Structured false positives are long-term events conﬁned to subset of network hosts without direct relationship to the 
background in the sense that AD’s output on them does not change with the time. LAMS can remove them in the 
following situations.
If LAMS’ similarity measure of alerts Kh is different from that used in the anomaly detector, large number of events 
with normal AD score can be similar to structured false positives, which decreases the scores output by LAMS on false 
positives. Example of this type of behavior can be seen on the Fig. 2, where we see that the amplitude of LAMS input 
is higher than that of the output.
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Fig. 2. Anomaly score of the HTTP request to google web API in time. There are sudden spikes in AD’s anomaly score (blue dashed line) that are reduced 
by the LAMS model (red solid line).
If LAMS aggregates outputs of the same anomaly detector deployed on many networks, structured false positives can 
be normal in other networks. Then, LAMS aggregation eliminates the false positives by aggregating them with these 
normal activities.
In other situations, structured false positives are conﬁned and there are no similar events receiving lower anomaly 
score. In this case LAMS fails to remove them, but does not increase their number.
3.1. Complexity considerations
The complexity of the smoothing of AD’s output described by Equation (3) is linear with respect to the number of 
observed events. This, together with the fact that all observed events need to be stored, makes LAMS useless for practi-
cal deployment, since number of network events can be as high as millions per second. We therefore resort to common 
approach to approximate (3) from values maintained in a set of pivots  = {φ j} Jj=1, φ j ∈X as
gˆlams(x) =
∑ J
j=1 Kh(x, φ j) yˆ j∑ J
j=1 Kh(x, φ j)
, (5)
where { yˆ j} Jj=1 are estimates of gˆnw(φ j) calculated according to (3). This reduces the computational complexity of the 
estimate in arbitrary x to O ( J ), which is linear with the number of pivots and independent of the number of observed 
alerts.2 The same holds for space complexity, because only positions φ j of ﬁnite number of pivots and relevant estimates 
yˆk need to be kept. The set of pivots  is updated using the modiﬁed Leader–Follower algorithm [13], where new pivot 
is added to the set  when an event not similar to any pivot in  is received. The update process is described in more 
detail in Section 3.2. Contrary to the standard deﬁnition of Leader–Follower [13,14] pivots are not allowed to move, because 
moving pivots towards areas of higher density causes forgetting of rare events, which we want to remember.
3.2. Incremental update of the LAMS model
Keeping LAMS model up to date on data-streams requires maintaining estimates { yˆ j} Jj=1 in {φ j} Jj=1 and alternatively 
adding new pivot if needed. Upon arrival of a new observation of a network event (yt , xt), estimates yˆ j stored in pivots φ j
should be updated using the Equation (3) as
yˆnewj =
∑n
i=1 Kh(φ j, xi)yi + Kh(φ j, xt)yt∑n
i=1 Kh(φ j, xi) + Kh(φ j, xt)
. (6)
If we denote
woldj =
n∑
i=1
Kh(φ j, xi), (7)
yˆoldj =
∑n
i=1 Kh(φ j, xi)yi∑n
i=1 Kh(φ j, xi)
, (8)
the Equation (6) can be rewritten as
yˆnewj =
woldj yˆ
old
j + Kh(xt , φ j)yt
woldj + Kh(xt , φ j)yt
. (9)
2 This statement holds only partially, since with increasing number of observed samples the number of pivots will increase as well [12].
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Therefore, for eﬃcient incremental update of the model only yˆ j and w j need to be stored in each φ j . The update can 
than be done using the following.
wnewj = woldj + Kh(xt, φ j)yt, (10)
yˆnewj =
1
wnewj
[
woldj yˆ
old
j + Kh(xt , φ j)yt
]
, (11)
The above can be further simpliﬁed to update only pivots close to xt , which we deﬁne as pivots with similarity Kh(xt , φ j)
greater than Kminh . This reduces the complexity of the update process, because only limited number of nearest pivots needs 
to be updated with each new event.
The update is outlined in Algorithm 1. First, a set of all pivots in ε(xi) in the Kh(xt , φ j) vicinity of a new event (yt , xt) is 
found and their estimates yˆ are updated as deﬁned in Equation (11). The γ parameter controls the distance (threshold on 
the similarity) upon which a new pivot is created with φ J+1 = xt , yˆ J+1 = yt and w J+1 = 1.
Data: Stream of events (yi, xi), i = 1 . . .
Result: Set of pivots  = {φ j = (x j , ˆy j)} Jj=1
Start with an empty set  =∅;
while there is a new event (yi , xi) do
ε(xi) = {φk ∈  | Kh(xi , φk) > Kminh };
for φk ∈ ε(xi) do
Update yˆk relevant to pivot φk using Equation (10) and (11);
end
Find the most similar pivot φN to the xi :
φN := argmaxφ∈ Kh(xi , φ);
if Kh(xi , φN ) < γ then
Create new pivot φ J+1 := xi ;
w J+1 := 1;
yˆ J+1 := yi ;
 =  ∪ {φ J+1};
end
end
Algorithm 1: LAMS model update algorithm.
The algorithm is controlled by several parameters allowing to trade high locality (precision) for generalization and ef-
ﬁciency. The most important parameter is γ , which inﬂuences the total number of pivots in LAMS and hence the cost of 
the algorithm. When this parameter is set to maxx,x′∈X Kh(x, x′), the number of pivots is identical to the number of unique 
events. Departing from this extreme case the number of pivots decreases with decreasing its value with a possible impact 
(both positive or negative) on the accuracy of estimates if local variations are strong. An example of its effect is shown in 
Fig. 3. The minimal update weight Kminh is not overly important and it is there more for computational speed-up, as sample’s 
neighborhood are more controlled by the similarity function Kh(x, x′).
3.3. Querying the LAMS model
The query of the model follows the Equation (5) with the difference that the estimate is computed only over similar 
pivots, controlled by the same parameter γ as used in the update. Formally the estimate yˆt is calculated as
yˆt =
∑
φ j∈ε(xt ) Kh(xt, φ j)y j∑
φ j∈ε(xt ) Kh(xt, φ j)
, (12)
where ε(xt) = {φ j ∈  | Kh(xi, φk) > Kminh }. Restricting the estimate to be calculated from the neighborhood ε(xt ) is mainly 
to be consistent with the update procedure. In practice, Kminh is so small that the effect of points outside ε(xt ) on the points 
would be negligible.
When LAMS is deployed, it always performs an update before the query, which means that there is always at least one 
pivot from which the estimate can be calculated.
3.4. LAMS model feature selection
As in other machine learning algorithms the biggest inﬂuence on LAMS’s accuracy has the selection of similarity measure 
and features deﬁning it. The number of features that can be extracted from network traﬃc events can be high and deﬁning 
the context with respect to all of them would lead to poor generalization — a phenomenon known as curse of dimen-
sionality [15]. The usual approach is to reduce dimension by feature extraction algorithms [16] or by feature selection. In 
experiment described in the next section we have chosen the latter approach.
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Fig. 3. The graph shows effects of γ parameter on the average AUC score (see Section 4 for deﬁnition). Too large γ reduces effect of the smoothing causing 
smaller eﬃcacy. On the other hand, too small γ decreases model’s eﬃcacy, since the model cannot capture local variations in the events.
The features should be selected such that malicious network events are conﬁned in a rather limited part of the space 
covered by only few pivots. This guarantees that such model will improve the accuracy, since if malicious events fall into a 
speciﬁc region of the feature space the long term anomaly estimate in this region will be consistently high. To select the 
features in practice, one either has to have examples of network attacks and use feature selection algorithm [17], or use a 
domain knowledge provided by an expert.
4. Experimental evaluation
We have evaluated the effectiveness of the proposed LAMS model in two different anomaly detection engines: the ﬁrst, 
described in Subsection 4.1, uses NetFlow [18] records while the second, described in Section 4.2, uses HTTP proxy logs. Both 
anomaly detection engines are based on ensemble of simple yet diverse anomaly detectors allowing to eﬃciently process 
large data-streams while providing good detection accuracy.
The accuracy is measured by the area under Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUC) [19], which is frequently used when 
the operating point of the detector is not known.3 AUC is equal to the probability that the anomaly score of a randomly 
chosen malicious sample is higher than a randomly chosen legitimate one. The AUC score one means that the detector is 
always correct, zero means it is always wrong, and 0.5 means that its accuracy is equal to random guessing.
4.1. NetFlow anomaly detection
The NetFlow anomaly detection engine [20,21] processes NetFlow [18] records exported by routers or other network 
traﬃc shaping devices. List of all features available in the NetFlow records can be seen in Table A.5 in Appendix A. The 
anomaly detection engine identiﬁes anomalous traﬃc using ensemble of anomaly detection algorithms, some of them based 
on Principal component analysis [22–24], some detects abrupt changes detection [8], and some even uses ﬁxed rules [25]. 
Furthermore, there are detectors designed to detect speciﬁc type of unwanted behavior like network scans [26] or malware 
with domain generating algorithm [27]. In total the NetFlow anomaly detection engine uses 16 anomaly detectors. The 
rationale behind the ensemble is that (a) it decreases the computational requirements, since individual detectors and their 
internal models are simpler, and (b) errors of individual detectors cancels out [28,29] decreasing the false positive rate in 
effect.
One of the problems to solve with ensemble systems is the combination of their outputs. Arithmetic mean or majority 
vote are preferred if individual classiﬁers have roughly the same accuracy [30]. This is not the case in our engine due to 
detectors specialized to some attacks. For such systems Evangelista [31] suggested to use average of mean and maximum 
scores of detectors within the ensemble, as it should be more robust to presence poor detectors without knowing which 
ones are poor. This combination function (further called Evangelista’s) favors the highest anomaly scores and reduces the 
effect of poor detectors.
The combined output of 16 anomaly detectors is used as an input in ﬁve different LAMS models with different contexts. 
The rationale behind using more than one LAMS model is again the ensemble principle, as the hope is that errors of outputs 
of different LAMS models will be uncorrelated and they will cancel out. Contexts (features) of individual models are shown 
in Table 1 and they are named according to the publications which have used them in anomaly detection. Since all features 
3 By an operating point it is understood an upper bound on false positives/false negatives or their costs.
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Table 1
Features deﬁning similarity in NetFlow LAMS models.
Name Context features
Xu-source [25] entropy of source ports for the source IP
entropy of destination ports for the source IP
number of destination IP addresses for the source IP
Xu-destination [25] entropy of source ports for the source IP
entropy of destination ports for the source IP
number of source IP addresses for the source IP
MINDS [8] number of ﬂows originating from the source IP
number of ﬂows originating from the destination IP
number of different destination ports for the source IP
Lakhina [22] number of ﬂows originating from the source IP
number of packets transferred from the source IP
number of bytes transferred from the source IP
TAPS [26] number of different destination IPs of the source IP
number of unique ports of the source IP
entropy of packets size of the source IP
Fig. 4. NetFlow anomaly detection system architecture. In the experimental evaluation (Section 4.1.2) we compare the eﬃcacy of the anomaly detection 
engine alone (depicted in the left box) with the eﬃcacy when using anomaly detection followed by LAMS models (both the boxes).
are real numbers, the similarity is deﬁned using the Gaussian kernel introduced in Section 3. The schema of the system is 
shown in Fig. 4. The system consists from two blocks, where the ﬁrst (left) block represents the anomaly detection part, 
while the second (right) block represents the part with LAMS models.
4.1.1. Dataset of NetFlow
To evaluate the effects of LAMS model on the NetFlow Anomaly detection engine we have created several datasets from 
a traﬃc captured on the network of Czech Technical University (CTU) in Prague. We have used three different approaches 
to create labels: manual labeling, infecting virtual machines, and attacking our computers within the network by us.
Manual labeling. A week long capture from the university contains 41 517 828 ﬂows between 19 261 different IP addresses. 
An experienced network operator has identiﬁed 10% as anomalous and 11% as legitimate. The most prevalent malicious 
traﬃc was ssh scan (55%) followed by p2p traﬃc (36%), horizontal scan (6.8%), and vertical scan (1.5%).
Malware infection. The second dataset was created by executing real malware inside controlled virtual machine (VM).4 VMs 
were infected using malicious binaries captured during 24 hours of their traﬃc together with the traﬃc of the whole CTU 
network. The labels were created such that every NetFlow originating from the infected machines was labeled as malicious, 
divided into requests and responses according to the direction. NetFlows corresponding to normal traﬃc of Windows XP 
operating system running on the VMs, such as connection check, Windows Update checks, NTP checks, etc., were also 
labeled as normal.
In the ﬁrst capture we have infected only one VM running Windows XP with Neeris [21] malware that has generated 
a lot of traﬃc (malware generated on average three NetFlows per second). Second, we have infected ten different VMs by 
4 The bandwidth of the connection was lowered to 150 kb/s to prevent generating huge amount of traﬃc.
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Table 2
Comparison of AUC Scores without and with LAMS model.
Manual labeling AUC
without LAMS with LAMS
horizontal scan request 0.82 0.83
horizontal scan response 0.77 0.66
p2p request 0.87 0.91
p2p response 0.89 0.75
scan sql request 1 1
scan sql response 0.92 0.91
ssh cracking request 0.80 0.83
ssh cracking response 0.84 0.71
vertical scan request 1 1
vertical scan response 0.98 0.96
Malware infection
Neris bot 0.69 0.87
FastFlux botnet 0.81 0.88
RBot ICMP ﬂood 0.91 0.94
Artiﬁcial attack
SSH scan request 0.93 1
SSH scan response 0.84 0.77
SSH cracking request 0.83 0.83
SSH cracking response 0.77 0.78
anomalous SSH download response 0.95 0.97
anomalous SSH download request 0.95 0.95
FastFlux botnet [21]. Finally, we have infected ten VMs by rbot we could control, and instruct it to perform ICMP ﬂood 
attack against one of our servers.
Manual attacks. Third dataset was created by network specialist attacking one computer with an open SSH port inside the 
university network. She has started her attack by horizontal scan of university network searching for a computer with an 
open SSH port. Then, she performed brute force cracking of an ssh password with a help of dictionary of 1000 passwords 
with the last one being correct. She has tried all passwords within 5-minute long window. Finally, she has downloaded 
0.5 GB from the attacked computer to simulate stealing the data. Corresponding NetFlows in the dataset were labeled on 
the basis of known attacker and attacked IP addresses and ports and time of the attack information.
4.1.2. Experimental results
Table 2 shows AUC scores of the anomaly detection engine after the ﬁrst aggregation before using multiple LAMS models 
(denoted without LAMS), and after the second aggregation (denoted with LAMS) on individual datasets and attacks described 
previously. The results reveal that LAMS models improve the accuracy in detecting attack requests, but decrease the accuracy 
on responses. To investigate this, we have plot in Fig. 5 distribution of points corresponding to ﬂows related to the horizontal 
scan in the context deﬁned by Lakhina’s entropy based features. The ﬁgure conﬁrms the assumption that requests are 
located in a very small and distinct part of the space and therefore LAMS models can well estimate the anomaly score, 
whereas responses are scattered all over the space mixed with other mostly legitimate traﬃc. According to Table 1 Lakhina’s 
entropy features are calculated from a set of ﬂows with the same source IP address receiving the same entropy and also 
anomaly values. During horizontal scan, each attacked network host will probably have only one response ﬂow to the attack, 
which will be well hidden among host’s own legitimate traﬃc. This causes (a) the responses to have different entropies and 
locations in the space and (b) receiving low anomaly values. Contrary, requests of the attack stand out, since they have the 
same source IP address and the same values of entropies. Moreover, this entropy would be very different from that of other 
hosts in the network leading to high anomaly. This explanation is supported by the fact that LAMS models do not decrease 
anomaly values of response to attacks targeting a single host (e.g., vertical scan). Finally note that it is important to detect 
at least one part of the attack, either the attack, or the responds.
To demonstrate the decrease in false positive rate on structured false positives, we have used the dataset described 
in Section 4.1.1 and analyzed the traﬃc identiﬁed as the most anomalous traﬃc by the ﬁrst part of the detection system 
(combined output of the anomaly detectors without LAMS models). Within we have identiﬁed a legitimate traﬃc meeting 
the criteria of the structured false positives (being explainable and corresponding to rare events). The complete list is in 
Table 3 and includes responses of NTP servers, software licenses servers, downloads from local data and database servers, 
etc. The decrease has been again measured by the AUC score, where the false positives were treated as negative samples 
and all attacks identiﬁed in the dataset 4.1.1 as positive samples. AUCs of identiﬁed structured false positives are shown in 
Table 3. According to it LAMS models almost always reduce the false positive rate and increase the accuracy of detection.
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Fig. 5. Visualization of the anomaly scores assigned by the Lakhina LAMS model (see Table 1) to the horizontal scan and corresponding responses contained 
in the manually labeled dataset described in Section 4.1.1. Each point represents one scan request (cross) or scan response (dot). The color corresponds to 
obtained anomaly score with red being the most anomalous and blue being the least. Visualization of all the other LAMS models deﬁned in Table 1 can be 
see in Appendix A in Fig. A.9. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 3
AUC scores of structured and unstructured false positives in the dataset in-
troduced in Subsection 4.1.1 when LAMS models are used (right column) 
and not used (middle column). Higher AUC is better.
Structured false positive AUC
without LAMS with LAMS
NTP server response 0.98 0.99
ICQ servers 0.98 0.99
Google crawler 0.99 1
Local data server downloads 0.9 0.93
Local database server requests 0.98 0.98
Local database server responses 0.96 0.98
Local software license server 0.19 0.89
Subnetwork gateway requests 0.83 0.90
Subnetwork gateway responses 0.30 0.24
HTTP proxy requests 0.75 0.77
HTTP proxy responses 0.76 0.73
Unstructured false positive AUC
without LAMS with LAMS
DNS request 0.63 0.70
DNS response 0.45 0.71
Web browsing user 1 0.99 1
Web browsing user 2 0.99 0.99
Web browsing user 3 0.92 0.94
Gmail.com servers 0.98 0.99
The above investigation of false positives also revealed some unstructured false positives corresponding to excessive web 
and DNS traﬃc of some users, which anomaly detectors ﬂagged as suspicious. LAMS models have decreased their anomaly 
values as is shown in the second part of the Table 3.
4.2. HTTP anomaly detection
Cisco Cognitive Threat Analytics (CTA) [32] is an anomaly-based IDS that uses HTTP proxy logs typically produced by the 
proxy servers located on the network perimeter and used by the network hosts to access web content. Contrary to NetFlow, 
these logs contain information extracted from HTTP header (time of the request, source IP address, destination IP address, 
url, MIME type, downloaded and uploaded bytes, User-Agent identiﬁer, etc.). For the complete list of items see Table A.6 in 
Appendix A.
Anomaly detection part of the CTA consists from more than 30 various anomaly detectors detecting anomalies according 
to empirical probability estimates and conditional probability estimates (e.g., P(country), P(domain|host), P(User-Agent|sec-
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Table 4
HTTP LAMS models.
Name Context features
LAMS 1 number of unique referrers of the visited domain
number of unique operating systems used to visit domain
number of unique MIME types hosted on the domain
LAMS 2 number of unique referrers of the visited domain
number of unique HTTP status responses of the visited domain
amount of bytes downloaded using the User-Agent
LAMS 3 number of unique User-Agents used to visit the domain
entropy of the MIME types hosted on the domain
number of unique referrers of the visited domain
LAMS 4 URL length
number of unique operating systems used to visit domain
number of unique referrers of the visited domain
ond level domain), etc.), time series analysis (models of user activity over time, detection of sudden changes in activity, 
identiﬁcation of periodical requests, etc.) and HTTP speciﬁc detectors (e.g., discrepancy in HTTP User-Agent ﬁeld [33]).
The overall architecture of the system is the same as the NetFlow anomaly detection engine shown in Fig. 4. Again, there 
is a ﬁrst block of 30 anomaly detectors, whose output is combined by Evangelista’s fusion function to obtain one anomaly 
score value for each HTTP proxy log entry. This output is used as an input to the second block with several LAMS models 
with context features listed in Table 4 and Gaussian similarity function deﬁned in Section 3. Outputs of four LAMS models 
are again combined by Evangelista’s fusion function to the ﬁnal output.
4.2.1. Dataset of HTTP proxy logs
The database of HTTP proxy logs was collected from networks of 30 different companies of various sizes and types 
with collection period ranging from six days to two weeks. There are more than seven billion HTTP logs in the database. 
A small team of security researchers has identiﬁed in them 2 666 users infected with a malware of 825 various families 
that have generated in total more than 129 millions HTTP logs. HTTP logs corresponding to malware requests represent 
less than 2% of the total traﬃc of the individual networks except for few cases, where the networks were infected by 
ZeroAccess malware [34]. ZeroAccess is very noisy, generating many HTTP logs which has reached up to 21% of the total 
number of logs. The other malware families worth to mention were: Cycbot, QBot, SpyEye, BitCoinMiner, Zbot and many 
others. All the malware was identiﬁed using several approaches starting with an analysis of the most anomalous HTTP logs 
as reported by the CTA, malware reported by the individual network administrators, using blacklists and other public feeds 
or third-party software. The rest of the unlabeled logs were considered to be legitimate traﬃc. We are aware that within 
them there might be another proxy logs corresponding to malware traﬃc, but we are not aware about any additional 
method providing the ground truth. Moreover since the most anomalous traﬃc was always investigated for a malware 
HTTP logs, the most important part corresponding to low false positive rate was always labeled. This labeling of the most 
anomalous part has been done for the detection engine using only anomaly detection part and using both parts including 
LAMS models.
4.3. Experimental results
To demonstrate the advantage of LAMS models we have calculated AUC score on sub-datasets with HTTP logs of each 
malware family considered as positives and all unlabeled HTTP logs as negatives. Since there are 825 different malware 
families in the dataset the table showing the AUC improvement would be huge. Therefore we have decided to show the 
effect of the LAMS model in a ﬁgure. The Fig. 6 shows a scatter plot where x-coordinate of each point is AUC score of 
output of the ﬁrst part of the detection engine using only anomaly detectors and the y-coordinate is AUC score of the 
output of the second part with LAMS models. This means that if the point is above the diagonal, LAMS models improve 
the detection accuracy and vice versa. We can observe that LAMS models generally improve the accuracy of detection since 
majority (75%) of the points is above the diagonal. Particularly noticeable are points within the green rectangle that would 
not be detectable without LAMS models, but LAMS models signiﬁcantly increase their anomaly values.
Figs. 7 and 8 show the distribution of anomaly scores of the anomaly detection engine without (left) and with (right) 
LAMS models. We can see that outputs of an anomaly detection engine without LAMS models on malware HTTP logs are 
more equally spread across the entire range of values. Contrary, when the anomaly detection engine uses LAMS models, the 
scores of malware’s HTTP logs are located in the most anomalous part of the distribution.
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Fig. 6. Scatter plot of the AUC scores when running the anomaly detection engine without and with the LAMS model. Each point represents one malware 
sample and different colors denote different malware families to illustrate variety of the samples. Points that are above the blue line represent an AUC 
improvement when LAMS is used, whereas points below represent cases where LAMS decreases the eﬃcacy. As can be seen the LAMS model signiﬁcantly 
improves the AUC score of the samples with AUC smaller than 0.2, as depicted by the green bar in the ﬁgure. (For interpretation of the references to color 
in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 7. Distributions of anomaly values of HTTP proxy logs without LAMS models.
5. Related work
The prior art in reducing the false positives used statistics [35], time series [36], and machine learning algorithms [37]
to achieve this goal. Most approaches work with a notion of a network alert, which is a collection of networks ﬂows, rather 
than with individual ﬂows, which is one of the biggest differentiating factor of our work.
Bolzoni et al. [38] propose to correlate anomalies in incoming and outgoing traﬃc as successful attack should raise 
alarms in both directions.
Pietraszek [37] has created a classiﬁer that is reducing the workload of the human analyst by classifying the alerts into 
true positives and false positives. The knowledge of how to classify alerts is learned adaptively by observing the analyst. 
Similarly, Tian et al. [39] use the analyst feedback to generate custom-made ﬁltering rules, that automatically discard similar 
false alerts encountered in the future. The need of human interaction represent always a bottleneck since the effectiveness 
of the IDS depends on the human analyst.
Hooper [40] introduced intelligent network quarantine channels technique to get additional information about the sus-
pected hosts. This information is further used to estimate the probability of a host being infected. Although, this technique 
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Fig. 8. Distributions of anomaly values of HTTP proxy logs with LAMS models.
provides additional information that can reduce the amount of false alarms, it is not always allowed by the organization’s 
security policy to perform such a host checking.
Viinikka and Debar [36] proposed to use Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) control charts of the ﬂow of 
alerts and try to spot abnormalities. Their experimental results concern the production of less and more qualitative alerts.
The proposed model was inspired by trust models [41–44] which are specialized knowledge structures designed to 
maintain information about the trustworthiness of a communication partners, either acquired from interactions, observed 
from the interactions of others, or received from others by means of reputation mechanism [45]. The design of trust models 
emphasizes features such as fast learning, robustness in response to false reputation information [46], and robustness with 
respect to environmental noise.
Extended trust models (ETM) introduced by Rehak et al. [47] enhance the original trust models with context repre-
sentations in order to reﬂect the context of trusting situation, putting it on par with the identity of trusting parties. The 
paper [48] took the work further and placed the ETMs in the context of network security problem and use them to aggre-
gate the anomaly scores provided by several anomaly detectors. Each of the network anomaly detectors had its own ETM 
model with a feature space deﬁned by identity and detector-speciﬁc context, serving mainly as a long term memory of past 
anomaly events. Our current work is an extension of the original ETM model, described in [48]. Unlike its predecessor, it 
has been simpliﬁed by omitting the fuzzy number representation of the anomaly value. Furthermore, we have discarded the 
identity, focusing only on the context of the observed network events. This simpliﬁcations have allowed us to re-formulate 
the problem more concisely as LAMS, and generalize its application in context of classiﬁcation of a stream of events.
Pouzos et al. [14] introduced an adaptive kernel smoothing regression which to some extent similar to LAMS models. 
Contrary to the LAMS model, it updates only the nearest neighbor of the observation and allows the pivots to move towards 
regions with higher probability density. As discussed in Section 3, this behavior is undesirable, because it will cause LAMS 
models to forget rare events.
6. Conclusion
We have presented a method reducing false alarm rate of anomaly detection-based intrusion detection systems. The 
technique smooths detectors’ output simultaneously over time and space, which improves the estimate of true anomaly 
score.
We have proved under mild assumptions that the method reduces unstructured false positives caused by stochasticity of 
the network traﬃc. The experiments also showed reduction of the structured FPs, while not having major negative effect in 
the remaining cases.
The method has been evaluated using large-number of samples from two domains with diverse sets of anomaly de-
tectors. Furthermore the method is a critical component of Cognitive Threat Analytics [32] — an online malware detection 
security-as-a-service product delivered by Cisco, which analyzes more than 10 billions of requests per day. This illustrates 
one of the key advantages of our method: simplicity and ﬂexibility. It also shows that the method is usable in real-life 
production IDS systems.
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Appendix A. Examples of NetFlow record and HTTP logs
Table A.5
Example of one NetFlow record containing information about 
both communication participants (source and destination IP 
and port), time of the communication, protocol used, bitwise 
OR of all TCP ﬂags, type of service (tos), number of packets 
and bytes transferred in both directions.
Feature Example of values
start-time 1440870672
duration 5
protocol TCP
source ip 192.168.1.2
destination ip 208.80.154.224
source port 1604
destination port 443
TCP ﬂags .AP.SF
type of service 0
number of packets 1201
number of bytes 1.8 M
Table A.6
Example of HTTP log. This is one of the HTTP logs created when downloading a wikipedia 
page. Each page download generates more HTTP logs since all the page resources have to be 
downloaded. To render the page from the example the browser generated additional 20 HTTP 
logs, containing page styles, scripts, pictures, etc. In the example the cssc preﬁxes denote the 
client to server and server to client communication respectively, so the sc-bytes represent the 
amount of bytes downloaded by the client and cs-bytes the amount of uploaded bytes to the 
server. The rest of the features is self-explanatory.
Feature Value example
x-timestamp-unix 1440870672
sc-http-status 200
sc-bytes 16671
cs-bytes 0
cs-uri-scheme https
cs-host en.wikipedia.org
cs-uri-port 1604
cs-uri-path /wiki/Anomaly_detection
cs-uri-query
cs-username Martin Grill
x-elapsed-time 5
s-ip 208.80.154.224
c-ip 192.168.1.2
Content-Type text/html; charset=UTF-8
cs(Referer) https://www.google.com/
cs-method GET
cs(User-Agent) Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_5)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko)
Chrome/44.0.2403.157 Safari/537.36
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The Steganographer is the Outlier:
Realistic Large-Scale Steganalysis
Andrew D. Ker, Member, IEEE, and Tomáš Pevný
Abstract— We present a method for a completely new kind of
steganalysis to determine who, out of a large number of actors
each transmitting a large number of objects, is hiding payload
inside some of them. It has significant challenges, including
unknown embedding parameters and natural deviation between
innocent cover sources, which are usually avoided in steganalysis
tested under laboratory conditions. Our method uses standard
steganalysis features, the maximum mean discrepancy measure of
distance, and ranks the actors by their degree of deviation from
the rest: we show that it works reliably, completely unsupervised,
when tested against some of the standard steganography methods
available to nonexperts. We also determine good parameters for
the detector and show that it creates a two-player game between
the guilty actor and the steganalyst.
Index Terms— Data security, information security.
I. INTRODUCTION
STEGANALYSIS aims to detect the presence of hiddenpayload inside apparently-innocent covers. Although a
refined discipline, particularly when the covers are still images,
no research has yet considered how to detect payload when
monitoring an entire network. In such a case the detector
will see vast numbers of objects, transmitted by a variety
of users each of whom uses slightly differing sources, the
embedding methods used by “guilty” users may be unknown,
and the amount of payload almost certainly is unknown. Such a
situation is completely different to the “laboratory conditions”
found in most steganalysis experiments, and the challenges
are different from classifying an individual object as cover or
stego. We address them in this paper.
After briefly surveying the state of art in steganalysis of
individual objects (Subsection I-A), we explore the require-
ments of large-scale steganalysis (Section II). We then propose
a new steganalysis paradigm (Section III), which differs from
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conventional steganalysis in two main ways: it takes as its
unit the actor (network or social network user, or cover object
source) rather than the single object, and it performs anomaly
detection rather than classification, calibrating its expection of
actors by the behaviour of the majority. This means that the
method is entirely unsupervised, and robust to the challenges
of large-scale steganalysis.
We then perform large-scale experiments, using a real-
world social networking image set and steganography acces-
sible to the non-expert (Section IV), to demonstrate that the
method works robustly on a number of embedding algorithms
(Section V), and to tune some of its parameters (Section VI).
The experiments are performed using well-established embed-
ding methods with available implementations, and use a well-
established feature set: neither of these represents the academic
state-of-art, but we stress that the contribution of this paper is
the framework for large-scale steganalysis, rather than a detec-
tor using particular features. By testing in well-understood
circumstances, we eliminate potential complications from the
latest embedding methods and detection features. Finally, we
conclude with discussion of many future directions for this
line of research (Section VII).
This work extends our two previous conference papers on
this subject [17], [18]: as well as new metrics for accuracy, we
additionally evaluate a number of different parameters for the
large-scale detector, uncover a game between the embedder’s
strategy and the detector’s optimal behaviour, and compare to
the (scarce) relevant prior art.
A. State of the Art in Binary Steganalysis
The contemporary approach to steganalysis involves three
components. It extracts, from each object under examination,
steganalytic features of high dimension; it supplies training
sets of cover and stego objects; and it runs a machine learning
algorithm on the training data. This creates a decision function
for novel objects, classifying them as cover or stego, occasion-
ally with some sort of associated level of confidence.
Recent feature sets for the domain of still images, where the
literature is most advanced, comprise thousands of relatively
weak features [7], [8], [19]. It seems that there may be a
linear relationship between number (or rate) of embedding
changes and the position of feature in the feature space, since
linear classifiers [21], [24] are sufficient to devise very accurate
detectors.
Some drawbacks of this approach are that detectors are
targeted towards a given steganographic algorithm and payload
size [26] (used to create the training stego set), and to a
particular source of covers. If the objects under scrutiny
1556-6013 © 2014 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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come from a different source (e.g. camera or settings) from
the training data, the accuracy of detectors decreases, often
dramatically [1]. This phenomenon, a cover-source mismatch,
is unavoidable in reality unless the suspected steganographer
is considerate enough to supply their enemy with their cover
source.
Another drawback is that the design is for a decision
function for single objects, which would only be applicable
in the case when a steganalyst is presented with a small
amount of data to classify individually. It does not address
the challenges of large-scale steganalysis.
II. LARGE-SCALE STEGANALYSIS
Suppose that a steganalyst is monitoring a large network,
with multiple users and many potentially suspect communica-
tions. For example, they might be scanning all the images
on a social media site for hidden content, or acting as a
corporate firewall to prevent data exfiltration. We identify four
requirements for a steganalysis system:
Universality. The steganalyst may not know what steganog-
raphy algorithm is being used on the network. As much as
possible, their detector should be able to identify unknown
or new embedding methods, with unknown sizes of payload.
Most existing steganalysis methods do not have this property
(see Subsection III-D for a survey of prior art).
Robustness. If the steganalyst has some training data,
they cannot ensure that it comes from an identical source
to that used by the actors they are monitoring. As much as
possible, their detector should not suffer unpredictably from
cover-source mismatch. Again, existing steganalysis methods
generally fail this condition [27].
Multiple actor. The network has multiple users, some
(most) of them innocent of steganographic embedding, but
each with a slightly different cover source. The detector needs
to determine who is guilty, not necessarily which of their
objects specifically contain payload. No previous steganalysis
methods have considered this case. Exactly what output is
required depends on the situation: it might be known that at
least one guilty actor exists, or not, and it might be required
to obtain a probability of guilt for each or simply a ranking.
In this paper we assume that it is sufficient to rank the actors
in order of likeliness of guilt.
Multiple object. Each actor emits many objects. For inno-
cent actors, all of their objects are plain covers. For guilty
actors, some (not necessarily all) of them contain payload.
The detector must aggregate the evidence in the objects, and
this is the pooled steganalysis problem from [14], which has
not yet been addressed successfully.
We also require a certain computational efficiency, ideally
linear in the number of objects captured from the network.
Large-scale monitoring, in real-world scenarios, may have to
cope with vast amounts of intercepted data.
Naturally, we expect some penalty for universality and
robustness: a hypothetical detector for single images with
these properties would likely be inferior to existing binary
classification steganalysis when tested under laboratory con-
ditions (known algorithm and payload size, no mismatch).
However, we are able to turn the large-scale situation, with
multiple actors and objects, to our advantage. More evidence
is available: of individual actor’s guilt, of the behaviour of
innocent actors, and (crucially) of how much innocent actors
sources tend to differ from each other. As with the original
pooled steganalysis problem, the difficulty is how to aggregate
the evidence.
III. DETECTING ANOMALOUS ACTORS
Our proposed detector identifies actors that significantly
deviate from the majority. We assume the scenario of multiple
actors each emitting multiple objects, all of which are seen
by the detector, who also knows which actor sent what.
In the discussion below, we assume that the objects are digital
images, but the same system could be used for any domain
with good steganalytic features.
The detector works in three steps: first, extracting standard
steganalytic features from all objects; second, calculating
distances between each pair of actors based on the cloud
of feature points that they have emitted; third, identifying
actors deviating from the majority using an anomaly measure
computed from the distances. If steganalytic features are
sensitive to hidden payload, and relatively insensitive to other
characteristics of the objects, then an actor’s deviation is
evidence of their guilt: the steganographer is the outlier. These
three steps are now described in detail, with a discussion of
the design choices to be made by the steganalyst.
A. Features
The detector extracts features from every image transmitted
by every actor. The steganalyst’s first design decision is to
select a suitable feature set: in theory, a detector should work
with any steganalytic features sensitive to embedding changes
and relatively insensitive to image content.
In experiments performed in this paper, which use JPEG
images, we have chosen so-called PF274 features [28],
because they reliably detect the steganographic algorithms
used (described in Subsection IV-B), their extraction is fast,
and they have good signal to noise ratio. In other work we have
shown that the detector works with high dimensional features
as well [20], but due to their sensitivity to image content, they
have to be made robust with respect to it [31].
Once features are extracted from all images, the steganalyst
must pre-process them, to make the contribution of each
feature equal and hence the distance (below) meaningful.
We determined (see Section VI-A) that a global whitening
works best. The whitening projects features into a new space,
of slightly lower dimension, where features are uncorrelated
and they have unit variance in each direction. The base of
the projection space is found by eigenvalue decomposition of
the features’ covariance matrix (the same operation is used in
principal component analysis) calculated from all images. For
numerical stability, projections with corresponding eigenvalues
smaller than 0.01 (see Section VI-A) are discarded.
B. Distance Between Actors
We propose to measure distance between actors using an
empirical Maximum Mean Discrepancy (MMD) [9], which
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is a measure of similarity between probability distributions.
It has the useful property that it can be estimated robustly, even
for high dimensional probability distributions, from relatively
little data. MMD corresponds to an L2 distance in some
Hilbert space implicitly defined through a positive definite
kernel function κ(x, y) : Rd × Rd → R (if pre-processed
features are real and of dimension d). Popular kernels include
the linear kernel κ(x, y) = xT y and the Gaussian kernel
κ(x, y) = exp(−γ ‖x − y‖2), where γ is the inverse kernel
width. Assuming n samples {xi }ni=1 and {yi}ni=1, pre-processed
feature vectors from actors X and Y , a sample estimate of the
MMD distance has the following simple form
MMD(X, Y ) = 1(n
2
) ∑
1≤i< j≤n
κ(xi , x j )
− κ(x j , yi ) − κ(xi , y j ) + κ(yi , y j ). (1)
An adjustment can be made when the number of samples is
different between X and Y , for which we refer to the original
publication [9].
The above formula requires O(n2) computations, where n is
the number of images emitted by each actor. This is undesir-
able for large-scale application, but a simple approximation
is available: in case of a the linear kernel, MMD converges
with n → ∞ to ‖x¯ − y¯‖22, the L2 norm between the actors’
centroids x¯ and y¯ in the feature space (see Appendix B).
We call this the centroid ‘kernel’ (it is not really a kernel,
but an asymptotic approximation) and use it extensively in
our experiments because it can be computed in O(n) time.
The influence of the MMD kernel on the quality of detection
is studied in greater detail in Section VI-B.
C. Anomaly Detector
Once distances between actors are calculated, we iden-
tify outlying actors. From the plethora of outlier detection
methods [3], we have chosen the local outlier factor (LOF)
method [2], as it has several desirable features: (a) it detects
outliers in probability distributions with clusters of different
densities; (b) the provided anomaly score is interpretable, as
values around one corresponds to true ‘inliers’ and values
greater than two correspond to outliers. Given a set P of points
(actors) with a metric d : P × P → [0,∞) and an integer
parameter 1 < k < |P|, the LOF is calculated as follows.1
The reachability distance of point p from q , rk(p, q), is
the greater of d(p, q) and d(q, q ′), where q ′ is q’s k-nearest
neighbour. Compared with the metric d , the reachability
distance reduces statistical fluctuations for close objects, with
smoothing controlled by the parameter k.
Fix a point p, and write Pk for the k-nearest neighbourhood
of p in P . The local reachability density of p is defined as
an inverse of the average reachability distance of point p from
all points q ∈ Pk ,
lrdk(p) =
(
1
k
∑
q∈Pk
rk(p, q)
)−1
,
1For this exposition we assume no exact duplicates in P or exactly tied dis-
tances between members of P , which simplifies the description considerably.
For full details, see the original publication [2].
and the local outlier factor (LOF) of p is
lofk(p) =
1
k
∑
q∈Pk
lrdk(q)
lrdk(p)
.
Thus lofk(p) captures the degree to which p is further from
its k-nearest neighbours than they are from theirs. Defining it
as a relative number means that it does not depend on absolute
values of distances d(p, q).
The original publication recommends k = 10, and we
have used this value throughout all experiments except in
Section VI-C. The results will show that the optimal value of k
depends on the number of guilty actors and their embedding
strategies. The LOF calculation is quadratic in the number
of actors (as it must compute and rank all pairwise distances)
which is slightly undesirable, but the number of actors is likely
to be orders of magntitude smaller than the number of images.
By design, this detector works (only) for a multi-actor,
multi-image scenario. And because it is completely unsuper-
vised, it cannot suffer from mismatch between training and
testing data. Thus our requirement of robustness is automat-
ically met. It remains to demonstrate that it works and has
good universality.
D. Relation to Prior Art
The vast majority of published work on steganalysis attacks
a different problem: analysis of one image at a time. The
first work proposing to investigate multiple images from a one
actor was [14]: it describes different strategies of aggregating
detection results from individual images to find whether one
actor is guilty or not. Although the work assumes a targeted
detector for a single image, it could be used with universal
steganalyzer as well. It does not consider the scenario of
multiple actors.
Universal steganalysis, where the steganalyst does not know
the embedding algorithm, is a largely neglected field of
research. Probably the first work in this field was [25], which
modelled distribution of cover images by one-class SVM and
classified deviations as stego images. The problem was further
studied in [30], where it is shown that universal steganalyzers
are sensitive to what is now called cover-source mismatch.
To the best of our knowledge, the large-scale steganalysis
scenario described here has not been attacked at all, except
in our prior work [16]–[18]. Combining the universal single-
image steganalyzer [30] with aggregation methods published
in [14] is the only prior art we can find. We compare our
detector to it in Section V-B.
IV. SIMULATING THE REAL WORLD
We wish to validate this new detection paradigm, in a
situation which mimics as much as possible a real-world net-
work scanning problem. We therefore selected covers, stegano-
graphic embedding methods, and strategies for guilty actors
to allocate payload between covers, to mimic a hypothetical
steganographer inserting payload into social media images.
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A. Cover Images
The images were obtained from a leading social network
site, which is popular for sharing pictures. Such a service could
provide an ideal steganographic channel, because uploading
and downloading many images should not raise suspicion.
We used a web crawler to download all public images
from users who identified themselves as members of Oxford
University. We stopped after downloading more than 4 million
images from more than 70 000 users. All personally iden-
tifiable information was removed, and the files anonymized
except for grouping images uploaded by the same user. The
actors in our experiments are the uploaders, which mimic
well the behaviour of real-world actors: sometimes a single
actor uses two or three cameras. In the experiments described
here, we used a randomly selected subset of 4000 actors and
200 images for each actor, for a total of 800 000 images.
At the time of crawling, the social networking site automat-
ically resized large images, to approximately 1Mpix, and then
JPEG compressed them with quality factor 85. This simplifies
steganalysis, since it is known that steganalytic features are
very sensitive to different quantisation matrices [29], but does
introduce a second compression (if the files were originally
uploaded as JPEGs); double compression is usually considered
a difficult nuisance parameter in steganalysis [29].
Apart from a fairly uniform size and completely uniform
quality factor, the images in the database are very diverse,
as they (a) come from different sources (cameras, flatbed
scanners), (b) are of different types (indoor party pictures,
cities, outdoor nature scenes, etc.), and (c) underwent different
image processing from acquisition to download. Some of them
are not natural images at all, but synthetic images or mosaics.
Most steganalysis literature would perform experiments on
images with such “impurities” removed, but we did not remove
them: the impurities are there in practice and these images are
a good prototype for what might be expected when monitoring
a real network. Their proportion in the database should reflect
the proportion we can expect in the wild, since it was crawled
from a real-world source.
B. Embedding Algorithms
In our experiments, we have used the following five
steganographic algorithms: F5 [38], [39], F5 with shrinkage
removed by wet paper codes and matrix embedding turned
off (nsF5), JPHide&Seek [23], OutGuess [32], [33], and
Steghide [10], [11]. These algorithms have diverse embedding
mechanisms, software implementations are all publicly avail-
able (except for nsF5 where only a simulator exists), and they
do not utilise side information in the form of the raw image.
Thus they could be applied by a non-expert. Furthermore,
there is copious evidence that these embedding methods can
be detected by the chosen steganalytic feature set. Below, the
ideas behind each algorithm are briefly described. For further
details we refer to the original publications.
OutGuess [32] is an improved version of JSteg [37].
OutGuess inserts the message by using standard LSB
replacement, while it avoids changing zeros and ones.
Since this embedding operation changes the first-order
histogram of DCT coefficients, OutGuess reserves some DCT
coefficients to restore, approximately, the first order histogram.
By doing so, OutGuess performs approximately twice as
many changes as JSteg, which makes the algorithm more
detectable by methods (features) modelling higher order
dependencies.
Unlike OutGuess, F5 [38] does not try to preserve the first-
order histogram of DCT coefficients. Instead, it preserves the
shape of the histogram, making it similar to that of the cover
image. The message is embedded by changing the absolute
values of DCT coefficients toward zero. DCT coefficients
equal to zero are skipped, and if the coefficient is changed
to zero during embedding, it is skipped as well and a new one
is utilised for re-embedding. The F5 algorithm was also the
first algorithm to use matrix embedding, a coding scheme that
increases embedding efficiency, here measured as the number
of bits embedded per embedding change.
Steghide [11] tries to preserve first-order statistics, but with-
out making additional embedding changes like OutGuess. The
algorithm starts by constructing a graph, where each vertex
corresponds to a group of pixels that need to be changed. The
weight of an edge between two vertices is proportional to the
distortion caused by modification of both vertices such that
they code the message. During the embedding, the algorithm
finds the partition of the graph minimising the cost, subject to
the chosen message being coded.
Despite the C source code for JPHide&Seek being avail-
able, its method of operation has not been described. To our
knowledge, the algorithm has not been published in any
scientific or other paper.
The nsF5 algorithm uses the same type of embedding
changes as the F5 algorithm. To avoid introducing more
zeros (the shrinkage effect), nsF5 uses wet paper codes
with improved efficiency [6]. The experiments in this paper
used the version of the algorithm from 2008, which sim-
ulates the embedding efficiency of particular wet paper
codes; this differs from the version currently published
by the author, which simulates the theoretically-optimal
efficiency.
C. Embedding Strategies
Embedding in multiple images poses new problems, origi-
nally described in [14]. The steganographer must choose how
to spread a message of total length M bits into n covers
(X1, . . . , Xn) with capacities (c1, . . . , cn) by using the cho-
sen steganographic algorithm. We distinguish the embedding
strategy, which allocates payload amongst objects, from the
embedding algorithm which inserts the payload steganograph-
ically.
In [17], we have identified five simple strategies to break
the message into fragments of lengths (m1, . . . , mn) such that
M = ∑ni=1 mi . Since one of the strategies had little practical
value, we omit it here. None of the strategies is theoretically
optimal, and indeed the batch steganography problem has
not been solved. We have chosen strategies that could be
applied by a non-expert, similarly to our choice of embedding
algorithms.
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The greedy strategy tries to use as few images as possible.
The steganographer chooses the cover with highest capacity,
and embeds part of his message up to maximum capacity.
If more message remains, he repeats with the cover of next
highest capacity, until the whole message is embedded.
If the images are ordered by capacity so that c1 ≥
c2 ≥ . . . ≥ cn , this leads to the following message lengths:
mi = ci , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , I − 1},
mI = M −
I−1∑
i=1
mi ,
mi = 0, ∀i ∈ {I + 1, . . . , n},
where I denotes the smallest possible number of images with
sufficient capacity, i.e.
I = arg min
i
M ≤
i∑
j=1
c j .
The maximum strategy is a variation of the greedy strategy,
where the images for embedding are selected in random
order and used to full capacity. This simulates a case of a
steganographer who is not able to estimate capacity until they
embed.
The linear strategy distributes the message into all
available covers proportionately to their capacity. This means
that
mi = ci M∑n
j=1 c j
.
(Fractional bits are ignored in this study.)
In the even strategy, the message is distributed evenly into
all available covers regardless of their capacity. Thus
mi = M
n
.
For relatively large payloads and covers of uneven capacity,
sometimes mi exceeds ci . In this cases, we set mi = ci
and recalculate an even message length for the remaining
images.
We do not consider, in this work, how the receiver is to
reconstruct the original message. The allocation of payload
might be part of a shared secret key, or stored in the first few
bits of payload in a fixed position.
V. MAIN EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We simulated large-scale steganalysis using tens of thou-
sands of experiments. In each experiment, we randomly
selected NA actors out of the 4000 in our data set, and NI
images from each actor. Exactly one guilty actor is simulated,
by using the chosen embedding algorithm (from Subsec-
tion IV-B) and embedding strategy (Subsection IV-C) to insert
of payload size np, where 0 ≤ p < 0.25 and n is the total
number of nonzero coefficients in their images. Thus p is the
number of bits per nonzero coefficient (bpnc). It is important
to measure the payload size relative to a fixed quantity, not to
the capacity of an individual embedding algorithm, otherwise
the results are incomparable. We then calculate features from
each of the NA NI images, MMD between each pair of actors,
and LOF scores for each actor.
For each combination of parameters, each experiment is
repeated 500 times with a different selection of actors and
guilty actor. We need a benchmark to reflect how well the
guilty actor is identified, and we have chosen the average
rank of the guilty actor. An average rank of one corresponds
to perfect detection — the guilty actor is always ranked most
suspicious — and an average rank of NA+12 corresponds to ran-
dom guessing. We would not expect a universal, unsupervised
detector to achieve perfect accuracy, but instead hope that it
provides intelligence by ranking a truly guilty actor amongst
the top 5-10%, say, of all actors.
A. Detecting Different Algorithms
We first demonstrate that the proposed detector is
capable of detecting a wide range of algorithms (it has
good universality). We tested NA ∈ {100, 400, 1600} actors
with NI = 100 images each, and every combination
of embedding algorithm and strategy from subsects. IV-B
and IV-C. The steganalyser used the centroid ‘kernel’ for the
MMD distance measure, whitening of raw features (more on
this in Subsection VI-A), and the LOF parameter k = 10.
The average ranks of the true guilty actor, when hiding
payloads p ∈ {0.025, 0.05, . . . , 0.25}, are shown in Figure 1.
Our first observation is that the method works, when the
total payload is large enough. There are differences between
embedding algorithms (it confirms the known relative secu-
rity of the embedding algorithms [28], that nsF5 is most
secure and OutGuess/Steghide least secure) and between
embedding strategies, but the overall pattern is consistent.
With weaker embedding algorithms, perfect identification of
the guilty actor is achievable around 0.1–0.2 bpnc payload
sizes; perfect detection is not observed with nsF5 and F5,
but the guilty actor is consistantly ranked as one of the
2–6 most suspicious out of 100. Monitoring larger number
of actors does not substantially change the results, except
that the average rank of the guilty actor apparently scales
slightly sublinearly with the total number of actors NA .
A similar phenomenon was observed in [17], using a different
metric for the anomaly detector, and this finding would seem
favourable for large-scale steganalysis, but it has not yet been
explained.
Second, we observe that the greedy strategy is consistently
the most secure for the embedder: the average rank of the
guilty actor is higher, in all algorithms and payloads. We
will later show that this is only true when the steganalyst
uses the centroid ‘kernel’. The second most secure strategy is
maximum, except in the case of F5 where the matrix embed-
ding induces a nonlinear relationship between payload size
and steganographic distortion. The linear strategy is next, and
even is most insecure. The reason that the greedy/maximum
strategy is more secure than linear/even has been explained
in detail in our prior work [17].2 In brief, this effect is
caused by whitening the features in the pre-processing stage.
2In [17] the greedy and maximum strategies are called max-greedy and
max-random, respectively.
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Fig. 1. Performance of the proposed detector: from top to bottom, five different embedding algorithms; from left to right, different numbers of actors NA
(NI = 100 in each case); lines in each chart denote different embedding strategies; each x-axis represents total payload (bpnc) and each y-axis represents the
average rank of the truly guilty actor. The detector parameters are: centroid ‘kernel’, whitened features, k = 10.
But, as will be shown in Subsection VI-A, such preprocessing
is needed to achieve good accuracy. We discuss this further
in Section VII.
Because the greedy strategy dominates maximum, and linear
dominates even, in subsequent experiments we will discard the
maximum and even strategies.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of proposed detector with prior art. Each x-axis represents total payload (bpnc) and each y-axis represents the average rank of the truly
guilty actor; left, using the linear strategy; right, using the greedy strategy. In both cases NA = NI = 100, and the detector parameters are: centroid ‘kernel’,
whitened features, k = 10.
B. Comparison With Prior Art
As mentioned above, no other literature addresses the large-
scale steganalysis problem, so there is no direct prior art that
we can compare to. The only method we can identify, for
ranking guilty actors without knowledge of the embedding
algorithm, is a combination of the universal detector proposed
in [30] and pooling strategies described in [14] (which aggre-
gate the scores for each actor).
The universal steganalyzer, here implemented as a one-class
support machine (1-SVM) [34], assigns to each image a score
f (x) = 〈w, x〉H − b, where x is a feature vector of a given
image and (w, b) defines a hyperplane in a Hilbert space H,
which is determined from the training data. Following [14],
we implemented two pooling strategies to rank the guiltiness
of each actor from the scores of their images: (i) we calculated
the average score
1
n
n∑
i=1
f (xi ),
or (ii) we calculated the number of positive scores (number of
images classified as outliers)
#{xi | f (xi ) > 0}.
There may well be better methods for aggregation, but the
literature does not yet contain them.
The 1-SVMs were trained on 6000 cover images from
60 actors; the pool of actors used for this training was
disjoint from, but from the same social media source as,
all the other experiments in the paper. To avoid bias from
picking a particularly good or poor set of training images, we
trained 20 different 1-SVMs, on different cover examples, and
picked one of the machines at random for each experiment.
The 1-SVM hyperparameters were ν = 0.01 (proportion of
outliers) and γ (width of Gaussian kernel) using the follow-
ing common heuristic: inverse median of squared distances
between cover images (features) in the training set. The
features were normalised to have zero mean and unit variance.
Note the distinction between the method presented in this
paper, which is completely untrained, and the use of 1-SVMs,
which do require cover training data.
The average rank of the guilty actor, hiding payloads
p ∈ {0.025, 0.05, . . . , 0.25} using only the nsF5 algorithm and
greedy/linear strategies, is shown in Figure 2. The steganalyst
used the two aggregations of 1-SVM scores, or the proposed
detector with the same settings as in the previous subsection.
Here NA = 100 and NI = 100 (similar results are observed,
but not included here, with other combinations of parameter).
The graphs clearly show that the proposed solution is substan-
tially more accurate than prior art (except for tiny payloads
when both are guessing randomly), which is not aggregating
effectively the evidence from the multiple images.
VI. SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERIMENTS
The detector described in Section III has several hyperpa-
rameters, which influence its performance. In the previous
section, we used parameters based on our previous experi-
ments published in [16] and [18]. Here, we re-examine the
choices one-by-one.
Unless otherwise indicated, all experiments in this section
share the same setting of one guilty actor emitting a payload
of 0.1 bpnc, using nsF5 algorithm and the greedy or linear
strategy. The steganalyst uses the proposed detector with
whitened features, the centroid ‘kernel’, and LOF parameter
k = 10. NI = 100 and NA ∈ {100, 400, 1600}.
A. Pre-Processing
The pre-processing of features has a significant impact
on the accuracy of detection. In steganalysis literature a
common pre-processing is normalisation, where each feature
is individually scaled to have zero mean and unit variance
(usually across the cover training set). The goal is to prevent
features with high variance from dominating other, perhaps
more informative, features of low variance. In this application
it is essential, so that the MMD distances are meaningful and
not dominated by noisy components.
For additional stabilization, one can also apply whitening
(principal component transform), to decorrelate the features
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Fig. 3. The effect of different feature pre-processing. From left to right, different numbers of actors NA (NI = 100 in each case); lines in each chart denote
different pre-processing options and embedding strategy; each x-axis represents total payload (bpnc) and each y-axis represents the average rank of the truly
guilty actor. The embedder uses nsF5 embedding. The other detector parameters are: centroid ‘kernel’, k = 10.
Fig. 4. The effect of the number of components retained after whitening. From left to right, different numbers of actors NA (NI = 100 in each case); lines
in each chart denote different embedding strategy; each x-axis denotes the number of components kept for the LOF analysis, and each y-axis represents the
average rank of the truly guilty actor. The embedder uses nsF5 embedding with total payload 0.2 bpnc. The other detector parameters are: centroid ‘kernel’,
k = 10.
(again, usually on the cover training set); in this application,
because equally-scaled components are essential, we further
apply normalization after whitening.
Figure 3 shows the performance of the detector, when the
steganalyst uses unprocessed (raw), normalised, and whitened
features. In all situations (different embedding strategies of
the guilty actor, different number of actors) the raw features
are near-useless, confirming the importance of equal scaling of
features in the anomaly detector: a different situation may hold
in supervised classifiers, where the training phase can learn to
ignore noisy features. Whitened features are consistently the
best option. Surprisingly, with an increasing number of actors,
the advantage of whitening over normalization decreases.
In image recognition applications, principal component
analysis (PCA) is frequently used as a denoising filter, dis-
carding components corresponding to small eigenvalues in
the correlation matrix. We use the same in our application,
applying it to all feature vectors pooled across all actors in
each experiment, and discarding the components with low
eigenvalue after whitening the features. In the previous exper-
iments we discarded such components with corresponding
eigenvalues lower than 0.01, as we expected them to carry
noise. But is this really a sensible choice? Figure 4 shows
the average rank of the guilty user, as we vary the number
of components retained after whitening: the components were
sorted from those highest eigenvalue (variance) to lowest, and
we kept only the highest. The results show that better accuracy
is acheived when most components are used; for large number
of actors the improvement is very negligible and it looks like
that the optimum is near, but not quite at, the maximum of
retaining all 274 components. Due to the difficulty of finding
this maximum in advance, and for good numerical stability,
we suggest continuing to use the eigenvalue threshold 0.01.
B. Kernel
The kernel function used in the calculation of MMD dis-
tance underpins the entire system. Thus far we have used
the centroid ‘kernel’, which approximates the linear kernel
κ(x, y) = xT y, because it has linear time complexity. Exper-
iments in [18] report its superiority with respect to other
kernels, but only one embedding strategy was examined.
There is reason to believe that alternative kernels
should have advantages against certain embedding strategies.
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Fig. 5. The effect of the MMD kernel. The x-axis denotes strategies
interpolating smoothly between greedy (left) and linear (right), the y-axis the
average rank of the truly guilty actor. The different lines indicate diffeerent
kernels. Here NA = NI = 100, the payload is 0.2 bpnc and the embedding
is by nsF5, the features were whitened, and the LOF parameter k = 10.
To summarise the argument in [17]: because of noisy com-
ponents, steganalysis features per object are distorted by
an amount sublinear in the payload, and the linear kernel
only agglomerates this distortion linearly. Hence the apparent
superiority of the greedy strategy. But consider some of
the theoretical steganography work on small payloads: in
principle, distortion relating to statistical detectability (KL
divergence) is locally quadratic in the payload size [5]. Thus a
kernel which captures such distortion would be more powerful
against the greedy strategy. This motivates us to examine
polynomial kernels k(x, y) = (xT y)2 (quadratic, which should
be powerful against the greedy strategy) and k(x, y) = (xT y)3
(cubic), as well as Gaussian k(x, y) = exp(−γ ‖x − y‖2). The
problem of setting γ is treated in more detail in Appendix A.
We also investigated higher-order polynomials, but the results
were weak and are not included here.
For a more fine-grained analysis of embedding strategy, we
used methods which apply linear embedding to the greatest-
capacity proportion P of the guilty actor’s images. For
small P , this is equivalent to the greedy strategy (maximum
payload in fewest covers); for P = 100% it is the linear
strategy, and in between it exchanges size of payload-per-
image for number of images used. The average rank of the
guilty actor, when testing each kernel against strategies for
various P , is shown in Figure 5. The results validate our
theory that the embedding strategies have a detection counter-
strategy: for low P (greedy) the quadratic kernel is indeed
most accurate, while for high P it is the Gaussian kernel
with best performance. Our use of the centroid ‘kernel’ was
slightly sub-optimal, in that it is dominated by the Gaussian
or quadratic kernels, but the difference between centroid and
Gaussian is not so great as to outweigh the benefits of its linear
time complexity.
As predicted in [14] and [15], we find a two-player game
between the embedder and detector. We could define the
TABLE I
THE AVERAGE RANK OF 1, 2, 4, OR 8 GUILTY ACTORS USING EITHER
LINEAR OR GREEDY STRATEGY. THE DETECTOR VARIES THE NEAREST
NEIGHBOUR PARAMETER k IN THE LOF METHOD. HERE NA =
NI = 100, THE PAYLOAD IS 0.2 BPNC, THE EMBEDDING IS
BY NSF5, AND THE FEATURES WERE WHITENED.
THE LAST ROW CAPTIONED “PERFECT” SHOWS
THE AVERAGE RANK OF A PERFECT DETECTOR
zero-sum payoff to be the average rank of the guilty actor.
In that case we can even, purely for illustration, use standard
linear-programming techniques to compute the equilibrium
strategies from our empirical data. It turns out that both players
should use mixed (randomized) strategies to avoid being
exploited by their opponent: the embedder should pick the
greedy or linear strategy at random, with probability approx-
imately 0.52 and 0.48, respectively (intermediate options are
dominated), while the detector should pick the Gaussian kernel
with probability 0.27, and quadratic with probability 0.73.
The average rank is then approximately 6.9. Of course, these
strategies are only optimal within the narrow confines of this
game, in particular for this embedding algorithm, payload size,
number of images, and number of actors, and other possible
kernels or embedding strategies may change the results. The
game theory of steganography is still in its infancy [36], and
has not reached the batch steganography case.
C. Multiple Guilty Actors, Effect of k
Thus far, our experiments have simulated only one guilty
actor, and the number of nearest neighbours in LOF method
was set to k = 10, as recommended in [2]. If there are
multiple guilty actors in a tight cluster then the optimal choice
of k depends on the size of that cluster: too small a value
k causes the cluster to be deemed ‘normal’, too large will
smooth out its anomaly level. To briefly investigate this, we
vary the number of guilty actors from {1, 2, 4, 8} out of a
total of NA = 100 actors, and tested k ∈ {2, 4, 6, . . . , 20}. We
compute the same metric: average rank of the guilty actor.
The results in Table I reveal that smaller values of k are
slightly more accurate for detecting a single guilty actor, and
larger values better for detecting more actors. This suggests
that the guilty actors indeed form some sort of cluster, which
would probably not happen if the guilty actors used different
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embedding methods or strategies (we postpone such further
experiments to future work). The default value of k = 10,
which we have used in this paper, seems to be a good
compromise, but the optimal k depends also on the embedding
strategy used by the guilty actors, introducing another potential
game between embedder and detector.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a first method for addressing a new
and realistic problem in steganalysis: detecting the guilty
actor, rather than individual image, in the setting of network
monitoring when there are many actors and images to consider.
To our knowledge this is the first work to address this problem
or the pooled steganalysis problem [14], and the first to use
MMD in steganalysis detection. A key element is to turn some
of the difficulties in the problem – the large number of users
and images – to our advantage by calibrating the behaviour
of outliers against that of the majority, allowing completely
unsupervised detection.
Our experiments, which simulated embedding and detection
in 100−1600 actors, each transmitting 100 images,3 repeated
thousands of times with different combinations of embedding
parameters, payload size, and detection parameters.
Essential to every modern steganalysis method are the
features that drive it. We used a well-established feature set,
which is not one of the recent “rich model” [7], [13], [20]
feature sets that have been published recently, for two reasons.
First, for experiments on such a scale it is essential that the
features be calculated quickly and the many-thousand dimen-
sional rich model features are not quick to extract. Second,
and a subject of our current work, is that larger feature sets
perform worse when plugged into the same anomaly detection
framework despite being considerably more effective in tradi-
tional binary steganalysis. We have examined this phenomenon
and it is an unavoidable consequence of unsupervised learning:
there is no way to discard or weight down the weaker features
in a training phase, so the anomaly detector is overwhelmed
by noise. It illustrates that the design of good features for
the standard binary-classification steganalysis, where extra
features are essentially free of cost, does not translate well
into an unsupervised case. Our current work involves partially-
supervised dimensionality reduction to focus the power of
large feature sets into a smaller set which is suitable for
unsupervised anomaly detection [31].
We also tested only well-understood embedding algorithms
which have long been known to be detectable by statistical
analysis, and naive embedding strategies with little or no
adaptive allocation of payload between images. Again this
is required for experimental efficiency, but we were also
motivated by simulating a “real-world” steganographer who
uses tools currently easily available on the internet. For the
same reason we used a large image set downloaded from social
media. Our method, however, is applicable to any embedding
method where the features are more sensitive to stego content
3Further experiments with as few as 20 and as many as 200 images were
performed, but the results were so similar to those presented here that we do
not include them.
Fig. 6. Effect of the Gaussian kernel width. The embedder uses nsF5
embedding with total payload 0.2 bpnc, the features have been whitened,
and the LOF parameter is k = 10.
than payload content, and it would be very surprising if even
the most recent adaptive embedding methods [4], [12] were
not detectable, albeit at higher payloads because of their lower
distortion, than their simpler ancestors tested here.
Although we have investigated good parameters (feature
preprocessing, kernel, LOF parameter) for the detector, this
demonstrated the game at the heart of steganography and
steganalysis: fixed (known) choices by the embedder allows
the detector to tune parameters to enhance accuracy, whereas
fixed (known) choices by the detector allow the embedding to
tune their parameters to reduce detection accuracy. We cannot
solve such games until all the options, for embedder and
detector, are properly understood, but in the future we might
hope to find both equilibria and, more practically usefully,
conservative minimax strategies for each player.
Other future work should be to examine more closely the
cases of multiple guilty actors, as well as the case of zero
guilty actors: throughout this paper we assumed that at least
one actor was guilty, which may not be true in application.
Ideally we would like to estimates the probability of guilt
for each actor, which is a known and difficult problem in
anomaly detection. Another direction might be to use mul-
tiple anomaly detectors instead of a single LOF, hoping that
diversity amongst outlier-detection methods will lead to better
results, but this runs into the known, nontrivial, problem of
aggregating scores [22].
APPENDIX
A. Gaussian Kernel Width
The quality of detection with the Gaussian MMD kernel
κ(x, y) = exp(−γ ‖x − y‖2) depends on the choice of γ ,
and a wrong choice can decrease the performance. With
the recommendation of [35], we investigated γ in a range
around γ0, the latter defined as the inverse of the median
squared distances between (whitened) image features. We set
γ = γ0 · γ1 where γ1 ∈ {10n|n ∈ {−3,−2, . . . , 3}}. Fixing on
a payload of 0.2 bpnc, the nsF5 embedding algorithm, and the
greedy and linear strategies, we tested all such γ and display
the results in Fig. 6.
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Because of the connections between linear and Gaussian
kernel with small γ (see Appendix B), it is not surprising that
small kernel γ does not penalise the performance very much;
large γ causes performance to decrease to random guessing
because the MMD calculations are dominated by outliers in
the feature point clouds of each actor. The optimum is indeed
around the default γ = γ0 in each case.
B. Connections Between Kernels
We have used primarily the centroid ‘kernel’; here we
demonstrate its connection with the true linear kernel, and
also the Gaussian kernel for large kernel width.
First, use symmetry of the kernel to write
MMDlinear(X, Y ) = 1
n(n − 1)
×
∑
1≤i = j≤n
xTi x j − 2xTi y j + yTi y j .
Then we expand
MMDcentroid(X, Y )
=
(1
n
∑
i
xi − 1
n
∑
i
yi
)T(1
n
∑
i
xi − 1
n
∑
i
yi
)
= 1
n2
∑
i, j
xTi x j − 2xTi y j + yTi y j
= n
n − 1 MMDlinear(X, Y ) +
1
n2
∑
i
(xTi − yi )(xi − yi).
This demonstrates that the centroid ‘kernel’ approximates the
true linear MMD for large n.
Now let k be the Gaussian kernel with inverse width γ , then
k(x, y) = 1 − γ ‖x − y‖2 + O(γ 2),
so that for small γ we have
MMDGaussian(X, Y ) ≈ γ
n(n − 1)
∑
1≤i = j≤n
2‖xi − y j‖2
−‖xi − x j‖2 − ‖yi − y j‖2.
The first term measures average distances between the distrib-
utions X and Y , and the other terms measure average distances
within them. Indeed, if the xi (respectively yi ) are drawn from
any multivariate distribution with mean μx (μy) and finite
covariance matrix 6x (6y) then elementary calculations give
E
[‖xi − y j‖2] = Tr(6x + 6y) + ‖μx − μy‖2,
E
[‖xi − x j‖2] = 2 Tr(6x ),
E
[‖yi − y j‖2] = 2 Tr(6y),
and hence by the law of large numbers MMDGaussian(X, Y ) →
γ ·MMDcentroid(X, Y )+ O(γ 2) as n → ∞. The LOF method
is scale insensitive, so the factor γ has no effect on it. This
explains the behaviour seen in Fig. 6.
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Network Traffic Fingerprinting Based on
Approximated Kernel Two-Sample Test
Jan Kohout and Tomáš Pevný
Abstract— Many applications and communication protocols
exhibit unique communication patterns that can be exploited
to identify them in network traffic. This paper proposes a
method to represent these patterns compactly, such that they
can be used in different analytical tasks. The method treats
each communication as a set of observations of a random
variable with unknown probability distribution. This view allows
us to derive the representation from a distance between two
probability distributions used in maximum mean discrepancy—
a non-parametric kernel test. The representation (and distance)
can be then easily used in various algorithms for identification
of communicating application and data analysis, independently
of the specific type of input data.
Index Terms— Communication fingerprinting, maximum mean
discrepancy, application identification.
I. INTRODUCTION
IDENTIFICATION of applications based on informationobtained by monitoring their network traffic is a well
established problem in the network security domain. Know-
ing which application is communicating with which server
improves the understanding of a monitored network, resulting
into more precise identification of infected computers and
better enforcement of policies, because in some enterprises,
the use of specific types of programs is against policy. Even
though approaches relying on content inspection (also known
as deep packet inspection, DPI) are still widely used ( [1]–[8]),
the need of lightweight methods not inspecting the content
has been recognized by both the industry and the research
community. This need is currently driven by the increased
adoption of encryption, which is on the rise and which compli-
cates content inspection. Furthermore, the constant growth of
network traffic volume makes content inspection prohibitively
expensive, because detection systems should work in real-time.
It has turned out that the identification of applications from
their communication does not always require to inspect the
content ([9]–[15]). As these works show, it is often sufficient
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to observe just basic features of flows or packets based on their
sizes and timing to distinguish individual protocols or applica-
tions with acceptable accuracy. This is because most applica-
tions and protocols have unique statistical distributions of these
variables, which allows to use machine learning algorithms
to solve problems of interest, e.g. distinguishing applications
based on their network footprint. This brings the need to
represent the distributions in a compact way so that they
can be effectively handled by the algorithms. Many works
solve this by using either aggregate statistics (e.g., mean, vari-
ance or entropy) to represent the distributions or by capturing
marginal distributions of observed features ([15]–[19]). This
can reduce the amount of information about the distribution
that the representation is able to capture. Moreover, these
representations are often suited for specific scenarios and
adapting them to different setups might demand considerable
effort.
This work presents a framework for fingerprinting repeated
communication over the network. The proposed fingerprint
effectively captures joint distribution of features and represents
them in a compact way. It consists of a single vector of fixed
dimension designed such that the Euclidean distance between
fingerprints approximates Maximum Mean Discrepancy [20],
a well established measure of similarity of two probability
distributions observed through a set of finite number of sam-
ples. The advantage of the proposed fingerprint is (i) strong
theoretical justification, (ii) finite dimension of the fingerprint,
which allows it to be used with most contemporary machine
learning algorithms, and (iii) easy adaption of the framework
to new data with different features. The experimental eval-
uation reveals that the proposed representation outperforms
methods adopted from previous works, it can successfully
handle different types of data (packets and flows), and is
generally usable in a detection system relying on machine
learning algorithms.
The main contribution of this work is the efficient approxi-
mation of the Maximum Mean Discrepancy measure described
in Section II and the representation of a set of observations
as a single real vector of finite dimension. This makes the
proposed representation scalable and usable beyond the field
of network traffic analysis, whenever the sample consists of a
set of observations.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, statistical
fingerprints of communication are defined and their effective
representation is proposed. In Section III, the related work
is reviewed, emphasizing the differences from this work.
1556-6013 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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In Sections IV and V, methods selected from previous works
for comparison are characterized in more detail and datasets
used in evaluation are described. Sections VI and VII are
then devoted to the evaluation, showing applications of the
proposed technique in different scenarios. Finally, the work is
concluded in Section VIII.
II. COMMUNICATION FINGERPRINTING
Before diving into details of the proposed characterization
of a sample of communication as a vector in Euclidean space
of fixed dimension, key terms and notations are introduced.
Definition 1: Message is a basic unit of communication
exchanged between two communicating peers. The exact def-
inition of message is dependent on the level at which the
communication is observed. It can be a single IP-layer or trans-
port layer packet, a transport layer flow or even a request-
response pair in a client-server communication. It is assumed
that each message can be represented as a point m ∈ Rd in
d-dimensional Euclidean space and is characterized by a set
of d features. Attributes of a single message can be its size,
duration (if measurable), or time from the previous message.
However, in general, they can be any features observable and
relevant for messages in the given scenario.
Definition 2: Message set is a set of messages R =
{m1, . . . , mn} sharing the same identifier of the communi-
cation. Again, the specific identifier of the message set is
dependent on the level of observation and it can vary from
a single flow specified by the both communicating endpoints
to entire server specified by its IP address or hostname. For
example, if messages are defined as individual TCP packets,
then a message set can be defined as one TCP flow of packets
that share the same source and destination IPs and ports.
Definitions 1 and 2 are general and inference of the rep-
resentation presented below was made independently of any
specific features observed on messages and or type of com-
munication identifier. Thanks to this the entire fingerprinting
framework can be easily adapted to different scenarios and
sources of data.
For purposes of a message set representation, each message
m ∈ Rd in a message set R is treated as a realization of
a d-dimensional random variable with probability distribution
PR ∈ P , where P is the set of all probability distribution on
the space of messages Rd . The underlying assumption is that
the message set R is fully determined by its distribution PR
followed by its messages. In practice, PR is never precisely
known, but it is observed through that finite set of messages
R = {mi ∈ Rd | i = 1, ..., n} . Naturally, different message
sets might have different cardinalities due to the different
number of observed messages in them.
Assuming the message set R to be fully characterized by
its probability distribution PR ∈ P , the fingerprint of the
message set and a metric between two message sets R1,R2
should reflect distance between two probability distributions
PR1 , PR2 . This would enable to easily compare two message
sets and also paves the road to use algorithms from the rich
state of the art in machine learning to achieve desired goals.
There exists plethora of distances and pseudo-distances on
the space of probability distributions [21]: Kullback-Leibler
divergence, Total Variation, Bhattacharyya distance, Hellinger
distance, and Rényi entropy to name a few. However, the pro-
posed fingerprint is derived from Maximum Mean Discrep-
ancy (MMD) [20], because it can be efficiently estimated
from a small number of observations. Moreover, it enables to
compare joint distributions of features without explicitly esti-
mating their probability density functions. This is important,
because joint distributions can provide rich information about
the features but direct estimation of the probability density
would be often impossible due to demand for extremely high
number of observations. MMD is defined as
MMD(F , PR1 , PR2 )= supf ∈F
{
Ex∼PR1 [ f (x)]−Ey∼PR2 [ f (y)]
}
,
where F is a unit ball in a reproducing kernel Hilbert
space (RKHS)H ( [22], [23]) associated with a kernel function
k : X ×X → R (here X = Rd ). If the kernel is characteristic
([20], [24]), then MMD defines a metric on the space P and
it holds that MMD(F , PR1 , PR2 ) = 0 if and only if PR1 =
PR2 . An example of a characteristic kernel is the Gaussian
kernel used in [20], defined as k(x, y) = exp (−γ ‖x − y‖22) .
As already mentioned, an important advantage of MMD is
that it can be well estimated from a limited set of observations.
Given two message sets R1 = {m1i }n1i=1, R2 = {m2i }n2i=1 (with
distributions PR1 and PR2 ), estimate of MMD2(F , PR1 , PR2)
can be calculated ( [20]) as
MMD2(F ,R1,R2)
= 1
n21
n1,n1∑
i, j=1
k(m1i , m
1
j )
+ 1
n22
n2,n2∑
i, j=1
k(m2i , m2j ) −
2
n2n1
n1,n2∑
i, j=1
k(m1i , m2j ) (1)
The above estimate can be compactly written as the norm of
estimates of means in the Hilbert space H as
MMD2(F ,R1,R2) = ||μ1 − μ2||2H, (2)
where
μ1 = 1
n1
n1∑
i=1
k(m1i , ·), μ2 =
1
n2
n2∑
i=1
k(m2i , ·) (3)
are so called mean maps of the distributions PR1 and PR2 .
Note that the mean map is a function of one real variable,
which is marked by the · symbol in the definitions above.
Therefore, μ(t) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 k(mi , t), t ∈ R. Reader interested
in more details about MMD and its calculation is referred
to [20].
Although the MMD is a theoretically well justified distance,
its practical use is limited due to the excessive computational
and memory requirements. Memory requirements grow lin-
early with the size of R (number of observed messages) and
system’s memory would be quickly exhausted (discarding old
messages should be avoided to prevent loss of information).
Moreover, calculation of the distance between two message
sets R1 and R2 is of order O(max{|R1|, |R2|}2), which is
prohibitive in practice. These constrains motivated the search
for an alternative representation and calculation that would
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approximate the MMD (1) with computational complexity
independent of sizes of individual message sets.
The proposed method approximates the mean maps (3) as
a linear combination of a fixed base set of basis functions
K = {k(li , ·)|i ∈ {1, . . . , |L|}}, where L ⊂ Rd is a set of
points chosen from the same space in which the messages
exist. For now, it is assumed that the set L is already given
and its construction is deferred to the end of this section.
To express given mean map μ in K, i.e. to find coefficients of
basis function amounts α, the following optimization problem
is solved:
α = argminα
∥∥∥∥∥∥
|L|∑
i=1
αi k(li , ·) − μ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
H
(4)
= argminα
∥∥∥∥∥∥
|L|∑
i=1
αi k(li , ·) − 1
n
n∑
j=1
k(m j , ·)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
H
, (5)
where n = |R|. Denoting kernel matrix of points from L as
Ki j = k(li , l j ), K ∈ R|L|,|L| and kernel matrix of points from
L and messages from R as Qi j = k(li , m j ), Q ∈ R|L|,n ,
the solution of (5) is
α = 1
n
K−1Q1n, (6)
where 1n is a vector of ones of size n. The solution vector α
is therefore of fixed dimension α ∈ R|L|, which depends on
the cardinality of the set L.
Let’s now assume two message sets R1 and R2 with mean
maps expressed in the base K as α1 and α2. Their MMD
distance can be then approximated as:
MMD2(F ,R1,R2) ≈
∥∥∥∥∥∑
i
α1i k(li , ·) −
∑
i
α2i k(li , ·)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
(7)
= α1T Kα1 − 2α1T Kα2 + α2T Kα2. (8)
Since K is positive semi-definite (if k is Mercer’s kernel),
there exists a Cholesky decomposition such that K = LLT
and L is a triangular matrix. Using L, the approximated MMD
distance (8) can be compactly expressed as
MMD2(F ,R1,R2) ≈
∥∥∥Lα1 − Lα2∥∥∥2 . (9)
Substituting the calculation of α from (6) and using the
property of Cholesky decomposition that K−1 = L−1L−1T ,
the approximate MMD becomes
MMD2(F ,R1,R2) ≈
∥∥∥L(α1 − α2)∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥∥LK−1 ( 1n1 Q11n1 − 1n2 Q21n2
)∥∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥LL−1L−1T (ϕ(μ1) − ϕ(μ2))∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥L−1T (ϕ(μ1) − ϕ(μ2))∥∥∥2 .
where ϕ : H→ R|L| is a functional evaluating the mean map
μ = 1
n
∑n
i=1 k(mi , ·) (i.e., Parzen window estimates) at points
from L
ϕ(μ) = (μ(l1), ..., μ(l|L|)).
Note that it holds that
ϕ(μ) = 1
n
Q1n
= 1
n
(
n∑
i=1
k(mi , l1), . . . ,
n∑
i=1
k(mi , l|L|)
)
.
Therefore, after pre-computing the inverse L−1 which
is relatively easy as the matrix L is triangular, MMD
distance ‖μ1 − μ2‖2H can be approxiamted by Euclidean dis-
tance ‖L−1T(ϕ(μ1)−ϕ(μ2))‖22. In other words, the MMD dis-
tance between μ1 and μ2 in H is approximated by generalized
Mahalanobis distance (as introduced in [25]) between ϕ(μ1)
and ϕ(μ2) in R|L|, defined by the matrix (L−1)L−1
T = K−1.
A fingerprint of a message set is therefore computed and
stored using the function ϕ in a form of an |L|-dimensional
real vector, which can be updated on-line as new messages
are observed, which removes the need to keep all messages in
memory. Storing fingerprint as ϕ(μ) is preferred to L−1Tϕ(μ)
(which would save computational resources) as most of its
components are equal to zero (or very small such they can be
replaced by zero without loss of accuracy), enabling efficient
storage in sparse structures.
In further text, this proposed representation is called
Approximated MMD representation — AMRep. Computing
the AMRep representation of message sets from an input set
of messages thus include these steps:
1) Forming the set L with respect to the given input set of
messages.
2) Computing the matrix L−1.
3) Computing and maintaining the function ϕ for each
message set.
To this end it has been assumed that the set L is given.
The method how L is constructed should reflect the intention
of its use. For determining the set L, it is assumed that there
is an input training set of messages M available, that can be
used to compute L. In a typical case, M will be a set of all
messages from message sets obtained as training data for a
classifier, or all messages contained in some unknown data
that are about to be analyzed. A common requirement would
be to select L such that |L|  |M|. Otherwise, storing of
fingerprints and all computations would be expensive. If the
fingerprint would be used to model majority of traffic, then
items of L should be located in parts of the space where
most messages are located (i.e., in the most “interesting”
areas of the input space) and algorithms like self-organising
maps [26] are appropriate. Contrary, if fingerprints will be
used to distinguish many different communictions or to detect
rare events, elements of L should cover the entire space of all
messages, including regions with low density of messages. The
latter approach is followed in this work. Formally, the cover
should in this case satisfy the following condition: ∀m ∈ M
∃m′ ∈ L such that ‖m′ − m‖2 ≤ , where  is a preset
constant. This parameter determines granularity and size of
the cover L. Below experiments used this condition to build
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Algorithm 1 Greedy -Cover of a Set M
1: procedure COVER(M, )
2: L← {m}, m randomly selected from M
3: for m ∈M do
4: if ∀m′ ∈ L : ‖m − m′‖2 >  then
5: L← L ∪ {m}
6: end if
7: end for
8: return L
9: end procedure
L, when a sub-optimal solution to the class cover problem
([27]–[29]) was obtained by a greedy algorithm shown in the
listing of Algorithm 1. However, the AMRep representation is
not limited to this specific algorithm and any method which is
able to construct L with desired properties can be considered.
III. RELATED WORK
Modelling applications based on statistical properties of
their network communication has been already investigated
in the related works differing mainly in the goal of the model.
Large part of published methods models communication to
detect command and control (C&C) channels of botnets that
are used by a botmaster to communicate with infected com-
puters. The main reason is that the presence of a C&C channel
is an intrinsic property of botnets and they frequently have a
distinct statistical properties.
BotMiner [30] is a complex system detecting C&C channels
by correlating communication patterns of network hosts. From
a sequence of TCP flows (called C-flows in the reference),
it extracts the number of flows per hour, number of packets
per flow, average number of bytes per one packet, and average
number of bytes per second in a flow, and uses marginal
distributions of these quantities to identify groups of possible
C&C channels. The main difference to this work is in features
and their scope, since the cited work is targeted only to detect
botnets and therefore the algorithms rely on additional assump-
tions about the traffic of C&C channels, such as periodicity
or, in general, low entropy (i.e., well predictable behaviour)
of the communication.
BotFinder [15], Disclosure [17], and [18], [19], [31] all
represent communication by aggregate statistics (mean and
standard deviations, Aiello et al. in [31] also uses kurtosis
and skewness) of marginal distribution of different features
such as transferred bytes, inter-arrival times, and durations of
either flows or packets. Individual works differ by features they
use, by the definition of a message (flow or packet), by the
statistics (only [31] uses kurtosis and skewness), and finally
by their aim, as the works [15], [17] aim to detect botnets
while the work [31] detects DNS tunnelling. Nevertheless,
their common property is the use of simple statistics over
marginals, not joint distributions.
Wright et al. [9] aims at identification of application proto-
cols, namely HTTP(S), AIM, SSH, SMTP and Telnet, from a
stream of TCP packets. The work utilizes only sizes of packets
and their directions (i.e., from client to server or from server to
client) to model the protocols’ behaviour. The representation is
a histogram of four types of packet according to their size and
direction ({incoming, outgoing} × {small,large}) seen during
the observation window. To make the representation richer,
histograms from several consecutive widows are concatenated
together. Contrary to this reference, the proposed work uses
finer quantization (specified by the cover L) of the data and
uses a joint distribution.
Packets’ sizes and inter-arrival times (the time between two
consecutive packets in the same direction) extracted from TCP
flows of packets are used in works [13] and [32] to build
statistical representation of application layer protocols. The
representation is a collection of N joint histograms, where
each histogram models size and inter-arrival time of i -th packet
in the observed set of flows. This makes this representation
dependent on information about messages’ order in a message
set which might not be always available and it is subject
to noise caused by reordering during transit. Contrary to
these references, the proposed work treats messages as i.i.d.
realizations of a random variable.
Hermann et al. in [33] aims at fingerprinting of websites
from streams of TCP packets captured during loading of
web pages to identify which web page was accessed by
encrypted communication. The classifier is implemented as
naive Bayes with histograms of packets’ sizes as the feature
vector. SPID [16] is a modular framework for identification
of application layer protocols (BitTorrent, HTTP, SSH,...).
Depending on the specific source of data, it can use different
number of features. Independently on the particular feature set
which is used, observed values of each feature are modelled
separately by a histogram. The classifier is implemented as a
nearest prototype classifier with distance defined by Kullback-
Leibler divergence between the known protocol models and
a representation created from the classified sample of com-
munication. AMRep differs from these works by relying on
joint distribution and by using a distance derived from MMD
measure.
The work [10] proposes a representation of TCP flows based
on aggregate statistics of transferred packets and bytes in each
flow. This representation is then used by an SVM classifier to
identify communicating application, browser or operating sys-
tem. While the domain in which that representation is applied
overlaps with aim of this work, the difference is in the way
how the representation is designed (AMRep treats messages
individually while [10] uses aggregate statistics). Furthermore,
this representation is not easily extendable to cases when it
is needed to represent unordered sets of messages (e.g., for
representing servers instead of individual flows as shown in
Section VII).
In [34], a mechanism based on Hidden Markov Mod-
els (HMM) is introduced to build profiles of users behind a
NAT. The representation uses only elementary features like
sizes and inter-arrival times of NetFlows to represent users’
behaviour. However, the training of the underlying HMMs
is supervised (needs a training set with labels determining
which NetFlow belongs to which user), which makes the
representation unusable for cases with little or no labelled
data.
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The experimental section of this article compares the pre-
sented method (AMRep) to [32], [33] and [16], because
representations used in these works are the most similar to that
proposed in this work. They all build probability distributions
of observed features to represent network communication.
Detailed description of the compared methods can be found
in Section IV.
IV. COMPARED METHODS
The representation proposed in this work is compared to the
related methods [33], [16] and [32] selected because (i) they
can be extended to different definitions of messages and
message sets and (ii) they cover principles of most approaches
proposed by the state of the art algorithms that rely on
modelling of probability distributions.
A. Multinomial Naive Bayes (MNB)
Hermann et al. [33] models encrypted communication by
one-dimensional histogram of datagram sizes with datagrams’
direction encoded by sign. In the definition used in this paper,
one message in [33] corresponds to one packet and a mes-
sage set corresponds to a set of packets interchanged during
loading of one specific web page. As individual messages are
represented by scalar values (their sizes), MNB uses a one-
dimensional histogram hR to represent a message set R. The
histogram has m bins hR1 , ..., hRm and the i -th bin caputres
number of messages of size i observed in R. Each target class
ω is represented by a set of empirical probabilities {P(i |ω)|i =
1, ..., m}, where P(i |ω) is an estimation of probability that a
message of size i will be observed in a message set belonging
to class ω. An unknown message set R is then assigned to
the most probable class ω∗, which satisfies:
ω∗ = arg min
ω
−
m∑
i=1
hRi log P(i |ω).
Since the motivation behind this representation was to
treat histogram bins as words, the histogram bins are scaled
using term-frequency inverse document frequency (TF-IDF)
paradigm. The best results were reported for the combination
of term-frequency normalization (which is implemented by
using logarithmic scale for bins’ sizes in the histograms)
combined with L2 normalizations of the histograms. These
transformations were implemented in the below comparison.
Despite the above representation was originally proposed for
fingerprinting web sites, it can obviously be used with other
definitions of messages and message sets.
B. Statistical Protocol Identification (SPID)
SPID [16] is designed to identify application protocols on
basis of variable number of messages’ attributes. Looking at
this framework by the formalism used in this work, SPID
represents a single message set as well as a model of a
single protocol by a set of d empirical estimates of marginal
probability densities of d features observed on the messages.
A classified message set R is then assigned to protocol ω∗
which minimizes the following Kullback-Leibler divergence
averaged over the observed features:
ω∗ = arg min
ω
1
d
d∑
i=1
DKL(Pωi ‖PRi ),
where Pωi and PRi are estimates of probability density func-
tions of the i -th feature for the protocol model ω and for
the classified message set R, respectively. Individual features
are therefore considered to be independent of each other and
only their marginal distributions are modelled, which is one of
the biggest differences to the approach proposed in this work
which models joint distributions.
C. Tunnel Hunter (TunHunter)
Tunnel Hunter [32] identifies application-layer protocols
tunnelled through other protocols. Its main difference to all
related methods is that it captures packets’ order by modelling
separately the first, the second, …, up to the N-th packet in
a TCP flow. Models of protocols are implemented as joint
empirical histograms of packets’ sizes and inter-arrival times
and they are estimated from a set of TCP flows with the same
protocol label. Unlike the fingerprinting framework proposed
in this work, TunHunter has stricter requirements for deploy-
ment, as the order of packets matters. The histograms are then
smoothed by a Parzen window estimator (in implementation
used for comparison in this article, Gaussian kernel was used
for this smoothing as suggested in the original work). The
classification is a variation of Naive-Bayes, where a message
set R = {mi }N ′i=1 (a TCP flow) is assigned to a protocol ω∗
which minimizes the following log-likelihood:
ω∗ = arg min
ω
− 1
min{N ′, N}
min{N ′ ,N}∑
i=1
log P(mi |ω),
where N is the number of messages (packets) used to model
each protocol, N ′ is the number of messages observed in
the classified message set R and P(mi |ω) is a probability
of observing message mi ∈ R in a TCP flow belonging to the
protocol ω.
V. DATASETS
To demonstrate the generality of the fingerprint with respect
to the definition of a single message (one of the main design
goals), the experiments used two sources of data described
below.
A. AnyConnect Data
This dataset contains TCP flows collected during one work
day in February 2015 in a corporate network of a company
with 550 active users with computers running mostly Win-
dows or OSX operating systems. To access internal network
and the Internet, these users used AnyConnect VPN client [35]
modified such that it exported names of the processes running
on users’ machines that generated the network communica-
tion (this feature is not present in the standard AnyConnect
VPN client and the users were informed about the extension).
Appendix 4 - Kohout, J. and Pevny´, T. : Network Traffic Fingerprinting Based on
Approximated Kernel Two-Sample Test [33]
85
KOHOUT AND PEVNÝ: NETWORK TRAFFIC FINGERPRINTING BASED ON APPROXIMATED KERNEL TWO-SAMPLE TEST 793
Fig. 1. Data of a single TCP flow collected by the modified AnyConnect
client (in JSON format), including the application label (the “an” field).
The modified client collected following information about each
TCP flow: name of the process (and its hash), local user IP
address, remote server IP address, remote server port, number
of bytes and packets sent to and received from the server,
and duration of the particular flow. Additionally, since the
AnyConnect client sees also packets at the transport layer
within each flow, it was to able log the sequence of their sizes
and inter-arrival times for each flow. An example of collected
data of single TCP flow is shown in Figure 1.
The data collected by the AnyConnect client thus allowed
to define the message either:
• as a TCP packet at the transport layer in which case single
TCP flow corresponds to one message set (this dataset is
further called Any-P);
• or as an entire TCP flow in which case one message
set corresponds to all TCP flows interchanged between
the client and the server endpoint, with identifier of a
message set defined as the triplet client IP, server IP,
server port (this dataset is further called Any-F).
Difference in both definitions is outlined in Figure 2. Each
message at the transport layer (in the Any-P dataset) is
described by its size (in number of bytes), direction and time
elapsed from its predecessor (the inter-arrival time). Similarly
as in ( [33]), the direction of each message is encoded by the
sign of its size and inter-arrival time. In the Any-F dataset,
each message is described by the number of bytes and packets
sent to and received from the server, and by the duration of
the flow.
Since the modified AnyConnect Client included names of
clients’ processes initiating the connection, this information
was used as ground-truth labels for the applications’ classifica-
tion experiments (Section VI). After dropping flows with less
than 10 packets, both datasets contain message sets belonging
to 69 applications, with 198 786 flows in total. The number
of flows per application varied from 550 to 9800. A complete
list of application names is provided in the appendix.
B. Proxy Logs Data
The dataset contains records collected by a cloud
web proxy, where each entry corresponds to one
HTTP request-response pair [36]. Web proxies like,
Fig. 2. Two definitions of messages in the AnyConnect data. Any-P dataset
defines a message as one packet at the transport layer (solid and dashed
rectangles), while a message set is defined as one TCP flow of packets. Any-F
dataset defines a message as one TCP flow and a message set as a set of all
TCP flows interchanged between a client and a server.
for example, Squid 1 are commonly used in corporate
environments to access the World Wide Web as they allow
easy deployment of security policies and they are also able to
produce logs of users’ communication for forensic analysis.
The data were collected during one week in July, 2016 from
networks of 30 international companies that use cloud web
proxies to manage and secure Internet communication of
their employees. This data source, though limited only to
HTTP traffic, is interesting as more and more applications
and malware tunnel their communication through the HTTP
protocol to prevent blocking on firewalls and therefore it is
increasingly more popular among security analysts. Although
the visibility of communication on the application layer brings
the possibility to use number of attributes that are specific
for the HTTP protocol, such as URLs, referrers or user
agents strings, due to the increasing popularity of HTTPs
these attributes are frequently hidden. In case of encrypted
communication, available attributes are typically limited
to only sizes and timings of these request-response pairs.
Therefore these features were used in below experiments.
An example of a single datum provided by the cloud web
proxy is shown in Table I.
The proposed fingerprint is used to define message set
comprising of all HTTP requests exchanged between users
and a particular domain (or destination IP address if domain
is invisible). Message therefore corresponds to an HTTP
request-response pair described by the size of the request
and response (in bytes) and duration of the request-response
loop. This dataset is further called Proxy dataset. This dataset
was used in experiments presented in Section VII. These
experiments used 5903 request-response pairs to 146 different
servers (identified by their hostnames) of the Dropbox service,
and 32000 requests-response pairs to totally 880 servers in the
entire autonomous system owned by Facebook, Inc.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION — CLASSIFICATION
A. Application Identification
In this section, the AMRep representation of message sets
is compared to the methods described in Section IV on a
problem of identification of application to which the observed
network traffic belongs. The comparison is done at the level
1http://www.squid-cache.org/
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TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF FIELDS LOGGED BY A WEB PROXY FOR ONE HTTPS REQUEST-RESPONSE PAIR
TABLE II
AVERAGE ACCURACY OF APPLICATION IDENTIFICATION ON ANY-P DATASET (TOP HALF OF THE TABLE)
AND ON ANY-F DATASET (LOWER)
of individual TCP flows, where one message corresponds to
a single TCP packet (Any-P dataset) and at the level where a
message set is identified by unique tuple of client IP, server
IP and server’s destination port, and one message corresponds
to one TCP flow (Any-F dataset). Since AMRep representa-
tion is designed to approximate MMD distance between two
probability distributions, it is primarily used with a k-nearest
neighbours (k-NN) classifier [37] for which a meaningful
definition of distance is crucial. Also, the k-NN classifier
naturally well extends to multi-class problems (recall that the
dataset used in this section contains 69 different classes — the
individual applications).
The k-NN classifier was taken from the PRTools toolbox
for Matlab™ [38], which has advantage in having its own
routine for determining the proper value of k from the training
data. Other parameters of the AMRep representation ( for
the cover computation and γ for the width of the Gaussian
kernel used in the mean map) were determined by exhaustive
search over all combinations of values  ∈ {0.5, 0.6, ..., 2}
(Any-P dataset) and  ∈ {0.5, 0.6, ..., 5} (Any-F dataset) and
γ ∈ {2n |n ∈ {−2,−1, ..., 4}} for the kernel width values.
Each combination of the parameters’ values was evaluated by
5-fold cross-validation and the combination with the highest
classification accuracy was used to train the final classifier
which was then evaluated on a testing set. Note that the
classification accuracy is defined as the ratio of the number
of correctly classified messages sets to the total number of
classified messages sets.
Presented experimental results are averages of ten repeti-
tions, where each iteration used 10 000 randomly selected
samples (message sets) from the entire dataset (Any-P or
Any-F). This sample was used to create the training and the
testing sets in the given iteration. Each iteration used 10-fold
cross-validation to estimate the classification accuracy. How-
ever, since ground-truth (true labels) are notoriously difficult
to obtain in network security, this scenario was simulated
by using only 10% of samples available in each iteration
for training in one fold of the cross-validation. Remaining
90% of samples were used to estimate the accuracy of
identifying the application corresponding to testing samples.
TABLE III
AVERAGE EXECUTION TIMES OF INDIVIDUAL METHODS
NEEDED FOR CLASSIFICATION OF THE TEST DATA
Average accuracy computed over all 69 applications (and all
10 iterations) is shown in Table II. According to the results,
AMRep with k-NN outperforms representations and methods
proposed in the related works. Moreover, the results show
that statistics of packets are more informative for application
identification than statistics of flows, which is expected. Inter-
estingly, according to these experiments, inter-arrival times of
packets improved the accuracy only by 0.3% on the Any-P
dataset. However, paired t-test at 5% significance level does
not reject the hypothesis that the accuracies achieved with
and without the inter-arrival times are the same. Hence, this
improvement can be considered statistically significant.
Runtimes (in seconds) of individual methods needed
for computing classifications of the testing data in one
fold (9000 message sets) are compared in Table III. The
table presents runtimes averaged over all folds of the cross-
validation on a personal computer with Intel Core-i7 CPU
(4 cores, 2.2GHz) and 16GB RAM. The evaluation envi-
ronment was implemented in Matlab R2016a software. The
AMRep representation used with the k-NN classifier is signif-
icantly faster than SPID and TunHunter methods. The only
faster method is the Multinomial Naive Bayes classifica-
tion (MNB), but at the cost of notably lower accuracy (see
results in Table II). The fast computation of MNB is thanks
to its simplicity, as it uses only one feature (message sizes)
and a Naive Bayes classifier.
Since results in Table II used only 10% of available sam-
ples for training it is interesting to study, how the accuracy
improves as the number of training samples increases. This
has been investigated by holding 20% of samples in each
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Fig. 3. Comparison of average accuracy for different methods depending on
the ratio of samples used for training.
Fig. 4. Confusion matrix of AMRep on Any-P dataset for all 69 applications.
Each row and each column in the figure corresponds to one application and
the colour of each cell (i, j) represents the ratio of message sets of application
i classified as application j . The lighter the colour of a cell, the higher the
ratio which the cell represents.
iteration for testing and varying the size of the training set
from 10% to 80% randomly selected from remaining 80%
of samples. Resulting graphs for AMRep and the best state
of the art method for each version of the dataset are shown
in Figure 3. As expected, the accuracy improves as the size
of the training set increases, especially for models based
on AMRep. Contrary, the accuracy of SPID quickly reaches
flat region when the size of the training set is 20% of all
data. SPID’s behaviour can be explained by histograms in its
model being estimated with sufficient accuracy, therefore the
approach hits its boundary and only adding new features could
probably further improve the accuracy. As seen in Figure 3,
the accuracy of AMRep with k-NN classifier improves as the
amount of training data increases, reaching accuracy of 84.7%
on Any-P dataset and 74.6% on Any-F dataset when 80% of
messages sets are used for training. This makes it always the
best performing classifier on given dataset.
To further discuss AMRep’s performance, Figure 4 shows
confusion matrix in form of a heatmap for all 69 applications
on the Any-P dataset. Each row and each column in the
figure corresponds to one application and the colour of each
cell (i, j) represents the ratio of message sets of application
i classified as application j . The lighter the colour of a cell,
the higher the ratio which the cell represents. Cells on the
main diagonal therefore represent accuracies achieved on indi-
vidual applications while cells outside the diagonal represent
mis-classifications. Due to the large number of classes,
the names of individual applications are omitted in the figure.
The confusion matrix shows that for the vast majority of appli-
cations the classification is very accurate, which also means
that statistics of their packets are very distinct. However, there
are few pairs which are frequently confused, some of them are
discussed in detail below:
• GoogleSoftwareUpdateAgent and ksfetch —
ksfetch is an OSX process involved in downloading
updates for Google products, hence these two misclas-
sified applications are related and might share the code
base.
• SoftwareUpdateCheck and softwareupdate —
Both of these are names of processes running on OSX
systems and involved in checking for updates of software
installed on the system. Hence, there is clear relation
between these processes.
• WmiPrvSE.exe and lsass.exe are essential Win-
dows processes and therefore they probably use the same
libraries for network communication.
• cma and DropboxOriginal — cma is a part of
McAfee software, while DropboxOriginal is part of
the Dropbox file storage service. These two are likely
unrelated and this is a true mis-classification.
• helpd and com.apple.WebKit.Networking —
helpd is a process running on Apple devices which
connects to on-line support of Apple and downloads the
help pages. WebKit is an engine for rendering web pages
used, for example, by Apple Safari browser. It is likely
that the helpd process could use this engine too but
authors were not able to verify this.
• googledrivesync and netsession_win — while
the googledrivesync process is responsible for syn-
chronizing Google Drive content between a user’s com-
puter and the on-line storage, the netsession_win
process is part of Akamai NetSession Client which is,
as stated by Akamai, “a tool to improve the speed,
reliability, and efficiency for downloads and streams”.
While these two applications are not closely related, their
basic behavioural patterns might be similar — both of
them are likely transferring batches of larger data which
explains why the classifier mismatched them.
B. Accuracy With Limited Number of Observations
The quality of representation of probability distributions
depends on the number of observations. To assess how
the compared classification methods are sensitive to limited
number of observations, the main classification experiment
described in Section VI-A was repeated while limiting the
number of observed messages for each repeated communi-
cation to 5, 10, 15 and 20. The rest of the experimental
settings remained the same as in the previous subsection and
the classifiers used all features available for a given dataset.
Classification accuracies of different methods are summarized
in Figures 5a 5b for Any-P and Any-F datasets. For easier
comparison of the results achieved by the version of the
classifier without upper bound on the number of messages
per message set (individual methods from Table II) are shown
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Fig. 5. Comparison of average accuracy depending on the maximal number of messages used from each message set. (a) Any-P dataset. (b) Any-F dataset.
Fig. 6. Average accuracy and running times for AMRep and SPID used either with the k-NN classifier or with the nearest prototype (NP) classifier.
(a) Average accuracy (higher is better). (b) Average runtime (lower is better).
in Figures 5a 5b as well under the tick “unlimited” on
the x-axis. As expected with decreasing the limit on max-
imum messages used the accuracy of methods decreases.
The only exception seems to the MNB classifier which only
the messages’ sizes and is therefore less prone to errors
caused but insufficient number of observations (messages).
However, the AMRep representation with the k-NN classifier
still outperforms the other methods, despite that it uses joint
distributions of all the features. This is probably because
MMD metric does not need to explicitly estimate the shape of
probability distributions, it can effectively operate even with
very limited number of observations from each distribution.
This efficiency in terms of number of observations is in fact
one of the main feature of MMD.
C. Dependency on the Classifier
The k-NN classifier is for AMRep a natural choice, since it
leverages the well-defined pairwise distances between classi-
fied objects. Because the classifier uses local neighborhoods of
the queried objects, it can well capture multi-modal behavior
of the applications (k-NN classifier is asymptotically con-
sistent [39]). Flows belonging to the same application (e.g.,
Dropbox) can belong to different modes of the application’s
behaviour (e.g., regular polling for change notifications, files
upload, filed download etc.). While flows from different modes
are dissimilar to each other, behaviour within one mode is
homogenous which allows the k-NN classifier to correctly
classify most of the unknown flows (this is illustrated in the
visualisation of the clustering of flows in the next section).
However, the AMRep representation is not tightly connected
with one specific classifier, as it is a general algorithm for
building representations of message sets. Similarly, the SPID
method can be viewed as an implementation of a nearest
prototype (NP) classifier paradigm [40] with the Kullback-
Leibler divergence as distance metric. The SPID method can
be therefore extended to use the k-NN classifier with Kullback-
Leibler divergence instead of the originally proposed NP
classifier while AMRep can be used with the NP classifier by
creating the applications’ prototypes by merging all training
messages belonging to the same application into one message
set and then using the AMRep algorithm to create its repre-
sentation.
This motivates the experimental comparison of these four
different configurations of these two methods, namely AMRep
with the k-NN classifier, SPID with the k-NN classifier,
AMRep with the NP classifier and the original version of
the SPID method (with the NP classifier). The method are
compared in the same evaluation setup as in Section VI-A
and the average classification accuracy and running times
are measured. According to classification accuracies presented
in Figure 6, the k-NN classifier always significantly
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outperforms the NP classifier, which is likely due to the multi-
modality of individual classes discussed above. The unimodal
behaviour implicitly assumed by the NP classifier seems to be
oversimplified. Furthermore, AMRep outperforms the SPID
representation regardless the used classifiers. Finally, running
times of classifiers that use AMRep are considerably lower,
which makes them more suitable solution, especially for real-
time deployment.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION — CLUSTERING
Clustering algorithms are essential in unsupervised analysis
of unlabelled data, since they reveal groups of similar objects.
This section demonstrates how the AMRep representation
can be used in analysis of unlabelled traffic in two different
scenarios. The first scenario clusters individual flows (Any-P
dataset), which can be used to identify similar applications
active in a network. Results of this clustering can be used,
for example, to uncover new and possibly unwanted appli-
cations in the network or as a basis of anomaly detectors
that discover outlying flows that do not belong to any widely
used application. The second scenario identifies groups of
web servers running the same service. Knowledge of such
structure can significantly improve, besides other applications,
the behavioural models used in user behaviour analysis (UBA)
systems ( [41], [42]). The demonstrated clustering of servers
can be used in tools that support work of security analysts and
architects to design the UBA monitoring systems.
Since graphical representation of clustering results enables
an analyst to quickly identify groups of similar objects, this
work uses similarity graphs to visualise the results. In a
similarity graph vertices correspond to individual objects that
are clustered, while weights of edges correspond to their simi-
larities. Since AMRep is designed such that Euclidean distance
between two fingerprints approximates the MMD distance
between the underlying distributions, calculating similarity
with Gaussian kernel as
sim(s1, s2) = exp(−γ ′‖s1 − s2‖2), (10)
corresponds to kernel over the space of probability distrib-
utions as introduced in [43]. si = L−1Tϕ(μi ), i ∈ {1, 2},
in Equation 10 are AMRep fingerprints of the two compared
message sets as defined in Section II and γ ′ is the width
parameter of the Gaussian kernel on the space of fingerprints
which is different from γ used to calculate si . The width
parameter γ ′ can be used to change sensitivity of the similarity
function, the experiments presented here used inverse of the
median of squared distances between all pairs of fingerprints,
which is a “rule of thumb” recommended in [44]. The sim-
ilarity graph is then visualized in two-dimensional plane by
means of ForceAtlas2 algorithm [45], which causes highly
similar vertices to be attracted to each other, while those with
low similarity are repulsed. To further improve visualization
qualities of the graph, edges with weights close to zero can
be omitted to make groups of similar vertices more distinct.
Finally note that the visualization algorithm and clustering
were chosen to enable easy assessment by a human analyst.
However, any other clustering algorithm requiring only pair-
wise distances, similarities, or even existence of the clustered
TABLE IV
EXAMPLE OF 8 CLUSTERS WITH THE HIGHEST SILHOUETTE SCORE
PRODUCED BY K-MEANS ALGORITHM APPLIED ON DATA USED IN
SECTION VII-A. FOR EACH CLUSTER, APPLICATIONS WITH AT
LEAST 1% REPRESENTATION IN THE CLUSTER ARE PRESENTED
objects in a metric space could be used. Examples include
k-means, spectral clustering ( [46], [47]) or the Louvain
method [48], which can be even applied directly on the
similarity graph and is able to optimise also the number of
clusters.
A. TCP Flows Clustering
The demonstration of clustering of application flows
(Any-P dataset) uses a subset of 5000 TCP flows of 69 dif-
ferent applications used in the previous section. The subset
was selected randomly, but with the restriction that there
were at least 10 flows from each application. Restricting the
experiment to only 5000 samples was to enable comprehensive
visualisation of results, as more samples would make the graph
cluttered. The similarity graph drawn as described above is
shown in Figure 7. Vertices are colored according to different
applications (recall that ground truth is known in this case) to
which the respective flows belong. Flows (vertices) belonging
to same applications mostly form well separated clusters which
asserts that AMRep representation is able to distinguish the
applications, using only information about packets’ sizes and
their inter-arrival times. This visualisation also helps to under-
stand why the k-NN classifier outperforms the NP classifier,
as discussed in Section VI-C. For example, the application
“Cisco Jabber” is spread over multiple clusters which indicates
that it has multiple types of behaviour. However, each cluster
is homogenous which allows the k-NN classifier to correctly
classify flows from different clusters (it uses the k nearest
Appendix 4 - Kohout, J. and Pevny´, T. : Network Traffic Fingerprinting Based on
Approximated Kernel Two-Sample Test [33]
90
798 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 13, NO. 3, MARCH 2018
Fig. 7. Visualization of similarities of TCP flows (each treated as a message set of packets) belonging to different applications. Each vertex represents one
TCP flow. The vertices are coloured according to the ground-truth application labels as logged by the AnyConnect client. Clusters of vertices containing the
most prevalent applications are labelled with those applications’ names.
neighbours that will be likely from the same cluster). As in
previous section, some clusters contain multiple applications
mixed together. A closer inspection of flows of these clusters
shows that they have something in common. Few larger
clusters with mixed application contain:
• com.apple.WebKit.Networking, WebProcess
and Google Chrome, which can be explained by
WebKit (as already mentioned in the previous section)
being a widely used rendering engine for web pages and
being used as a component of many other applications
including the Chrome browser.
• Dropbox.exe, DropboxOriginal and Drop-
box109 are different names of the Dropbox application
running on different operating systems that appeared in
the network from which the data were collected.
• Mail, CalendarAgent and AddressBook-
SourceSync are all processes running on Apple’s
devices responsible (as their names suggest) for a mail
client operation and the Calendar application. These
two applications frequently work in tandem, e.g., when
a user connects to Microsoft Exchange server which
manages e-mails, meeting invitations etc.
To illustrate flexibility of AMRep with respect to clustering
method used, the k-means clustering algorithm was applied to
the same 5000 TCP flows used in visualization in Figure 7.
Implementation of the k-means clustering was provided by
Matlab™’s statistics and machine learning toolbox, which
determines the optimal value of k by maximizing the silhoutte
score [49]. Since the k-means algorithm uses Euclidean dis-
tances, it directly used fingerprints as described in Section II.
The algorithm returned 73 clusters, which is surprisingly
close to the true number of different applications in the
data, which was 69. Homogeneity [50] measuring purity of
clusters achieved 0.67 (higher is better, with 0 being minimum
and 1 being maximum which is achieved if and only if
the individual clusters are identical to individual ground-truth
classes, i.e., application labels). Although 0.67 might seem to
be low, an inspection of applications in 8 clusters with the
highest silhouette score (shown in Table IV) reveals that the
real number will be higher, because of multiple applications
with different labels are in fact very similar or the same.
For example, Dropbox clients running on different platforms,
as can be seen in Figure 7, or the cluster number 5 in Table IV
containing only flows belonging to applications Meeting
Center and atmgr.exe that are both related to Cisco
Webex service, or the cluster number 8 which contains
mixture of Cisco Jabber and Cisco Webex/Meeting Center
applications that can all work integrated together to allow
communication and organizing calls or teleconferences.
B. Web Servers Clustering
The second clustering scenario demonstrates how AMRep
can be used to identify functional parts of a single web service
accessed via HTTP(s) protocol. This scenario is interesting in
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Fig. 8. Visualization of similarities between fingerprints of Dropbox servers and between servers in the autonomous system belonging to Facebook, Inc..
Each vertex represents one server, the closer two vertices are, the more similar are their respective fingerprints. The vertices are coloured according to the
servers’ specializations. (a) Servers belonging to Dropbox. (b) Servers in the autonomous system belonging to Facebook, Inc.
cases of web services being spread over multiple servers with
several groups of servers having the same purpose. An exam-
ple is Dropbox — a widely used on-line file store, which
has servers specialized for API calls, notifying clients about
changes, serving the content, etc. For network analysts aiming
at modelling users’ behaviour, it is important to recognize
groups of similar servers, as this knowledge can improve their
models. Servers’ roles can sometimes be inferred from patterns
of their hostnames. However, the hostnames might not be
always available in the logs as, depending on the settings of the
logging proxy, the hostnames can be hidden due to encryption.
This motivates the modelling of servers’ behaviour based only
on statistics of their communication.
In this scenario, one message set corresponds to all web
communication of all clients to a single server (identifier of
a message set is the server’s hostname or IP, if the hostname
is not available), and one message corresponds to a single
HTTP(s) request-response pair described by three features:
sent and received bytes and duration. AMRep framework is
easily extended to model entire communication to a server,
because it treats individual messages in a message set inde-
pendently.
Figure 8a shows the similarity graph for Dropbox ser-
vice (146 servers in total), while Figure 8b shows the similarity
graph of 880 servers hosted in the entire autonomous system
belonging to Facebook, Inc.. Although the exact ground-
truth labelling was not available, for Dropbox service par-
tial ground-truth exists thanks to [51] and for Facebook’s
autonomous system (Figure 8b) servers implementing the
same sub-service were estimated from patterns of hostnames.
If hostname’s service was unknown or could not be clearly
estimated, it is marked by grey color. The similarity graph of
Facebook servers also contains multiple vertices labelled as
“raw IPs” (marked by violet color). These represent servers
for which the hostname was not available and only their IP
addresses were logged by the proxy. As discussed earlier,
this can be caused by using HTTPs or the clients con-
tacted directly the server’s IP address, without specifying
the hostname. To verify that even these groups of servers
represented just by IPs gather servers with similar special-
izations, additional analysis was performed using publicly
available services including SenderBase2 and VirusTotal.3
These services provide information about hostnames observed
on IP addresses in the Internet. This analysis revealed that
the servers in separate groups indeed serve different purposes.
For example, the group of raw IPs in the bottom left corner
of Figure 8b gathers servers that are operated by Edge Net-
works Limited, a subsidiary company of Facebook, Inc. and
that are used for handling photos (hostnames with patterns
like sphotos-a.xx.fbcdn.net). Similarly, the second
isolated group of raw IPs in the bottom of Figure 8b contains
servers that are running MQTT protocol, which was used by
Facebook as part of the Messenger service [52].
2http://www.senderbase.org/
3https://www.virustotal.com/
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Both figures nicely show how servers with different special-
izations are separated and those serving the similar purpose are
close to each other. This demonstrates that AMRep fingerprints
of two servers with the same specialization are indeed similar.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This work has addressed the problem of modeling and
representing a set of messages of variable size exchanged
between network entities as a vector in Euclidean space. The
proposed representation, based on a well defined distance on
spaces of probability distributions used in kernel two sample
hypothesis test (known as Maximum Mean Discrepancy) is
general and not restricted to security domains.
The representation was evaluated and compared to the
state of the art in the supervised setting on the problem of
identification of application from the observed traffic at two
different levels: (i) identification of application from a set
of measurements on TCP packets and (ii) identification of
application from a set of flows that a client exchanged with
a server. The representation was also evaluated in unsuper-
vised problems of (i) identifying groups of flows initiated by
the same applications and (ii) identifying groups of servers
providing the same service (e.g., a set of servers providing
content in Dropbox). The experimental results demonstrated
the generality of the proposed representation and superiority
to the state of the art. Moreover, the running times and compu-
tationally complexity of the proposed method is significantly
lower than the prior art.
APPENDIX
Here follows a complete list of 69 process names logged
by the AnyConnect VPN client that were used as application
labels for Any-P and Any-F datasets in the classification
experiments (Section VI):
’APSDaemon.exe’, ’AddressBookSourceSync’,
’AgentService.exe’, ’App Store’, ’AppleIEDAV.exe’,
’Arellia.Agent.Service.exe’, ’Box Sync’,
’CalendarAgent’, ’CcmExec.exe’, ’CiscoJabber.exe’,
’Cisco Jabber’, ’Cisco.WebEx.Start’, ’Dropbox109’,
’DropboxOriginal’, ’Dropbox.exe’, ’Evernote’,
’FireSvc.exe’, ’GoogleSoftwareUpdateAgent’,
’GoogleUpdate.exe’, ’Google Chrome’, ’Mail’,
’Meeting Center’, ’Microsoft Outlook’,
’OUTLOOK.EXE’, ’Python’, ’Safari’, ’SkyDrive.exe’,
’Skype’, ’SoftwareUpdateCheck’, ’Spotify’,
’SubmitDiagInfo’, ’VpxClient.exe’, ’WebProcess’,
’WmiPrvSe.exe’, ’apsd’, ’atmgr.exe’, ’chrome.exe’,
’cma’, ’com.apple.WebKit.Networking’,
’com.apple.WebKit.WebContent’,
’com.apple.iCloudHelper’, ’cscan.exe’,
’firefox-bin’, ’firefox.exe’, ’fpsaud’,
’gconsync’, ’googledrivesync.exe’,
’helpd’, ’iCloudServices.exe’, ’iTunes’,
’iTunes.exe’, ’iexplore.exe’, ’jamf’,
’java’, ’ksfetch’, ’lsass.exe’, ’mdmclient’,
’mutt’, ’netsession_win.exe’, ’pcdrcui.exe’,
’sfc.exe’, ’softwareupdate’, ’softwareupdated’,
’splwow64.exe’, ’ssh’, ’storeagent’, ’taskhost.exe’,
’thunderbird.exe’, ’vmnat.exe’, ’vmware-vmrc.exe’
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Abstract. Many objects in the real world are difficult to describe by
means of a single numerical vector of a fixed length, whereas describ-
ing them by means of a set of vectors is more natural. Therefore, Mul-
tiple instance learning (MIL) techniques have been constantly gaining
in importance throughout the last years. MIL formalism assumes that
each object (sample) is represented by a set (bag) of feature vectors (in-
stances) of fixed length, where knowledge about objects (e.g., class label)
is available on bag level but not necessarily on instance level. Many stan-
dard tools including supervised classifiers have been already adapted to
MIL setting since the problem got formalized in the late nineties. In this
work we propose a neural network (NN) based formalism that intuitively
bridges the gap between MIL problem definition and the vast existing
knowledge-base of standard models and classifiers. We show that the
proposed NN formalism is effectively optimizable by a back-propagation
algorithm and can reveal unknown patterns inside bags. Comparison to
14 types of classifiers from the prior art on a set of 20 publicly avail-
able benchmark datasets confirms the advantages and accuracy of the
proposed solution.
1 Motivation
The constant growth of data sizes and data complexity in real world problems
has increasingly put strain on traditional modeling and classification techniques.
Many assumptions cease to hold; it can no longer be expected that a complete set
of training data is available for training at once, models fail to reflect information
in complex data unless a prohibitively high number of parameters is employed,
availability of class labels for all samples can not be realistically expected, and
particularly the common assumption about each sample to be represented by a
fixed-size vector seems to no longer hold in many real world problems.
Multiple instance learning (MIL) techniques address some of these concerns
by allowing samples to be represented by an arbitrarily large set of fixed-sized
vectors instead of a single fixed-size vector. Any explicit ground truth informa-
tion (e.g., class label) is assumed to be available on the (higher) level of samples
but not on the (lower) level of instances. The aim is to utilize unknown patterns
on instance-level to enable sample-level modeling and decision making. Note that
Appendix 5 - Pevny´, T. and Somol, P. : Using Neural Network Formalism to Solve
Multiple-Instance Problems [48]
95
MIL does not address the Representation Learning problem [?]. Instead it aims
at better utilization of information in cases when ground truth knowledge about
a dataset may be granular and available on various levels of abstraction only.
From a practical point of view MIL promises to i) save ground truth acquisi-
tion cost – labels are needed on sample-level, i.e., on higher-level(s) of abstrac-
tion only, ii) reveal patterns on instance level based on the available sample-level
ground truth information, and eventually iii) achieve high accuracy of models
through better use of information present in data.
Despite significant progress in recent years, the current battery of MIL tools
is still burdened with compromises. The existing models (see next Section ?? for
a brief discussion) clearly leave open space for more efficient utilization of in-
formation in samples and for a clearer formalism to provide easily interpretable
models with higher accuracy. The goal of this paper is to provide a clean formal-
ism bridging the gap between the MIL problem formulation and classification
techniques of neural networks (NNs). This opens the door to applying latest
results in NNs to MIL problems.
2 Prior art on multi-instance problem
The pioneering work [?] coined multiple-instance or multi-instance learning as
a problem where each sample b (called bag in the following) consists of a set of
instances x, i.e., b = {xi ∈ X |i ∈ {1, . . . , |b|}}, equivalently b ∈ B = ∪k>1{xi ∈
X |i ∈ {1, . . . , k}} and each instance x can be attributed a label yx ∈ {−1,+1},
but these instance-level labels are not known even in the training set. The sample
b is deemed positive if at least one of its instances had a positive label, i.e., label
of a sample b is y = maxx∈b yx. Most approaches solving this definition of MIL
problem belong to instance-space paradigm, in which the classifier is trained on
the level of individual instances f : X 7→ {−1,+1} and the label of the bag b is
inferred as maxx∈b f(x). Examples of such methods include: Diverse-density [?],
EM-DD [?], MILBoost [?], and MI-SVM [?].
Later works (see reviews [?,?]) have introduced different assumptions on rela-
tionships between labels on the instance level and labels of bags or even dropped
the notion of instance-level labels and considered only labels on the level of bags,
i.e., it is assumed that each bag b has a corresponding label y ∈ Y, which is for
simplicity assumed to be binary, i.e., Y = {−1,+1} in the following. Most ap-
proaches solving this general definition of the problem follow either the bag-space
paradigm and define a measure of distance (or kernel) between bags [?,?,?]or the
embedded-space paradigm and define a transformation of the bag to a fixed-size
vector [?,?,?].
Prior art on neural networks for MIL problems is scarce and aimed for
instance-space paradigm. Ref. [?] proposes a smooth approximation of the maxi-
mum pooling in the last neuron as 1|b| ln
(∑
x∈b exp(f(x))
)
, where f(x) : X 7→ R
is the output of the network before the pooling. Ref. [?] drops the requirement
on smooth pooling and uses the maximum pooling function in the last neuron.
Both approaches optimize the L2 error function.
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Due to space limits, the above review of the prior art was brief. The Interested
reader is referred to [?,?,?] for a more thorough discussion of a problem and
algorithms.
3 Neural network formalism
The proposed neural network formalism is intended for a general formulation
of MIL problems introduced in [?]. It assumes a non-empty space X where
instances live with a set of all probability distributions PX on X . Each bag
corresponds to some probability distribution pb ∈ PX with its instances being
realizations of random a variable with distribution pb. Each bag b is therefore as-
sumed to be a realization of a random variable distributed according to P (pb, y),
where y ∈ Y is the bag label. During the learning process each concrete bag
b is thus viewed as a realization of a random variable with probability distri-
bution pb that can only be inferred from a set of instances {x ∈ b|x ∼ pb}
observed in data. The goal is to learn a discrimination function f : B 7→ Y,
where B is the set of all possible realizations of distributions p ∈ PX , i.e.,
B = {xi|p ∈ PX , xi ∼ p, i ∈ {1, . . . l}, l ∈ N}. This definition includes the orig-
inal used in [?], but it also includes the general case where every instance can
occur in positive and negative bags, but some instances are more frequent in one
class.
The proposed formalism is based on the embedded-space paradigm represent-
ing bag b in an m-dimensional Euclidean space Rm through a set of mappings
(φ1(b), φ2(b), . . . , φm(b)) ∈ Rm (1)
with φ : B 7→ R. Many existing methods implement embedding function as
φi = g
({k(x, θi)}x∈b) , (2)
where k : X × X 7→ R+0 is a suitably chosen distance function, g : ∪∞k=1Rk 7→ R
is the pooling function (e.g. minimum, mean or maximum), and finally Θ =
{θi ∈ X |i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} is the dictionary with instances as items. Prior art meth-
ods differ in the choice of aggregation function g, distance function k, and finally
in the selection of dictionary items, Θ. A generalization was recently proposed
in [?] defining φ using a distance function (or kernel) over the bags k : B×B 7→ R
and dictionary Θ containing bags rather instances. This generalization can be
seen as a crude approximation of kernels over probability measures used in [?].
The computational model defined by (??) and (??) can be viewed as a neural
network sketched in Figure ??. One (or more) lower layers implement a set of
distance functions {k(x, θi)}mi=1 (denoted in Fig. ?? in vector form as k(x, θ))
projecting each instance xi from the bag {xi}mi=1 from the input space Rd for
Rm. The pooling layer implementing the pooling function g produces a single
vector x¯ of the same dimension Rm. Finally subsequent layers denoted in the
figure as f(x¯) implement the classifier that already uses a representation of
the bag as a feature vector of fixed length m. The biggest advantage of this
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x1 ∈ Rd
x2 ∈ Rd
x3 ∈ Rd
xl ∈ Rd
...
k(x1, θ)
k(x2, θ)
k(x3, θ)
k(xl, θ)
x˜1 ∈ Rm
x˜2 ∈ Rm
x˜3 ∈ Rm
x˜l ∈ Rm
...
g
({x˜i}li=1) x¯ ∈ Rm f (x¯, θf )
One vector per instance (connection)
One vector per sample
Fig. 1. Sketch of the neural network optimizing the embedding in embedding-space
paradigm.
formalism is that with a right choice of pooling function g(·) (e.g. mean or
maximum) all parameters of the embedding functions k(x, θ) can be optimized by
the standard back-propagation algorithm. Therefore embedding at the instance-
level (layers before pooling) is effectively optimized while requiring labels only
on the bag-level. This mechanism identifies parts of the instance-space X with
the largest differences between probability distributions generating instances in
positive and negative bags with respect to the chosen pooling function. This is
also the most differentiating feature of the proposed formalism to most prior art,
which typically optimizes embedding parameters θi regardless of the labels.
The choice of a pooling function depends on the type of the MIL problem. If
the bag’s label depends on a single instance, as it is the case for the instance-level
paradigm, then the maximum pooling function is appropriate, since its output
also depends on a single instance. On the other hand if a bag’s label depends on
properties of all instances, then the mean pooling function is appropriate, since
its output depends on all instances and therefore it characterizes the overall
distribution.
Remark: the key difference of the above approach to the prior art [?] is in per-
forming pooling inside the network as opposed to after the last neuron or layer
as in the cited reference. This difference is key to the shift from instance-centric
modeling in prior art to bag-centric advocated here. However the proposed for-
malism is general and includes [?] as a special case, where instances are projected
into the space of dimension one (m = 1), pooling function g is set to maximum,
and layers after the pooling functions are not present (f is equal to identity).
4 Experimental evaluation
The evaluation of the proposed formalism uses publicly available datasets from
a recent study of properties of MIL problems [?], namely BrownCreeper, Core-
lAfrican, CorelBeach, Elephant, Fox, Musk1, Musk2, Mutagenesis1, Mutagen-
esis2, Newsgroups1, Newsgroups2, Newsgroups3, Protein, Tiger, UCSBBreast-
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proposed NN
meanmin
prior NN
minmin
MI-SVM r=10
MILES r=10
mean-inst
cov-coef cov-coef
emd
extremes
MILBoost
Citation
meanmean
MI-SVM p=1
haussd
Fig. 2. Critical difference diagram shows average rank of each method over 20 problems.
The thick black line shows the confidence interval of corrected Bonferroni-Dunn test
with significance 0.05 testing whether two classifiers have equal performance.
Cancer, Web1, Web2, Web3, Web4, and WinterWren. The supplemental mate-
rial [?] contains equal error rate (EER) of 28 MIL classifiers (and their variants)
from prior art implemented in the MIL matlab toolbox [?] together with the
exact experimental protocol and indexes of all splits in 5-times repeated 10-fold
cross-validation. Therefore the experimental protocol has been exactly repro-
duced and results from [?] are used in the comparison to prior art.
The proposed formalism has been compared to those algorithms from prior
art that has achieved the lowest error on at least one dataset. This selection
yielded 14 classifiers for 20 test problems, which demonstrates diversity of MIL
problems and difficulty to choose suitable method. Selected algorithms include
representatives of instance-space paradigm: MIL Boost [?], SimpleMIL, MI-
SVM [?] with Gaussian and polynomial kernel, and prior art in Neural Networks
(denoted prior NN ) [?]; bag-level paradigm: k-nearest neighbor with citation
distance [?] using 5 nearest neighbors; and finally embedded-space paradigm:
Miles [?] with Gaussian kernel, Bag dissimilarity [?] with minmin, meanmin,
meanmean, Hausdorff, and Earth-moving distance (EMD), cov-coef [?] embed-
ding bags by calculating covariances of all pairs of features over the bag, and
finally extremes and mean embedding bags by using extreme and mean values
of each feature over instances of the bag. All embedded space paradigm methods
except Miles used a logistic regression classifier.
The proposed MIL neural network consists of a single layer of rectified linear
units (ReLu) [?] with transfer function max{0, x}, followed by a mean-pooling
layer and a single linear output unit. The training minimized a hinge loss function
using the Adam [?] variant of stochastic gradient descend algorithm with mini-
batch of size 100, maximum of 10 000 iterations, and default settings. L1 regular-
ization on weights of the network was used to decrease overfitting. The topology
had two parameters — the number of neurons in the first layer defining the di-
mension of bag representation, m, and the strength of the L1 regularization, λ.
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Error of NN on prior art
training set testing set error algorithm
BrownCreeper 0 5.0 11.2 MILBoost
CorelAfrican 2.6 5.5 11.2 minmin
CorelBeach 0.2 1.2 17 extremes
Elephant 0 13.8 16.2 minmin
Fox 0.4 33.7 36.1 meanmin
Musk1 0 17.5 12.8 Citation
Musk2 0 11.4 11.8 Hausdorff
Mutagenesis1 7.5 11.8 16.9 cov-coef
Mutagenesis2 14.9 10.0 17.2 emd
Newsgroups1 0 42.5 18.4 meanmean
Newsgroups2 0 35 27.5 prior NN
Newsgroups3 0 37.5 31.2 meanmean
Protein 2.5 7.5 15.5 minmin
Tiger 0 20.0 19 MILES
UCSBBreastCancer 0 25 13.6 MI-SVM g
Web1 0 40.6 20.9 MILES
Web2 0 28.1 7.1 MI-SVM p
Web3 0 25 13.6 MI-SVM g
Web4 0 18.8 1.5 mean-inst
WinterWren 0 5.9 2.1 emd
Table 1. Average equal error rate of the proposed NN formalism on training and
testing set and average equal error rate on the testing set of the best prior art for the
given problem. Abbreviations of the prior art are as introduced in Section ??.
Suitable parameters were found by estimating equal error rates by five-fold cross-
validation (on training samples) on all combinations of k ∈ {2, 4, 8, 12, 16, 20}
and λ ∈ {10−7, 10−6, . . . , 10−3} and using the combination achieving the lowest
error. The prior art of [?] was implemented and optimized exactly as the pro-
posed approach with the difference that the max pooling layer was after the last
linear output unit.
Figure ?? summarizes results in critical difference diagram [?] showing the
average rank of each classifier over the problems together with the confidence
interval of corrected Bonferroni-Dunn test with significance 0.05 testing whether
two classifiers have equal performance. The critical diagram reveals that the
classifier implemented using the proposed neural net formalism (caption proposed
NN ) achieved overall the best performance, having the average rank 4.3. In fact,
Table ?? shows that it provides the lowest error on nine out of 20 problems.
Note that the second best, Bag dissimilarity [?] with minmin distance and prior
art in NN [?], achieved the average rank 6.4 and was the best only on three and
one problems respectively.
Exact values of EER of the best algorithm from the prior art and that of the
proposed NN formalism is summarized in Table ??. From the results it is obvious
that the proposed neural network formalism have scored poorly on problems with
a large dimension and a small number of samples, namely Newsgroups and Web
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(see Table 1 of [?] for details on the data). The neural network formalism has
easily overfit to the training data, which is supported by zero errors on the
training sets.
5 Conclusion
This work has presented a generalization of neural networks to multi-instance
problems. Unlike the prior art, the proposed formalism embeds samples con-
sisting of multiple instances into vector space, enabling subsequent use with
standard decision-making techniques. The key advantage of the proposed solu-
tion is that it simultaneously optimizes the classifier and the embedding. This
advantage was illustrated on a set of real-world examples, comparing results to
a large number of algorithms from the prior art. The proposed formalism seems
to outperform the majority of standard MIL methods in terms of accuracy. It
should be stressed though that results were compared to those published by au-
thors of survey benchmarks; not all methods in referred tests may have been set
in the best possible way. However, as many such cases would be very compu-
tationally expensive, the proposed formalism becomes competitive also due to
its relatively modest computational complexity that does not exceed that of a
standard 3-layer neural network. The proposed formalism opens up a variety of
options for further development. A better and possibly more automated choice
of pooling functions is one of the promising ways to improve performance on
some types of data.
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ABSTRACT
Modelling network traffic is gaining importance to counter
modern security threats of ever increasing sophistication. It
is though surprisingly difficult and costly to construct reli-
able classifiers on top of telemetry data due to the variety
and complexity of signals that no human can manage to
interpret in full. Obtaining training data with sufficiently
large and variable body of labels can thus be seen as a pro-
hibitive problem. The goal of this work is to detect infected
computers by observing their HTTP(S) traffic collected from
network sensors, which are typically proxy servers or net-
work firewalls, while relying on only minimal human input
in the model training phase. We propose a discriminative
model that makes decisions based on a computer’s all traf-
fic observed during a predefined time window (5 minutes in
our case). The model is trained on traffic samples collected
over equally-sized time windows for a large number of com-
puters, where the only labels needed are (human) verdicts
about the computer as a whole (presumed infected vs. pre-
sumed clean). As part of training, the model itself learns dis-
criminative patterns in traffic targeted to individual servers
and constructs the final high-level classifier on top of them.
We show the classifier to perform with very high precision,
and demonstrate that the learned traffic patterns can be in-
terpreted as Indicators of Compromise. We implement the
discriminative model as a neural network with special struc-
ture reflecting two stacked multi-instance problems. The
main advantages of the proposed configuration include not
only improved accuracy and ability to learn from gross la-
bels, but also automatic learning of server types (together
with their detectors) that are typically visited by infected
computers.
Keywords
Neural network; user modeling; malware detection; big data;
learning indicators of compromise
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1. MOTIVATION
In network security it is increasingly more difficult to re-
act to the influx of new malicious programs such as trojans,
viruses and others (further called malware). Traditional
defense solutions rely on identifying pre-specified patterns
(called signatures) known to distinguish malware in incom-
ing network connections, e-mails, locally stored programs,
etc. But signature-matching now runs out of breath with
the rapid increase in malware sophistication. Contemporary
malware deploys many evasion techniques such as polymor-
phism, encryption, obfuscation, randomization, etc., which
critically decrease recall of signature-based methods. One
of possible perpendicular approaches is identifying infected
computers on the basis of their behavior, i.e., usually by
monitoring and evaluating network activity or system calls.
The advantage of such an approach is higher recall, because
it is much harder to evade behavior-based detection. For
example, computers infected by spamming malware almost
inevitably display an increase in the number of sent e-mails.
Click-fraud, where infected computers earn money to the
originator of the infection by showing or accessing advertise-
ments, is another example where the increased volume of cer-
tain traffic is a good indicator of compromise. On the other
hand, behavior-based malware detection frequently suffers
from higher false positive rates compared to signature based
solutions.
Machine learning methods have recently attracted atten-
tion due to their promise to improve false-positive rates of
behavioral malware detection[2]. However, the use of off-
the-shelf machine learning methods to detect malware is
typically hindered by the difficulty of obtaining accurate la-
bels, especially if classification is to be done at the level of
individual network connections (TCP flow, HTTP request,
etc.)[11, 13]. Even for an experienced security analyst it
is almost impossible to determine which network connec-
tions are initiated by malware and which by a benign user
or application,1 since malware often mimics the behavior
of benign connections. We have observed malware connect-
ing to google.com for seemingly benign connection checks,
displaying advertisements, or sending e-mail as mentioned
above. Labeling individual network connections is thus pro-
1Even though one has access to the machine infected by
malware and can obtain hashes of processes issuing connec-
tions, malicious browser plugins will have the hash of the
browser, which is a legitimate application, which renders
this technique useless. Also, the database of hashes used to
identify malware processes might not be complete, resulting
in incomplete labeling.
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Figure 1: Sketch of the traffic of a single computer.
hibitive not only due to their huge numbers but also due
to ambiguity in individual connections’ classification. Auto-
matic and large-scale training of accurate classifiers is thus
very difficult.
In this work we sidestep this problem by moving the ob-
ject of classification one level up, i.e., instead of classifying
individual connections we classify the computer (represented
by a collection of all its traffic) as a whole. The immediate
benefit is twofold. First, the labeling is much simpler, as it
is sufficient to say “this computer is infected / clean” rather
than “this connection has been caused by malware”. Second,
a grouping of connections provides less ambiguous evidence
than a single connection (see cases described above where a
single access to an ad server does not tell much, but a mul-
titude of such accesses does). This latter property is in fact
the main motivation behind our present work.
The biggest obstacle in implementing a classifier on ba-
sis of all observed traffic is the variability in the number of
network connections (hereafter called flows). This property
effectively rules out the majority of machine learning algo-
rithms requiring each sample to be described by a fixed di-
mensional vector, because the number of observed flows sup-
posed to characterize one computer can range from dozens to
millions while information content of the flows may vary sig-
nifica tly. Our problem thus belongs to the family of multi-
instance learning (MIL) problems [3, 7] where one sample
is commonly called a bag (in our case representing a com-
puter) and consists of a variable number of instances (in
our case one instance is one flow), each described by a fixed
dimensional vector.
The solution proposed below differs from the current MIL
paradigm by taking a step further and representing data not
as a collection of bags, but as a hierarchy of bags. We show
that such approach is highly advantageous as it effectively
utilizes the natural hierarchy inherent in our data. Flows
emitted or observed by one computer can be easily grouped
according to servers they connect to (these groups are called
sub-bags), so that the bag rep se ting the particular com-
puter becomes a collection of sub-bags. This hierarchy can
be viewed as a tree with leafs representing flows (instances),
inner nodes representing servers (sub-bags), and finally the
root representing the computer (bag). The structure of the
problem is shown in Figure 1. Note that trees represent-
ing different computers will have different number of inner
nodes and leafs. The proposed classifier exploits this struc-
ture by first modeling servers (sub-bags) on the basis of flows
targeted to them and then modeling the computer on top
of the server models. This approach can be viewed as two
MIL problems stacked ne on top of the other. In Section 3
we show how the hierarchical MIL problem can be mapped
into a neural-network architecture, enabling direct use of
standar back-propagation as well as many recent develop-
ments in the field of deep learning. Once trained, the ar-
chitecture can be used for classification but it can also be
decomposed to identify types of traffic significant for distin-
guishing benign from infected computers, i.e., it allows to
extract learned indicators of compromise (IOCs). Finally,
using an approach similar to URCA [17], it is possible to
identify particular connections which made the neural net-
work decide that the computer is infected; hence effectively
providing an explanation of the learned IOC.
Section 4 demonstrates the proposed approach on a large
scale real-world problem of detecting infected computers
from proxy logs. It is shown that the neural network can
learn to identify infected computers in computer networks,
as well as pr vide sound explanations of its verdicts to the
consumer. Neurons in lower layers are shown to have learned
weak indica rs of compromise typical for malware.
The proposed neural network architecture is shown to
have multiple advantageous properties. Its hierarchal MIL
nature dramatically reduces the cost of label acquisition. By
using labels on high-level entities such as computers or other
network devices the creation of training data is much sim-
pler. The ability to decompose the encoded structure is no
less important as it provides a definition of learned indica-
tors of compromise. Finally, it allows for human-intelligible
explanations of classifier verdicts as security incidents, which
simplifies the job of the netwo k administrator.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section for-
mulates the problem of multiple instance learning and re-
views important work we build upon. The proposed ap-
proach is presented in Section 3. Experimental evaluation is
provided in Section 4.
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2. RELATED WORK
Here we review the evolution of paradigms leading to the
solution proposed in the next section.
2.1 Multi instance learning problem
The pioneering work [6] coined multiple-instance or multi-
instance learning as a problem, where each sample b (to be
referred to as bag in the following) consists of a set of in-
stances x, i.e., b = {xi ∈ X|i ∈ {1, . . . , |b|}}. Each instance x
can be attributed a label yx ∈ {−1,+1}, but these instance-
level labels are not assumed to be known even in the training
set. The sample b is deemed positive if at least one of its
instances has a positive label, i.e., label of a sample b is
y = maxx∈b yx. For this scenario the prevalent approach is
the so-called instance-space paradigm, i.e., to train a classi-
fier on the level of individual instances f : X 7→ {−1,+1}
and then infer the label of the bag b as maxx∈b f(x).
2.1.1 Embedded-Space Paradigm
Later works (see reviews [3, 7]) have introduced different
assumptions on relationships between the labels on the in-
stance level and labels of bags or even dropped the notion of
instance-level labels and considered only labels at the level
of bags, i.e., it is assumed that each bag b has a correspond-
ing label y ∈ Y, which for simplicity we will assume to be
binary, i.e., Y = {−1,+1} in the following. The common
approach of the latter type is either to follow a bag-space
paradigm and define a measure of distance (or kernel) be-
tween bags, or to follow an embedded-space paradigm and
define a transformation of the bag to a fixed-size vector.
Since the solution presented in Section 3 belongs to the
embedded-space paradigm, we describe this class of methods
in necessary detail and adopt the formalism of [16], which is
suitable for presenting our solution. The formalism of [16] is
intended for a general formulation of MIL problems, where
labels are assumed only at the level of bags without any
labels at the level of instances. Each bag b consists of a
set of instances, which are viewed as a realization of some
probability distribution pb defined over the instance space X .
To allow more flexibility between bags even within the same
class, the formalism assumes that probability distributions
pb of different bags are different, which is captured as pb
being realization of a probability P (pb, y), where y ∈ Y is
the bag label.
During the learning process each concrete bag b is thus
viewed as a realization of an unknown probability distribu-
tion pb that can be inferred only from groups of instances
{x ∈ b|x ∼ pb} observed in data. The goal is to learn a
discrimination function f : B 7→ Y, where B is the set of
all possible realizations of all distributions p ∈ PX , i.e.,
B = {xi|p ∈ PX , xi ∼ p, i ∈ {1, . . . l}, l ∈ N}. Note that this
definition also subsumes the one used in [6].2
Methods from embedded space-paradigm [3, 7] first repre-
sent each bag b as a fixed-dimensional vector and then use
any machine learning algorithm with samples of fixed di-
mension. Therefore the most important component in which
2Ref. [6] assumed labels on instances and a bag was classified
as positive if it contained at least one positive instance. In
the used general formulation this corresponds to the case,
where in each positive bag exist instances that never occur in
negative bags, which means that the difference of support of
positive and negative probability distributions is non-empty,
i.e., p+\p− 6= Ø, where p+ ∼ P (p|+) and p− ∼ P (p|−).
k1(·)
k2(·)
km(·)
··
··
g(·)
g(·)
g(·)
··
··
f(·)
multiple vectors per bag single vector per bag
Figure 2: Neural network optimizing embedding in
embedding-space paradigm.
most methods differ is the embedding. An embedding of bag
b can be generally written as
(φ1(b), φ2(b), . . . , φm(b)) ∈ Rm (1)
with individual projection φi : B 7→ R being
φi = g
({k(x, θi)}x∈b) , (2)
where k : X ×Θ 7→ R+0 is a suitably chosen distance function
parametrized by parameters θ (also called dictionary items)
and g : ∪∞n=1Rk 7→ R is the pooling function (e.g. minimum,
mean or maximum). Most methods differ in the choice of
aggregation function g, distance function k, and finally in
the selection of dictionary items θ ∈ Θ.
2.2 Simultaneous Optimization of Embedding
and Classifier
The important novelty introduced in [16] is that embed-
ding functions {φi}mi=1 are optimized simultaneously with
the classifier that uses them, as opposed to prior art where
the two optimization problems are treated indepedently. Si-
multaneous optimization is achieved by using the formalism
of neural network, where one (or more) lower layers followed
by a pooling layer implement the embedding function φ, and
subsequent layers implement the classifier that is thus built
on top of bag representations in the form of feature vectors
of fixed length. The model is sketched in Figure 2 with a
single output neuron implementing a linear classifier once
the embedding to a fixed-length feature representation is re-
alized. The neural network formalism enables to optimize
individual components of the embedding function as follows.
• Lower layers (denoted in Figure 2 as {ki}mi=1) before
pooling identifies parts of the instance-space X where
the probability distributions generating instances in
positive and negative bags differ the most with respect
to the chosen pooling operator.
• The pooling function g can be either fixed, such as
mean or maximum, or any other pooling function for
which it is possible to calculate gradient with respect
to its inputs. The pooling function itself can have pa-
rameters that can be optimized during learning, as was
Appendix 6 - Pevny´, T. and Somol, P. : Discriminative Models for Multi-instance Problems
with Tree Structure [47]
105
shown e.g. in [9], where the pooling function has the
form q
√
1
|b|
∑
i∈b |xi|q with the parameter q being opti-
mized.
• Layers after the pooling (denoted in Figure 2 as f(·))
correspond to the classifier that already uses the rep-
resentation of bags as vectors of fixed dimension.
The above model is very general and allows for automatic op-
timization of all its parameters by means of back-propagation,
though the user still needs to select the number of layers,
number of neurons in each layer, transfer functions, and pos-
sibly also the pooling function.
3. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
In the light of the previous section, the problem of iden-
tifying infected computers can be viewed as two MIL prob-
lems, one stacked on top of the other, where the traffic of a
computer b is generated by a two-level generative model.
3.1 Generative Model
Let us denote S the set of all servers accessible by any com-
puter. Let Sc ⊆ S denote the subset of all servers accessed
from computer c in a given time frame. The communication
of computer c with each server s ∈ Sc consists of a group of
flows x ∈ X that are viewed as instances forming a first-level
bag bs. The bag of flows bs is thus viewed as a realization of
some probability distribution pbs ∈ PX .
We imagine that every server s is associated with a type
t(s), which influences the probability distribution of the flows
pbs . Accordingly, each first-level bag bs is realized according
to pbs , which itself is a realization of a probability distribu-
tion P (pbs , t(s)). This captures the real-world phenomenon
of a user’s interaction with some server (e.g., e-mail server)
being different from that of a different user communicating
with the same server, as well as the fact that different types
of servers impose different communication patterns.
In view of the above we can now consider computer c to be
a second-level bag consisting of a group of first-level bags bs.
Similarly as above, we assume c to be a realization of proba-
bility distribution pc ∈ PB, where B is the set of all possible
realizations of all distributions p ∈ PX . The probability dis-
tribution pc is expected to be different for each computer, in
particular we assume this to be true between infected and
clean computers labeled by y ∈ {−1,+1}. The probability
distribution pc is thus viewed as a realization of a probability
distribution P (pc, y). This captures the real-world observa-
tion that infected computers exhibit differences in communi-
cation patterns to servers, both in what servers they access
and within individual connections to a server.
The model imposes a generative process as illustrated in
Algorithm 1.
The proposed multi-level generative model opens up pos-
sibilities to model patterns at the level of individual con-
nections to server as well as at the level of multiple servers’
usage. In the following we discuss the implementation and
show the practical advantages on large-scale experiments.
3.2 Discriminative model
The rationale behind the discriminative model closely fol-
lows the above generative model by breaking the problem
into two parts: classifying the computer based on the types
input : y ∈ {−1,+1} label marking computer c as
clear or infected
output: Set of flows F of one computer
1. sample a distribution pc of servers from P (pc, y);
2. sample a set of servers Sc from pc;
3. F = Ø;
foreach s ∈ Sc do %iterate over selected
4. sample distribution pbs of flows from P (pbs , t(s));
5. sample flows x from pbs ;
6. add sampled flows to all flows, F = F ∪ {xi};
end
Algorithm 1: Generative model of the flows of one com-
puter.
of contacted servers and classifying the type of a server based
on flows exchanged between the server and the client.
Let’s assume that each contacted server is described by a
feature vector of a fixed dimension, which can be as simple
as one-hot encoding of its type t(s). Then the problem of
classifying the computer becomes a MIL problem with the
bag being the computer and instances being the servers. The
problem is of course that types of servers t(s) are generally
unknown and we cannot imagine to manually create a map-
ping between a server IP or domain name and a server type.
To make the problem even more difficult, the same server
can be used differently by different computers, and there-
fore it can be of different type for each of them. One can
indeed learn a classifier that would predict the server type
from flows between the computer and the server, which again
corresponds to a MIL classifier with the bag being the server
and instances being the flows, but the problem of obtaining
labeled samples for training the classifier is non-trivial and
it is unlikely that we will have known all types of servers.
Moreover, since we are learning a discriminative model, we
are interested in types of servers occurring with different
probabilities in clean and infected computers.
To side step this problem we propose to stack a MIL clas-
sifier at the level of computers on top of a MIL classifier at
the level of servers. Since both MIL classifiers are realized
by a neural network described in the previous chapter, we
obtain one (larger) neural network with all parameters op-
timizable using standard back-propagation and importantly
using labels only at the level of bags (computers). This ef-
fectively removes the need to know types of servers t(s) or
learn classifier for them, because the network learns that au-
tomatically from the labels on the level of computers. The
caveat is that the network learns only types of servers that
occur with different probabilities in clean and infected com-
puters.
Figure 3illustrates the idea in its simplest incarnation.
The distinctive feature is the presence of two pooling lay-
ers reflecting two MIL problems dividing the network into
three parts. The first part part up to the first pooling in-
cluded implements the embedding of sub-bags into a finite-
dimensional vector (modeling servers based on flows). After
the first pooling each sub-bag (server) is represented by one
finite-dimensional vector. Similarly the second part start-
ing after the first pooling up to the second pooling included
embeds sub-bags into a finite dimensional vector character-
izing each bag (computer). Finally, the third part after the
second pooling implements the final classifier.
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Figure 3: Hierarchical MIL
The right choice of the pooling function is not straightfor-
ward as there are many aspects to be taken into the consid-
eration.
• Mean function should be theoretically better than max [12],
since it is more general. The advantage of mean pool-
ing function has been experimental demonstrated in [16].
• If malware performs only a few distinct types of con-
nections (e.g. connection checks) to well known servers,
max functions can identify them whereas mean func-
tion might suppress them among the clutter caused
by many connections of legitimate applications. This
problem has been recently studied in [4] in the context
of natural images.
• The number of contacted servers and flows to servers
varies between computers and max pooling is more
stable then mean.
• The training with max pooling is approximately six
times faster, since the back-propagated gradient is non-
zero only for one element entering the pooling opera-
tion (one flow per server and neuron, one server per
computer and neuron).
3.3 Extracting indicators of compromise
The presented model is based on the assumption that
there exist types of servers contacted with different prob-
ability by infected and clean computers, though one gener-
ally does not know much about them. If these types did
not exist, then the probability distributions pc of infected
and clean computers would be the same and it would be
impossible to create a reliable detector for them. But if the
neural network has learned to recognize them, vector repre-
sentations of servers (output of the network’s first part from
the input to the first pooling included in Figure 3) have to
have different probability distributions for clean and infected
computers.
Since the above line of reasoning can be extended to the
output of the layer just before the first pooling function, out-
put of each neuron of this layer can be viewed as an indicator
of compromise, since it has to contribute to the identifica-
tion of infected computers. From a close inspection of flows
on which these neurons provide the highest output a skilled
network analyst can figure out what kind of traffic it is (con-
crete examples are shown in Section 4.2). Admittedly, these
learned IOCs would deliver poor performance if used alone.
But in the neural network they are used together with IOCs
from different servers, which provide context contributing
to good accuracy. Also, once a network administrator anno-
tates these neurons, this annotation can be used to provide
more detailed information about the decisions.
3.4 Explaining the decision
Neural networks have a reputation being a black-box in
the sense that they do not provide any details about their
decisions. In intrusion detection this behavior is undesirable,
since the investigation of a possible security incident would
have to start from the very beginning. Therefore providing
the analyst with an explanation why the classifier viewed
the computer as infected is of great help.
The explanation method relies on the assumption that
flows caused by the infection are additive, i.e. the malware
does not block user’s flows but only adds its own. This
means that if the computer was deemed infected, by remov-
ing the right flows (instances) the network should flip its de-
cision. Although finding the smallest number of such flows
is likely an NP complete problem, a greedy approximation
inspired by [17] performs surprisingly well.
The greedy approximation finds in each iteration a set of
flows going to same server (subbag), that causes the biggest
decrease of the classifier’s output when removed from a com-
puter’s traffic (in our implementation positive means in-
fected). The algorithm stops when the classifier’s output
becomes negative (clean). The set of all removed subbags
is returned as the explanation in the form: “This computer
was found infected because it has communicated with these
domains”. If decired, examples of flows to these domains can
be obviously supplied.
3.5 Computational complexity
The computational complexity is important not only for
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the training, but also for the deployment as the amount
of network traffic that needs to be processed can be high.
For example Cisco’s Cognitive Threat Analytics [5] processes
1010 proxy logs per day. The hierarchical aggregation inside
the network decreases substantially the computational com-
plexity, since after the first pooling, the network produces a
single vector per server instead of one vector per flow yield-
ing up to six fold decrease of the data to be processed. Simi-
larly, after the second pooling the computer is described just
by a single vector instead of a set of vectors, which again
decreases the complexity. Compare this to the prior art on
solving MIL with neural networks [18], where the pooling is
done after the last linear layer just before the output, which
means that all layers of the network have to process all flows.
The effect on the computational complexity is tremendous.
Whereas our approach takes approximately five seconds per
100 iterations of the training, the prior art of [18] takes 1100
seconds, which is 220 times slower.
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Albeit the proposed solution is general and can be used
for any kind of network traffic, it has been evaluated in the
context of detecting infected computers from logs of web
proxies due to the availability of large data to us. Besides,
proxy logs are nicer for human investigation than for exam-
ple netflow data. The proxy logs were collected by Cisco’s
Cognitive Threat Analytics [5] from 500 large networks dur-
ing eight days. The days were picked randomly from the
period from November 2015 till February 2016 with the test-
ing day being 7th March 2016. Since the total number of
infected computers in the dataset from seven training days
was small, we have added data of infected computers from
additional 25 days from the period spanning the training
data.
Since the data were collected in five-minute time windows,
one bag consists of all web requests of one computer during
that window. Computers were identified either by source
IP address or by the user name provided in the proxy logs.
Subbags contain requests with the same part in the HTTP
request.
Computers (bags) were labeled using Cisco’s Cognitive
Threat Analytics [5] so that if one computer had at least
one request known to be caused by malware, the computer
was considered to be infected in that five-minute window. If
the same computer in some different time window did not
have any malware flows, the bag from that time window was
considered as clean.
The training set contained data from approximately 20
million unique computers out of which 172 013 were infected
and approximately 850 000 000 flows, out of which 50 000
000 belonged to infected computers. The testing set con-
tained data of approximately 3 000 000 computers out of
which 3 000 were infected and approximately 120 000 000
flows with 500 000 flows belonging to the infecting comput-
ers.
We are certain that the labeling we have used in this ex-
periment is far from being perfect. While there will be a rel-
atively small number of infected computers labeled as clean,
there will be quite a lot of computers labeled as clean that
were in fact infected. Despite these issues, we consider this
labeling as ground truth, because the aim of the experiments
is to demonstrate that the proposed solution can learn from
high-level labels and identify weak indicators of compromise.
The experiments were implemented in author’s own li-
brary, since popular libraries for neural networks are not
designed for MIL problems. They do not allow to have sam-
ples (bags and sub-bags) of different sizes (number of in-
stances) which makes the encoding of the hierarchical struc-
ture impossible. Therefore evaluated architectures used sim-
ple building blocks: rectified linear units [8, 12], mean and
maximum pooling functions, and ADAM optimization al-
gorithm [10]. Unless said otherwise, ADAM was used with
default parameters with the gradient estimated in each it-
eration from 1000 legitimate and 1000 infected computers
(bags) sampled randomly. This size of the minibatch is
higher than is used in most prior art about deep learn-
ing, however we have found it beneficial most probably be-
cause the signal to be detected is weaker. Contrary to most
state of the art, we have used weighted Hinge loss function
max {0, 1− y · wy · f(x)} with w+ being the cost of (false
negative) missed detection and w− being the cost of false
positive (false alarms). The rationale behind Hinge loss is
that it produces zero gradients if sample (bag) is classified
correctly with sufficient margin. This means that gradient
with respect to all network parameters is zero, therefore
the back-propagation does not need to be performed, which
leads to a considerable speed-up. The learning was stopped
after ADAM has performed 3 · 105 iterations.
The performance was measured using precision-recall curve
(PR curve) [14] popular in document classification and infor-
mation retrieval as it is better suited for highly imbalanced
problems, into which intrusion detection belongs (in the test-
ing data there is approximately one infected computer per
one thousand clean ones).
4.1 Network architecture
All evaluated neural networks used simple feature vec-
tors (instances) with 34 cheap to compute statistics, such as
length of the url, query and path parts, frequency of vowels
and consonants, HTTP status, port of the client and the
server, etc, but not a single feature was extracted from the
hostname. Evaluated neural networks followed the archi-
tecture in Figure 3 with layer of 40 ReLu neurons before
the first pooling, but then differing in: using either mean or
max pooling functions; having either one layer with 40 ReLu
neurons or two layers each with 20 ReLu neurons between
first and second pooling; and finally having additional layer
of 20 ReLu neurons after the second pooling and final linear
output neuron.
Precision-recall curves of all six evaluated neural networks
each trained with three different costs of errors on false pos-
itives (0.5, 0.9, 0.99) and false negative (0.5, 0.1, 0.01) are
shown in Figure 4. Based on these experiments, we have
made the following conclusions.
• Simpler networks with max pooling function tend to
overfit, as the error on the training set of all three eval-
uated architectures is very good (dashed lines) but the
error on the testing set is considerably worse (solid
lines). We believe this to be caused by the network
to act more like a complicated signature detector by
learning specific patterns in flows prevalent in the in-
fected computers in the training set, but missing in
infected computers in testing set. This hypothesis is
supported by (i) the fact that when we have been creat-
ing ground truth, we have labeled computer as infected
if it had at least one connection known to be caused by
Appendix 6 - Pevny´, T. and Somol, P. : Discriminative Models for Multi-instance Problems
with Tree Structure [47]
108
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
recall
p
re
ci
si
o
n
w = 0.5 w = 0.1 w = 0.01
(a) relu-max-relu-max-lin
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
recall
p
re
ci
si
o
n
w = 0.5 w = 0.1 w = 0.01
(b) relu-mean-relu-mean-lin
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
recall
p
re
ci
si
on
w = 0.5 w = 0.1 w = 0.01
(c) relu-max-relu-max-relu-lin
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
recall
p
re
ci
si
on
w = 0.5 w = 0.1 w = 0.01
(d) relu-mean-relu-mean-relu
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
recall
p
re
ci
si
on
w = 0.5 w = 0.1 w = 0.01
(e) relu-max-relu-relu-max-
relu-lin
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
recall
p
re
ci
si
on
w = 0.5 w = 0.1 w = 0.01
(f) relu-mean-relu-relu-mean-
relu-lin
Figure 4: Precision-recall curves of six neural network ar-
chitectures utilizing simple 34 features. Dashed lines show
the curves estimated on the training set and solid lines show
the curves estimated from the testing set. Networks with PR
curves in the left column used max pooling function, whereas
those with PR curves in the right column used mean pooling
function. Captions w = 0.5, w = 0.1, and w = 0.01 corre-
spond to different costs in weighted hinge loss with cost on
false positives (false alarms) being w− = 1 − w while that
on the false negatives (missed detections) being w+ = w.
malware and (ii) testing data being one month older
then training ones.
• Simple networks with mean pooling with costs of error
w+ = 0.01 and w− = 0.99 are amongst the best ones.
Their discrepancy between training and testing error
is much lower than in the case of max pooling, ex-
cept the most complicated architecture 4f. We believe
this to be caused by the network learning how infected
computers behave (contacting too many advertisement
servers) rather than patterns specific for some type of
malware (like those with max pooling). This conclu-
sion is supported by the fact that max pooling function
can be approximated from the mean if layers preceding
the aggregation are sufficiently complex [15].
An interesting feature is the sharp drop in precision for cer-
tain architectures, which we attribute to the fact that some
infections cannot be detected based on the simple 34 fea-
tures.
4.2 Indicators of compromise
Since one of the main features of the proposed architecture
is the ability to learn indicators of compromise IOCs, we
show examples of traffic to which some neurons in the layer
just before the first pooling are sensitive. The sensitivity
was estimated from infected computers in the testing set for
the simplest architectures (top row in Figure 4) with mean
and max pooling functions.
We have not observed much difference between IOCs learned
by networks with mean and max pooling functions. Learned
IOCs included:
• tunneling through url (example shown in appendix due
to its length);
• sinkholed domains such as hxxp://malware.vastglow
s.com, hxxp://malware.9f6qmf0hs.ru/a.htm?u=3969
23, hxxp://malware.ywaauuackqmskc.org/.
• domains with repetitive characters such as hxxp://ww
wwwwwwwwwwvwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwvwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww
wwwwwwwwwwwwvww.com/favicon.ico or hxxp://ibuyi
tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttibuyit.com/
xxx.zip;
• https traffic to raw domains such as hxxps://209.12
6.109.113/;
• subdomain generated by an algorithm on a hosting do-
main, for example d2ebu295n9axq5.webhst.com, d2e2
4t2jgcnor2.webhostoid.com, or dvywjyamdd5wo.web
hosteo.com;
• Download of infected seven-zip: d.7-zip.org/a/7z93
8.exe3.
4.3 Example explanation
Table 1 shows an explanation of the simplest evaluated
neural network with maximum pooling functions. The ex-
planation consists of a list of domains with examples of re-
quests to them as they have been identified by the greedy
3We refer to hxxps://www.herdprotect.com/domain-d.
7-zip.org.aspx for confirmation that this is indeed malware-
related.
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NN
output url
4.84 hxxp://www.inkstuds.org/?feed=podcast
2.07 hxxp://feeds.podtrac.com/YxRFN5Smhddj
0.21 hxxps://www.youtube-nocookie.com/
0.18 hxxps://upload.wikimedia.org/
Table 1: Example output of the explanation of an incident.
algorithm described in Section 3.4. The column “NN out-
put” shows how the output of the neural net decreases as
flows to individual domains are iteratively removed.
At the time of writing this paper, the last three domains
were all involved in the communication with some malware
samples according to Virus Total [1]. Searching further on
the web we have found this article4 stating that www.inkstuds.org
was hacked and used to serve malware.
5. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a stacked Multiple Instance Learning
(MIL) architecture, where data is viewed not as a collection
of bags but as a hierarchy of bags. This extension of the
MIL paradigm is shown to bring many advantages particu-
larly for our target application of intrusion detection. The
hierarchical model is straightforward to implement, requir-
ing just a slight modification in a standard neural network
architecture. This enables the exploitation of the vast neural
network knowledgebase including deep learning paradigms.
The proposed architecture posseses key advantages espe-
cially important in network security. First, it requires labels
(clean / infected) only at the high level of computers instead
of at single flows, which dramatically saves time of human
analysts constructing the ground truth and also makes it
more precise (it might be sometimes nearly impossible to
determine if a flow is related to infection or not). Second,
the learned mapping of traffic patterns to neurons can be ex-
tracted to obtain human-understandable Indicators of Com-
promise (IOC). Third, it is possible to identify flows that
have caused the computer to be classified as infected, which
decreases the time needed to investigate a security incident.
The advantages of the proposed architecture were demon-
strated in the context of detecting infected computers from
their network traffic collected on the proxy server. It has
been shown that the neural network can detect infected com-
puters, learn indicators of compromise in lower layers of the
network from high-level labels, and provide sound explana-
tions of output classifications.
Acknowledgements
This work has been partially supported by Czech Science
Foundation project 15-08916S.
6. REFERENCES
[1] Virus total. https://www.virustotal.com, 2016.
[2] Tansu Alpcan and Tamer Bas¸ar. Network security: A
decision and game-theoretic approach. Cambridge
University Press, 2010.
4http://inkstuds.tumblr.com/post/139553865057/
started-my-day-with-the-inkstuds-site-getting
[3] Jaume Amores. Multiple instance classification:
Review, taxonomy and comparative study. Artificial
Intelligence, 201:81–105, 2013.
[4] Y-Lan Boureau, Jean Ponce, and Yann LeCun. A
theoretical analysis of feature pooling in visual
recognition. In Proceedings of the 27th international
conference on machine learning (ICML-10), pages
111–118, 2010.
[5] Cisco Systems Inc. Cisco Cognitive Threat Analytics.
https://cognitive.cisco.com.
[6] Thomas G Dietterich, Richard H Lathrop, and Toma´s
Lozano-Pe´rez. Solving the multiple instance problem
with axis-parallel rectangles. Artificial intelligence,
89(1):31–71, 1997.
[7] James Foulds and Eibe Frank. A review of
multi-instance learning assumptions. The Knowledge
Engineering Review, 25(01):1–25, 2010.
[8] Xavier Glorot, Antoine Bordes, and Yoshua Bengio.
Deep sparse rectifier neural networks. In Aistats,
volume 15, page 275, 2011.
[9] Caglar Gulcehre, Kyunghyun Cho, Razvan Pascanu,
and Yoshua Bengio. Learned-norm pooling for deep
feedforward and recurrent neural networks. In
Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in
Databases, pages 530–546. Springer, 2014.
[10] Diederik Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A method
for stochastic optimization. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
[11] Matthew V. Mahoney and Philip K. Chan. Learning
nonstationary models of normal network traffic for
detecting novel attacks. In Proceedings of the Eighth
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, KDD ’02,
pages 376–385, New York, NY, USA, 2002. ACM.
[12] Krikamol Muandet, Kenji Fukumizu, Francesco
Dinuzzo, and Bernhard Scho¨lkopf. Learning from
distributions via support measure machines. In
Advances in neural information processing systems,
pages 10–18, 2012.
[13] T. T. T. Nguyen and G. Armitage. A survey of
techniques for internet traffic classification using
machine learning. IEEE Communications Surveys
Tutorials, 10(4):56–76, Fourth 2008.
[14] James W. Perry, Allen Kent, and Madeline M. Berry.
Machine literature searching x. machine language;
factors underlying its design and development.
American Documentation, 6(4):242–254, 1955.
[15] T. Pevny´ and I. Nikolaev. Optimizing pooling function
for pooled steganalysis. In Information Forensics and
Security (WIFS), 2015 IEEE International Workshop
on, pages 1–6, Nov 2015.
[16] Toma´sˇ Pevny´ and Petr Somol. Using neural network
formalism to solve multiple-instance problems. In
submission to ECML 2016.
[17] F. Silveira and C. Diot. Urca: Pulling out anomalies
by their root causes. In INFOCOM, 2010 Proceedings
IEEE, pages 1–9, March 2010.
[18] Zhi-hua Zhou and Min-ling Zhang. Neural networks
for multi-instance learning. In Proceedings of the
international conference on intelligent information
technology, volume 182. Citeseer, 2002.
Appendix 6 - Pevny´, T. and Somol, P. : Discriminative Models for Multi-instance Problems
with Tree Structure [47]
110
APPENDIX
A. TYPES OF LEARNED IOCS
• tunneling through urls
hxxp://call.api.bidmatic.com/event/click/e54ae5b54
35b118ca6539752037be726e1d6ccbd297e8ce191ad1304c2d
813e9b0739b9699e4f69b370663ef3476aa3a4e6b15fd4dbe3
92849711a223e5635d088bad54f4aeee18fcf830b72c2c6588
f5a3faf4db8cf39b5aa5b1ee77bb5cd4254f666a6295ec4c47
c9eea5cdd612bcdd9541430f58e27d2d5f36700526f94106ad
7bfae9409dcc7d6897be9e015724fcd66e5564ab56f4e1be62
456237f7567d667a95f3b24ea2ef127b75e5cc353104579b04
7f09c5e01eab79a57935692e9be881eec56c4030a01b4ffa7b
cdc72430ffe1a8b091182851016c299a8b343f1cc015f6cc9b
36e109334b04bfef24b15acf0b0cb4bad9bd9523dbffe0e017
1e6f180ce475c3fdd701a33c6a144f135e8d651f54ca92a4fa
572938bc248471991542aba5e5f380d5b00c7931384d0a726b
1a27db83ceb1178e7355e1451a9e8f8ac91c7306aff1f23be8
5849b51dfa52f8bb52f1be5cdf5497d739a8760c7c7178a811
d7e2555e864bbd5b32840e65862aac63c266a0c6dd72468ae9
75982db1135322d604d43b62c1259f22677d15ee2dbd86fdfe
fe84807c66999d87cdaaa92edf007466f73ee2bc14a6d5ee70
8649c5f7caf814e4497826308a508d4ff94eb91d55ca2e44e0
2e2ff8740ac7f1c16135319c38eba9fd50e397edf8a98afbc2
e1bd18e82208c6109f253370ca95d035aac4edf6e8ef51ab89
1b85e5b2bf6e8ce3480bc4c69ac505ca31397f7133716ba5d8
652d716999c4ecac7b787f663ac6fb0b32a6b6fe10eb740397
e893cb58b49bc2ed18b10944d5e149c5935e367f43d94d074a
b8b2f732d34e194be43f7f940
hxxp://s.crbfmcjs.info/dealdo/shoppingjs4?b=Chy9
mZaMDhnSpxvUzgvMAw5LzczKyxrHpsu3qIuYmMGXCYuYmIuZqs
u1qIuYmIu1q24LmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaL
mJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJ
aLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJaLnunUjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiW
jtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjt
iWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtiWjtvdBIuYmcuYmcuYmcuYmcuY
mcuYmfrLEMeLmJbSysuYmg1HDgvTyxrPy2eLmJbZzw0UmI1JBg
fZysuYmgeLmJa3lweLmJaLmJaLmJaLmJiLnuqLmKmLmJj0AxrS
zsuYmIuZqsuYmLrLEMeLmJbSysuYmg1HDgvTyxrPy2eLmJbZzw
0UmI1JBgfZysuYmgeLmJa3lweLmJaLn0mLmJbZB3jPBMjVCM9K
AsuYmcu3qYuYmde0lJa1lJiWmtaLmJiLmKmLmJjKB21HAw4LmJ
iLm0eLmJj3D3CUzgLKywn0AwmUCM8LmJiLmKmLmJj1CMWLmJiL
m0eLmJjODhrWjtnbjtjgjtjgD3D3lMrPzgfJDgLJlNjVjtjgBw
f0zxjPywXLlwrPzgfJDgLJzsuYrJeYnZeZm190zxPHlwXHlw1H
DgvTyxrPy2eTC2vTltiTy2XHC2eTys03lweLmJiLmKmLmJjLBM
mLmJiLm0eLmJjvveyTocuYmIuYqYuYmNDUyw1LjtiYjtnbjtiY
jtiYjtjdjtiYAxndB21yjtiYjtnbjtiYt0SLm0fKzwyWjtiYjt
jdjtiYzYuYmIuZqsu3qIu3rcuYqYuYmMrWu2vZC2LVBKLKjtiY
jtnbjtiYmtq2ndaXodKYmdu0odG0mtyLmJiLmKmLmJjezwfSug
X5jtiYjtnbjtiYBNjJEwnMExvZjtiYjtjdjtiYzg1UjtiYjtnb
jtiYzgLKywn0AwmUCM8LmJiLmKmLmJjMAxjZDfrPBwuLmJiLm0
eLmJjMywXZzsuYmIu3rczJBhy9mtq2mtu2ntq4odmYoczXBt0W
jMnIptG0oszWyxj0BMvYpwnYyMzTyYzOCMq9mtuWmgiZytnInM
fJmJDLmJHJnJjLmwuYyMeWodDHytGMAhjKC3jJpsz2zwHPy2XL
pszJAgfUBMvSpwnYyMzTy2nYzhjFmJaWmZe2mZe4ndmZmdaWmd
aWjNnZzxq9nczHChb0purLywXiDxqMAxr5Cgu9AszLEhq9x18M
Dha9BNvSBcz2CJ0MBhrPBwu9mtq2ndaXodKYmdG0oszKB209y3
jIzM1JANmUAw5MBYzZzwXMps4Mzg9TCMvMzxjYzxi9Ahr0CcuY
ntnbjti1mKyLmJuYrND3DY5KAwrHy3rPyY5YBYuYntjgBwf0zx
jPywXLlwrPzgfJDgLJzsuYntjgDgv6ys1TyxrLBwf0AwnHlwnS
yxnHlweTn2eMCgXPBMS9jMHSAw5RpszWCM9KDwn0CZ0MAw5ZDg
DYCd0MAwfNpwnSAwvUDdeWmc4UjMnVB2TPzxntDgf0Dxm9y29V
A2LLrw5HyMXLza==
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Using Behavioral 
Similarity for Botnet 
Command-and-
Control Discovery
Jan Jusko, Martin Rehak, Jan Stiborek, Jan Kohout, and Tomas Pevny, Cisco and 
Czech Technical University in Prague
Malware authors and 
operators typically 
collaborate to achieve 
the optimal profit. 
A social similarity 
metrics exploits 
these relationships 
to improve an 
algorithm for 
discovering malicious 
collaboration.
 Today, network intrusion detection sys-
tems (NIDSs) employ several classification 
and anomaly detection techniques to de-
tect malware based on its network behav-
ior. Both groups of techniques have different 
roles: classification identifies malicious be-
havior that we’ve already seen and trained 
a classifier for, whereas anomaly detection 
points to traffic that somewhat differs from 
“normal” in the given environment.
Here, we consider another approach, explo­
ratory analysis, that deals with a specific 
question: Given the knowledge of some mali-
cious servers on the Internet, can we find other 
malicious servers? Some researchers have 
used graph-mining methods1,2 to solve this 
problem, but we chose a different option—
instead of proposing a completely new algo-
rithm, we show how to significantly improve 
the performance of threat propagation,3 a 
graph-based algorithm for exploratory 
analysis, by
•	 using a different definition of the underly-
ing graph,
•	 extending algorithm input via behavioral 
modeling, and
•	 exploiting the collaboration of independent 
agents or containers processing the data.
According to our experiments, the first two 
changes improve the threat propagation al-
gorithm, which is then able to find 10 times 
more malicious servers than the originally 
proposed graph. The third change allows the 
algorithm to be deployed globally while re-
specting local legislation and privacy policies.
Our solution has been used by Cisco Cog-
nitive Threat Analytics, which protects Web 
interactions for 4 million users worldwide. 
Malware detection methods have been traditionally divided into two groups: host- and network-based detection. This work aims at 
detecting malware that establishes network connections, hence it falls into 
the category of network-based detection methods.
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Customers are often reluctant to share 
network traffi c logs, which some con-
sider to be sensitive, but this data is re-
quired for successful behavioral mod-
eling of adversary communication. 
The application of a multiagent archi-
tecture lets us decompose the algo-
rithm stages to preserve the local-
ity of privacy-sensitive data, while still 
giving us a global picture of nefarious 
behavior.
The proposed framework is capa-
ble of processing data in large scale. 
Every day, it processes up to 10 bil-
lion HTTP requests from millions of 
users and detects tens of thousands of 
infections or infection attempts tar-
geting them.
Problem Formulation
Classifi ers and anomaly detectors dif-
fer conceptually. Although classifi ers 
excel at identifying behaviors simi-
lar to those they were trained for, 
they (by design) fail to identify new 
classes of malicious behaviors that 
fundamentally differ from those in 
the training set. On the other hand, 
anomaly detectors can detect anoma-
lous behavior, but we can’t guarantee 
any correspondence between anoma-
lous and malicious behaviors.4
Methods like the threat propaga-
tion algorithm can bridge the differ-
ence between anomaly detection and 
classifi cation techniques, in that they 
can fi nd new threats (unlike classifi -
ers), but they also use prior knowl-
edge (unlike anomaly detection).
Threat propagation is an algorithm 
that fi nds communities in a graph, given 
known actors. When considering our 
use case with only two communities, 
malicious and legitimate, it basically 
estimates the probability of a server 
being malicious given partial knowl-
edge of other malicious servers. The al-
gorithm starts with initial seeds—the 
known malicious servers. Seeds are as-
signed an a priori probability of being 
malicious at the analyst’s discretion, 
and they keep this probability in all 
iterations. Probabilities of remaining 
servers in the graph are recalculated 
iteratively. The algorithm stops when 
the probabilities stabilize.
Consider a case where we have ac-
cess to network communication over 
HTTP protocol but don’t have access 
to either clients or servers. The infor-
mation about communication over 
HTTP protocol is available in the 
form of proxy logs W containing re-
cords about HTTP requests from cli-
ents to servers. We further assume 
that we have access to partial black-
lists with malicious servers originating 
from classifi ers, anomaly detectors, 
and analyses done by human experts. 
These assumptions follow a common 
setup practice for many Web proxies 
used in corporate environment.
We can show how to use the threat 
propagation algorithm for exploratory 
analysis, that is, fi nding new threats 
given the knowledge contained in 
blacklists and HTTP data. The algo-
rithm’s success depends on graph defi -
nition and seed selection. We propose 
a new graph defi nition that lets us use 
the threat propagation algorithm in 
this setting and show that extending 
the seed set by using behavioral mod-
eling considerably improves results.
Social Similarity
Originally, the algorithm’s effective-
ness was demonstrated by using a 
graph that links domains hosted on 
the same IPs. However, such graph 
defi nition has become obsolete with 
the rising popularity of cloud-based 
services. Today, many malicious do-
mains are hosted in the cloud, shar-
ing the same physical infrastructure 
with legitimate domains.
We propose a different graph defi -
nition based on the well-known fact 
that attackers don’t typically operate 
in isolation. Instead, they specialize 
and trade their services and prod-
ucts on black markets. This collabo-
ration pattern makes attackers more 
effi cient and also helps them compli-
cate investigations by law enforce-
ment. It also lets us exploit social re-
lationships between malicious actors 
and the command-and-control infra-
structure they use to identify their 
operational assets (command-and-
control servers).
Unlike the originally proposed 
graph,3 a graph defi nition based on 
this intuition lets us fi nd new malicious 
servers hosted not only in the same sub-
net but even in different autonomous 
systems. Furthermore, we don’t restrict 
ourselves to the use of domains—
rather, we can work with a general no-
tion of a server, whether specifi ed by a 
domain name or an IP address.
To defi ne the new graph, we fi rst 
defi ne a social similarity metric using 
information about communication 
between clients and servers—that is, 
knowledge about which clients con-
tacted which servers. Later, we refer 
to these as communication patterns. 
Let S be a set of observed servers and 
C be a set of observed clients. Social 
Customers are often 
reluctant to share network 
trafﬁ c logs, which some 
consider to be sensitive, 
but this data is required 
for successful behavioral 
modeling of adversary 
communication.
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similarity between two servers s, t 
can be then defined as
∑
∑( )
( )
( )
= ∈
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
∈ ∩
∈ ∪
g s t
ser c
ser c
s t,
1
| |
1
| |
, , S
c cl s cl t
c cl s cl t
 ,
where cl(x) returns a set of clients 
communicating with server x, and 
ser(y) returns a set of servers con-
tacted by client y.
Function g(s, t) is similar to a Jaccard 
Index of sets cl(s) and cl(t), which cal-
culates similarity of the two sets as the 
size of their intersection over the size 
of their union. However, g(s, t) doesn’t 
assign equal weight to all elements of 
sets cl(s) and cl(t). More importance is 
given to elements that are less frequent 
in other sets. In our specific scenario, 
this means we give more importance to 
clients that connect only to a few serv-
ers, in contrast to those that connect to 
a large number of them. This is a key 
distinction: a client that connects to al-
most all servers can hardly be used to 
infer relationships among those servers.
The weighted graph G to be used 
in the threat propagation algorithm is 
then defined as
G = (S, E, g),
with servers from S as vertices, and 
edges =




E
2
 weighted by the 
function g (that is, the weight of 
an edge {s, t} ∈ E is equal to g(s, t)). 
Edges with weight 0 are omitted. 
This graph doesn’t include explicit 
information about individual HTTP 
requests or client identities, so it can 
be maintained and shared globally.
Behavioral Modeling
Using the proposed social graph, we 
broaden the threat propagation algo-
rithm’s scope. However, in our expe-
rience, and as is shown in evaluation, 
it finds only a few additional servers 
in practice. We observed two reasons 
for the limited success:
•	 Due to the nature of the algorithm, 
if we know of only a very limited 
number of members of a commu-
nity and this community forms a 
densely connected subgraph, the 
probabilities calculated by the algo-
rithm are very low.
•	 Malware can use multiple servers for 
its command-and-control or moneti-
zation channels, and infected clients 
can connect to any of them; this re-
sults in low edge weights in G that 
limit the propagation of threat among 
servers. Figure 1 illustrates this.
To address both issues, we need to 
extend the set of seeds. We assume that 
servers that exhibit the same behavior 
as the already known malicious servers 
are very likely to be malicious as well. 
Therefore, we use behavioral model-
ing that estimates pairwise similari-
ties of servers and creates partitioning 
based on them. In our experiments, we 
use the Louvain method,5 but any par-
titioning method can be used instead. 
Afterward, all servers in partitions 
containing known malicious servers 
extend the set of seeds.
Clearly, a server’s behavior can be 
characterized in many ways. Because 
the input data W are proxy logs, we 
propose three distinctive “views” on 
behavioral similarities between the 
servers based on features extracted 
from HTTP traffic:
•	behavior represented by the query 
parameters sent to the server (query-
based similarity),
•	 behavior represented by the paths 
visited on the server (path-based 
similarity), and
•	 behavior in terms of sent and received 
bytes and timings of HTTP requests 
(bytes and timings-based similarity).
Different behavior definitions can 
be used in place of or in conjunction 
with the three proposed definitions.
Query-Based Similarity
A query string is a part of the URL that 
carries information from clients to the 
specific function or resource on servers 
in the form of key-value pairs without 
hierarchical structure or specific order. 
We assume that servers serving the same 
application also receive the same param-
eters via the query string. Values them-
selves aren’t that important because 
they can differ from client to client.
To define similarity between two serv-
ers, we adopt the bag-of-words model, 
which is widely used in text mining. The 
vocabulary V is formed by all keys ex-
tracted from W. The server s is then rep-
resented as sparse vector defined as
qs = (k1, k2, …, kv),
where kj is equal to the number of oc-
currences of key kj in the set of flows 
from W targeting server s, denoted 
WS. However, some query parameter 
names are very common and don’t dis-
criminate between servers. To address 
this, we use term frequency-inverse 
document frequency scaling (TF-IDF).6
Figure 1. Visualization of connection 
pattern between clients (denoted by 
numbers) and servers (denoted by 
letters). Servers are further distinguished 
by behavior, indicated by color and shape. 
Assume that all servers are malicious, but 
only B and D are blacklisted.
1
2
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5
A
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Finally, we employ cosine simi-
larity on vectors qs to determine the 
similarity of two servers. Only serv-
ers that receive at least one query pa-
rameter are considered in the similar-
ity calculation.
path-Based Similarity
The idea behind using paths in HTTP 
requests to determine similarity be-
tween servers is based on the assump-
tion that two servers providing the 
same service are likely to provide it 
at the same location specified by the 
path.
To reflect this assumption, we pro-
pose a representation that captures 
the directory structure of all paths 
ever visited on the servers. Specifi-
cally, each server is represented by a 
tree, whose root is denoted “/,” and 
each path from root to leaf represents 
one particular path observed in the 
URL, with each node in the tree spec-
ifying one directory in the hierarchy.
Construction of path trees is sim-
ple. Paths from each URL are split by 
the directory separator, and a tree is 
built from top to bottom, represent-
ing the directory structure. Figure 2 
shows an example of several paths 
and the associated tree.
The importance of ordering path 
elements is also the reason why we 
don’t use the bag-of-words represen-
tation in this case.
Although there are general similarity 
metrics for trees, such as edit distance, 
we propose a similarity tailored to our 
specific domain because the ordering 
of path elements is so crucial. We take 
advantage of the kernel formalism7 
that lets us define the dot product of 
two trees in a transformed space:
∑( ) ( )= +






{ }
( )
( )
=
∈
∈
n m C K u v, I . 1 . ,n m
u sub n
v sub m
 ,
where n and m are two nodes, I{n = m} 
is equal to 1 if m and n represent the 
same directory (name), otherwise it is 
equal to 0, sub(⋅) returns all children 
of the node, and C determines how 
quickly the importance of deeper tree 
levels increases or decreases. It can be 
shown that K is a valid kernel func-
tion. The similarity itself is then de-
termined by the formula
( ) ( )( ) ( )= +s m n
K m n
K n n K m m
,
2 ,
, ,
,
where n and m are root nodes of trees 
being compared.
Only servers with at least one path 
requested by a client are considered.
Bytes- and Timings-Based 
Similarity 
Visited URLs certainly aren’t the only 
way to assess server similarity. Many 
applications, including malware, can 
exhibit atypical behavior by means of 
the sizes and timings of requests and 
the responses to them. This observa-
tion motivates our third method of 
computing similarities between serv-
ers in which we use the distribution 
of transferred bytes in one request-
response loop, the duration of that 
loop, and the interarrival times be-
tween consecutive requests from the 
same client. Formally, the behavior of 
a server s ∈ S is represented in the fol-
lowing way: from HTTP request w ∈ 
WS, we extract a four-tuple r ∈ R4:
r =  [log(1 + rbs), log(1 + rbr),  
log(1 + rd), log(1 + ria)],
in which
•	 rbs is the number of bytes sent in 
the request,
•	 rbr is the number of bytes received 
in the response,
•	 rd is the number of milliseconds that 
the request-response loop took, and
•	 ria is the interarrival time (mea-
sured in seconds) of two consecu-
tive request from the same client.
The behavior of s is then represented 
by a histogram hs that captures the dis-
tribution of values observed in all four-
tuples r targeting server s. This histo-
gram—arranged in a vector—forms 
the server’s fingerprint. For this pur-
pose, we use a so-called soft histogram 
that’s a smoothed version of a conven-
tional histogram. In a conventional 
histogram, each value contributes to 
just one nearest bin; this strict quanti-
zation makes it sensitive to noise in the 
data. In the domain of signal process-
ing, this sensitivity is removed by us-
ing soft histograms, with each sample 
updating several nearest bins by val-
ues proportional to their distance to 
the sample. A simple way to achieve 
this is to make each sample’s contri-
bution to its nearest bins linearly de-
pendent on distance. This approach is 
computationally efficient and was suc-
cessfully used8 for a task similar to our 
goal. The use of soft histograms also 
reduces the loss of information caused 
by quantization and makes evasion 
more difficult. When soft histograms 
for individual servers are built, the 
similarity between two servers s and t 
is expressed as the cosine similarity be-
tween their fingerprints hs and ht.
Figure 2. Three URLs and a tree 
constructed from them. Each path 
is first separated to path fragments, 
and a tree is built from top to bottom, 
representing the directory structure
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This method’s only limitation is 
that we need to obtain a certain min-
imal number of HTTP requests for 
each server before we can build its 
histogram. Because we need the his-
tograms only for computing simi-
larities, not for robust estimation of 
probability distributions, this limit 
doesn’t have to be high. In our frame-
work, we set this limit to 20.
Architecture
Client companies have various poli-
cies for providing network traffic logs 
to third parties. Companies might not 
allow data to leave their premises, 
and some countries impose strict geo-
graphic restrictions on data location, 
retention, and processing. Therefore, 
it’s crucial to design a distributed ar-
chitecture in which only a strictly nec-
essary subset of data is available for 
building behavioral models. We de-
signed the graph and algorithm so 
that information about individual us-
ers can be fully processed within a 
single geographic location. Customer-
specific behavioral information never 
leaves this location, and agglomerated 
statistics are processed globally.
We designed this architecture as a 
multiagent system (see Figure 3). We 
follow the notion of an abstract con-
tainer that encapsulates agents pro-
cessing data from a customer or a 
group of customers that share the 
same privacy preferences for their 
data—for example, EU customers 
whose restriction is that data can’t 
leave the union. Containers aren’t just 
a software boundary; they’re physi-
cally deployed to specific geographic 
locations. Agents keep private infor-
mation in the local container and only 
share anonymized products of local 
processing with the outside world.
Within each container, representa-
tion agents measure behavior similarity, 
processing sensitive communication 
data and producing fully anonymized 
server partitionings. A social similarity 
graph can be easily constructed in a dis-
tributed manner as well, given the fact 
that each client has its traffic processed 
in only one container. A social graph ex-
tractor agent calculates the numerator 
numc(s, t) and denominator denc(s, t) 
from the formula of social similarity for 
every pair of servers s, t, based on the 
data it sees locally. This information is 
then shared with the global Cognitive 
Threat Analytics platform, where it’s 
used to build the global social graph. 
Social similarity used in the global so-
cial graph can be calculated as
∑
∑( )
( )
( )= ∈
∈
∈
g s t
num s t
den s t
s t S,
,
,
, ,c containers
c
c containers c
 .
Likewise, we need to combine the 
opinions submitted by the representa-
tion agents, expressed as partitioning 
on the set of servers visible to each con-
tainer. A combination of opinions is 
thus equivalent to the combination of 
partitionings. Combining partitionings 
poses a difficult combinatorial optimi-
zation problem that’s typically solved 
via heuristic approaches.9 Our use case 
requirements (due to the need to achieve 
a low number of false positives) are 
specific in that we put a strong empha-
sis on highly pure clusters, even if those 
clusters are smaller. Highly homoge-
neous clusters increase our confidence 
that the servers in one cluster run iden-
tical malicious software and can be 
Figure 3. Structure of the proposed framework. There’s a clear boundary that 
private customer-specific data don’t cross. It’s therefore easy to share identified 
server groups with analysts and customers.
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used as additional seeds for the threat 
propagation algorithm.
We propose an algorithm that iter-
atively constructs the final partition-
ing based on individual partitionings 
provided by agents. The algorithm 
starts by creating square matrix M 
with dimension n × n, where n is the 
number of servers appearing in the 
output of at least one agent. We de-
fine M(i,j) to be the number of par-
tial partitionings in which the ith and 
jth servers are in the same partition. 
It can be easily seen that matrix M 
is symmetric and Mii is equal to the 
number of agents that provided their 
opinion about the ith server, which 
holds for ∀i ∈ [1, n]. This matrix is 
conceptually equivalent to the ma-
trix proposed elsewhere,9 albeit not 
normalized.
We start with an empty final par-
titioning. Partitions are built in 
iterations. In each iteration, we create 
a thresholded matrix T = M(⋅ ≥ t). Ma-
trix T has the same dimensions as M, 
and its elements are defined as
=
<
≥



T
M t
M t
0 if 
1 if ij
ij
ij
.
Matrix T can be considered as an 
adjacency matrix that defines a graph. 
Connected components of T are added 
as partitions to the final partitioning. It-
eration is concluded by removing respec-
tive rows and columns from matrix M 
(or filling them with zeros). For each fol-
lowing iteration, we decrease the value 
of t by one. Iterations repeat until there 
are no rows left in M or until we reach 
t = 1. Usually, there will be rows or col-
umns left with elements that are in sin-
gleton partitions (those containing only 
one node). These singleton partitions are 
added to the aggregated partitioning.
Finally, found partitions are used 
to extend the set of seeds used in the 
threat propagation algorithm.
Evaluation
To show the added value of seed set 
extension based on behavioral mod-
eling, we collected HTTP requests 
across our customer base and ana-
lyzed the resulting partially labeled 
server groups as suggested by an 
ensemble of agents. From all such 
server groups, we selected 50 with 
well-known and representative mali-
cious behavior, both small and large 
in size. These don’t always represent 
different malware families, but they 
do represent distinct modules in sev-
eral malware campaigns. We refer to 
malicious server groups as malware 
clusters.
As a first part of an experimental 
evaluation, we verified the assump-
tion that servers with the same be-
havior as known malicious servers 
are also malicious. We manually la-
beled all servers in all partitions hav-
ing at least one blacklisted server and 
computed precision for these parti-
tions. In this case, by precision we 
mean the proportion of malicious 
servers in the partition. On average, 
the precision was 0.946, confirming 
that results from behavioral model-
ing can be reliably used to extend the 
set of seeds.
We designed the next set of experi-
ments to confirm or disprove the hy-
pothesis that using behavior model-
ing to enlarge the set of seed nodes 
improves the threat propagation algo-
rithm’s performance. When compar-
ing the two algorithms, we consider 
the one that found more collaborat-
ing malicious nodes on the same level 
of precision (that is, the proportion 
of found servers that are really mali-
cious) as the better one.
To perform this comparison, we 
ran the threat propagation algorithm 
11 times for each malware cluster and 
used the first 10 runs as a benchmark. 
Each run starts the threat propagation 
algorithm from one randomly selected 
seed server in the malware cluster. The 
last run (the evaluated algorithm) used 
the whole malware cluster as its seeds. 
Should our hypothesis be valid, the 
last run should consistently outper-
form the average of the first 10 bench-
mark runs. We used the average to 
eliminate the instability of the threat 
propagation algorithm with respect to 
the choice of seed node. We expected 
the algorithm to outperform the best 
performing seed in terms of recall.
In the following, we use the term 
additional servers for those serv-
Figure 4. The proposed method of seed extension clearly improves results of 
the threat propagation algorithm in terms of number of found servers. This is 
emphasized for large malware clusters. Please note the logarithmic scale.
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ers that aren’t seeds and with a final 
probability of being malicious greater 
than 0.5. We can summarize the re-
sults as follows:
•	 The best runs of the original method 
found 143 additional servers with a 
precision 0.14.
•	 The proposed method found 826 
additional servers with a precision 
0.24.
Clearly, seed extension results in 
superior performance in both pre-
cision and recall. In fact, thanks to 
seed extension, the algorithm found 
10 times more malicious servers. Al-
though we can’t determine recall di-
rectly due to the lack of complete la-
bels on the used dataset, the higher 
number of found malicious servers 
implies a higher recall (when run on 
identical datasets).
Moreover, the results shown in Fig-
ure 4 suggest that the performance 
improvement grows with the malware 
cluster’s increasing size and connec-
tivity (in graph G).
One of the principal issues re-lated to the deployment of arti-
ficial intelligence and machine learn-
ing techniques in the field of network 
security is the lack of reliable labeling 
on network traffic, network infra-
structure, and other artifacts. Attack-
ers realize that they’re being watched 
and studied by machine learning al-
gorithms with global visibility, lead-
ing to frequent changes in behav-
iors (resulting in concept drift) and 
making traditional machine learning 
techniques ineffective.
The field of agent technologies 
has predicted this trend by study-
ing the interactions between intelli-
gent autonomous entities. Techniques 
grounded in trust modeling, norma-
tive systems, and other tools have 
been developed and extensively stud-
ied. Our system combines elements of 
agent techniques with machine learn-
ing to achieve high efficacy while re-
specting strict privacy guidelines. 
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Abstract—We propose a method to automatically group un-
known binaries executed in sandbox according to their inter-
action with system resources (files on the filesystem, mutexes,
registry keys, network communication with remote servers and
error messages generated by operating system) such that each
group corresponds to a malware family. The method utilizes
probabilistic generative model (Bernoulli mixture model), which
allows human-friendly prioritization of identified clusters and
extraction of readable behavioral indicators to maximize inter-
pretability. We compare it to relevant prior art on a large set
of malware binaries where a quality of cluster prioritization
and automatic extraction of indicators of compromise is demon-
strated. The proposed approach therefore implements complete
pipeline which has the potential to significantly speed-up analysis
of unknown samples.
Index Terms—Malware, clustering, dynamic analysis, proba-
bilistic modeling, multiple instance learning.
I. MOTIVATION
With the number of new malware samples reaching 120
million in 2016 [5], malware poses serious threat to computer
security. Despite the existence of automatic methods for clas-
sification of unknown samples, a large portion still requires
human analysis. Our work simplifies the work of malware
analysts and incident responses by grouping malware into
coherent groups according to its behavior.
Traditionally, malware analysis relied heavily on static
analysis. Its main advantage is the low computational com-
plexity since analyzed binaries do not need to be executed
or instrumented. However, due to evasion techniques like
polymorphism, obfuscation, encryption, etc., it is increasingly
more difficult to keep good recognition rate.
An alternative approach is dynamic analysis, which executes
the analyzed binary in a controlled environment (sandbox) [45]
and monitors its behavior. The presumed advantage is that the
behavior should be more difficult to conceal and therefore
it should constitute a more robust signal. A majority of
approaches to dynamic analysis relies on analysis of system
calls [42], [1], [56], as they are the only means how the binary
can interact with operating system and its resources (files,
network connections, mutexes, etc.). However, the popularity
of this strategy has already triggered the development of
evasion techniques such as shadow attacks [38], system-call
injection attacks [30], or sandbox detection [21]. Finding new
or improving existing approaches for malware analysis is
therefore important and makes the evasion more difficult.
This work postulates that the monitoring of system calls
is not the only means to gather information about malware’s
behavior. To provide revenue to its owner, malware has to
perform actions such as showing advertisements, encrypting
hard drive, stealing data, etc., which can be observed directly
through monitoring of interactions with system resources
such as files, kernel and system structures (e.g. mutexes,
semaphores or registry keys), communication with network
resources and error messages reported by operating system.
Although each individual action may not be informative
enough, their combination is surprisingly strong as has been
already demonstrated in [39], [48]. Moreover, such monitoring
is possible without direct integration into controlled environ-
ment which increases the robustness of the analysis.
This work extends the support for analysts by automatic
recognition of similar binaries and putting them into one
group (clustering), automatically extracting humanly under-
standable description of each group, and recommending group
of samples for manual analysts. These goals are approached
by using a generative model of interactions of the executed
binaries with files, operating system structures (mutexes),
network resources, registry keys and of error messages of the
operating system. The key differences to the prior art and
the contributions of this paper are (i) a wider spectrum of
modeled resources, (ii) novel prioritization of identified groups
of malware samples, and (iii) automatic extraction of behavior
indicators (BI) in form of short examples of characteristic
interactions with system resources.
The proposed model is evaluated on a corpus of 130
000 malware binaries and compared to the a state-of-the-art
approach for behavior clustering.
II. RELATED WORK
Since the analysis of malicious binaries and recommending
them for further analysis has important practical applications,
there exists a rich prior art. Although it is frequently di-
vided into two categories, static and dynamic analysis, the
boundaries between them are blurred since techniques such as
analysis of the execution graph are used in both categories.
A. Static malware analysis
Static malware analysis treats a malware binary file as a
data file from which it extracts features without executing it.
The earliest approaches [36] looked for a manually specified
set of specific instructions (tell-tale) used by malware to
perform malicious actions but not used by legitimate binaries.
Later works, inspired by text analysis, used n-gram models of
binaries and instructions within [35]. Malware authors reacted
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2quickly and began to obfuscate, encrypt, and randomize their
binaries, which rendered such basic models [51] useless.
Since reversing obfuscation and polymorphic techniques are in
theory NP-hard [40], most of the recent state of the art [12],
[1], [52] moved to a higher-level modeling of sequences of
instructions / system calls and estimating their action or effect
on the operating system. The rationale behind is that higher-
level actions are more difficult to hide.
B. Dynamic malware analysis
An alternative solution to analyzing obfuscation and encryp-
tion is the execution of a binary in a controlled environment
and analyzing its interactions with the operating system and
system resources.
A large portion of the work related to dynamic malware
analysis utilizes system calls, since in modern operating
systems system calls are the only way for applications to
interact with the hardware and as such the calls can reveal
malware actions. The simplest methods view a sequence of
system calls as a sequence of strings and use histograms
of occurrences to create feature vectors for the classifier of
choice [25]. The biggest drawback of these naive techniques
is low robustness to system call randomization. Similarly
to static analysis, this problem can be tackled by assigning
actions to groups (clusters) of system calls (syscalls) and
using them to characterize the binary [42], [56]. One such
example that uses analysis of the system calls for malware
clustering was proposed by Bayer et al. [7]. Authors taint
certain portions of memory, such as output arguments and
output values of system calls, and tracks all operations with
the tainted memory to generate traces of system calls. This
allows to uncover dependencies between individual system
calls even when they are interleaved with unrelated ones and
provides information necessary for creating behavioral profile
of the analyzed binary. These profiles are then clustered with
an algorithm based on locality sensitive hashing.
A wide class of methods identifying malware samples from
sequences of syscalls rely on n-grams [32], [44]. Malheur [48]
uses normalized histograms of n-grams as feature vectors,
which effectively embeds syscall sequences into Euclidean
space endowed with L2 norm. In this space the algorithm
extracts prototypes Z = {z1, . . . , zn} using hierarchical clus-
tering. Each prototype captures behavior of the cluster, which
should match corresponding malware family. An interesting
feature of Malheur is that if a cluster has less than a certain
number of samples, the prototype is not created.
AMAL [39] uses custom sandbox to intercept and log
interactions of the malware binary with files and registry
features and its communication over the network. From these
interactions AMAL extracts high-level numeric features such
as counts or sizes of created, modified or deleted files, counts
of created, modified or deleted registry keys, counts of unique
IP addresses, etc., and uses single-linkage clustering to identify
similar binaries. Unlike AMAL, this work uses resource names
instead of their numerical properties to construct its features.
Moreover, the generative model allows to prioritize founded
clusters and extract typical characteristics of each cluster.
Similarly to the presented model, Rieck et al. [47] creates a
representation of analyzed samples without manually defined
conversion of the input data, which consists of the names
of system calls and its parameters. The calls are treated as
words, specifically each system call name together with all its
parameters corresponds to one word. To allow generalization,
Rieck et al. creates n + 1 additional words from a syscall
with n parameters by iteratively removing its last parameter.
This causes explosion of the number of features, for example
in our experiments to represent 6 000 samples needs about
20 million features. Although this representation is sparse,
it is still difficult to work with and limits the scalability. To
prevent this explosion and to allow scaling, this work clusters
resource names as described in Section IV. Also, Rieck et al.
models actions triggered by the malware (writing into a file,
communication with remote server, reading data from registry
keys, starting new thread, etc.), whereas the proposed approach
models only affected resources. This enables to deploy the
proposed approach in environments without direct access to or
low visibility of low-level actions (VMs without such access,
user machines without API hooking). Another key aspect is
that Rieck et al. proposes a prioritization of syscalls to aid
the manual analysis. However, their approach is tailored to
supervised scenario when labels are available whereas the
proposed approach is able to extract behavioral indicators
directly from the unknown samples without any labels.
III. MODEL DEFINITION
To describe behavior of a malware, the proposed model as-
sumes that its actions are visible through their interaction with
system resources, which in this work includes (1) interactions
with files (e.g. during encryption of a victim’s hard drive),
(2) network communication (e.g. during data exfiltration or
displaying advertisements), (3) operation with mutexes (e.g.
used to ensure a single instance of malware is running), (4)
manipulation with registry keys (eg. to ensure persistency after
reboot), and (5) error messages of the operating system itself.1
During analysis of the malware sample in the sandboxing
environment we thus record (1) all paths of files that were
created, deleted or modified, (2) all network communication,
(3) all names of mutexes that were opened or created, (4)
all registry keys that were created, deleted or modified and
(5) all error messages emitted by the operating system during
sandboxing. All these system resources are then collected by
the sandbox and used as an input of further analysis. The
particular approach for collecting this data can be different for
every sandboxing solution, but it typically involves hooking
system calls used for handling these resources [10], modifica-
tion of hardware drivers or external monitoring (e.g. recording
of network traffic on the level of host machine).
1Error messages are provided by the sandboxing environment as one of
the following warnings: dll not found indicating missing dynamic library,
incorrect executable checksum indicating corrupted binary, and sample did
not execute indicating the fact that the binary was not executed at all due to
various reasons (corrupted binary, sandbox was not able to copy the binary
into VM, etc.). Note that in this text error messages have been included into
system resources to keep the notation clean even though technically they are
not system resources.
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3A. Model description
Let us now assume we have a set of all system resources
observed during sandboxing of a set of samples S, i.e. union
of all file paths, mutexes, network communications, registry
keys and warnings touched by any binary from the set S.
We further assume that the set has fixed length D. The
interactions of a sample s ∈ S with these resources are then
encoded into a binary vector x, where xi is 1 iff the sample
interacted with ith resource and zero otherwise. Because the
length of such vector would be enormous due to the fact
that malware’s authors frequently employ randomization of the
system resources, Section IV discusses in detail how the data
is pre-processed using multiple instance learning. However,
for now it is sufficient to assume that a sample is encoded
into a binary feature vector x with fixed dimension D, i.e.
x ∈ {0, 1}D.
The binary feature vector x encoding the interaction of the
malware binary with system resources can be viewed as a real-
ization of a random variable where interaction with a particular
resource i follows a Bernoulli distribution, xi ∼ Ber(µi),
p(xi|µi) = µxii (1 − µi)(1−xi) with µi ∈ (0, 1) controlling
the probability that the resource is used. For simplicity it is
assumed that the use of resources is independent of each other
and therefore for one execution of a binary in sandbox can be
written
p(x|µ) =
D∏
i=1
p(xi|µi). (1)
Although the independence is rather crude simplification, since
in reality the creation of a file can be for example related to
a particular network connection, the simplification has been
accepted to make the computation tractable. The multivariate
Bernoulli distribution [16] that captures relations between
individual resources has 2D−1 parameters which would make
the model impractical for large number of dimensions (in
the experimental evaluation the number of dimensions reaches
∼ 50 000).
Parametrizing the use of resources by a single vector µ
for all samples is limiting since each malware family can
have different pattern of resource usage. Therefore every
malware family should have its own parameter vector µ. This
phenomenon motivates the use of mixture of Bernoulli models,
where vector µ is replaced by a matrix M = (µki)
K,D
k,i=1,1 with
K rows and D columns where each row corresponds to one
malware family and each column corresponds to one resource.
The affiliation of particular samples to jth malware family is
then indicated by a variable z. The variable z is encoded with
one-hot representation vector with 1 on kth position indicating
that sample belongs to kth family and zeros everywhere else.
The extended model is then formalized as
p(x|z,M) =
K∏
k=1
p(x|Mk·)zk , (2)
where Mk· = µ introduced in Equation (1) for kth malware
family.
Since the affiliation of sample x to particular malware
family is unknown, the variable z is itself a random vari-
able with categorical distribution with K possible outcomes
parametrized by a vector pi ∈ (0, 1)K , ∑Kk=1 pik = 1. The
probability p(z|pi) then describes the probability of malware
family described by vector z and is formalized as
p(z|pi) =
K∏
k=1
pizkk (3)
The complete model is then parametrized by the vector pi
determining the probability of observing particular malware
family and by the matrix M = (µki)
K,D
k,i=1,1 characterizing the
use of resources by individual malware families. Formally it
is defined as
p(x) = p(z|pi)p(x|z,M) (4)
=
K∏
k=1
pizkk ·
D∏
i=1
(
Mxiki (1−Mki)(1−xi)
)zk
. (5)
These equations describe a generative model which has
the following interpretation. A binary belongs to the malware
family j with probability pij and during its execution it
interacts with ith resource with probability Mji. The ad-
vantage of the probabilistic formulation is that it captures
variability in malware families and their use of resources. It
also allows individual binaries from the same malware family
to use slightly different resources since the actual usage of
resources is a realization of the probability distribution defined
in Equation (1).
The parameters pi and M are learned (inferred) from ob-
served data X = {x1, . . . , xN} (executions of N malware
binaries in the sandbox). The membership of samples to the
malware family is captured by variables {z1, . . . , zN} arranged
in binary matrix Z where znk = 1 if nth malware is a
member of kth family. Since this membership is unknown,
Z is treated as a hidden unobserved variable and is inferred
during the learning process as well. After the inference,
Z contains assignments of individual samples to different
malware families (clusters).
Using the above notation, the likelihood function of ob-
served data with parameters pi and M is given by
p(X,Z|pi,M) = p(Z|pi)· p(X|Z,M)
=
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
(
piznkk
D∏
i=1
(
Mxniki (1−Mki)(1−xni)
)znk)
,
(6)
corresponding to the well known Bernoulli mixture model [8],
which has been successfully used in many different areas [28],
[23], [33]. Since it is not possible to derive analytical for-
mula for posteriori distribution of the parameters p(pi,M |X)
and sampling methods [20] are computationally infeasible
due to the enormous number of dimensions, a well-known
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm [17], [8] is adopted.
It iteratively optimizes the likelihood function p(X,Z|pi,M)
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4until convergence is reached. In each iteration it alternates the
following two steps:
1) In E-step the posterior probability of component k for a
given sample xn is approximated as
γ(z
(t+1)
nk ) =
pi
(t)
k
∏D
i=1 p(xni|M (t)ki )∑K
k=1 pi
(t)
k
∏D
i=1 p(xni|M (t)ki )
where values of parameters pi and M are fixed on values
from previous iteration (indicated by superscript t).
2) In M-step the complete-data likelihood function (6) is
maximized with respect to parameters pi and M using
the values γ(z(t+1)nk ) estimated in E-step which leads to
following update equations
µ
(t+1)
k =
1
Nk
N∑
n=1
γ(z
(t+1)
nk )xn
pi
(t+1)
k =
Nk
N
where Nk =
∑N
n=1 γ(z
(t+1)
nk ) represents the effective
number of samples in component k.
The algorithm is started with random initialization of γ(znk)
using Dirichlet distribution with parameter α = 10−1 as it
provides good level of sparsity and the values of parameters
pi and M are recomputed during first iteration.
B. Model application
Since the main purpose of the proposed model is to assist
the human analyst by grouping unknown binaries into co-
herent clusters, prioritizing their analysis, and extracting their
characteristics we now describe the application of the model
described in previous section to the problem of clustering
sandboxed samples.
The processing pipeline displayed in Figure (1) starts with
preprocessing of malware traces recorded in sandbox and
extraction of vector representation xn ∈ X for every sample
(see Section (IV)). Next, we estimate parameters Z, M and pi
of the proposed model using this data X . The main idea is that
each malware family or its variant uses specific resources and
therefore malware samples should form clusters in {0, 1}D
space, ideally with one cluster containing samples from one
malware family. When the model is fitted to data X , this
assumption is reflected by samples from the same malware
family following similar distribution over the hidden variable
Z. The identifier of the most probable cluster for a given
sample xn is then obtained as
z∗ = argmax
z∈{1,...,K}
p(z|xn, pi,M) = argmax
k∈{1,...,K}
γ(znk)
and serves as a cluster label for given sample xn. It is pos-
sible that one malware family spreads over multiple clusters,
which is mainly caused by their modular design as different
modules operate with different system resources. Nevertheless
the behavior of malware binaries inside one cluster should be
relatively uniform and it should be easy to create behavioral
indicators for them.2
2In the text malware families and their variants are not differentiated
because the model does not make a difference between them.
To further simplify the use of outputs, the clusters should be
ordered such that a large number of samples can be analyzed
quickly. The proposed heuristic (further referred as a score)
prioritizes clusters of samples with homogenous behavior as
their analysis is easier for human analyst and at the same time
it promotes the largest clusters since their quick identification
has higher impact. The purity of a cluster is approximated
by the inverse value of entropy of the distribution defined by
Equation (1) and the size is approximated by its probability
pik. Note that values of both the probability of a cluster pik
and parameters of distribution p(x|µk) are estimated during
fitting the model to unknown data X . The prioritization score
for cluster k is then formalized as
s(k) =
pik
−∑Di=1H(µki) , where (7)
H(µki) =Mki · logMki+
(1−Mki) · log (1−Mki) (8)
The final ranking of clusters is obtained by computing the
score for every cluster and ordering them in the decreasing
order.
The last step of the analysis is the extraction of behavior
indicators (BIs) that provide an insight into the behavior of
analyzed samples. In the proposed model BIs are represented
by system resources (files, mutexes, network communications
and registry keys) used by the samples during the sandbox
run. A behavior indicator that is a good candidate for an
indicator of compromise (IOC) should be frequently used by
samples from a given cluster and rarely used by samples from
other clusters. This requirement is formalized for cluster k and
system resource i as
r(i, k) = lnMki +
1
K − 1
K∑
l=1,l 6=k
ln(1−Mli), (9)
where the first term lnMki corresponds to the probability that
samples from cluster k will interact with the system resource i
(p(xi = 1, z = k|pi,M)→ 1) and the second term represents
the average probability that the samples from other clusters
will not interact with the system resource i (∀l 6= k, p(xi =
1, z = l|pi,M)→ 0). Using average of probability overcomes
the instability which can demote system resources common
for cluster k but used by the few samples from other clusters
as well in favor to system resource rarely used by samples
from cluster k and not used by any other samples. This is
caused by the fact that without the normalization term 1K−1
the term
∑K
l=1,l 6=k ln(1 −Mli) would have disproportionally
higher influence than the term lnMki. The variable r(i, k)
then provides a ranking score for the system resources within
the cluster k where higher values indicate good candidates for
IOCs.
IV. DATA REPRESENTATION
The model described in the previous section assumes that
execution of malware’s actions involves interactions with sys-
tem resources visible at the operating system level. Malware
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Figure 1: Schema of the proposed approach that chains the preprocessing (building data representation–see Section IV),
clustering and preparation of clusters for human analyst (see Section III-B).
sample is then modeled as a binary vector x ∈ {0, 1}D where
xi = 1 iff the sample interacted with ith system resource and
0 otherwise. However, the randomization frequently employed
by malware authors prevents to use every system resource
as individual feature since (1) the number of such features
can easily reach millions and (2) only a small number of
samples will interact with the same resource which would
limit the discovery of malware families. This section describes
approaches to reduce the dimensionality and thus effectively
mitigating both of these problems.
To model the malware interactions with system resources
this work uses an approach we have originally proposed in
[53], where each binary executed in a sandbox is modeled as
a set of system resources the binary interacted with. Since the
number of system resources can be different for every sample
we have adopted a multiple instance learning (MIL) where
each sample consists of a set of instances of different size. In
our scenario an instance corresponds to a pair of name and
type of a system resource the sample interacted with during
its execution in sandbox.
A recent review of MIL algorithms [2] lists various ap-
proaches to overcome the variability in sample sizes. The
approach adopted in this work (outlined in Algorithm 1)
belongs to a class of vocabulary-based method. First, all
instances I of all samples S are clustered per given resource
type by a Louvaine clustering method [9] combined with
suitable similarity measure discussed below. Then each sam-
ple is described by a fixed-dimensional binary vector with
length equal to the size of vocabulary (number of clusters of
instances) such that the element of this vector equals to 1 iff
there is an instance of the sample close to the particular cluster
of instances. Since the number of clusters is much smaller
than the number of all system resources, this approach reduces
the dimensionality of the problem and effectively removes the
randomization of resource names.
The above clustering and the following encoding is per-
formed separately for each resource type: files, mutexes, reg-
istry keys and network communication, as the corresponding
similarity metrics are specifically designed for individual types
Algorithm 1 Projection of samples S into binary vector.
1: function PROJECT(S)
2: X ← ∅
3: I ← extractInstances(S)
4: C ← cluster(I) . Clustering of instances
(separately for individual
types)
5: for all s ∈ S do
6: Is ← extractInstances(s)
7: x← ~0
8: for all i ∈ Is do
9: c∗ ← nnSearch(i, C) . Finds closest center
c∗ to instance i.
10: x[c∗]← 1
11: end for
12: X ← X ∪ {x}
13: end for
14: return X
15: end function
of system resources in order to precisely capture their unique
properties. Note that, the warnings generated by the sandbox-
ing environment are used directly (each warning is treated as
a separated cluster), since their number is very limited. Once
all samples are encoded into fixed-dimensional vectors, we
can apply probabilistic modeling described in Section III to
discover different malware families.
Since the clustering of instances is an essential component
of the above algorithm, the definitions of similarities over in-
stances (resource names) greatly influence the accuracy of the
system, and therefore they should reflect properties of different
types of system resources. The rest of this section discusses a
specific similarity metric for each type of resource the malware
interact with, namely for files, mutexes, network hostnames,
and registry keys. For the comprehensive discussion reader is
referred to [53].
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6A. Similarity between file paths
Although viewing file paths as strings would allow to
utilize various similarities [34], [43], [37], the file systems
were designed as tree structures with names of some folders
(fragments of the path) being imposed by the operating system
and the distance should reflect that. For example two files with
paths /Documents and Settings/Admin/Start
Menu/Programs/Startup/tii9fwliiv.lnk
and /Documents and Settings/Admin/Start
Menu/Programs/Accessories/Notepad.lnk share
large parts of their paths and common string similarities will
return high similarity score, but they serve very different
purposes. The first file is a link to an application executed
after the start of the operating system (OS), while the second
is a regular link in the Start menu in Windows OS. Another
aspect that prohibits the use of common string similarities is
their computational complexity (typically O(n2) where n is
the length of the string). The complexity combined with the
number of resources to be clustered (in the order of millions)
leads to unfeasible time requirements. This motivates the
design of a similarity that is fast and takes into the account
the tree structure of the file system, special folders, and
differences between folders and filenames.
The proposed similarity s(x, x′) of two file paths x and x′
is defined as
s(x, x′) = exp
(−wT f(x, x′)) , (10)
where w is a vector of weights and f(x, x′) is a function
extracting a feature vector from file paths x and x′.
The function f in (10) captures differences between the two
paths x and x′ by a fixed-dimensional vector. It first splits both
paths x and x′ into fragments xi and x′i using OS specific path
separator3, then in the cases of MacOS and Windows changes
all characters to lowercase, and then assigns all fragments into
one of the following four categories:
1) known folder – fragment xi is a well known folder in
the list of folders imposed by the operation system (e.g.
Windows, Program Files, System32, etc.),
2) general folder – fragment xi is a not-well-known folder
(e.g. unknown folders in Program Files, randomly
generated folders in Internet Explorer cache folder, etc.),
3) file – fragment xi is file,
4) empty – artificial fragment used for padding the paths
in cases when paths x and x′ have different depths.
When all fragments are assigned to one of the above classes,
their dissimilarity is captured by the function f as
f(x, x′) = (fKK , fKG, fKF , fKE , fGG, fGF , fGE , fFF , fFE),
where
• fKK is the number of fragments on the same level that
are both classified as known folder and are not equal,
• fGG is the sum of Levenshtein distances [34] between all
fragments on the same level that are classified as general
folder,
3Unixes and MacOS uses ’/’ as a path separator, Windows uses ’\’.
• fFF is the sum of Levenshtein distances of all fragments
on the same level that are classified as file,
• fKG, fKF , fKE , fGF , fGE , fFE are the sums of all
fragments of the same level and are classified as known
and general folder, known folder and file, known folder
and empty, general folder and file, general folder and
empty, and file and empty respectively.
The weight vector w in (10) captures the contribution of
individual elements of the feature vector f(x, x′). Impos-
ing condition w ≥ 0, in combination with construction of
function f , bounds the value of the similarity function (10)
s(x, x′) ∈ [0, 1] such that the similarity functions returns 1
(or values close to 1) if x and x′ belong to the same class
(files in /temp/ directory, cache of the Internet Explorer,
files in system directory, etc.) and values approaching 0 if they
belong to different classes. Since the similarity function (10)
was inspired by the popular Gaussian kernel, the parameter
vector w was optimized using the Centered Kernel Target
Alignment [15] (CKTA), which is a method to optimize
kernel parameters. The example of using the similarity and
optimization of the parameter vector w is further described in
[53].
B. Similarity of network traffic
To define the similarity between network resources one has
to overcome the randomization often employed by malware
authors that render trivial similarity based on names of network
resources (domains, IPs) ineffective. To escape blacklisting
command and control (C&C) channels of malware, its authors
use various techniques to hide and obscure C&C operation.
Popular approaches include randomization of domain names
by generating them randomly (DGA), quickly changing host-
ing servers and / or domain names by fast flux, or using large
hosting providers like Amazon Web Services to hide among
legitimate servers, etc. These techniques are relatively cheap
(e.g. registering a new .com domain costs ~3USD per 1 year)
and they allow for variation in domain names without updating
disseminated malware binaries. In contrast, switching from
one C&C paradigm to another requires such an update and
therefore occurs relatively infrequently. These two properties
contribute to each malware family using specific patterns of
domain names, paths, and parts of URLs. Exploiting these
patterns allows to group domain names into clusters. In this
work the similarity in network traffic is defined only for
HTTP/HTTPS protocol, because it is presently the default
choice for malware authors as it is rarely filtered. The ex-
tension to other network traffic is possible [31].
The similarity in URL patterns used in this work has been
adopted from [29], which has proposed to cluster domain
names so that each cluster contains domains of one type / for
one family of malware. The calculation of similarity starts by
grouping all HTTP/HTTPS requests using the domain names.
Then the model of each domain name is built from path and
query strings, transferred bytes, duration of requests and inter-
arrival times (time spans between requests to the same domain)
of individual requests to it. Finally, these models are used to
calculate the similarity function between two domain names
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7in the clustering. Since the calculation of the similarity is out
of scope, a reader is referred to an original publication [29]
for details.
C. Similarity between mutex names
Mutex (Mutual exclusive object) is a service provided by
most modern operating systems to synchronize multi-threaded
and multi-processes applications. This mechanism is popular
among malware authors to prevent multiple infections of the
same machine, because running two instances of the same
malware can cause conflicts limiting the potential revenue.
Mutexes are identified by their name, which can be an arbitrary
string. The naming scheme is challenging for malware authors,
because the names cannot be static, which would make them
good indicators of compromise of a particular malware, but
they cannot be completely random either, because two inde-
pendent binaries of the same family would not be able to check
the presence of each other. Therefore malware authors resorted
to pseudo-deterministic algorithms or patterns for generating
mutex names. For some malware families these patterns are
already well known, for example Sality [54] uses mutex
names of the form "<process name>.exeM_<process
ID>_"-explorer.exeM_1423_.
Since operating systems do not impose any restrictions on
the names of mutexes, they can be arbitrary strings. Therefore
standard string similarities such as Levenshtein distance [34],
Hamming distance [24], Jaro-Winkler distance [14], etc. can
be used. In experiments presented in Sections V Levenshtein
was used, as it gives overall good results.
D. Similarity between registry names
In Microsoft Windows operating system, the primary
target of the majority of malware, registry serves as a place
where programs can store various configuration data. It is a
replacement of configuration files with several improvements
such as strongly typed values, faster parsing, ability to store
binary data, etc. The registry is a key-value store, where key
names have the structure of a file system. The root keys
are HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, HKEY_CURRENT_USER,
HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG, HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT,
HKEY_USERS and HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA; some
root keys also have sub-keys with specific names (Software,
Microsoft, Windows, etc.). Due to similarity with a file
system, the similarity distance is the same as the one defined
in Subsection IV-A, but with a different set of names of
known folders and a weight vector optimized on registry data
rather than on files.
V. EVALUATION
This section presents the results of the experimental com-
parison of the proposed model to AMAL [39] on the problem
of clustering of unknown samples. AMAL is the closest prior
art, as it clusters malware binaries on basis of their interac-
tion with system resources. Furthermore, clustering using the
generative model is compared to the popular K-Means [27]
algorithm with k-means++ initialization [4] to observe benefits
or disadvantages of the probabilistic formulation. Lastly, we
evaluate the cluster prioritization and extraction of behavioral
indicators.
A. Data set description and performance metric definition
The dataset used for experimental evaluations contained
random selection of samples from files that were submitted
to AMP ThreatGrid [13] sandboxing service by its customers
between October 24, 2016 and December 12, 2016 and as
such can be considered as a representative example of the
threat landscape. All samples were analyzed by VirusTotal.com
service [22] and their labels were determined using AVClass
tool [50]. Then, malware families with less than hundred
samples were removed, which yielded 130 198 samples. The
exact numbers of samples of individual malware families
are summarized in Table IX in Appendix B. Since all three
compared solutions are applicable to any file type as long
as the underlying sandboxing solution is able to instrument
them, the evaluation dataset contained samples of various file
types such as 32bit PE executables, 64bit PE executables,
JavaScripts, VisualBasic scripts, etc. The complete list of
file types along with number of samples is summarized in
Table VIII in Appendix A.
All samples were analyzed in sandbox by AMP Threat-
Grid [13] service, using Windows 7 64bit (71% samples)
environment, as it is the most popular OS at the time
of writing4, and Windows XP (29% samples) environment,
since it is still widely deployed on embedded machines such
as ATMs. The sandboxing environment (OS) for individual
samples was selected randomly with exception of 64bit PE
executables that were executed solely on Windows 7 64bit.
Virtual machines were connected to the Internet without any
filtering or restrictions that would intervene connections to
command & control infrastructure or other servers. Note that
the approach proposed in this paper is not specific to AMP
ThreatGrid. Same similar information can be obtained with
a number of different sandboxing solutions such as Cuckoo
[45], Ether [18], or CWSandbox [55].
Although clustering algorithms are technically unsuper-
vised, they usually contains several hyper-parameters that
need to be tuned to achieve good performance. Samples
were therefore divided according to the time of their first
observations, such that those collected before October 27th,
2016 (17 064 samples further referred as training set) were
used to find the optimal configurations of all methods and
remaining samples (113 134 samples further referred as testing
set) were used for the final evaluations. The time-based split
makes the optimization phase more realistic since in real-world
scenario all parameters have to be set in advance with the risk
that some malware families will not be available.
The performance of all methods was evaluated using homo-
geneity, completeness and V-measure [49]. Homogeneity, h,
measures the “purity” of resulting clusters and equals to one
if all labels in each cluster are the same. It can be seen as
4According to http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers_os.asp Win-
dows 7 has 33.2% market share against 0.9% covered by Windows XP, 10.2%
covered by Windows 8 and 33.1% covered by Windows 10.
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8h c v1 avg. #clusters
AMAL 0.602 0.499 0.546 5856
Proposed model 0.767 0.609 0.679 492
K-Means 0.690 0.561 0.619 200
Table I: Homogeneity (h), completeness (c) and V-measure
(v1) estimated on test dataset for model, K-Means and AMAL.
a clustering’s counterpart to precision used in classification
scenarios. Completeness, c, measures how well individual
labels are grouped together, which makes it closely related to
recall used in classification. It equals to one if samples with
one label are all in one cluster. They are combined together
with equal importance into a single value by V -measure, v1,
defined as
v1 =
2 · h · c
h+ c
that resembles the F-measure from classification scenarios.
Additionally, the quality of individual clusters is measured by
purity [57], [58] defined as number of samples from most
prevalent malware family in given cluster normalized by its
size.
B. Hyper-parameter optimization
AMAL’s hyper-parameters consists of the metric that de-
fines similarity between samples (cosine, correlation, hamming
or jaccard), the linkage method in hierarchical clustering
(average, centroid, complete, median, single, ward), and the
value of threshold t for the hierarchical clustering. For every
combination of hyper-parameters we have estimated the value
of V-measure on the training data and the one with highest
value (jaccard metric, average linkage method and threshold
t = 0.25) was used in final evaluation.
The only parameter in the proposed method is the num-
ber of components K, which corresponds to the number of
clusters. Setting this number is generally unresolved prob-
lem, since one typically does not know the number of clus-
ters in data in advance. The training data were therefore
clustered with with different number of components K =
{50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, 2000} and the K with the highest V-
measure was used in the evaluation. Since the EM algorithm
depends on starting conditions (the problem may have many
local extrema), the accuracy of the clustering for every con-
figuration was estimated using five execution. As the optimal
number of clusters was then determined K = 500.
Similarly, K-Means clustering algorithm requires specifica-
tion of the number of cluster in advance as well, which has
been determined using the same approach as in the previous
paragraph. The optimal number of clusters for K-Means was
K = 200.
C. Clustering performance
The first part of experimental evaluation compares the clus-
tering performance of the proposed model, K-Means clustering
algorithm with the same features as the proposed model,
and AMAL. The performance is measure as homogeneity,
completeness and V-measure estimated on testing dataset for
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Figure 2: Confusion matrix of proposed model for 100 largest
clusters.
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Figure 3: Confusion matrix of K-Means for 100 largest clus-
ters.
all three approaches using settings described above and is
summarized in Table I. In order to eliminate the influence of
the random initialization of the proposed model and K-Means,
the testing data were clustered 10times and values summarized
in Table I represent average values of respective performance
measures. The last column in Table I contains average number
of clusters generated by evaluated approaches on testing data.
Due to the probabilistic definition of the proposed model, the
resulting number of clusters can be lower that the set threshold
(in our case K = 500), as it balances the complexity of the
model and its fit to the data.
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Figure 4: Confusion matrix of AMAL method for 100 largest
clusters.
As can be seen from the values of the V-measure, the
proposed model outperforms both AMAL and K-Means. Clus-
ters recovered by the model are the purest and the individ-
ual malware families are the least fractioned into multiple
clusters. These results are further displayed in more details
in Figures 2, 3, 4 that show confusion matrices of largest
100 clusters for proposed model, K-Means and AMAL re-
spectively, normalized by the number of samples per family
(i.e. every point displays ratio of samples from particular
malware family clustered into particular cluster). Although the
view is not complete, these selections covered 87%, 90% and
80% of samples for proposed model, K-Means and AMAL
respectively which represent significant portion of samples.
Confusion matrices show that the low performance of the
AMAL method (Figure 4) is mainly caused by the fact that it
failed to separate large portion of samples (∼ 37 000 samples)
and grouped them into single cluster. This indicates that
hand-designed features are not able to precisely capture the
behavior of a new, previously unseen malware. Comparison of
confusion matrices of proposed method and K-Means revealed
that although K-Means provided better results than AMAL, it
was still outperformed by the proposed method as it created
clusters that failed to separate several malware families. This
fact is significant for clusters 2–5, 30–50 and mainly cluster
76 that grouped more than 20 different malware families
such as lotoor (malware family #61), pdfka (malware family
#84) or zegost (malware family #117) correctly clustered by
the model. These results indicate that the probabilistic model
correctly captures malware behavior. It is caused by the fact
that K-Means is not able to distinguish minor differences
between individual malware families (e.g. one file specific to
particular malware family) as the euclidean distance embedded
in the K-Means smooths the distances between individual mal-
ware samples. Although it would be possible to find specific
h c v1 avg. #clusters
AMAL 0.542 0.503 0.521 6224
Proposed model 0.761 0.523 0.620 499
K-Means 0.722 0.495 0.588 200
Table II: Homogeneity (h), completeness (c) and V-measure
(v1) estimated on test dataset mixed with legitimate samples
for model, K-Means and AMAL.
combination of distance metric, clustering algorithm and its
parameters that provides better or at least comparable results,
such combination would introduce high bias as it would be
overfitted to our data and would lack the interpretability of
the proposed model.
Detailed analysis of clusters created by the proposed model
revealed that it correctly discovered several malware families
such as winner, waldek, ircbot, downloadguide, download-
assistant, kolabc, dlhelper, softpuls, etc., but some malware
families such as adwind, gamarue, locky, nemucod or zbot
were split into multiple pure clusters. This is caused by the fact
that a single label may refer to multiple variants of the same
malware family (locky or adwind), by modular design of some
malware families (zbot), or by the fact that some malware
families deliver additional infections (nemucod) with different
behavior. However, several clusters contained samples from
multiple malware families such as atraps (also known as
cryptowall), delf, flystudio, palevo or winsecsrv. Analysis of
these clusters revealed that these samples neither run properly
(e.g. crashed due to missing libraries) nor exhibited their true
behavior (advanced anti-vm protection, no command from bot
master, etc.), and the only interactions with system resources
recorded during sandboxing were caused by the operating
system handling the crash of the binary.
This exposes the main limitation of the proposed solution,
because if malware samples do not exhibit any behavior,
the model is not able to cluster them correctly as it does
not have enough information to distinguish individual mal-
ware families. In case that malware samples are equipped
with advanced anti-vm technique we can improve the results
by optimizing the sandboxing environment (anti-anti-vm/anti-
anti-sandbox techniques) and thus limit its detectability by
malware. Although such approach is successful for some
malware families (e.g. gamarue), malware authors quickly
adapt the anti-vm techniques to avoids detection (e.g. atraps).
As the hardening techniques are usually tailored for specific
sandboxing solution, their description is out of the scope of
this paper and reader is referred to [11] for deeper analysis of
this problem.
To conclude the first part of experiment, the proposed
solution significantly outperforms the prior art and it is able in
most cases correctly recognize binaries from the same family
under the condition that the binary has exhibit its true behavior
in sandbox.
D. Clustering robustness
In reality it is not guaranteed that the analyzed data will
contain only malicious samples. To test the robustness of the
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proposed model, we have mixed legitimate samples into our
testing dataset and evaluated their influence on the perfor-
mance of the compared clustering algorithms. We have added
55 243 samples that were analyzed in the same sandboxing
environment as malicious samples (see Section V-A) and were
verified in the VirusTotal.com service to have 0 positive hits,
i.e. none of the AV engines deployed in the service marked
these samples as malicious. This mixed dataset was then
processed by AMAL, proposed model and K-Means. Note that
the methods used the same settings of hyper-parameters as in
previous experiments (see Section V-A details).
The results summarized in Table II show a drop in the
value of the V-measure for all three methods which indicates
that the legitimate samples add noise into the data an thus
worsen their results. A close analysis revealed two, principally
different, effects of this noise to the clusters generated by
compared methods. The results of AMAL show significant
drop in the homogeneity (0.602 for only malicious data vs.
0.542 for mixed data) which corresponds to the fact, that
AMAL grouped majority of the legitimate samples (~52 000
legitimate samples, i.e. almost 95% of legitimate samples)
together with large portion of malicious samples (35 000
malicious samples) into single large cluster (~88 000 samples).
Problem is that analysis of such large, heterogenous cluster is
nearly impossible which effectively rules out analysis of more
than half of the mixed dataset.
An opposite effect can be seen in the results produced by
the proposed model and K-Means. Both these methods split
the legitimate data into multiple clusters which corresponds
to the drop in completeness—0.609 for only malicious data
vs. 0.523 for mixed data in the case of proposed model,
and 0.561 vs. 0.495 in the case of K-Means. However, since
these clusters are relatively pure and well defined, theirs
analysis is much easier compared to the analysis of single
large cluster produced by AMAL. The direct comparison of
results produced by the proposed model and K-Means revealed
that although K-Means split the legitimate samples into lower
number of clusters than proposed model (50 clusters with
legitimate samples produced by K-Means vs. 200 clusters with
legitimate samples produced by the proposed model) these
clusters are mixed with malicious samples which hardens the
analysis which is reflects the lower value of homogeneity for
K-Means (0.761 for proposed model vs. 0.722 for K-Means).
The overview of 25 largest clusters produced by AMAL, K-
Means and proposed model is summarized in Tables X, XIII
and XII respectively. Note that the top 25 clusters generated
by proposed model and prioritized by the score proposed in
Section III-B are listed in Table XI.
E. Prioritization score
As has been discussed in Section III-B, resulting clusters
should be presented to a security analyst sorted to facilitate
quick analysis of a large number of samples. Instead of
selecting clusters at random, the optimal prioritization should
focus the analyst’s attention to large and pure clusters that can
be easily analyzed (ideally to clusters that contain samples
from single family).
Cluster Size Malware categories with coverage
1 1302 trojan (1.00)
2 811 banking trojan (1.00)
3 4337 unknown (0.41), worm (0.26), dropper (0.18)
4 531 banking trojan (1.00)
5 2135 dropper (0.92), banking trojan (0.08)
6 6320 dropper (0.33), unknown (0.33), trojan (0.14),
rat (0.08), information stealer (0.07)
7 495 banking trojan (1.00)
8 141 dropper (0.94), banking trojan (0.06)
9 4228 dropper (0.62), banking trojan (0.37)
10 904 rat (0.99)
11 5967 dropper (0.74), ransomware (0.26)
12 374 trojan (1.00)
13 91 unknown (1.00)
14 5942 information stealer (0.96)
15 9366 ransomware (0.98)
16 1197 unknown (0.33), dropper (0.30), trojan (0.09),
rat (0.07), ransomware (0.06), information
stealer (0.05)
17 191 dropper (0.90), banking trojan (0.10)
18 1475 ransomware (1.00)
19 2876 banking trojan (0.92), unknown (0.08)
20 456 banking trojan (1.00)
21 1556 rat (0.98)
22 1402 ransomware (1.00)
23 2273 banking trojan (1.00)
24 1271 trojan (0.78), unknown (0.11), rat (0.05)
25 883 ransomware (0.99)
Total 56 524
Total pure 21 919
Table III: Top 25 clusters created by proposed model and pri-
oritized with score with the malware categories the clustered
samples belong to along with the ratio of every category in
particular cluster.
To verify this assumption, clusters identified by the pro-
posed model from the testing data were ordered by priori-
tization score proposed in Section III-B (further referred to
as Score), and by their size (referred to as Size). Figure 5a
shows the average purity for first 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, etc. clusters
ordered by the Score and those ordered by the Size. Similarly,
Figure 5b shows the cumulative number of samples for first
5, 10, 15, 20, 30, etc. clusters prioritized by the Score and the
Size. We observe that the purity of clusters ordered by Score is
much higher than of those ordered by Size, while cumulative
numbers of samples of top n clusters are very similar. This
means that the proposed Score promotes purer clusters without
too much sacrificing their size.
In order to further verify these results we have performed
deeper analysis of top 25 prioritized by the Score and the Size.
Tables III and IV provide details about malware categories the
samples from particular cluster belong to and their ratio. Note
that malware category listed as unknown covers malware fam-
ilies that we were not able to reliably assign to any category.
The statistics indicate that the Score promotes larger number
of pure clusters5 (14 out of 25) compared to the Size (7 out of
25) and these clusters cover larger portion of samples, namely
21 919 samples in the case of Score vs. 18 510 samples in the
case of Size. In order to provide complete results, we include
results obtained on clusters created by K-Means (Table VI)
5Here, we consider cluster with at least 98% samples from the same
category as pure rather than 100%.
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Figure 5: Average purity (figure on the left) and cumulative number of samples (figure on the right) for top 10, 20, 30, etc.
clusters for proposed prioritization (Score) and size-based prioritization (Size).
Cluster Size Malware categories with coverage
1 9366 ransomware (0.98)
2 6320 dropper (0.33), unknown (0.33), trojan (0.14),
rat (0.08), information stealer (0.07)
3 5967 dropper (0.74), ransomware (0.26)
4 5942 information stealer (0.96)
5 4337 unknown (0.41), worm (0.26), dropper (0.18)
6 4228 dropper (0.62), banking trojan (0.37)
7 2876 banking trojan (0.92), unknown (0.08)
8 2661 dropper (0.97)
9 2273 banking trojan (1.00)
10 2135 dropper (0.92), banking trojan (0.08)
11 1726 dropper (0.75), ransomware (0.25)
12 1691 trojan (0.45), dropper (0.39), unknown (0.10)
13 1623 dropper (0.83), ransomware (0.17)
14 1556 rat (0.98)
15 1475 ransomware (1.00)
16 1402 ransomware (1.00)
17 1302 trojan (1.00)
18 1292 dropper (0.74), ransomware (0.26)
19 1283 information stealer (0.96)
20 1271 trojan (0.78), unknown (0.11), rat (0.05)
21 1266 ransomware (0.82), unknown (0.18)
22 1197 unknown (0.33), dropper (0.30), trojan (0.09),
rat (0.07), ransomware (0.06), information
stealer (0.05)
23 1136 ransomware (1.00)
24 1005 unknown (0.53), information stealer (0.31), rat
(0.08)
25 964 information stealer (0.73), unknown (0.21)
Total 66 294
Total pure 18 510
Table IV: Top 25 clusters created by the proposed model
prioritized by size with the malware categories the clustered
samples belong to along with the ratio of every category in
particular cluster.
and AMAL (Table V) prioritized by their size as the Score
is not applicable. The detailed statistics regarding the clusters
created by AMAL show that in top 25 clusters there are 12
considered pure, but they cover only 12 323 samples which
is almost half of samples covered by the proposed model.
Cluster Size Malware categories with coverage
1 37303 information stealer (0.27), unknown (0.21), rat
(0.17), dropper (0.16), trojan (0.07)
2 6263 dropper (0.46), banking trojan (0.25), trojan
(0.13), pua (0.08)
3 3678 dropper (0.62), banking trojan (0.38)
4 2889 banking trojan (0.92), unknown (0.08)
5 2472 ransomware (0.58), unknown (0.22), pua
(0.08), dropper (0.08)
6 2105 ransomware (0.99)
7 1710 banking trojan (1.00)
8 1465 trojan (0.92), unknown (0.08)
9 1438 ransomware (0.99)
10 1153 ransomware (0.91)
11 1099 ransomware (0.33), dropper (0.30), trojan
(0.25), unknown (0.12)
12 1066 banking trojan (0.99)
13 1013 ransomware (0.98)
14 988 trojan (0.90), unknown (0.08)
15 889 ransomware (0.99)
16 888 dropper (0.64), ransomware (0.36)
17 861 trojan (0.93), dropper (0.05)
18 819 dropper (0.88), ransomware (0.12)
19 806 dropper (0.99)
20 750 ransomware (0.98)
21 686 worm (0.99)
22 664 dropper (0.98)
23 658 dropper (0.76), ransomware (0.24)
24 601 ransomware (1.00)
25 595 ransomware (0.98)
Total 72 859
Total pure 12 323
Table V: Top 25 clusters created by AMAL and prioritized by
size with the malware categories the clustered samples belong
to along with the ratio of every category in particular cluster.
Similarly, top 25 clusters created by K-Means contains 6 pure
clusters, covering 9520 samples. These numbers indicates that
the proposed model combined with the prioritization score
correctly promotes clusters so that the security analyst can
analyze large number of samples efficiently.
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Cluster Size Malware categories with coverage
1 12719 unknown (0.30), dropper (0.20), rat (0.15),
worm (0.09), trojan (0.09), information stealer
(0.05),
2 4211 information stealer (0.96)
3 3478 banking trojan (0.90), unknown (0.06)
4 3450 dropper (0.71), ransomware (0.29)
5 3192 dropper (0.75), banking trojan (0.15), unknown
(0.06)
6 3073 dropper (0.79), ransomware (0.21)
7 3044 unknown (0.31), dropper (0.26), pua (0.18),
trojan (0.12), ransomware (0.10)
8 3007 unknown (0.31), rat (0.28), information stealer
(0.23), worm (0.08), trojan (0.06)
9 2850 unknown (0.42), dropper (0.20), rat (0.14),
trojan (0.12)
10 1943 ransomware (0.99)
11 1890 banking trojan (1.00)
12 1766 dropper (0.79), unknown (0.15), banking trojan
(0.05)
13 1713 banking trojan (1.00)
14 1574 unknown (0.41), dropper (0.25), trojan (0.09),
rat (0.07), information stealer (0.06)
15 1548 unknown (0.40), trojan (0.31), pua (0.16)
16 1511 information stealer (0.97)
17 1490 ransomware (1.00)
18 1353 rat (0.91), unknown (0.05)
19 1344 trojan (1.00)
20 1328 trojan (0.75), unknown (0.12), rat (0.05)
21 1266 information stealer (0.95)
22 1143 information stealer (0.33), rat (0.31), unknown
(0.24), trojan (0.09)
23 1140 ransomware (0.99)
24 1140 banking trojan (0.89), dropper (0.08)
25 1130 trojan (0.40), unknown (0.23), information
stealer (0.20), rat (0.10), dropper (0.08)
Total 62 303
Total pure 9520
Table VI: Top 25 clusters created by K-Means and prioritized
by size with the malware categories the clustered samples
belong to along with the ratio of every category in particular
cluster.
F. Behavioral indicators
The last step of the analysis of a cluster is the extrac-
tion of behavior indicators (BIs) represented by the system
resources that can be considered as indicators of compromise.
To verify the performance of the ranking score proposed
in Section (III-B), top 20 clusters identified by the model
from the testing data and prioritized by Score were manually
analyzed and searched for system resources (further referred
as convicted BIs or convicted resources) that matched known
IOCs for the most prevalent malware family in the given
cluster. Known IOCs were collected from reports published
by various AV companies (e.g. [46]) such as Symantec,
ESET, TrendMicro, etc., or publicly available collections of
various behaviors frequently exhibited by malware [3], [26].
Additionally, we have searched for BIs, that, although not
listed in known IOCs, are highly suspicious and specific for
given malware family and thus can be considered as additional
potential IOCs recovered by the proposed approach.
Table VII summarizes the number of resources used by
the malware samples in a given cluster, the rank of the first
convicted resource and the ratio of samples that interacted with
this resource. In the situation when human analyst performs
manual inspection of generated clusters, this rank indicates
the number of system resources that have to be manually
analyzed in order to convict given cluster. Lower number
therefore indicates better performance of the ranking score
proposed in Section (III-B). In order to provide additional
insight, the table contains numbers of convicted BIs in top 10
rank, total number of convicted BIs and number of BIs that
can be considered as additional IOC (system resources that
are not listed as known IOC but are highly suspicious, e.g.
file /windows/driiver/é¿ßp¡¬¿/é¿ßp¡«¬1.png).
Higher number of convicted BIs in the top 10 rank indicates
that the ranking score is able to correctly recover large portion
of known IOCs.
The Table VII shows that for 12 clusters out of 20 the
ranking correctly promoted convicted IOCs to the top as
the first convicted IOC has rank 1 or 2 and majority of
all convicted IOCs is in the top 10 rank.6 Additionally, the
numbers of potential IOCs indicates that the ranking score
recovers large number of additional, previously unknown, BIs
that further describe the malware behavior. The lower ranks
of the convicted system resources for clusters 14 and 18 are
caused by the nature of the malware families dominant in these
clusters. Although bladabindi malware uses system resources
that are not frequently used by other malware families
in our dataset (/windows/syswow64/netsh.exe,
/windows/microsoft.net/.../machine.config,
etc), they cannot be considered as IOCs since they are part
of Windows operating system or other common software.
In this case the only system resources that matched known
IOCs are specific registry keys modified by only portion of
samples from this cluster which lowers their rank. Similarly,
locky malware uses internal components of the operating
system that are specific to this particular family and thus are
incorrectly prioritized over the actual known IOCs.
For 6 clusters we were not able to find any IOC that
will match with the proposed BIs. In the case of clusters
3, 6 and 16 it is caused by the fact that these clusters
contain samples that did not exhibit their true behavior. In
case of clusters 11 and 13, it is caused by the nature of
behavior of the malware dominant in this cluster. Similarly
to bladabindi, malwares nemucod (cluster 11) and fujacks
(cluster 13) interact with files specific for this malware. It
may be an example of installation of .NET framework in the
case of fujacks or using internal vbscript interpretter in the
case of nemucod. However, these system resources are also
used by legitimate software and as such cannot be considered
as IOCs. This implies that the algorithm is able to correctly
group malware samples from given malware families based
on their interaction with legitimate resources alone, even if
the samples do not create any specifically malicious system
resource. This capability is highly important for analysis file-
less malware which is specifically designed to reduce its foot
print. In order not to sacrifice its functionality such malware
has to interact with system resources that are part of the
6The example of matched IOCs is a path to malware’s main binary, specific
registry key, known C&C domain or mutex with specific name.
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Cluster Rank #BIs % samples #known
IOCs in
top 10
#potential
new
IOCs in
top 10
Cluster Rank #BIs % samples #known
IOCs in
top 10
#potential
new
IOCs in
top 10
1 1 80 100% 4 5 11 N/A 42 N/A N/A N/A
2 1 19 100% 10 0 12 1 48 100% 1 6
3 N/A 20 N/A N/A N/A 13 N/A 150 N/A N/A N/A
4 2 15 100% 4 3 14 21 61 89% 0 9
5 1 15 100% 5 2 15 N/A 142 N/A N/A N/A
6 N/A 22 N/A N/A N/A 16 N/A 51 N/A N/A N/A
7 1 15 100% 4 3 17 1 15 100% 4 3
8 1 15 100% 4 3 18 11 37 84% 0 3
9 1 47 99% 1 6 19 1 52 99% 2 5
10 1 22 99% 3 1 20 1 16 100% 4 3
Table VII: Rank of first behavior indicator that matches known IOCs of most frequent malware family in generated clusters
and percentage of samples covered with this behavior indicator. Additionally, we provide number of BIs in top 10 rank that
matched known IOC and number of BIs that are not matched to known IOC but can be considered as additional potential
IOCs recovered by the proposed approach. N/A indicates that no behavior indicator matched known IOC.
OS in a similar as fujacks or nemucod does. Cluster 15
contains cerber ransomware that encrypted various different
files during sandboxing which can be easily recognized by
malware analyst. However, the recorded behavior indicates that
these samples belong to different variants for which we were
not able to find any known IOCs.
VI. DISCUSSION
The experimental results revealed, that when a binary (or
all binaries of some malware family) does not perform any
action reflected by interaction with files, mutexes, network
communication, and registry keys, it clearly evades detection.
An example of such malware is bitcoin miner that resides only
in memory without any additional footprint (no operations
with files, no operations with registry keys, no mutexes, very
limited network communication). Such malware has to be
carefully crafted to avoid any interaction with system resources
(statically compiled to carry all libraries in the executable,
limited network communication, no mutexes ensuring that
only single instance is running on the same machine, no
persistency after reboot, etc.). Fortunately, at the time of
writing this work, this is not an easy task and the majority
of malware authors choose to interact with system resources
rather than sacrifice functionality.
Another limitation is the fact that a growing number of
malware families are equipped with advanced anti-VM and
anti-sandbox features (Gamarue/Andromeda [6]) and/or are
targeted to specific environments (Stuxnet [19]). Such malware
families do not reveal their true purpose during sandboxing
or mimic less severe types of malware (adware, potentially
unwanted application, etc.). This fact is recognized by the
community as the main factor hindering the performance of
dynamic analysis as a whole. Addressing this issue, however,
is out of the scope of this paper.
Another important aspect that affects the performance of
the proposed method is the quality of the data representation.
First problem is when system resources are incorrectly split
into multiple instance clusters due to the randomization of
their names. This fragmentation can cause the split of binaries
from the same malware family into multiple clusters. Even
though this is clearly an error, it does not severely affects the
analysis. According to our experience when malware families
are split into low number of clear clusters, they can be still
quickly analyzed, which is the goal of this work. Second
problem arises when unrelated system resources are merged
into single instance cluster. This can cause that corresponding
malware samples from different malware families are grouped
into single cluster. Again, according to our experiments this
situation is not so common to drastically affect the analysis.
The only clusters containing samples from multiple binaries
are the ones that did not reveal their true behavior or did
not execute correctly. Such situation can be easily identified,
since the interaction with system resources limits to the noise
generated by the operating system (operations with system
logs, creating generic mutexes, etc.).
The quality of the data representation raises question which
system resources are the most important for malware cluster-
ing. According to our experiments, model limited only to file
paths and mutexes achieves ∼ 70% − 75% of the clustering
performance compared to the case with complete information.
However, only the combination of all five types of system
resources provides optimal results as there are some malware
families (e.g. scar) that use legitimate file paths to hide their
payload but uses specific command and control infrastructure
which is exploited by the model and detected as possible IOC.
The last question we need to discuss is the scalability of
the proposed method. The most of the time required for the
overall analysis was consumed in the preprocessing phase
(∼ 1h15min) and in the fitting of the model (∼ 50min),
and the time required for cluster prioritization and extraction
of behavioral indicators was negligible (less than 1min). The
theoretical analysis of the preprocessing phase shows the linear
computational complexity in the number of samples (see [53]
for more details). Similarly, the EM algorithm used to find the
parameters pi and M is linear in the number of samples which
enables good scalability to large-scale dataset. In comparison
the time required by AMAL was only ∼ 28min. However,
since the computational complexity of the hierarchical clus-
tering used in AMAL is Θ(N2) or Θ(N3) depending on the
linkage method [41] the scalability to the large-scale dataset
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is limited.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work has focused on providing complete analysis
pipeline for analysis of large number of binaries executed
in the sandbox. The pipeline starts with grouping binaries
belonging to the same malware family, continuing by priori-
tizing bigger groups with homogeneous behavior, and ending
with human-readable descriptions of groups of binaries. The
proposed method utilizes a probabilistic model of malware be-
havior observed through its interactions with operating system
and network resources (operations with files, mutexes, network
servers, registry keys or system messages). To the best of our
knowledge, such a complete pipeline was not yet published,
albeit there is a prior art on the first problem of clustering.
Individual steps of the pipeline were evaluated on a large
corpus of binaries, and the first problem of clustering has
been compared to the prior art. This comparison showed
that the proposed method outperforms the related state-of-
the-art approach as it produce clusters that are purer and
individual malware families were less fractioned into multiple
clusters. Moreover, the evaluation also revealed limitations
of the proposed method, which fails on samples that do not
interact with resources monitored by the sandbox.
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APPENDIX
A. Number of samples per file type
B. Number of samples of individual malware families
File type #samples
Microsoft Office - DOC 898
Microsoft Office - HWP 1
Microsoft Office - MSI 17
Microsoft Office - PPS 1
Microsoft Office - XLS 21
HTML document 3464
Java archive data 1845
JavaScript 6370
Microsoft Office 2007+ - DOCM 546
Microsoft Office 2007+ - DOCX 18
Microsoft Office 2007+ - DOTM 49
Microsoft Office 2007+ - PPSX 2
Microsoft Office 2007+ - PPTX 10
Microsoft Office 2007+ - XLSM 138
MS-DOS executable 1536
PDF document 859
PE32 executable 97 428
PE32+ executable 182
Rich Text Format data 4
VisualBasic Script 4749
Windows Script File 5295
XML document text 5
Zip archive data 6760
Total 130 198
Table VIII: Number of samples per file type extracted from
evaluation datasets.
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Family Category #samples Family Category #samples
nemucod dropper 15 644 paneidix 278
cerber ransomware 12 813 gamehack 277
bladabindi inf. stealer 10 984 myxah 276
locky ransomware 10 697 delbar 274
gamarue banking trojan 7677 winner 264
darkkomet RAT 4661 advml 261
hupigon dropper 3568 confuser 260
upatre dropper 3256 flystudio 252
tinba banking trojan 3089 dynamer 249
scar trojan 2958 redirector 242
swrort dropper 2866 multiplug 241
zbot banking trojan 2421 nitol 230
adwind RAT 1875 mamianune 228
virlock ransomware 1789 browsefox 217
fareit inf. stealer 1784 fakejquery 211
farfli trojan 1761 vopak 209
zegost RAT 1745 cosmu 203
virut trojan 1591 filefinder 194
zusy trojan 1502 linkury 192
ircbot trojan 1442 dlhelper 190
zerber ransomware 1322 ardamax 188
palevo worm 1269 msilperseus 184
vobfus worm 1262 lotoor 183
delf dropper 1255 pcclient 181
donoff dropper 1211 vittalia 180
amonetize adware 1198 lethic 170
loadmoney PUA 1037 ngrbot 161
nanocore RAT 1031 buzus 156
autoit 1006 skeeyah 151
yakes trojan 901 koutodoor 150
poison 836 neshta 148
bifrose inf. stealer 819 barys 148
kolabc worm 705 parite 146
waldek 684 mikey 146
downloadassistant PUA 678 redosdru 142
pdfka exploitkit 644 hancitor 139
shipup trojan 624 mintluks 134
rebhip inf. stealer 612 cheatengine 133
razy 598 miancha 133
agentb 576 midie 133
onlinegames 529 fujacks 127
xtrat 510 pidief 126
ramnit banking trojan 498 teslacrypt 126
atraps 478 kolovorot 124
magania 471 dupzom 123
softpulse PUA 467 bublik 122
banload 435 opencandy 120
installmonster 411 socks 118
ruskill 373 icloader 114
convertad 363 fadok 113
installcore PUA 361 garrun 113
sality dropper 356 disfa 113
binder 355 chisburg 112
shiz 341 bedep 111
downloadguide PUA 340 banbra 111
shyape 324 mydoom 108
llac 296 jaik 103
bayrob inf. stealer 293 hlux 103
mywebsearch 283 refroso 101
winsecsrv 281
Total malicious 130 198
Table IX: Number of samples of malware families in the data set. The malware families for individual samples were determined
using AVClass tool [50]. The categories were determined using various reports published by AV companies and independent
researchers.
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Cluster Size Malware categories with coverage
1 87 912 legitimate (0.60), unknown (0.09), information
stealer (0.07), dropper (0.07), rat (0.05),
2 6498 information stealer (0.56), rat (0.30), trojan
(0.06), unknown (0.06),
3 4412 dropper (0.58), banking trojan (0.35),
4 3682 dropper (0.62), banking trojan (0.38),
5 2887 banking trojan (0.92), unknown (0.08),
6 2819 ransomware (0.51), unknown (0.21), legitimate
(0.09), dropper (0.08), pua (0.07),
7 2735 ransomware (0.53), dropper (0.14), unknown
(0.14), trojan (0.10),
8 2241 dropper (0.74), ransomware (0.26),
9 1710 banking trojan (1.00),
10 1428 ransomware (0.99),
11 1360 trojan (0.99),
12 1076 banking trojan (0.98),
13 1020 trojan (0.93), unknown (0.06),
14 1003 ransomware (0.98),
15 923 dropper (0.98),
16 866 ransomware (0.99),
17 714 trojan (0.99),
18 697 information stealer (0.36), unknown (0.21),
dropper (0.21), rat (0.13),
19 667 dropper (0.98),
20 644 dropper (0.94),
21 617 ransomware (0.98),
22 602 ransomware (1.00),
23 595 ransomware (0.96),
24 595 ransomware (0.98),
25 560 banking trojan (1.00),
Total 128 263
Total pure 12 121
Table X: Top 25 clusters generated by AMAL from testing
data mixed with legitimate samples and prioritized by size.
The third column contains malware categories the clustered
samples belong to along with the ratio of every category in
particular cluster.
Cluster Size Malware categories with coverage
1 6785 legitimate (1.00),
2 2512 dropper (0.92), banking trojan (0.08),
3 2969 legitimate (1.00),
4 3149 legitimate (0.83), unknown (0.07),
5 7225 legitimate (0.43), unknown (0.22), worm
(0.16), dropper (0.10),
6 832 banking trojan (1.00),
7 5955 legitimate (0.96),
8 1165 trojan (1.00),
9 4178 dropper (0.62), banking trojan (0.36),
10 1601 legitimate (1.00),
11 4037 dropper (0.50), unknown (0.18), legitimate
(0.13), information stealer (0.08),
12 1339 legitimate (0.86),
13 1028 banking trojan (1.00),
14 5753 legitimate (0.96),
15 3399 legitimate (0.97),
16 2310 dropper (0.63), ransomware (0.36),
17 896 banking trojan (1.00),
18 817 banking trojan (1.00),
19 489 trojan (0.99),
20 716 legitimate (1.00),
21 834 legitimate (0.90), unknown (0.09),
22 85 legitimate (1.00),
23 889 dropper (0.92), ransomware (0.08),
24 885 rat (0.95),
25 936 information stealer (0.98),
Total 60 784
Total pure 18 319
Table XI: Top 25 clusters generated by proposed model from
testing data mixed with legitimate samples and prioritized
with score. The third column contains malware categories
the clustered samples belong to along with the ratio of every
category in particular cluster.
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Cluster Size Malware categories with coverage
1 7225 legitimate (0.43), unknown (0.22), worm
(0.16), dropper (0.10),
2 6785 legitimate (1.00),
3 5955 legitimate (0.96),
4 5753 legitimate (0.96),
5 4178 dropper (0.62), banking trojan (0.36),
6 4037 dropper (0.50), unknown (0.18), legitimate
(0.13), information stealer (0.08),
7 3399 legitimate (0.97),
8 3149 legitimate (0.83), unknown (0.07),
9 2969 legitimate (1.00),
10 2512 dropper (0.92), banking trojan (0.08),
11 2310 dropper (0.63), ransomware (0.36),
12 1820 ransomware (1.00),
13 1601 legitimate (1.00),
14 1527 unknown (0.25), dropper (0.25), legitimate
(0.20), trojan (0.07), rat (0.05),
15 1357 ransomware (1.00),
16 1339 legitimate (0.86),
17 1239 legitimate (0.97),
18 1179 trojan (0.99),
19 1178 legitimate (0.78), unknown (0.18),
20 1165 trojan (1.00),
21 1073 information stealer (0.97),
22 1028 banking trojan (1.00),
23 1004 legitimate (0.79), unknown (0.10),
24 1001 banking trojan (0.94), unknown (0.06),
25 936 information stealer (0.98),
Total 65 719
Total pure 18 840
Table XII: Top 25 clusters generated by proposed model from
testing data mixed with legitimate samples and prioritized
by size. The third column contains malware categories the
clustered samples belong to along with the ratio of every
category in particular cluster.
Cluster Size Malware categories with coverage
1 16 162 legitimate (0.94),
2 11 529 legitimate (0.33), dropper (0.18), unknown
(0.16), rat (0.15), trojan (0.09),
3 11 420 legitimate (0.39), unknown (0.22), worm
(0.10), rat (0.10), dropper (0.07),
4 9995 legitimate (0.87), unknown (0.06),
5 6881 information stealer (0.96),
6 5136 dropper (0.65), ransomware (0.33),
7 4758 dropper (0.59), banking trojan (0.33),
8 3989 legitimate (0.87), exploitkit (0.06),
9 3696 legitimate (1.00),
10 3693 trojan (0.47), unknown (0.25), legitimate
(0.09), pua (0.07), rat (0.05),
11 3653 unknown (0.30), dropper (0.22), pua (0.15),
legitimate (0.12), trojan (0.10), ransomware
(0.08),
12 3561 dropper (0.87), ransomware (0.13),
13 3496 legitimate (0.98),
14 3424 ransomware (0.96),
15 3281 legitimate (0.54), unknown (0.18), dropper
(0.12),
16 3231 dropper (0.72), banking trojan (0.22), unknown
(0.05),
17 2984 ransomware (0.40), unknown (0.22), banking
trojan (0.19), legitimate (0.07),
18 2876 banking trojan (0.92), unknown (0.08),
19 2444 unknown (0.34), legitimate (0.28), information
stealer (0.23), rat (0.06),
20 2388 legitimate (0.83), dropper (0.12),
21 2324 dropper (0.71), ransomware (0.29),
22 2251 information stealer (0.42), worm (0.21),
unknown (0.16), ransomware (0.12),
23 2212 ransomware (0.95),
24 2046 ransomware (0.96),
25 2007 ransomware (0.96),
Total 119 437
Total pure 7192
Table XIII: Top 25 clusters generated by K-Means from testing
data mixed with legitimate samples and prioritized by size.
The third column contains malware categories the clustered
samples belong to along with the ratio of every category in
particular cluster.
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a b s t r a c t 
This work addresses classiﬁcation of unknown binaries executed in sandbox by modeling their interaction 
with system resources (ﬁles, mutexes, registry keys and communication with servers over the network) 
and error messages provided by the operating system, using vocabulary-based method from the multiple 
instance learning paradigm. It introduces similarities suitable for individual resource types that combined 
with an approximative clustering method eﬃciently group the system resources and deﬁne features di- 
rectly from data. This approach effectively removes randomization often employed by malware authors 
and projects samples into low-dimensional feature space suitable for common classiﬁers. An extensive 
comparison to the state of the art on a large corpus of binaries demonstrates that the proposed solution 
achieves superior results using only a fraction of training samples. Moreover, it makes use of a source 
of information different than most of the prior art, which increases the diversity of tools detecting the 
malware, hence making detection evasion more diﬃcult. 
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
1. Motivation 
Since malware is presently one of the most serious threats to 
computer security with the number of new samples reaching 140 
million in 2015 ( AV-Test, 2016a ), battles against it are fought on 
many fronts. Signature matching remains the core defense tech- 
nology, but due to evasion techniques such as polymorphism, ob- 
fuscation, and encryption, keeping good recall is diﬃcult for static 
analysis and methods based purely on string matching. A popular 
approach to tackle these problems is to execute a binary in a con- 
trolled environment (sandbox) ( Oktavianto & Muhardianto, 2013 ), 
monitor its behavior, and based on this behavior classify the sam- 
ple into benign or malware class (or as a particular malware fam- 
ily). The assumption of these dynamic analysis methods is that 
behavior should be more diﬃcult to randomize and therefore it 
should constitute a more robust signal. 
Most approaches to dynamic analysis rely on system calls 
( Ahmadi, Ulyanov, Semenov, Troﬁmov, & Giacinto, 2016; Naval, 
Laxmi, Rajarajan, Gaur, & Conti, 2015; Wüchner, Ochoa, & 
Pretschner, 2014 ), as they are the only means how the binary can 
interact with the operating system and other resources. This pop- 
ularity has however already triggered many evasion techniques, 
such as shadow attacks ( Ma, Duan, Liu, Gu, & Liu, 2012 ), system- 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: jastibor@cisco.com (J. Stiborek), tpevny@cisco.com (T. Pevný), 
marrehak@cisco.com (M. Rehák). 
call injection attacks ( Kc, Keromytis, & Prevelakis, 2003 ), or sand- 
box detection ( Garcia, 2016 ). 
A perpendicular approach to modeling system calls is to model 
resources the binary has interacted with together with the type of 
the resources. The rationale is that if malware wants to provide 
revenue to its owner, it has to perform actions, such as download- 
ing advertisements in the case of adware, encrypting hard drive in 
the case of ransomware, exﬁltrating sensitive data in the case of 
credential stealers or Remote Administration Trojans ( Chen, Wei, & 
Delis, 2008 ), etc. This work assumes that execution of these actions 
involves interactions with resources visible at the operating system 
level, and this interaction can be viewed as a signal which is hard 
to hide and which can be indicative of malware families. 
Modeling interactions with system resources has been al- 
ready exploited by the prior art. Mohaisen, Alrawi, and Mo- 
haisen (2015) extracts a manually predeﬁned set of features such 
as number of ﬁles created in speciﬁc folders, number of HTTP re- 
quests, etc., and use it in supervised classiﬁcation. However, we 
believe that the rapidly changing threat landscape makes it diﬃ- 
cult to manually design features that are indicative while also be- 
ing stable over time. An alternative paradigm is to avoid manual 
design and to use a bag-of-words model (BoW model), where ev- 
ery interaction with a particular resource identiﬁed by its name 
is considered as a unique feature ( Rieck, Holz, Willems, Dussel, & 
Laskov, 2008 ). The price paid for circumventing manual feature de- 
sign using BoW is an explosion of the problem dimension, which 
can easily reach millions. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2017.10.036 
0957-4174/© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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This work circumvents the problem of manually designing fea- 
tures while at the same time avoiding the problem dimension ex- 
plosion. The approach is to ﬁrst cluster resource names with sim- 
ilarity functions tailored for each resource type (ﬁle names, mu- 
texes, registry names, and domain names), and then use this clus- 
tering to represent a sample (a binary executed in the sandbox) in 
a lower-dimensional space. This enables us to use a random for- 
est classiﬁer (or any other classiﬁer of choice) to separate malware 
from legitimate samples. The clustering also effectively removes 
randomization used to evade detection. 
The proposed approach is extensively evaluated on a large 
number of samples (more than 230,0 0 0) and compared to rele- 
vant prior art. Experimental results show that the proposed ap- 
proach indeed improves the accuracy of detecting malware bina- 
ries with the low complexity required for deployment on large- 
scale datasets. 
The contributions of this paper are manifold. This paper 
presents a novel approach to representing malware samples us- 
ing their interactions with system resources. It employs vocabulary- 
based method from the ﬁeld of multiple instance learning (MIL) 
combined with a deﬁnition of novel similarity measures for dif- 
ferent types of resource types reﬂecting their unique properties 
(structure of ﬁle paths, network communication, etc.). Next, it 
presents a fast approximation of Louvain clustering method used 
to automatically deﬁne the vocabulary that allows to scale the MIL 
method to large scale datasets. To the best of our knowledge, this 
work is the ﬁrst that employs techniques for multiple instance 
learning in the ﬁeld of malware analysis and presents a viable al- 
ternative to traditional approaches for malware classiﬁcation. 
2. Related work 
Since the analysis of malicious binaries and recommending 
them for further analysis has important practical applications, 
there exists rich prior art. Although it is frequently divided into 
two categories, static and dynamic, the boundaries between them 
are blurred since techniques such as analysis of the execution 
graph is used in both categories. 
2.1. Static malware analysis 
Static malware analysis treats a malware binary ﬁle as a data 
ﬁle from which it extracts features without executing it. The ear- 
liest approaches ( Lo, Levitt, & Olsson, 1995 ) looked for a manu- 
ally speciﬁed set of speciﬁc instructions (tell-tale) used by mal- 
ware to perform malicious actions but not used by legitimate bi- 
naries. Latter works, inspired by text analysis, used n -gram mod- 
els of binaries and instructions within ( Li, Wang, Stolfo, & Herzog, 
2005 ). Malware authors reacted quickly and began to obfuscate, 
encrypt, and randomize their binaries, which rendered such ba- 
sic models ( Sharif, Lanzi, Giﬃn, & Lee, 2008a ) useless. Since re- 
versing obfuscation and polymorphic techniques is in theory an 
NP-hard problem ( Moser, Kruegel, & Kirda, 2007 ), most state of 
the art ( Ahmadi et al., 2016; Christodorescu & Jha, 2006; Sharif, 
Yegneswaran, Saidi, Porras, & Lee, 2008b ) moved to a higher-level 
modeling of sequences of instructions / system calls and estimating 
their action or effect on the operating system. The rationale behind 
is that higher-level actions are more diﬃcult to hide. An example 
of higher-level modeling is a call graph ( Hu, Chiueh, & Shin, 2009; 
Kinable & Kostakis, 2011; Kong & Yan, 2013 ) where vertices repre- 
sent individual functions and edges capture dependencies between 
them. The analysis is then formulated as a problem of ﬁnding ap- 
propriate similarity measure (ﬁxed graph edit distance ( Kinable & 
Kostakis, 2011 ), normalized maximal common subgraph ( Hu et al., 
2009 ) or trained similarity ( Kong & Yan, 2013 ). Even though such 
analysis provides deep understanding of malware binaries, its scal- 
ability is limited due to complexity of the similarity measures (typ- 
ically NP-complete problem). 
2.2. Dynamic malware analysis 
An alternative solution to analyzing obfuscation and encryption 
is the execution of a binary in a controlled environment and an- 
alyzing its interactions with the operating system and system re- 
sources. 
A large portion of the work related to dynamic malware anal- 
ysis utilize system calls, since in modern operating systems sys- 
tem calls are the only way for applications to interact with the 
hardware and as such they can reveal malware actions. The sim- 
plest methods view a sequence of system calls as a sequence of 
strings and use histograms of occurrences to create feature vectors 
for the classiﬁer of choice ( Hansen, Larsen, Stevanovic, & Pedersen, 
2016 ). The biggest drawback of these naive techniques is low ro- 
bustness to system call randomization. Similarly to static analysis, 
this problem can be tackled by assigning actions to groups (clus- 
ters) of system calls (syscalls) and using them to characterize the 
binary ( Bayer, Comparetti, Hlauschek, Kruegel, & Kirda, 2009; Naval 
et al., 2015; Wüchner et al., 2014 ). Another 
A wide class of methods identifying malware binaries from 
sequences of syscalls rely on n -grams ( Canzanese, Mancoridis, 
& Kam, 2015; Lanzi, Balzarotti, Kruegel, Christodorescu, & 
Kirda, 2010; O’Kane, Sezer, McLaughlin, & Im, 2013 ). Malheur 
( Rieck, Trinius, Willems, & Holz, 2011 ) uses normalized histograms 
of n -grams as feature vectors, which effectively embeds syscall se- 
quences into Euclidean space endowed with L 2 norm. In this space 
the algorithm extracts prototypes Z = { z 1 , . . . , z n } using hierarchi- 
cal clustering. Each prototype captures the behavior of the cluster, 
which should match corresponding malware family. An interesting 
feature of Malheur is that if a cluster has less then a certain num- 
ber of samples, the prototype is not created. The classiﬁcation of an 
unknown binary is determined by searching for the nearest proto- 
type within certain range. If the nearest prototype is outside of this 
range, the sample is not classiﬁed. 
To counter dynamic analysis advanced malware detects the 
presence of a sandbox and does not execute within it. Since 
most sandboxes rely on a detectable system call interposition, 
Das, Liu, Zhang, and Chandramohan (2016) propose to extend hard- 
ware with FPGA that would extract system calls from their exe- 
cution on processor. Syscalls are then grouped by comprehensive 
yet hand designed rules, and these groups are then fed into multi- 
layer neural network classiﬁer. The classiﬁer itself is also part of 
the FPGA, such that the system can simultaneously extract training 
samples and classify them. 
AMAL uses its custom sandbox to extract features de- 
scribing ﬁles, network communication and registry features 
( Mohaisen et al., 2015 ) and tunes various classiﬁcation algorithms. 
The main difference between AMAL and this work is the con- 
struction of features. Whereas AMAL uses numeric features such 
as counts or sizes of created, modiﬁed or deleted ﬁles, counts of 
created, modiﬁed or deleted registry keys, counts of unique IP ad- 
dresses, etc., we assume that individual resources (ﬁles, registry 
keys, mutexes and network communication) have speciﬁc role in 
the operation system, which can be different even though the char- 
acteristics exhibited by the ﬁle are the same. 
The approach proposed by Rieck et al. (2008) creates a repre- 
sentation of the analyzed binaries directly from the data which is 
at the ﬁrst sight similar to the proposed approach, however there 
are two key differences. The ﬁrst one is the source of data, because 
Rieck et al. model actions triggered by the malware (writing into a 
ﬁle, communication with remote server, reading data from registry 
keys, starting new thread, etc.), whereas the proposed approach 
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models only affected resources. This enables to deploy the pro- 
posed approach in environments without access to low-level ac- 
tions (VMs without such access, user machines without API hook- 
ing). Another difference is in handling the randomization of re- 
source names. Instead of clustering resource names used in this 
work, Rieck et al. remove parameters of actions, which increases 
the dimensionality of the model since for every action with n pa- 
rameters it creates n + 1 features representing the action at dif- 
ferent levels of granularity by removing parameters from the end: 
from full description with all parameters to the most coarse de- 
scription where only name of the action is used. This leads to a 
massive increase in the already large number of features. 1 Even 
though the resulting feature space, is sparse the scalability of such 
an approach is limited. 
Anderson, Storlie, and Lane (2012) propose to combine tech- 
niques from static analysis with the data obtained using dynamic 
analysis in order to counter techniques frequently used by mal- 
ware authors to avoid detection, e.g. packing or execution stalling. 
Authors propose six different types of input data, three based on 
techniques from static analysis: (1) features extracted from raw bi- 
nary modeled as n -grams, (2) opcodes extracted from disassem- 
bled binary and (3) control ﬂow graph —a graph of all possible exe- 
cution paths; two based on dynamic analysis: (4) instruction traces 
( Anderson, Quist, Neil, Storlie, & Lane, 2011 ) and (5) system call 
traces; and (6) various information extracted from the binary it- 
self such as packer identiﬁcation, entropy of the binary, number 
of instructions in disassembled ﬁle, etc. For every type of input 
authors deﬁne a kernel which are then combined using multiple 
kernel learning ( Gonen & Alpaydin, 2011 ) to obtain optimal combi- 
nation. The optimized kernel combination is then used with SVM 
classiﬁer. 
The approach proposed by Chen et al. (2012) utilizes knowl- 
edge from the malware encyclopedias for malware classiﬁcation as 
it extracts model of the malware description and applies it to the 
output produced by the sandbox. Using such approach authors are 
able to annotate malware with various labels ( exploit, dropper , etc.) 
which is then used for threat estimation and classiﬁcation. 
2.3. Algorithms for multiple instance learning 
Classiﬁcation based on multiple instance learning paradigm is 
a popular topic with many possible applications such as classiﬁ- 
cation of images, classiﬁcation of candidates drugs, online object 
tracking, etc. 
Recently, Amores (2013) proposed taxonomy of approaches for 
multiple instance learning that divides proposed algorithms into 
three classes: (1) algorithms based on instance-space paradigm(IS), 
(2) algorithms based on bag-space paradigm (BS) and (3) algo- 
rithms based on embedded-space paradigm (ES). 
The IS paradigm states that the multiple instance classiﬁcation 
is based solely on information extracted from individual instances. 
The IS-based methods ﬁrst classify the individual instances and 
then propagate the estimated labels to the whole bags. Algorithms 
incorporating IS paradigm include Diverse density (DD) proposed 
by Maron and Lozano-Pérez (1998) , Expectation-Maximization Di- 
verse density (EM-DD) proposed by Zhang and Goldman (2002) , 
Multiple Instance Support Vector Machines (MI-SVM) proposed by 
Andrews, Tsochantaridis, and Hofmann (2003) , MIForests proposed 
by Leistner, Saffari, and Bischof (2010) or G3P-MI proposed by 
Zafra and Ventura (2010) . Since the IS-based methods operate on 
the level of individual instances, they require a numerical repre- 
sentation of the instances or an appropriate kernel function. How- 
ever, the kernelized methods applicable in our scenario (MI-SVM) 
1 According to the experiments, the number of features generated for about 60 0 0 
samples reaches over 20 million. 
do not scale well to large datasets ( O ( M 3 ) where M is total number 
of instances) which make their use computationally infeasible. An 
interesting idea to improve the scalability of the IS-based methods 
is proposed by Cano, Zafra, and Ventura (2015) . Authors propose 
to leverage the performance of the GPUs for training of MI classi- 
ﬁers. However, since GPUs are designed for fast matrix operations, 
the performance boost of the similarity metrics proposed in this 
paper would be limited. Nevertheless, such approach provides an 
interesting option and will be considered in further research. 
In algorithms based on the BS paradigm is the information ex- 
tracted from the whole bags. Typically, it involves deﬁnition of a 
distance function D ( X, Y ) that compares two bags X and Y . Such 
functions include minimal Hausdorff distance used in Wang and 
Zucker (20 0 0) , MI-Graph proposed by Zhou, Sun, and Li (2009) or 
kernel function proposed by Gärtner, Flach, Kowalczyk, and 
Smola (2002) . However, as discussed in Amores (2013) , the com- 
plexity of approaches based on BS paradigm is O ( N 2 ·m 2 ) ≈O ( M 2 ) 
where N is number of bags, m is average number of instances in 
a bag and M is total number of instances. Even though the com- 
putational complexity is lower than the complexity of MI-SVM, it 
is still too much for large dataset (the testing dataset in this paper 
has more 7 million instances). 
The last class of approaches are based on ES paradigm. They 
transform the bags into numerical vectors using a mapping func- 
tion M : X → R d and train a supervised machine learning al- 
gorithm on the transformed vector representation. The simplest 
mapping functions proposed by Dong (2006) and Bunescu and 
Mooney (2007) are deﬁned as M (X ) = ( f 1 , . . . , f d ) , where f i = 
1 
| X | 
∑ 
x ∈ X x i , or f i = max x ∈ X x i , or f i = min x ∈ X x i . More complex 
mapping functions deﬁne the embedding using a vocabulary V = 
{ ( θ1 , c 1 ) , . . . , ( θd , c d ) } , a set of concepts (set of instances) where 
each concept is identiﬁed by identiﬁer c j and parameters θ j . The 
mapping function is then deﬁned as M (X, V ) = ( f 1 , . . . , f d ) with f i 
deﬁned as f i (X, V ) = 1 Z 
∑ 
x ∈ X p(x | c i ) , ∀ i ∈ 1 , . . . , d, where Z is a nor- 
malization constant ensuring 
∑ 
f i = 1 , and p ( x | c i ) represents the 
likelihood that an instance x belongs to a concept c i or hard assign- 
ment of instance x into concept c i . Regarding the deﬁnition of the 
vocabulary V, a traditional approach, adopted in this work as well, 
is to cluster all instances extracted from all bags using a suitable 
clustering algorithm (typically K-Means) and to use the resulting 
clusters as the concepts. However, such approach does not reﬂect 
relations between bags and individual instances. To address this is- 
sue, Weidmann, Frank, and Pfahringer (2003) propose partitioning 
of instances based on decision trees that considers the knowledge 
of the labels of corresponding bags. However, as the decision trees 
assume numerical representation of the instances, this approach is 
not applicable in our scenario. 
Cano (2017) proposes an interesting approach that combines 
multiple-instance with multi-view learning approach. The multi- 
view approach allows to fuse various source of information about 
the data which in our case corresponds to various types of system 
resources and thus boost the classiﬁcation performance. Further- 
more, authors propose to replace a single multiple instance classi- 
ﬁer with an ensemble approach to further improve the classiﬁca- 
tion performance. However, since the base classiﬁers in the ensem- 
ble are standard multiple instance classiﬁers described above, they 
share the same limitations, which limits the use of this approach 
in our scenario. 
3. Classiﬁcation of sandboxed samples 
To capture the malware behavior, this work assumes that ex- 
ecution of malware’s actions involves interactions with resources 
visible at the operating system level. Examples of such interac- 
tions include operations with ﬁles during encryption of a victim’s 
hard drive, network communication during data exﬁltration or dis- 
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playing advertisements, operation with mutexes used to ensure a 
single instance of malware is running, or manipulation with reg- 
istry keys to ensure persistency after reboot. An additional source 
of information are error messages of the operating system itself. 
Such information is provided by the sandboxing environment as 
the following warnings: dll not found indicating missing dynamic 
library, incorrect executable checksum indicating corrupted binary, 
and sample did not execute indicating the fact that the binary was 
not executed at all due to various reasons (corrupted binary, sand- 
box was not able to copy the binary into VM, etc). 
To model the interactions of a malware binary with resources, 
this work views each binary executed in a sandbox as a set of 
pairs of names and types of resources the binary interacted with. 
This view frames the problem as a multiple instance learning (MIL) 
problem where each sample (binary) is represented as a bag that 
consists of a set of instances of different size. In our scenario an 
instance represents the pair of name and type of a resource the 
binary interacted with during sandboxing. 
Variable sizes of samples and lack of order over their instances 
pose a challenge to traditional machine learning methods that ex- 
pect samples to have ﬁxed size. A recent review of MIL algorithms 
( Amores, 2013 ) lists various approaches to overcome this variabil- 
ity in sample sizes. One of the popular approaches (also adopted 
in this work) is vocabulary-based method ( Sivic & Zisserman, 2003 ) 
outlined in Algorithms 1 and 2 . It employs clustering of instances 
Algorithm 1 High-level overview of training (function TRAIN) and 
classiﬁcation (function PREDICT) of malware samples. 
1: function train ( S, y ) . Training samples and labels 
2: I ← extractInstances (S) 
3: C ← cluster (I) . Clustering of instances (sep- 
arately for individual types) 
4: X ← project (S, C) . Projection of samples into 
binary vector (Alg. 2) 
5: M ← trainClassiﬁer (X, y ) 
6: return M , C . Returns cluster centers C 
and trained classiﬁer M 
7: end function 
8: function predict ( S ′ , C, M ) . Testing samples S ′ , clusters 
C and classiﬁer M 
9: X ′ ← project (S ′ , C) . Projection of samples into 
binary vector (Alg. 2) 
10: ˆ y ← predict (M , X ′ ) . Classiﬁcation of testing sam- 
ples 
11: return ˆ y
12: end function 
Algorithm 2 Projection of samples S into binary vector using clus- 
ter centers C . 
1: function project ( S, C) . Samples S and clusters C. 
2: X ← ∅ 
3: for all s ∈ S do 
4: I ← extractInstances (s ) 
5: x ← ~ 0 
6: for all i ∈ I do 
7: c ∗ ← nnSearch (i, C) . Finds closest center c ∗
to instance i . 
8: x [ c ∗] ← 1 
9: end for 
10: X ← X ∪ { x } 
11: end for 
12: return X 
13: end function 
Table 1 
Example of clustering ﬁles of two binaries from the same family executed 
in the sandbox. 
Binary 1 Binary 2 
(a) raw ﬁlenames 
\ Temp \ 4ffdd6ab-8020 \ conﬁg.dmc \ Temp \ ed8a9718-c7a0 \ conﬁg.dmc 
\ Temp \ 4ffdd6ab-8020 \ bin.dmc \ Temp \ ed8a9718-c7a0 \ bin.dmc 
\ Windows \ System32 \ ftp.exe \ Windows \ System32 \ netsh.exe 
(b) artifact clusters 
Artifact cluster 1 Artifact cluster 1 
Artifact cluster 1 Artifact cluster 1 
Artifact cluster 2 Artifact cluster 2 
to describe the sample by a ﬁxed-dimensional vector with length 
equal to the size of vocabulary, i.e. a set of clusters, so that an or- 
dinary machine learning method can be applied. 
To convert a sample into a ﬁxed-dimensional vector, all in- 
stances I from all training samples S are extracted and clustered 
by a suitable method per given resource type–ﬁles, mutexes, reg- 
istry keys, network communication. Note that warnings generated 
by the sandboxing environment are used directly, i.e. every warn- 
ing is considered as a separated cluster. The resulting clusters rep- 
resent the vocabulary. Next, for every instance i the closest cluster 
prototype c ∗ (a small random subset of the cluster of instances) 
of corresponding type is located. Finally, the binary representation 
is then used such that element of the vector equals to 1 iff there 
was an instance close to the particular cluster prototype. Once all 
samples are encoded as ﬁxed-dimensional vectors, one can use a 
machine learning algorithm of choice to implement the classiﬁer. 
This work uses the random forest classiﬁer ( Breiman, 2001 ) due to 
its versatility, accuracy, and scalability, which make it a popular 
choice for many different machine learning tasks including mal- 
ware classiﬁcation ( Hansen et al., 2016 ). 
Since the clustering is an essential component of the above 
algorithm, the deﬁnition of similarity over instances (resource 
names) greatly inﬂuences the accuracy of the system, and there- 
fore it should reﬂect properties of the application domain. The rest 
of this section deﬁnes a speciﬁc similarity metric for each type of 
resources the malware interact with, namely on ﬁles, mutexes, net- 
work hostnames, and registry keys, and also justiﬁes our choice of 
the clustering method ( Table 1 ). 
3.1. Similarity between ﬁle paths 
Although viewing ﬁle paths as strings would allow to use 
vast prior art such as Levenshtein distance ( Levenshtein, 1966 ), 
Hamming distance, Jaro–Winkler distance ( Navarro, 2001 ), or 
string kernels introduced in Lodhi, Saunders, Shawe-Taylor, Cris- 
tianini, and Watkins (2002) , the ﬁle systems were designed 
as tree structures with names of some folders (fragments of 
the path) being imposed by the operating system and the dis- 
tance should reﬂect that. For example two ﬁles with paths 
/Documents and Settings/Admin/Start Menu/Progra 
ms/Startup/tii9fwliiv.lnk and /Documents and Sett 
ings/Admin/Start Menu/Programs/Accessories/Note 
pad.lnk share large parts of their paths and common string 
similarities will return high similarity score, but they serve very 
different purposes, since the ﬁrst ﬁle is a link to an application 
executed after the start of the operating system (OS), while the 
second is a regular link in the Start menu in Windows OS. Another 
aspect that prohibits the use of common string similarities is 
their computational complexity (typically O ( n 2 ) where n is the 
length of the string). The complexity combined with the number 
of resources to be clustered (in order of millions) leads to unfea- 
sible time requirements. This motivates the design of a similarity 
that is fast and takes into the account the tree structure of the 
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Table 2 
Example of two paths x and x ′ separated into individual fragments with labels ( K – known folder, G – general folder 
and F – ﬁle). 
Fragment 1 Fragment 2 Fragment 3 
x Documents and Settings ( K ) Admin ( G ) Start Menu ( K ) 
x ′ Documents and Settings ( K ) Admin ( G ) Start Menu ( K ) 
Fragment 4 Fragment 5 Fragment 6 
Programs ( K ) Startup ( K ) tii9fwliiv.lnk ( F ) 
Programs ( K ) Accessories ( G ) Notepad.lnk ( F ) 
ﬁle system, special folders, and differences between folders and 
ﬁlenames. 
The proposed similarity s ( x, x ′ ) of two ﬁle paths x and x ′ is de- 
ﬁned as 
s (x, x ′ ) = exp 
(
−w T f (x, x ′ ) 
)
, (1) 
where w is a vector of weights and f ( x, x ′ ) is a function extracting 
a feature vector from ﬁle paths x and x ′ . Both the weight vector 
w and function f play an essential role and are both discussed in 
detail below. 
The function f in (1) captures differences between the two 
paths x and x ′ by a ﬁxed-dimensional vector. It ﬁrst splits both 
paths x and x ′ into fragments x i and x ′ i using OS speciﬁc path sep- 
arator, 2 in the cases of MacOS and Windows changes all characters 
to lowercase, and assigns all fragments into one of the following 
four categories: 
1. known folder – fragment x i is a well known folder in the list 
of folders imposed by the operation system (e.g. Windows , 
Program Files , System32 , etc.), 
2. general folder – fragment x i is a not-well-known folder (e.g. 
unknown folders in Program Files , randomly generated 
folders in Internet Explorer cache folder, etc.), 
3. ﬁle – fragment x i is ﬁle, 
4. empty – artiﬁcial fragment used for padding the paths in 
cases when paths x and x ′ have different depths. 
When all fragments are assigned to one of the above classes, 
their dissimilarity is captured by the function f as 
f (x, x ′ ) = ( f KK , f KG , f KF , f KE , f GG , f GF , f GE , f F F , f F E ) 
where 
• f KK is the number of fragments on the same level that were 
both classiﬁed as known folder and were not equal, 
• f GG is the sum of Levenshtein distances between all frag- 
ments on the same level that were classiﬁed as general 
folder , 
• f FF is the sum of Levenshtein distances of all fragments on 
the same level that were classiﬁed as ﬁle , 
• f KG , f KF , f KE , f GF , f GE , f FE are the sums of all fragments of the 
same level and were classiﬁed as known and general folder, 
known folder and ﬁle, known folder and empty, general folder 
and ﬁle, general folder and empty, and ﬁle and empty respec- 
tively. 
To illustrate the calculation of f ( x, x ′ ), let’s consider the same 
two paths used above. At ﬁrst, function f splits both paths 
into fragments and assign them into one of four categories (see 
Table 2 ). Assigning fragment to classes requires a list of known 
folders, 3 which for the purpose of this example we assume to 
contain Documents and Settings , Start Menu , Programs 
2 Unixes and MacOS uses ’/’ as a path separator, Windows uses ’ \ ’. 
3 Full list of known folders is available online: https://github.com/SﬁnxCZ/ 
Multiple- Instance- Learning- for- Malware- Classiﬁcation 
and Startup , which are present in all windows installations. All 
corresponding folders from those two paths are therefore assigned 
to known folder class, while Admin and Accessories are la- 
beled as general folders. 4 Individual elements of the vector f ( x, x ′ ) 
are calculated using the above rules as follows: the ﬁrst rule ap- 
plies to three fragments 1, 3, and 4 belonging to known folder 
class, but as they are all equal f KK = 0 ; the second rule returns 
0 based on analogous reasoning but for general folders; the third 
rule returns f F F = 0 . 7143 , which is the Levenshtein distance be- 
tween tii9fwliiv.lnk and Notepad.lnk ; the only mismatch 
is on fragment 5–known folder and general folder yielding f KG = 1 ;
and ﬁnally all remaining elements of feature vector are 0. The out- 
put of f ( x, x ′ ) is captured by the feature vector 
f (x, x ′ ) = (0 , 0 , 0 . 7143 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0) . 
The weight vector w in (1) captures the contribution of indi- 
vidual elements of the feature vector f ( x, x ′ ). Imposing condition 
w ≥0, in combination with construction of function f , bounds the 
value of the similarity function (1) s ( x, x ′ ) ∈ [0, 1] such that the 
similarity functions returns 1 (or values close to 1) if x and x ′ be- 
long to the same class (ﬁles in /temp/ directory, cache of the 
Internet Explorer, ﬁles in system directory, etc.) and values ap- 
proaching 0 if they belong to different classes. Since the similarity 
function (1) was inspired by the popular Gaussian kernel, the pa- 
rameter vector w was optimized using the Centered Kernel Target 
Alignment ( Cortes, Mohri, & Rostamizadeh, 2012 ) (CKTA), which is 
a method to optimize kernel parameters. CKTA assumes training 
data { (x i , y i ) , } m i =1 where x i is a ﬁle path and y i is the class of the 
path x i , and deﬁnes centered kernel matrix as 
[ S w c ] i j = S w i j −
1 
m 
m ∑ 
i =1 
S w i j −
1 
m 
m ∑ 
j=1 
S w i j + 
1 
m 2 
m ∑ 
i, j=1 
S w i j , (2) 
where S w i j = s w (x i , x j ) is the kernel matrix corresponding to the 
similarity function (1) parameterized by the weight vector w . CKTA 
maximizes correlation between labels and a similarity matrix by 
solving the following optimization problem 
w ∗ = arg max 
w ≥0 
〈 S w c , Y c 〉 F 
‖ S w c ‖ F · ‖ Y c ‖ F , (3) 
where Y is target label kernel with [ Y ] ij equals to 1 when i th and 
j th paths from training data belongs to the same class and −1 oth- 
erwise, 〈 · , · 〉 F is Frobenius product and ‖ · ‖ F is Frobenius norm 
(see Appendix A.1 for more details). In below experiments (3) is 
solved by stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm ( Bishop, 2011 ). 
Note that although the path similarity s ( x i , x j ) is not a valid ker- 
nel because it is not positive deﬁnite, the use of centered kernel 
alignment is still possible as the only limitation is that the global 
optimum might not be found. 
4 The ﬁrst three known folders are embedded in the functionality of the Win- 
dows OS. The Startup folder has a speciﬁc meaning altering the behavior of the 
operation system since all programs listed in this folder are executed after the boot 
of the OS. On the other hand Accessories can be easily changed without major 
consequences. 
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To ﬁnish the example, the similarity function (1) with weight 
vector w = (2 , 10 −5 , 1 , 2 . 3 , 1 . 6 , 1 , 0 . 36 , 0 . 7 , 0 . 9) returns the value 
s (x, x ′ ) = 0 . 049 , which correctly indicates that the two paths are 
different. 
3.2. Similarity of network traﬃc 
To deﬁne the similarity between network resources one has 
to overcome the randomization often employed by malware au- 
thors that render trivial similarity based on names of network re- 
sources (domains, IPs) ineffective. To escape blacklisting command 
and control (C&C) channels of malware, its authors use various 
techniques to hide and obscure C&C operation. Popular approaches 
include randomization of domain names by generating them ran- 
domly (DGA), quickly changing hosting servers and / or domain 
names by fast ﬂux, or using large hosting providers like Amazon 
Web Services to hide among legitimate servers, etc. These tech- 
niques are relatively cheap (e.g. registering a new .com domain 
costs ˜3USD per 1 year) and they allow for variation in domain 
names without updating disseminated malware binaries. In con- 
trast, switching from one C&C paradigm to another requires such 
an update and therefore occurs relatively infrequently. These two 
properties contribute to each malware family using speciﬁc pat- 
terns of domain names, paths, and parts of URLs. Exploiting these 
patterns allows to group domain names into clusters. In this work 
the similarity in network traﬃc is deﬁned only for HTTP/HTTPS 
protocol, because it is presently the default choice for malware au- 
thors as it is rarely ﬁltered. The extension to other network traﬃc 
is possible ( Kohout & Pevny, 2015 ). 
The similarity in URL patterns used in this work has been 
adopted from Jusko, Rehák, Stiborek, Kohout, and Pevný (2016) , 
which has proposed to cluster domain names so that each cluster 
contains domains of one type / for one family of malware. The cal- 
culation of similarity starts by grouping all HTTP/HTTPS requests 
using the domain names. Then the model of each domain name 
is built from path and query strings, transferred bytes, duration of 
requests and inter-arrival times (time spans between requests to 
the same domain) of individual requests to it. Finally, these models 
are used to calculate the similarity function between two domain 
names in the clustering. Since the calculation of the similarity is 
out of scope, we refer to an original publication ( Jusko et al., 2016 ) 
for details. 
3.3. Similarity between mutex names 
Mutex ( Mutual exclusive object ) is a service provided by most 
modern operating systems to synchronize multi-threaded and 
multi-processes applications. This mechanism is popular among 
malware authors to prevent multiple infections of the same ma- 
chine, because running two instances of the same malware can 
cause conﬂicts limiting the potential revenue. Mutexes are iden- 
tiﬁed by their name, which can be an arbitrary string. The nam- 
ing scheme is challenging for malware authors, because the names 
cannot be static, which would make them good indicators of com- 
promise of a particular malware, but they cannot be completely 
random either, because two independent binaries of the same 
family would not be able to check the presence of each other. 
Therefore malware authors resorted to pseudo-deterministic algo- 
rithms or patterns for generating mutex names. For some mal- 
ware families these patterns are already well known, for exam- 
ple Sality ( Symantec Security Response, 2011 ) uses mutex names 
of the form ‘‘ < process name > .exeM_ < process ID > _’’ 
- explorer.exeM_1423_ . 
Since operating systems do not impose any restrictions on the 
names of mutexes, they can be arbitrary strings. Therefore stan- 
dard string similarities such as Levenshtein distance, Hamming dis- 
tance, Jaro–Winkler distance, etc. can be used. In experiments pre- 
sented in Section 4 Levenshtein was used, as it gives overall good 
results. 
3.4. Similarity between registry names 
In Microsoft Windows operating system, the primary target of 
the majority of malware, registry serves as a place where pro- 
grams can store various conﬁguration data. It is a replacement 
of conﬁguration ﬁles with several improvements such as strongly 
typed values, faster parsing, ability to store binary data, etc. The 
registry is a key-value store, where key names have the struc- 
ture of a ﬁle system. The root keys are HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE , 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER , HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG , HKEY_CLASS 
ES_ROOT , HKEY_USERS and HKEY_PERFORMANCE_DATA ; some 
root keys also always have sub-keys with speciﬁc names 
( Software , Microsoft , Windows , etc.) . Due to similarity with 
a ﬁle system, the similarity distance is the same as the one deﬁned 
in Section 3.1 , but with a different set of names of known folders 
and a weight vector optimized on registry data rather than on ﬁles. 
3.5. Clustering of resource names 
The above similarities are not true distances, which limits the 
choice of applicable clustering methods to those that do not re- 
quire proper distance metric between points. The Louvain method 
( Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008 ) is a popular 
choice and it is used in experiments below, because it also au- 
tomatically determines the number of clusters and thus removes 
the need to set it manually. The use of the Louvain method is the 
authors’ preference, but other clustering methods can be used as 
well; the reader is referred to Fortunato (2010) for an overview of 
methods requiring only similarity. 
The use of the Louvain method is not straightforward in 
the scenario of this paper because it requires a full adjacency 
matrix in advance. This results in a lower bound to computa- 
tional complexity being O ( n 2 ) in the number of resources, which 
is clearly prohibitive as the number of unique resource names 
to cluster can easily reach the order of millions. To decrease 
the number of calculated similarities, an approach inspired by 
Zhang, Ramakrishnan, and Livny (1997) , Zimek, Gaudet, Campello, 
and Sander (2013) and Jang, Brumley, and Venkataraman (2010) is 
adopted where the Louvain clustering is used iteratively as sum- 
marized in Algorithm 3 . Given a set of instances I of a particular 
Algorithm 3 Approximative clustering algorithm for instances I 
(resource names). 
1: function approxCluster ( I; k,m, ) 
2: C = ∅ 
3: while I  = ∅ do 
4: I ′ ← Random subset of size k from I 
5: C ′ ← cluster (I ′ , m ) . Cluster instances I ′ 
and create cluster 
prot. of size m . 
6: for all i ∈ I \ I ′ do 
7: c ∗ ← nnSearch (i, C ′ ) . Find cluster prot. c ∗
closest to instance i . 
8: if s (i, c ∗) >  then 
9: c ∗ ← c ∗ ∪ { i } 
10: end if 
11: end for 
12: C ← C ∪ C ′ 
13: end while 
14: return C 
15: end function 
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type, in every iteration the algorithm selects a random subset I ′ ⊂ I 
of the data of size k small enough for the Louvain method to be 
computationally feasible. The results of the Louvaine clustering are 
then transformed to cluster prototypes—random subsets of clusters 
with size limited to m . Remaining data I \ I ′ are then traversed and 
all samples with similarity larger than  to some cluster prototype 
c ∗ ∈ C ′ are added to c ∗ and removed from I . Finally, C ′ is merged 
with the clustering C obtained in the previous iteration, and if I is 
not empty, the process is repeated. 
Clearly the algorithm is an approximation of a clustering with 
complete data and its performance depends on the choice of pa- 
rameters k and . Experiments indicate that if parameter k is large 
enough ( k = 10 4 ) and parameter  is set reasonably (in the ex- 
perimental evaluation we use  = 0 . 4 , see Section 4.2 for details), 
the results are comparable with clustering methods applied to the 
complete data. The computational complexity of this sequential ap- 
proximation is O ( l · ( k · ( k − 1 ) / 2 + c l · m · ( n l − k ) ) ) wher e l is the 
number of iterations of algorithm (typically l ≤10), n l is the num- 
ber of non-clustered samples in l th iteration, k is the number of 
randomly selected samples, c l is the number of cluster prototypes 
produced by the clustering algorithm in l th iteration and m is the 
maximal size of a cluster prototype (typically m = 10 ). Since the 
parameter k is ﬁxed and k n , we can see that the number of eval- 
uations of the similarity function is linear in the number of sam- 
ples, which clearly outperforms the quadratic complexity required 
by the vanilla Louvain method. 
4. Evaluation 
In this section the proposed approach (further referred 
as MIL model) is compared to the approach proposed by 
Rieck et al. (2008) (further referred to as Rieck ) and the approach 
proposed by Mohaisen et al. (2015) (further referred to as AMAL ). 
Rieck has been selected as a representative of the prior art that en- 
codes malware behavior into a high-dimensional feature space us- 
ing bag-of-words model built directly from data; it uses kernelized 
SVM to classify binaries. The second approach, AMAL, encodes mal- 
ware behavior using a relatively low number of hand-made fea- 
tures; to classify unknown binaries AMAL trains multiple classiﬁers 
(SVM, decision trees, k-nearest neighbor, etc.) and selects the opti- 
mal classiﬁer for given data using cross-validation. 
4.1. Data set description 
The dataset used for experiments contained 250 527 ﬁles col- 
lected from October 24, 2016 to December 12, 2016 using AMP 
ThreatGrid ( CISCO Systems, Inc., 2017 ). All ﬁles were also analyzed 
by VirusTotal.com service ( Google Inc., 2017 ) and labeled using its 
verdicts as follows: a ﬁle was labeled as malicious if at least 4 out 
of 10 selected AV engines (see Table 4 for details) detected the ﬁle 
as malicious, and it was labeled as legitimate if none of the AV en- 
gines detected the ﬁle. Remaining ﬁles were discarded as unknown 
and removed from both training and testing sets in order to limit 
the effect of misclassiﬁcations by individual AV engines. The ﬁnal 
numbers of ﬁles were: 143,684 malicious, 86,707 legitimate, and 
20,136 discarded as unknown. The numbers of samples of individ- 
ual malware families are summarized in Table 3 . 
All ﬁles were executed in sandbox by AMP ThreatGrid 
( CISCO Systems, Inc., 2017 ) service, using Windows 7 64bit (71% 
samples) environment, as it is the most popular OS at the time 
of writing, 5 and Windows XP (29% samples) environment, since 
5 According to http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers _ os.asp Windows 7 
has 34.6% market share against 1.0% covered by Windows XP, 11.1% covered by Win- 
dows 8 and 30.9% covered by Windows 10. 
Table 3 
Number of samples of malware families in the data set. The malware 
families for individual samples were determined using AVClass tool 
Sebastián, Rivera, Kotzias, and Caballero (2016) . 
Malware family #samples Malware family #samples 
nemucod 13,731 amonetize 1167 
cerber 12,790 nanocore 1027 
bladabindi 10,910 loadmoney 957 
locky 9855 yakes 892 
gamarue 7670 bifrose 802 
darkkomet 4642 autoit 776 
hupigon 3539 kolabc 704 
upatre 3255 waldek 683 
tinba 3089 pdfka 644 
scar 2949 shipup 624 
swrort 2859 rebhip 611 
zbot 2412 razy 597 
virlock 1789 agentb 575 
fareit 1757 poison 548 
farﬂi 1743 xtrat 508 
zegost 1712 onlinegames 501 
virut 1551 ramnit 492 
adwind 1534 magania 462 
zusy 1499 atraps 457 
ircbot 1437 softpulse 457 
zerber 1321 banload 386 
palevo 1268 ruskill 373 
vobfus 1241 downloadassistant 371 
delf 1223 binder 349 
donoff 1207 remaining MW families 31,738 
Total malicious 143,684 
Total legitimate 86,707 
Table 4 
Selected AV engines that received full 6 points for performance in AV-Test 
report from December 2016 ( AV-Test, 2016b ). 
AhnLab, V3 Internet Security G Data, InternetSecurity 
Avira, Antivirus Pro Kaspersky Lab, Internet Security 
Bitdefender, Internet Security Microworld, eScan internet security suite 
ESET, Internet Security Symantec, Norton Security 
F-Secure, Safe Trend Micro, Internet Security 
it is still widely deployed on embedded machines such as ATMs. 
Virtual machines were connected to the Internet without any ﬁl- 
tering or restrictions that could by any mean prevent connec- 
tions to command & control servers or other servers. The work 
here is not tailored to AMP ThreatGrid, as the same or sim- 
ilar information about binaries can be obtained by a number 
of different sandboxing solutions such as Cuckoo ( Oktavianto & 
Muhardianto, 2013 ), Ether ( Dinaburg, Royal, Sharif, & Lee, 2008 ), 
or CWSandbox ( Willems, Holz, & Freiling, 2007 ). 
In contrast to the majority of prior art, binaries were divided 
into training and testing sets according to the dates they were col- 
lected rather than randomly. This approach is more realistic since 
it does not overestimate the detection performance as some mal- 
ware families may not be known at the time of training, as they 
might have appeared later. Thus, all training samples collected 
prior to November 12, 2016 (72,689 malicious binaries and 47,961 
legitimate binaries) were used for training, and remaining samples 
(70,995 malicious binaries and 38,746 legitimate binaries) were 
used for testing. 
4.2. Hyper-parameter optimization 
All compared methods have several parameters that have to be 
tuned to achieve good detection accuracy. While in Rieck and the 
proposed method the parameters have to be optimized using grid 
search (detailed below), AMAL is designed to perform such opti- 
mization during training in order to select both the optimal classi- 
ﬁer (SVM, linear SVM, decision trees, logistic regression, k-nearest 
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neighbor and perceptron) and its parameters and thus it does not 
need to optimize its parameters in advance. 
Since Rieck uses SVM with L2 regularization and polynomial 
kernel there are two parameters that need to be tuned: misclas- 
siﬁcation cost C ∈ 
{
10 −2 , . . . , 10 8 
}
and degree of the kernel d ∈ 
{ 1 , . . . , 5 } . The optimal conﬁguration achieving highest accuracy 
estimated by ﬁve-fold cross-validation on the training data was 
C = 10 4 , d = 4 . 
The random forest classiﬁer described in Section 3 contains sev- 
eral parameters such as the number of trees K ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100, 
200}, maximal depth d m ∈ {5, 10, 30, 50, ∞ }, minimal number of 
samples in node to perform split s n ∈ {2, 4, 6, 10, 20}, and criterion 
c ∈ {gini, entropy}. All remaining parameters (maximal number of 
features, minimal number of samples in leaf, maximal number of 
leafs, class weights, minimum weighted fraction of the total sum 
of weights in leaf, minimal impurity for split) were set to their de- 
fault values as deﬁned in the Scikit-learn library ( Pedregosa et al., 
2011 ) since according to our experiments they have little inﬂuence 
on detection performance. The optimal conﬁguration of parameters 
with respect to accuracy estimated by ﬁve-fold cross-validation on 
training data was K = 100 , d m = ∞ , s n = 2 and c = gini . 
Additional two parameters (minimal similarity  ∈ { 0 . 1 , . . . , 0 . 9 } 
and size of randomly selected subsets k ∈ {10 4 , 2 ·10 4 , 5 ·10 4 , 10 5 , 
2 ·10 5 , 5 ·10 5 , ∞ }) affect the clustering of the resource names de- 
scribed in Section 3.5 . The minimal similarity was optimized on 
a manually labeled set of ﬁle paths and registry keys that were 
clustered with different values of . The resulting clusters were 
evaluated with respect to the adjusted rand index ( Rand, 1971 ), a 
well known score for evaluation of clustering algorithms, and the 
optimal value of  = 0 . 4 was selected. To ﬁnd the optimal size of 
randomly selected subsets k the accuracy of the whole proposed 
method with different settings of parameter k was estimated using 
ﬁve fold cross validation on randomly selected subset of training 
data. 6 Since the differences between various settings were negligi- 
ble, the value of the parameter k = 10 5 was selected as a reason- 
able balance. Low value of parameter k increases the number of 
iterations l performed by the clustering algorithm, since too many 
samples are rejected to be too dissimilar to available cluster proto- 
types, and high value increases the quadratic cost for computation 
of adjacency matrix required by Louvain method. 
Classiﬁcation performance was measured with standard evalua- 
tion metrics ( Fawcett, 2006 ): true positive rate (TPR), false negative 
rate (FNR), true negative rate (TNR), false positive rate (FPR) and ac- 
curacy . Since the experimental scenario is binary (positive malware 
vs. negative benign), the TPR (FNR) is the proportion of correctly 
(incorrectly) classiﬁed malware samples, TNR (FPR) is the propor- 
tion of correctly (incorrectly) classiﬁed legitimate samples and ac- 
curacy is the rate of correctly classiﬁed samples regardless their 
class. 
4.3. Experimental results 
The experiments discussed in this section are divided into three 
parts that provide complex evaluation of all aspects of the pro- 
posed method. 
The ﬁrst experiment compares the classiﬁcation performance of 
the MIL model to Rieck and AMAL using the complete dataset to 
evaluate the ability of the proposed approach to correctly detect 
malicious samples. Note that to evaluate AMAL on the complete 
training set, the meta learner was not allowed to use SVM classi- 
ﬁer with RBF kernel due to excessive computational requirements. 
However, AMAL’s meta-learner has never selected this variant of 
6 The subset was limited to ˜ 30,0 0 0 samples in order to limit the number of re- 
sources so that complete clustering could be performed. 
Table 5 
True (TPR), false (FPR) positive rates and accuracies of evaluated methods 
estimated on the training and testing set. 
Estimated on testing set Estimated on training set 
TPR FPR ACC TPR FPR ACC 
MIL model 0.954 0.067 0.943 0.973 0.061 0.956 
Rieck 0.934 0.081 0.926 0.974 0.014 0.980 
AMAL 0.795 0.108 0.845 0.845 0.047 0.899 
Fig. 1. True (TPR), false (FPR) positive rates and accuracies of evaluated methods 
estimated on the training and testing set. 
the SVM classiﬁer in smaller experiments performed in this work, 
hence removing it most probably does not have any impact on the 
results. Next experiment estimates the performance degradation 
of compared approaches when only a limited number of data are 
available for training (5%, 10%, 20% and 100% of training samples). 
The last part evaluates the robustness of the proposed MIL-based 
representation of malware samples by comparing results obtained 
with the random forest to results obtained with two other classi- 
ﬁers, linear SVM and multi-layered perceptron. 
4.3.1. Classiﬁcation of malware samples 
The detection rates and accuracy of classiﬁers trained on all 
121 115 training samples as estimated on testing samples are 
shown in Table 5 and Fig. 1 . The differences between evalua- 
tion metrics indicate that the proposed approach outperforms both 
Rieck and AMAL having the lowest false positive rate and false neg- 
ative rate. A deeper analysis of the misclassiﬁcations produced by 
the proposed approach revealed that most of the false positives 
(legitimate binaries classiﬁed as malware) were software utilities 
such as TeamViewer that install themselves into system directories 
without any user interaction. Since their incidence in the training 
set was relatively low, the random forest was not able to precisely 
learn this type of behavior. A second source of errors are false neg- 
atives (malware samples classiﬁed as benign) where almost 70% 
are caused by insuﬃcient numbers of training samples (less than 
100 samples) from corresponding malware families. Another 11% 
of false negatives was caused by concept drift as a portion of test- 
ing samples exhibited different behaviors than training samples, 
i.e. created ﬁles or registry keys followed different pattern, network 
communication signiﬁcantly different URLs, etc. 
Large gaps between training and testing accuracies for AMAL 
and Rieck suggest that manually created features and BoW fea- 
tures do not generalize over longer periods of time as well as fea- 
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Fig. 2. Comparison of FNR and FPR for Rieck and proposed method trained on 
training sets of different sizes (5%, 10%, 20% and 100% of training samples). 
tures created through clustering do. This suggests that clustering 
removes some randomization of resource names while retaining a 
large part of information content. 
4.3.2. Evaluation of performance degradation 
Fig. 2 a and b show graphs of FNR and FPR rates for larger 
sizes of the training set expressed as fraction of the data avail- 
able for training. For fair comparison the testing set was kept static 
containing all 110 140 samples collected after November 12, 2016. 
Both graphs show that the proposed approach is able to achieve 
lower FNR and FPR using fewer samples. In fact, the proposed ap- 
proach achieved FNR of 0.052 using just 5% of samples, while Rieck 
achieved 0.0 6 6 using the full training set. Similarly, the proposed 
approach needed just 20% of samples to achieve the same FPR 
0.081 as Rieck on all samples. 
Fig. 2 a and b also shows that while false negative rates al- 
most do not change with respect to the size of the training set 
(especially for the proposed approach), the false positive rates de- 
crease dramatically. This suggests that learning behavior of legit- 
imate applications is more diﬃcult than that of malware, which 
can be caused by the fact that the behavior of malware is more 
uniform than that of legitimate applications. This corroborates the 
motivation of this work, that even though malware authors try to 
Table 6 
Classiﬁcation of malware samples using various 
standard classiﬁers trained on proposed MIL 
representation. 
Estimated on testing set 
TPR FPR ACC 
Random Forest 0.954 0.067 0.943 
Linear SVM 0.952 0.063 0.944 
MLP 0.951 0.074 0.938 
randomize, they tend to randomize with same sort of regularity, 
which leads to uniformity. 
4.3.3. Robustness of MIL-based representation 
To evaluate the robustness of the proposed MIL model, we 
trained two other standard classiﬁers, linear SVM and multi- 
layered perceptron, on the same representation used for train- 
ing random forest, with parameters of the classiﬁers optimized 
the same way as the parameters of the random forest. The 
selection of these two base learners was based on the work 
of Fernández-Delgado, Cernadas, Barro, Amorim, and Amorim 
Fernández-Delgado (2014) where these classiﬁers provided the 
best results across multitude of different classiﬁcation tasks. 
The values of TRP, FPR and ACC estimated on testing set are 
summarized in Table 6 . The minor differences between perfor- 
mance of individual base learners indicate that the proposed MIL 
model is robust and provides consistent results with different 
types of classiﬁers. 
4.4. Detection limits 
The experimental results hint at where are the limits of classi- 
fying binaries executed in sandbox. When a binary (or all binaries 
of some malware family) does not perform any actions changing 
the data used by the proposed or other methods (ﬁles, mutexes, 
network communication, registry keys) it clearly evades detection. 
An example of such malware is bitcoin miner that resides only in 
memory without any additional footprint (no operations with ﬁles, 
no operations with registry keys, no mutexes, very limited network 
communication). Such malware has to be carefully crafted to avoid 
any interaction with system resources (statically compiled to carry 
all libraries in the executable, limited network communication, no 
mutexes ensuring that only single instance is running on the same 
machine, no persistency after reboot, etc.). Fortunately, at the time 
of writing this work, this is not an easy task and the majority of 
malware authors choose to interact with system resources rather 
than sacriﬁce functionality. 
Another limitation is the fact that a growing number of mal- 
ware families are equipped with advanced anti-VM and anti- 
sandbox features and/or are targeted to speciﬁc environments 
(Stuxnet ( Falliere, Murchu, & Chien, 2011 )). Such malware families 
do not reveal their true purpose during sandboxing or mimic less 
severe types of malware (adware, PUA, 7 etc.). This fact is recog- 
nized by the community as the main factor hindering the perfor- 
mance of dynamic analysis as the whole. Addressing this issue is 
out of the scope of this paper. 
The last aspect we need to discuss is the false positive rate. The 
analysis of the results from Section 4 revealed that a large num- 
ber of false alarms is caused by applications that install themselves 
into system directories without user’s interaction and since their 
number is limited, the classiﬁer was unable to ﬁt this behavior. A 
solution is of course to improve the training data by including a 
7 Potentially unwanted application. 
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Fig. 3. Time (in minutes) required for clustering of system resources ( Clustering ), 
projecting training ( Preprocessing train ) and testing ( Preprocessing test ) data using 
estimated vocabulary, training the random forest classiﬁer ( Train classiﬁer ) and clas- 
siﬁcation of samples from test set ( Classiﬁcation test ) when the training data is lim- 
ited to 5%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 100% of original training dataset. 
larger number of such samples and thus achieve lower false posi- 
tive rate. 
4.5. Scalability and computational complexity 
The last aspect we will discuss is the scalability of the proposed 
solution and prior art. Since the proposed solution employs cluster- 
ing to project the raw input data into a feature space with a lower 
dimension, a large portion of the training time is spent in the clus- 
tering phase. However, the preprocessing of the dataset used in 
above experiments was much faster ( ∼ 18 min ) than the highly 
optimized pre-computation of the full kernel matrix required by 
Rieck ( ∼ 7 h ). 8 This is caused by the fact that the time required 
by Rieck for preprocessing grows quadratically with the number 
of training samples in contrast to the proposed solution with lin- 
ear complexity (up to an additive constant, see Section 3.5 ) which 
can be seen in Fig. 3 . It summarizes time required for preprocess- 
ing of the data with different amount of samples used for training 
(5%, 10%, 20%, 50% and 100%). Note that the proposed approach 
can be easily parallelized or distributed since in every iteration the 
nearest neighbor search depends only on a limited set of current 
cluster prototypes C ′ and thus further improve the scalability of 
the MIL-based solution. Regarding the memory requirements of the 
proposed approach, the main memory requirements arise from the 
amount of data used for training. As soon as the representation is 
built, the preprocessing of testing samples can be performed on- 
line with minimal memory requirements. 
Another beneﬁt of the proposed solution is tied to the repre- 
sentation itself. Since the clustering is performed only on training 
samples, in order to classify unknown samples we need to store 
only the cluster prototypes determined during training. For the 
whole training dataset used in this paper, which contains over 7 
million unique resource names projected into ∼10, 0 0 0 features, 
only 10 0,0 0 0 instances need to be stored. In contrast, the kernel- 
ized SVM classiﬁer used by Rieck et al. requires to store all training 
samples (over 120,0 0 0 samples in the data discussed in Section 4 ) 
with all actions (on average 20 0 0 actions per sample) in order to 
make prediction on unknown samples. 
In contrast to both the proposed solution and Rieck, AMAL does 
not need any preprocessing since the features can be extracted 
8 The processing times were estimated on 32-core machine with 250GB RAM 
(RAM was utilized from ˜40%) running GNU Linux with the code implemented in 
Java 8 (Oracle JDK). 
per sample. However, the complexity arises from the design of the 
training process. Authors in Mohaisen et al. (2015) argue that the 
dynamic selection of both optimal algorithm and its parameters 
provides optimal results, but this design makes the training pro- 
cess computationally expensive since every training of the meta- 
learner requires to evaluate all possible combinations of parame- 
ters for all its classiﬁers. Another aspect is the selection of classi- 
ﬁers itself. Authors propose to use an array of classiﬁers such as 
kernelized SVM, linear regression, decision trees, perceptron, etc. 
However, the complexity of some classiﬁers (e.g. kernelized SVM) 
prevents any large-scale training. Moreover, according to the eval- 
uation the AMAL’s detection capabilities are not suﬃcient for real- 
world deployment since both FPR and FNR are nearly 20%, which 
is clearly insuﬃcient. 
5. Conclusion 
Using sandboxing and dynamic analysis for malware classiﬁca- 
tion is a popular approach. This paper has proposed a novel model 
of malware behavior observed through its interactions with the op- 
erating system and network resources (operations with ﬁles, mu- 
texes, registry keys, operations with network servers or error mes- 
sages provided by the operating system) based on multiple in- 
stance learning. The proposed model combines similarities specif- 
ically designed for different types of system resources with an ef- 
ﬁcient clustering of resource names to build a vocabulary used to 
project malware samples into a low-dimensional space suitable for 
classiﬁers such as random forest. The approach has been shown 
to effectively reduce the impact of randomization commonly em- 
ployed by malware authors to avoid detection. 
The proposed solution was extensively compared to related 
state of the art on a large corpus of binaries where it demonstrated 
signiﬁcant increase in precision of malware detection as it was 
able to detect more malware (95.4% correctly detected malware 
vs. 93.4% and 79.5%) with lower number of false alarms (6.7% of 
false alarms vs. 8.1% and 10.8%). Moreover, the analysis of process- 
ing times shown that the proposed approach required only fraction 
of processing time compared to the state of the art methods and 
thus it is better suited for large datasets. 
The analysis of classiﬁcation performance and scalability shown 
that the proposed approach is well-suited for deployment any- 
where where the sandboxing is currently deployed (from near- 
real-time to post-mortem analysis) as the processing time required 
for modeling and classiﬁcation of malware samples is insigniﬁcant 
compared to the time required for instrumentation of the binaries. 
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Appendix A. Appendix 
A1. Frobenius product and Frobenius norm 
For two matrices A ∈ R n ×m and B ∈ R n ×m we deﬁne Frobenius 
product 〈 · , · 〉 F and Frobenius norm ‖ · ‖ F as follows 
〈 A, B 〉 F = 
n ∑ 
i =1 
m ∑ 
j=1 
A i j · B i j 
‖ A ‖ F = 
√ 〈 A, A 〉 F = 
√ 
n ∑ 
i =1 
m ∑ 
j=1 
A 2 
i j 
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ABSTRACT
This paper considers the research goal of dependable steganalysis: where false positives occur once in a million or
less, and this rate is known with high precision. Despite its importance for real-world application, there has been
almost no study of steganalysis which produces very low false positives. We test existing and novel classifiers for
their low false-positive performance, using millions of images from Flickr. Experiments on such a scale require
considerable engineering. Standard steganalysis classifiers do not perform well in a low false-positive regime, and
we make new proposals to penalise false positives more than false negatives.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers the research goal of dependable steganalysis. By this we mean steganalysis that could
potentially be suitable for forensic analysis, which requires two properties:
(a) The false positive rate of the detector should be known with high precision.
(b) The false positive rate of the detector should be very low (10−6, or even 10−9).
The aim is to move steganalysis more towards real-world applications.1 Note that we focus on false positive
rates because false negative rates can only be defined when there is a simple alternative hypothesis (for example
that a steganographer uses a known embedding algorithm with a known length of payload, or payload with
exactly known distribution) which is not likely to fit real-world scenarios. Furthermore, in a real world where
true positives are very scarce, the false positives dominate the failure cases.
Both aims are challenging. (a) is difficult because steganalysis is highly dependent on context: the cover
source,2 scene content, and potentially unknown other factors all influence accuracy. There has been some
research aimed in this direction3 but empirical evidence suggests that false alarm rates are not robust in practice.
(b) has been relatively little studied: practically every piece of steganalysis literature focuses on error rates under
equal priors, or area under an ROC curve, metrics little affected by low false positive performance. One difficulty
with (b) is that empirical tests of very low false alarm rates are simply impossible unless the evidence base is
enormous.
This paper is an initial move towards (b). Using standard steganalysis features, we modify classifiers to
optimize low false positive rates, and provide a very large real-world evidence base (millions of images) to
evaluate the results. To do so, we examine the low false-positive region of the ROC directly, and also use a new
metric.
In the following subsections we discuss the benchmarking metrics for steganalysis and establish notation.
In Sect. 2 we discuss literature on classification that prioritizes one class over another. We propose new linear
classifiers in Sect. 3, and adapt ensemble classification to the low false-positive regime in Sect. 4. We measure
the performance of the new classifiers, single and in ensembles, in Sect. 5, and draw conclusions in Sect. 6.
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1.1 Benchmarks for steganalysis
Early steganalysis literature struggled to reduce the performance envelope of a detector (false positive and false
negative rates as the payload size varies) to simple benchmarks. See Ref. 4 for a survey, which includes some of
the popular options from the literature at the time, and a more recent discussion in Ref. 5. For at least the last
five years, however, by far the most popular benchmark is the minimal misclassification rate under equal priors
(assuming that the payload size is fixed). This can be defined by
PE =
1
2 min(PFP + PFN)
where PFP and PFN represent the false positive and false negative rate and the minimum ranges over the ROC
curve. If, in application, the detector expects to see equal numbers of true positive and negative classes, and
the costs of misclassification are symmetrical, then this is indeed the threshold that should be chosen and PE
represents the error rate of such a detector.
The PE benchmark is useful for demonstrating advances in steganalysis feature design or classification, but
as a measure of practical performance it seems rather far from reality. In almost any realistic problem domain,
the vast majority of images transmitted will be covers, because most transmissions are not covert. Even if each
false positive result costs the detector the same as a false negative (which itself is a dubious assumption), that
does not imply an equal weighting between PFP and PFN. When positives are observed rarely, false negatives
have fewer opportunities to happen, compared with false positives.
There is no perfect benchmark, and every problem application will have a slightly different preference for
the classifier’s performance envelope. However, dependable steganalysis requires low false positive rates, and in
practice the cost of a false negative is likely to be relatively low (an enemy steganographer will probably act
more than once). So we propose a metric which we call FP-50, the false positive rate when the false negative
rate is 50%. This benchmark is not new, and indeed it was advocated in Ref. 4, but it has not been used much
in steganalysis before now.
We also need to make more clear separation of training and testing sets. Following the gold standard of
machine learning, we will use three sets of data: training data to learn a classifier, validation data to optimize
hyperparameters and thresholds, and testing data to measure a final single (PFP, PFN) pair. Training and
validation sets are selected repeatedly from the same pool, but testing is completely disjoint. If detection
thresholds were set using results from the testing data (which is typical for the steganalysis literature, when
drawing a ROC curve) this would be considered a form of cheating. We will still draw ROC curves, using a
semi-log plot to display the low false-positive region directly, but they will be from the validation set. Our true
benchmark is the final false positive/negative rate on the never-before-seen testing set.
1.2 Notation
We use the following notation throughout the paper. P c (respectively, P s) denotes the probability distribution
of all cover images (respectively, stego images, with an implicit embedding method and payload or payload
distribution). Ic (Is) is a finite set of cover (stego) images, typically for training a classifier. {xi}i∈I represents
the matrix of features extracted from images in set I, arranged in rows. The domain of the features is X . µc
and Cc (µs and Cs) denote the empirical mean and covariance of features from Ic (Is).
Throughout, λ will be an optional regularisation parameter (in the experimental results we will always set it
to zero). I[x] denotes the indicator function which is equal to 1 when x is true, 0 otherwise.
2. RELATED WORK
Any classification algorithm on continuous data can be adapted to favour false positives over false negatives, by
moving a decision boundary. This is the traditional way to trace the receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve, but it has no guarantee of optimality.
The proper foundation is classification with imbalanced costs,6 which despite its importance has not been
studied in steganalysis. Most practical work in the machine learning literature uses a Bayesian framework, with
known costs of false positives and false negatives, together with prior probabilities of encountering positive and
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negative cases in the data. An example of an algorithm for class-imbalanced problems is the cost-sensitive (or
weighted) support vector machine (SVM), optimizing the following cost function
argmin
ρ,w
λ
2
‖w‖22 +
η
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
max{0, wTxi − ρ}+ 1− η|Is|
∑
i∈Is
max{0, ρ− wTxi}, (1)
where λ is the regularization parameter (here using L2 regularization, though other options are possible) and η
balances the costs of misclassification of cover and stego samples. ρ is the margin hyperparameter.
Another option is to turn traditional logistic regression into a maximum a posteriori problem with a prior,
optimizing
argmin
ρ,w
λ
2
‖w‖22 +
η
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
log
(
1 + exp
(
wTxi − ρ
))
+
1− η
|Is|
∑
i∈Is
log
(
1 + exp
(
ρ− wTxi
))
. (2)
In both cases we have an additional hyperparameter η, balancing the cost of false positives and negatives on
the training set. It is difficult to justify a correct value of η unless the problem domain is very well-understood
(if there is a known cost of error on each class, which is plausible, as well as a known proportion of each class
that will be encountered in the wild, which is not), so it might be optimized using cross-validation along with
the other hyperparameters. Thus it can only indirectly target a benchmark such as FP-50.
In fact, miniziming the FP-50 benchmark corresponds to a different problem: Neyman-Pearson classification
aims to minimize the false negative rate such that the false positive rate is below some threshold. This is more
applicable in security scenarios, as the number of false positives that the user is willing to tolerate can be usually
determined. Surprisingly, few works in machine learning literature deal with Neyman-Pearson classification7,8
and to the best of our knowledge there is no algorithm directly optimizing this error. This is usually swept
under the carpet by claiming that the same classifier can be obtained with an appropriate cost, such as η above.
This approach, where η and λ are optimized on training data to minimize FP-50, is used in experiments in
Subsection 5.2.
3. PROPOSALS FOR LINEAR CLASSIFIERS
In this work, we will try to target the FP-50 benchmark more directly. We will first present methods for
single linear classifiers, and move to ensembles of linear classifiers (in a way that also targets Neyman-Pearson
classification) in the following section.
We present two approaches to this problem: one minimizing upper bounds on the FP-50 benchmark, the
other using convex surrogates for it. It turns out that these approaches are, in some sense, equivalent.
3.1 Probabilistic approach
Consider the FP-50 benchmark. The optimal classifier minimizing it is
argmin
f∈F
Ex∼P c
[
I
[
f(x) > median {f(x)|x ∼ P s}]], (3)
where F is the set of all possible classifiers∗ of the form X 7→ R. Optimizing (3) is impractical, since a) P c and
P s are unknown, and b) median is not a differentiable function so the optimisation is NP-complete. We tackle
these problems by using finite sets of training samples instead of the distributions, and replacing median with
mean.
For further simplicity, we restrict F to be the set of linear classifiers. Due to the well-known kernel trick,9
the linear classifiers below could be adapted to non-linear circumstances, but instead we will follow the present
state-of-art in steganalysis by regaining nonlinearity via an ensemble of linear classifiers.
∗F is called the hypothesis space in the jargon of machine learning literature.
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Incorporating the above into (3), the problem becomes
argmin
w∈Rd
Ex∼P c
[
I
[
wTx > wTµs
]]
= argmin
w∈Rd
Px∼P c
[
wTx > wTµs
]
, (4)
where µs denotes the mean of stego features. By replacing median with mean, we are assuming that about
50% of stego features projected on w lie beyond their mean, which should be true for moderately symmetrical
distributions. Reminiscent of Vapnik’s technique,10 we use probabilitic inequalities to find upper bounds for (4),
which we can optimize efficiently. Different optimization problems arise from different inequalities.
Quadratic Chebyschev Minimizer. Applying the standard Chebychev inequality† to (4), we solve
argmin
w∈Rd
wTCcw
((µs − µc)Tw)2
. (5)
This problem has a close relationship with the Fisher linear discriminant (FLD): the only difference is that it
disregards the shape (covariance) of the stego distribution, which follows because we target the mean of the stego
distribution. It has an analytic solution which, it can be shown, corresponds to finding a single unregularized
projection by the calibrated least squares (CLS) method that we proposed in Ref. 5. (We also tested other
polynomial versions of Chebyschev’s inequality, with no success.)
Exponential Chebyschev Minimizer. Applying the exponential version of Chebychev’s inequality, also
known as the MGF bound‡ to (4), we solve
argmin
w∈Rd
∑
i∈Ic
et(xi−µs)
Tw. (6)
By varying the scalar t, this balances inequalities based on all moments of the cover distribution. In optimization
it is superfluous, since it can be absorbed by w. Equation (6) does not have an analytic solution, but the objective
function is strongly convex and fast-converging numerical optimizers can be used.
3.2 Machine learning approach
Applying Chebyschev’s inequalities can be alternatively viewed as approximating the ideal cost function assigning
1 to cover values projected beyond the stego mean, and zero otherwise. Machine learning algorithms use several
surrogates of this function to make the problem (4) convex and solvable in polynomial time. Popular convex
surrogates for I[y] include: hinge, max{0, 1− y}; truncated square, max{0, 1− y}2; square, (1− y)2; exponential,
e−y; logistic, log(1 + e−y). They are depicted in Figure 1.
For some of these, including I[·] itself, hinge, and truncated square, there may be an infinite number of solutions
to optimizing (4). This is typically solved by using regularization (usually Tikhonov), which corresponds to a
preference for simple solutions. Below, optimization problems with different loss functions are shown and their
properties discussed. All formulations include L2 regularization, controlled by a hyperparameter λ, but in our
experiments we will set λ = 0 to turn off regularization. L2 regularization was chosen as it has a smooth
derivative, which is favourable for optimization; L1 regularization promoting sparse solutions is also possible,
but the optimization would be more difficult and it will require the use of special solvers.
Hinge loss. This has been popularized by its use in SVMs, and it requires regularisation. Putting hinge loss
into (4) yields
argmin
w∈Rd
λ
2
‖w‖22 +
1
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
max
{
0, 1− wT(µs − xi)
}
,
which is reminscent of the problem solved in one-class SVM.11,12 Although the same results can be probably
obtained by using weighted SVMs, the proposed formulation has one fewer hyperparameter and it directly
optimizes the FP-50 criterion.
†The following version: P[Y > ] ≤ E[(Y − µY )2]/(− µY )2, for  > µY .
‡The following version: P[Y > ] ≤ E[et(Y−)], for all t > 0.
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Figure 1: Convex surrogates for the 0-1 loss function.
Truncated square loss. This is also sometimes used with SVMs. Putting truncated squared loss into (4)
(again requiring regularization to avoid infinitely many solutions) yields
argmin
w∈Rd
λ
2
‖w‖22 +
1
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
max
{
0, 1− wT(µs − xi)
}2
.
The advantage of square loss over hinge loss is that it is smooth, which simplifies the optimization by allowing
particularly effective stochastic gradient methods.
Square loss. This is advantageous because the optimization has the analytic solution
argmin
w∈Rd
λ
2
‖w‖22 +
1
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
(
1− wT(µs − xi)
)2
= (C+ λI)−1(µs − µc), (7)
where where C denotes covariance matrix of cover samples centered at the mean of stego samples, C =
1
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic(µs − xi)(µs − xi)T.
Note that this is almost identical to the previously-described CLS method (5), if λ = 0, but with the samples
centered differently.
Exponential loss. Intuitively, an exponential penalty on misclassified covers is aligned with our goal of re-
ducing false positives to very low rates. Exponential loss is used in Adaboost,13 and it does not neccesarily
require regularization, although this can be added to force the classifier toward simpler or sparser solutions.
Optimization problem (4) with an exponential loss surrogate becomes
argmin
w∈Rd
λ
2
‖w‖22 +
1
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
e−w
T(µs−xi). (8)
Turning off the regularization, we have recovered the Exponential Chebyshev Minimizer (6).
Logistic loss. This is used in logistic regression, which can provide a probability estimate of class membership
(more than just a binary classification) under the right conditions. The optimization becomes
argmin
w∈Rd
λ
2
‖w‖22 +
1
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
log
(
1 + e−w
T(µs−xi)
)
. (9)
Appendix 10 - Ker, A. D. and Pevny´, T. : Towards Dependable Steganalysis [45]
155
Similarly to exponential, logistic loss does not necessarily require regularization. Its shape is similar to that of
hinge loss, but it has the considerable advantges of being Lipschitz, strongly convex, and infinitely many times
differentiable. These are favorable properties for optimization, particularly online optimization.
4. PROPOSALS FOR ENSEMBLE CLASSIFIERS
The classifier used in state-of-the-art steganalysis is an ensemble of FLDs. It has come to dominate the literature
because of its simplicity, speed of training, and results with rich models.14 Our linear classifiers based on convex
surrogates to (4) can also be used in an ensemble, but the ensemble parameters must be adapted to target the
low false-positive regime.
The ensembles used in Ref. 15 consist of a set of base learners diversified by random subspace sampling, which
means that each base learner classifier operates on a randomly selected subspace of the original feature space.
The subspace sampling makes the training faster, as the complexity of training linear classifiers depends super-
linearly (in the case of FLD cubically) on the dimension of the input space. Another side-effect of subspace
sampling, to our knowledge not discussed so far in the literature, is that the size of the subspace acts as a
regularization parameter controlling the complexity of individual classifiers within the ensemble and preventing
over-fitting. Naturally, smaller subspace dimensions make individual classifiers less over-fitted.
4.1 Fusing classifiers to optimize low false-positives
We stick broadly to the ensemble framework used in Ref. 15 – binary classifiers voting with equal weight – but
adjust various thresholds used in it.
To formalize the problem, we assume the ensemble consists of the set of classifiers
{
fi|fi : Rd 7→ R
}l
i=1
. The
output of the ensemble is equal to
F (x) = sign
[
1
l
l∑
i=1
I
[
fi(x) > ti
]− te],
where {ti}li=1 are thresholds for the individual classifiers and te is the threshold of the ensemble, the number
of positive votes required for a positive classification. Determination of these is part of the training, because
F : Rd 7→ {−1,+1}.
Kodovsky15 optimizes thresholds ti, separately for each classifier, to optimize PE on the training set, and fixes
te = 0.5. The hyperparameters of the ensemble – the number l of base learners and the subsampling dimension
dsub – are optimized using cross-validation targeting the overall PE metric.
When we switch to the FP-50 criterion, we are once again unable to optimize {ti}li=1 and te collectively,
because the problem is l + 1 dimensional and the I[·] function is discontinuous. We propose to parameterize
all classifier thresholds ti by a fixed quantile of the distribution fi(x), x ∼ P c. Formally, each threshold ti is
determined by a hyperparameter τ ∈ [0, 1] by
tj(τ) = argmax
t
{
1
|Ic|
∑
i∈Ic
I[fj(xi) > t] ≤ τ
}
.
This approach is connected with Neyman-Pearson classification, since as |Ic| → ∞, 1 − τ tends to the false
positive rate of each individual classifier. With this simplification, optimization is only with respect to τ and te.
In our experiments the parameters τ and te are found by direct optimization of te for each value of τ ∈{
10i|i ∈ {−6,−5.9, . . . ,−0.1, 0}}, where the objective is the FP-50 metric on the validation set. We also tested
the original ensemble that optimizes PE for each base learner.
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5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Any experiments that want to explore the low-false positive performance of a detector need a huge corpus: to
measure robustly a false positive rate of 10−6 would need a realistic minimum of about 5 × 106 examples from
the negative class (preferably more). In our case this means millions of cover images. Furthermore, the data set
needs to be, in some sense, representative in its diversity and difficulty of classification. Working with data of
such size needs careful engineering.
In Subsection 5.1 we will explain the database that we collected, and our methodology for testing it. In
Subsections 5.2 and 5.3 we will report the results of single linear classifiers and ensembles, respectively. A few
further experiments are described in Subsection 5.4.
5.1 Experimental setup
In June 2014, Yahoo! Inc. made available to researchers a data set of 100 million creative-commons licensed
images (including a few videos) from the popular photo-sharing website Flickr.16 We were granted access to
this database, and from it collected a set of images useful for testing low false-positive steganalysis. We began
by selecting only compressed colour images where the full-size original uploaded image (as opposed to Flickr-
downsampled versions) was available, and where the camera model was included in the EXIF data. Then we
selected only images which were JPEGs compressed with quality factor 80 (steganalysis of images with varying
quality factors is a difficult and largely unsolved problem; quality factor 80 was chosen as the most common
choice that did not have very large file sizes). The images were partitioned depending on which actor they belong
to, where an actor is defined to be a username and camera model combination. Thus each actor’s images were
uploaded by the same user and taken with the same camera model. Finally, we discarded actors with fewer than
10 images.
This yielded a total of 4 511 523 images from 47 807 actors, a total of approximately 9 128 115 megapixels of
data taking 1307 GB on disk. The actor with the most images had 16 886, but only about 1% of the actors had
more than 1000 images; the median number of images per actor was 30.
We partitioned this image set into two. The training and validation subset consists of 10% of the actors
(in fact every 10th actor, ranking actors by size, so that a representative subset was taken): this totals 449 395
images from 4781 actors. The rest is the fixed testing subset which contains 4 062 128 images.
In our experiments we are assuming that the ground truth of these images is that they are covers, not used for
steganography. There is no reasonable way to verify this assumption, but we can take comfort from the fact that,
if it is wrong, only a small proportion of the database would be affected. Furthermore, if some of our assumed-
cover images are actually stego images, our empirical estimates of false positive rates will be conservative. There
is also an interesting connection with our presentation in Subsection 3.1: if by any chance some assumed-cover
images are actually stego objects, Chebyshev minimizers should be be unaffected.17
The steganographic algorithm used in all experiments was a simulator of nsF5 embedding with matrix embed-
ding turned off, which means that the number of embedding changes is equal to half the payload. The algorithm
was chosen because of its historic importance in steganography, because we know that it can be detected by
current steganalysis features, and its speed: essential for the number of images processed here. Since our goal
was to measure very reliable classifiers, the payload size simulated was 0.5 bits per nonzero coefficient (bpnc).
Our chosen steganographic features were the 22510-dimensional JPEG rich model (JRM).14 The reference im-
plementation takes approximately 15 seconds per megapixel to extract, on our main computing machine, but we
re-implemented a highly optimized version in C which takes around 0.5 seconds per megapixel. Our benchmarks
are taken from a workstation with two 6-core Xeon processors (Westmere-EP series) running at 3.47Ghz, with
192GB of memory.
We extracted JRM features for every cover image, for every stego image in the training and validation subset,
and for 10% of the stego images of each actor in the testing subset (thus 407 417 stego images in the testing
subset; the entire testing set is approximately 4.5 million images). It is not necessary, for our benchmarks, to
have millions of stego images in the testing set, because we do not need to examine very low false negative rates.
Extracting these features from all 5.4 million cover and stego images took around 120 core-days, spread across
a small cluster.
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FLD SVM Square loss Exponential loss Logistic loss
FP-50, training set 1.11 · 10−4 2.18 · 10−5 1.45 · 10−5 0 0
FP-50, validation set 2.52 · 10−4 1.99 · 10−4 5.61 · 10−4 9.87 · 10−4 1.02 · 10−3
Training time 4.8 · 102s 3.3 · 104s 2.4 · 102s 5.5 · 104s 1.0 · 105s
Table 1: Training and validation false positive rates (when false negative is 50%) of classifiers trained on the
whole input space. The last line shows the time needed to train a single classifier on 2× 40 000 samples.
The cover and stego JRM features, in double precision, require 900GB of disk space. The training and
validation features alone are 150GB, which is barely possible to load into memory in one go even on our largest
server, and in fact we will only train on up to 2× 40 000 samples in the experiments for this paper.
The advantage of this data set is that it is from the real world, and it contains all the difficulties that a stegan-
alyst should expect in pratice. In particular, there is cover source mismatch (note that the training/validation
set and testing set are from disjoint actors, and when we split the training and validation set apart we will again
segregate actors) and a variety of image sizes. Some of the images have been resampled prior to uploading, and
it seems likely that image processing operations will have been applied to many of them.
5.2 Single linear classifiers
We begin by training linear classifiers proposed in Subsection 3.2 on the entire 22510-dimensional feature space.
We tested standard FLD, linear weighted SVM optimizing (1), and the following convex surrogates for direct
optimization of FP-50: square loss (7), almost equivalent to the QCM method (5); exponential loss (8), equivalent
to the ECM method (6); and logistic loss (9). We did not test truncated square or hinge loss, after some initial
experiments not reported here, because a) their non-smooth nature makes their numerical optimization on large
data expensive, and b) they demand regularization, so λ would need to be optimised by an expensive grid-search.
The methodology was as follows. The training and validation subset, consisting of images from 4781 actors,
was partitioned into two subsets of actors so that the number of images in each was approximately half the total
(approximately 225 000 cover images in each half, plus the same number of corresponding stego images); this
breaks the training and validation subsets apart. From the training subset, 2 × 40 000 images (each cover with
its corresponding stego) were selected using maximum diversity: the fewest images per actor necessary to reach
this total. The rest of the training images were discarded. The classifier was trained on the training set, either
by standard FLD or weighted SVM methods,6,18 by solving (7), or by numerical optimization of (8) or (9) using
an iterative Newton method (we used the implementation at Ref. 19). The size of the used part of the training
set was limited by feasibility of this optimization over such large dimension. The trained classifier was tested
on all approximately 2 × 225 000 images in the validation set. Each experiment was repeated ten times using
different splits into training and validation.
Out of these classifiers, only weighted SVM has hyperparameters controlling the solution: the regularization
parameter λ and the class imbalance η. These were optimized by minimizing FP-50 on a full grid λ ∈ {2 ·10i|i ∈
{−3,−4,−5}} and η ∈ {10i|i ∈ {−5,−4,−3,−2}}. For every combination, the weighted SVM was trained on a
randomly selected 75% of training samples and the FP-50 criteria was estimated from the remaining 25%. This
was repeated five times with independent splits. The hyperparameters with the least FP-50 were used to train
the final SVM on all training data.
We then measured the FP-50 metric on both the training and validation set, averaging error rates over the
ten iterations. The results are displayed in Table 1. The results show that the loss functions which include an
exponential penalty for false positives – exponential and logistic loss – have zero false positives on the training
data (out of 40 000 cover samples and 10 repetitions), when the false negative rate is 50%, but also expose
their weakness: they overfit the training data, and their accuracy on the validation set is slightly worse than
the other loss functions. It is unsurprising that an exponential penality encourages overfitting, and it means
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that we need some kind of regularisation, which we will supply indirectly in the following subsection with a
dimension-subsampling ensemble.
At first sight, Table 1 suggests that the clear winner should be the weighted SVM. But its optimization
involves tuning hyperparameters, which would be prohibitively expensive in an ensemble. Moreover, we see the
zero false positive results, observed for exponential and logistic loss on the training set, as a positive sign: less a
problem of overfitting than a problem of insufficiently diverse training data. Also the lack of hyperparameters
simplifies their use.
The last line in Table 1 shows the time to train each classifier (for SVM this includes the search for hyperpa-
rameters). Unsurprisingly, training classifiers with algebraic solutions – FLD and square loss – is two orders of
magnitude faster than a linear SVM, and two to three orders of magnitude faster than the methods which require
numerical optimization. Nonetheless, such time is tractable on a fast machine. Furthermore, the time to apply
the trained classifier is the same for all methods, since each classifier simply produces a projection direction.
5.3 Ensembles of classifiers
We now plug the classifiers into the ensemble framework descibed in Sect. 4, although we now exclude the SVM
base learner as being too slow for ensemble settings.
Our first experiments, similarly to the last section, use only the training and validation sets. As before, we
take 2 × 40 000 training images. This time we train a fixed number (300) of FLD base learners, each using
a randomly-selected subset of dsub ∈ {100, 250, 500, 1000} features, and optimize the individual base learner
thresholds ti and the ensemble voting threshold te according to the method of Subsection 4.1 by measuring their
FP-50 benchmark on all approximately 2× 225 000 images in the validation set. We computed the ROC curves
across the data in the validation set for the optimal parameter combination.
We repeated with 10 different splits of training and validation actors, and then the entire procedure (with
the same training data and random subspaces) with base learners optimizing square loss, exponential loss, and
logistic loss. For each false positive rate on the validation data we averaged the corresponding false negative
rate over the ten iterations of the experiment. The ROC curves are displayed in Figure 2, where we have used
a logarithmic scale on the x-axis to highlight the low false-positive region. They show that the loss functions
with an exponential penalty – exponential and logistic loss – carry good true positive detection power into the
low false-positive regime much better than the quadratic penalties in FLD and the square loss surrogate (their
ROC curves have steeper slope on the onset). Observe that this advantage is balanced by decreased detection
accuracy on higher false positive rates, compared with the traditional ensemble of FLDs, but that aligns with
our aim.
Another reason why the square loss surrogate and FLD classifier may be inferior is because their losses are
symmetric (see Figure 1). This means that they penalize correctly classified samples, or more precisely that the
optimal projection direction w is still influenced by outliers even if they already lie on the correctly-classified
side of the boundary. We can see that this is so for FLDs, because Fisher’s presentation models the two classes
as Gaussian, and outliers in the correctly-classified direction influence the empirical covariance matrix in such a
way that the classifier expects also outliers in the incorrectly-classified direction, whether they exist or not.
The exponential and logistic loss surrogates work best if the dimension of the random subspace in the
ensemble is kept low: we believe dsub acts as an indirect regularizer, limiting the complexity of the base learners
and reducing their propensity to overfit, and overcoming a key weakness in their use as a full-space classifier.
Perhaps this, rather than the potential for nonlinear classification, explains why the ensemble of FLDs has been
so successful with large-dimensional “rich features”; in any case, the advantage is even more evidence for classifiers
with exponential penalties.
Thanks to the reduced dimension, the exponential loss base learner is no longer orders-of-magnitude more
expensive to train than the FLD: in our experiments with dsub = 100, training the ensemble of 300 learners on
2 × 40 000 samples took 136 seconds with the FLD base learner and 286 for the exponential loss base learner.
Both cases required a further 190 seconds to optimize the thresholds.
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Figure 2: ROC curves, on the validation set, for ensembles of FLDs and other base learners. 300 weak classifiers
were trained in random dsub dimensions of the feature space. All classifiers were trained on 2× 40 000 samples.
Note the logarithmic scale of the x-axis.
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False positive rate False negative rate
FLD Exp. Loss FLD Exp. Loss
Optimizing PE 9.07 · 10−3 1.88 · 10−3 1.33 · 10−3 1.89 · 10−2
Optimizing FP-50 3.26 · 10−4 5.56 · 10−5 4.58 · 10−1 5.12 · 10−1
Table 2: Error rates on the testing set, after optimization of ensemble parameters on the training and validation
set.
Ideally we would optimize both the number of base learners (currently fixed at 300) and the subspace di-
mension. But the training is too slow to perform a grid search, so we postpone such an investigation for further
work.
Finally, we apply the trained and threshold-optimized ensembles (selecting dsub = 100) to the testing set
of 4 062 128 cover images and 407 417 stego images. The size of this set gives us confidence in measuring false
positive rates into the region of 10−6. We emphasise this procedure, which did not tune any hyperparameters
with respect to the testing set, is the gold standard for machine learning. We also tuned another ensemble, this
time optimizing the PE benchmark for each base learner and fixing te = 0.5, to compare with the prior art.
We display results, only for the FLD and exponential loss base learners, in Table 2. The classification
thresholds were set for 50% false negatives on the validation set, and achieved close to that on the testing set.
The traditional ensemble of FLDs, optimizing for PE, can only manage a false positive rate of approximately 1
in 110 (and a false negative rate much lower than our target of 50%). Using our new ensemble optimization of
thresholds for FP-50, the FLD ensemble reduces its false positive rate to approximately 1 in 3000 (and a false
negative rate close to 50%), but the same ensemble using exponential loss base learners (equivalent to ECM)
achieves a false positive rate of approximately 1 in 18 000. We can have high confidence in these false positive
rates because the testing set is representative of the real world, and very large.
5.4 How many training images is sufficient?
We were not able to train on the potential training set of 2 × 225 000 images because of the time and memory
requirements: our current numerical optimzation method requires calculations over all data points on each
iteration, and the matrix of features, in double precision, would require about 83GB of memory. (This does
suggest further research using online base learners.) We had to limit ourselves to a diverse selection of 40 000
image from the training data.
But do we actually need even 40 000 images? If the training images were not sufficiently diverse, training on
more images would not be reflected by the lower error rates. We note that this question, largely neglected in the
literature, was first raised in Ref. 20 and was also studied in Ref. 21. In experiments for Subsect. 5.3, we also
evaluated ensembles trained on two smaller sizes of training data: 2× 10 000 and 2× 20 000 samples, as well as
2× 40, 000. As before, the images were selected from the training subset to diversify amongst actors as much as
possible. We emphasize the validation set was unchanged in these experiments, as were the selection of random
subspaces for the base learners. The results appear in Table 3.
The most important observation is that FP-50 does not change much with the size of the training set. This
indicates that including more images from the same actors does not increase the diversity of the training set.
This also suggests that the cover mismatch phenomenon2 is at work, and some misclassifications are more likely
due to some actors having non-typical image sources, than than individual outlier images.
Notice that FP-50 of the ensemble of FLDs slightly increases as the size of the training set increases to
40 000, in contrast to the general mantra of machine learning that increasing the size of the training set should
not degrade performance. This seems likely to be due to the inherent loss function in FLDs, since we observed
the same phenomenon with the traditional FLD ensemble from Ref. 15, perhaps making them more prone to
outliers.
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dsub Training set FLD Square loss Exponential loss Logistic loss
10
0
2× 10 000 1.69 · 10−4 1.63 · 10−4 7.55 · 10−6 8.91 · 10−6
2× 20 000 1.69 · 10−4 1.63 · 10−4 7.55 · 10−6 8.91 · 10−6
2× 40 000 1.78 · 10−4 1.70 · 10−4 7.56 · 10−6 8.02 · 10−6
25
0
2× 10 000 1.72 · 10−4 2.43 · 10−4 4.57 · 10−5 4.61 · 10−5
2× 20 000 1.72 · 10−4 2.43 · 10−4 4.57 · 10−5 4.61 · 10−5
2× 40 000 1.80 · 10−4 2.12 · 10−4 4.40 · 10−5 4.49 · 10−5
50
0
2× 10 000 1.86 · 10−4 2.88 · 10−4 8.53 · 10−5 8.18 · 10−5
2× 20 000 1.86 · 10−4 2.88 · 10−4 8.53 · 10−5 8.18 · 10−5
2× 40 000 1.91 · 10−4 3.02 · 10−4 7.27 · 10−5 7.19 · 10−5
10
00
2× 10 000 2.45 · 10−4 3.10 · 10−4 1.51 · 10−4 1.51 · 10−4
2× 20 000 2.45 · 10−4 3.10 · 10−4 1.51 · 10−4 1.51 · 10−4
2× 40 000 2.50 · 10−4 3.14 · 10−4 1.45 · 10−4 1.43 · 10−4
Table 3: The FP-50 benchmark on the validation set. 300 weak classifiers were trained in random dsub dimensions
of the feature space, using 2× 10 000, 2× 20 000, or 2× 40 000 maximally-diverse samples from the training set.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Low probability of false alarm would be crucial for steganalyzers to be used in the real world. Yet there has been
no serious study of how to achieve it. We admit that such a study is not simple: to estimate detection accuracy
at a false positive rate of 10−6, the number of validation samples has to be considerably greater then 1 million.
Compare with contemporary practice, where the most frequently used data set (BOSSBase) has 10 000 images.
We gathered 4.5 million images from Flickr, which has the realistic challenges of a real-world database, but even
this would be insufficient if we wanted to examine false-positive rates below 10−6.
We have advocated measuring the reliability of steganalyzers for real world applications by the false positive
rate at 50% detection accuracy (FP-50 error) and proposed a family of classifiers optimizing it. Although our
experiments demonstrated the advantage of the proposed classifiers over the current state of the art, we believe
the questions and new directions revealed are more important still.
It appears that evaluating how a steganalyzer would perform in the real world is impossible if one possesses
only a few thousand images from a few sources (e.g. BOSSBase). It should be done on millions of images, and
it is unlikely that a database of such size can be acquired with a known ground truth. So it is timely to consider
the literature on learning from positive and unlabelled data, as we move towards public databases. We note that
the proposed family of classifiers is an embodiment of recently proposed methods for this problem.17
Our experiments also revealed that classifiers with symmetric loss functions, of which FLD is a popular exam-
ple, have the undesirable property of penalizing correctly classified samples. This may be the cause of increased
FP-50 error when the size of training data increases. Our experiments demonstrated that the FLD ensemble,
which currently dominates the steganalysis literature, may benefit from indirect regularization controlled by the
size of the random subspaces on which the base learners operate. This suggests a study comparing symmetric
and asymmetric loss functions and regularizations. Such a study needs many sources and a large database, and
to include cover source mismatch.
We conclude with a return to Section 1, and the definition of dependable steganalysis. Is it achievable? In this
study we used a non-adaptive method of steganography that is well known to be detectable (nsF5), a very high
payload (0.5 bits per nonzero coefficient), images typically much larger than the 512×512 in BOSSBase, and our
best detectors managed a false positive rate of about 1 in 18 000. Even accounting for progress in steganalysis
features and new classifiers optimizing the FP-50 criterion, a false positive rate of 1 in a million, or lower, seems
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out of reach. If a steganalyst wants to make fewer errors, it seems the only option is pooled steganalysis,22 where
evidence is aggregated from many images instead of one alone.
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This paper presents a novel technique of ﬁnding a convex combination of outputs of anomaly detectors 
maximizing the accuracy in τ -quantile of most anomalous samples. Such an approach better reﬂects the 
needs in the security domain in which subsequent analysis of alarms is costly and can be done only 
on a small number of alarms. An extensive experimental evaluation and comparison to prior art on real 
network data using sets of anomaly detectors of two existing intrusion detection systems shows that the 
proposed method not only outperforms prior art, it is also more robust to noise in training data labels, 
which is another important feature for deployment in practice. 
© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
Increasing numbers of attacks against computing infrastructure 
and the critical importance of the infrastructure for enterprises 
drives the need to deploy progressively more sophisticated defense 
solutions to protect network assets. An essential component of the 
defense are Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) [1] searching for evi- 
dence of ongoing malicious activities (network attacks) in network 
traﬃc crossing the defense perimeter. 
Many intrusion detection systems are implemented as ensem- 
bles of relatively simple, yet heterogeneous detectors [2,3] , where 
some of them can be specialized to particular types of intrusions, 
whereas others can be general anomaly detectors capable of de- 
tecting previously unseen attacks at the expense of higher false 
alarm rates. Such a setup has multiple advantages, including faster 
processing of the data stream, lower complexity of the detectors, 
and simpler inclusion of domain knowledge into the system. The 
main drawback is that combining outputs of individual detectors 
is a non-trivial problem. Although a vast prior art on the problem 
exists [4–6] , we believe that peculiarities of the security domain, 
namely a highly imbalanced ratio of non-alarm and alarm samples 
in the data, lack of accurately labeled datasets, and the need of 
extremely low false positive rates, call for a tailored solution. 
The rationale behind the above speciﬁcs is that from the user 
perspective each raised alarm needs to be thoroughly investigated, 
which is expensive and can be done only for a small number of 
them. Hence reporting high numbers of false positives renders any 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: magrill@cisco.com (M. Grill), tpevny@cisco.com (T. Pevný). 
intrusion detection system useless (recall that most of the samples 
are legitimate). Note that using a supervised method to learn the 
combination may bring the expense of lower generalization, but 
according to our experience completely unsupervised approaches 
rarely have false positive rate low enough to be usable in prac- 
tice. Moreover, anomaly detectors and their features are usually se- 
lected based on the experience of the designer, which is a kind of 
proxy for labels and surely not guaranteed to be complete. 
Obtaining labeled data in security domains and in network in- 
trusion detection especially can be diﬃcult, time consuming, and 
expensive. Besides, labeled data frequently contains errors in labels 
of different sorts, for example some alerts might be missed and la- 
beled as legitimate samples, or even worse, all samples of alerts of 
certain types might be missed and labeled as legitimate. 
The above concerns motivated the main goals and contributions 
of this paper, which are a method of ﬁnding a convex combina- 
tion of outputs of a ﬁxed set of anomaly detectors maximizing the 
number of true alarms in τ -fraction of most anomalous connec- 
tions (samples) 1 and an experimental study of the effect of dif- 
ferent types of label noise in the training data on the accuracy of 
combinations obtained by different methods to better understand 
their advantages and drawbacks. Conducted experiments revealed 
that the proposed method is not only better than the state of the 
art, but also more robust with respect to various kinds of noise in 
labels we can expect in intrusion detection domains. 
If the proposed method requires labeled data, one can ask why 
not use them to train a classiﬁer and sidestep the use of anomaly 
1 Since the experimental evaluation is performed with network intrusion detec- 
tion systems, the terms sample and connection are used interchangeably. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2016.05.021 
1389-1286/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
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detectors? The most important reason to favor anomaly detec- 
tors is that network traﬃc discussed in this paper is very non- 
stationary and anomaly detectors are good at coping with this as- 
pect, as they can constantly update their models (see [7–9] for a 
review). 
This paper is organized as follows: The next section for- 
mally deﬁnes the problem and presents the proposed solution. 
Section 3 reviews related work and algorithms that we evaluate 
in the experimental section. The experimental Section 4 compares 
the proposed solution with existing methods using sets of anomaly 
detectors from two different network intrusion detection systems 
operating on two different data sources. 
2. Proposed method 
Prior art in combining detectors and anomaly detectors in par- 
ticular is vast [4,10] , nevertheless we feel that security domains 
requires a tailored solution because of its prominent requirement 
of extremely low false positive rate. We assume that the network 
operator observers connections (samples) from an unknown distri- 
bution P o = πP a + (1 − π) P b with P a / P b being distributions of ma- 
licious/background samples and π ∈ [0, 1]. The network opera- 
tor uses set of m anomaly detectors on samples H m = { h k : X → 
[0 , 1] } m 
k =1 (w.l.o.g. it is assumed that zero means the sample is le- 
gitimate and one means the sample is malicious) and wishes to 
have a convex combination of anomaly detectors α = (α1 , . . . , αm ) 
that would maximize the number of alarms in top τ quantile of 
the distribution of the combined anomaly scores. For purposes of 
this paper it is safe to assume that each connection (sample) is 
described by m -dimensional vector (an output of m anomaly de- 
tectors), which implies that distributions P o , P a , and P b are deﬁned 
on the m -dimensional Euclidean space.The requirements on detec- 
tors having their image in the interval [0, 1] and learning a convex 
combination instead of a linear one are to improve interpretability 
of the results as discussed in [11] , but can be dropped. The same 
work also presents a general approach to scale the output of any 
anomaly detector to the interval [0, 1] reviewed in Appendix A . 
With respect to the above, networks operator’s goal can be 
written as 
arg min 
α∈ R m 
R (H α) = E x ∼P b 
[
1 (αT h (x ) ≥ q α,τ ) 
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
R fp (H α ) 
+ E x ∼P a 
[
1 (αT h (x ) < q α,τ ) 
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸ 
R fn (H α ) 
, (1) 
subject to 
H α(x ) = 
m ∑ 
k =1 
αk h k (x ) = αT h (x ) , 
1  α = 1 , 
αi ≥ 0 , ∀ i ∈ { 1 , . . . , m } , 
(2) 
where the ﬁrst term in (1) is the false alarm rate, the second term 
is the false negative rate, and ﬁnally q α, τ is a τ -quantile of ob- 
served distribution of ensemble’s output { αT h ( x )| x ∈ P o }. The min- 
imized term (1) captures the accuracy of a particular convex com- 
bination in top τ -quantile of its distribution, which is the goal. 
In theory it would be suﬃcient if (1) minimizes either only the 
false positive rate R fp or only the false negative rate R fn , because 
each of them together with constraints (2) implies minimization of 
the other. But including both terms increases the robustness with 
respect to noise on labels, since the error and its gradient are es- 
timated from larger number of samples implying their better esti- 
mates. This is demonstrated in Appendix B , where the combination 
of anomaly detectors was found by optimizing either only false 
positive rate or only false negative rate under constraints (2) . The 
experiments have conﬁrmed that optimizing the proposed (1) is 
indeed more robust to error in labels, which are almost inevitable 
in security domains. In the rest of this section we show, how to 
ﬁnd a good solution in practice using adaptation of the method of 
Boyd et al. [12] . 
First, the true loss function (1) cannot be used in practice, since 
the true probability distributions P a and P b are not known. There- 
fore the expectations are replaced by their empirical estimates cal- 
culated from some labeled data used for learning the weight vector 
α. Below the S = S a ∪ S b denotes the set of available samples with 
S b being the set of background (legitimate) samples and S a the set 
of malicious samples. The empirical estimate of (1) is therefore 
ˆ R (H α) = 1 |S b | 
∑ 
x ∈S b 
1 
[
αT h (x ) ≥ ˆ qα,τ
]
+ 1 |S a | 
∑ 
x ∈S a 
1 
[
αT h (x ) < ˆ qα,τ
]
, 
(3) 
where ˆ qα,τ is an empirical estimate of the true quantile q α, τ de- 
ﬁned as 
ˆ qα,τ = arg max 
ω 
1 
|S| 
∑ 
x ∈S 
[
1 (αT h (x ) ≤ ω) 
]
≤ τ. (4) 
Since the empirical loss function (3) is neither convex nor smooth, 
ﬁnding the optimal solution is an NP-complete problem. A usual 
approach is to replace indicator function 1 with a convex surro- 
gate, for example an exponential used in this work. 2 This substitu- 
tion leads to the following optimization problem 
arg min 
α
1 
|S b | 
∑ 
x ∈S b 
exp 
(
αT h (x ) − ˆ qα,τ
)
+ 1 |S a | 
∑ 
x ∈S a 
exp 
(
ˆ qα,τ − αT h (x ) 
)
(5) 
subject to 1  α = 1 , 
αi ≥ 0 , ∀ i ∈ { 1 , . . . , l} , 
ˆ qα,τ is a τ -quantile deﬁned in (4) . 
where the optimized term (further denoted as ˆ R exp (H α) ) is an up- 
per bound of the empirical loss function ˆ R (H α) deﬁned in Eq. (3) . 
Nevertheless the last problem is still hard to solve, as it is 
not convex. Boyd et al. [12] showed how to ﬁnd a good solu- 
tion in polynomial time using series of convex problems. How- 
ever his algorithm does not guarantee ﬁnding the global mini- 
mum, and the computational complexity prevents it from being 
used on problems with millions of samples. We therefore pro- 
pose to solve (5) by a simple gradient algorithm summarized in 
Algorithm 1 , which albeit not reaching the global minimum per- 
forms well, according to our experiments. In each step the current 
solution αk is updated by subtracting a small multiple of the gradi- 
ent of (5) , which is decreasing in each step to ensure convergence. 
The αk is then truncated to satisfy the constraints, and ﬁnally 
the estimate of the quantile ˆ qα,τ is updated. The algorithm may 
ﬁnd sub-optimal solutions but the experiments in Section 4 show 
that the solutions found are in most of the cases better than the 
ones of the state-of-the-art methods. Additionally, detailed discus- 
sion about the differences between the solution found by Boyd 
et al. and the one found by the proposed algorithm can be found 
in Appendix C . 
The combination of detectors found by the above algorithm is 
optimized with respect to the known malware, by which we under- 
stand the malware whose samples are present in the training set 
2 The chosen convex surrogate does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the solution 
and can be replaced by the reader’s favorite choice, e.g. logistic, hinge, truncated 
square, etc. 
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Algorithm 1: The algorithm used to solve the optimization 
problem (5) . 
Data : Set of labeled samples x 1 , . . . , x l ∈ S , 
set of anomaly detectors H m 
and δmin . 
Result : weights α ∈ R m 
Start with equal weights α1 = 1 /m ; 
repeat 
Set q H α (τ ) to be τ -quantile of the distribution of H αk ; 
Update the step size as γk = 1 √ k ; 
αk+1 = αk − γk ∂ ∂α ˆ R exp (H αk ) ; 
until | R (H αk ) − R (H αk−1 ) | < δmin ; 
and most of them are correctly labeled. We believe that it is very 
hard to draw any conclusions about the accuracy of the algorithm 
on malware that has never been observed. If the unknown mal- 
ware is similar to the known one (e.g. using similar components 
or having similar behavior), then it is likely that the above opti- 
mization will help. In order to get insight to this phenomenon on 
real data, the experimental section compares accuracy of several 
algorithms on training sets with errors on labels of different types. 
We believe this study will help to select the right algorithms for 
practice. 
3. Related work 
There are two classes of prior art relevant to this work. The ﬁrst 
are unsupervised methods combining outputs of anomaly detec- 
tion algorithms. The second are supervised methods maximizing 
accuracy or some other type of loss in top τ -quantile of outputs 
using labeled samples. Both are brieﬂy reviewed below (sorted 
from the least to the most important). 
3.1. Unsupervised methods 
The ﬁrst explicit use of ensembles in anomaly detection [6] em- 
ployed a feature bagging method to create a diverse set of anomaly 
detectors. Their output was fused either by summing anomaly 
scores of individual anomaly detectors for a given sample, which is 
equivalent to taking the mean , or by picking the k most anomalous 
samples from each detector ( breadth-ﬁrst strategy). In [3] authors 
have compared several static combination functions, namely mean, 
median, minimum, maximum , and mean of maximum and mean in 
network intrusion detection. According to their results, mean of 
maximum and mean [13] was the most effective. 
A necessary condition to combine heterogeneous anomaly de- 
tectors is similar range of their output. This problem is tackled 
in [11] by using estimated cumulative distribution functions of 
detectors’ output. The authors show that their approach outper- 
forms other normalization strategies including HeDES [14] , maxi- 
mum rank [6] or sigmoid mean [15] . The experimental part of this 
work uses an adaptation of [11] described in Appendix A . 
A hybrid solution proposed in [14] relies on artiﬁcial samples 
generated uniformly at random. First, several classiﬁers are trained 
to separate the artiﬁcial samples from the provided true ones, and 
then weights of classiﬁers in the combination function are deter- 
mined according to their accuracy on artiﬁcial samples. 
3.2. Supervised methods 
Algorithms learning the combination of classiﬁer outputs using 
labeled data do not differ much from general algorithms for su- 
pervised classiﬁcation. But as already mentioned, for security ap- 
plications the algorithms should be designed to handle large dis- 
proportions between numbers of samples in positive and negative 
classes, and achieve extremely low false positive rates. Such algo- 
rithms are also needed in information retrieval (although the re- 
quirement on low positive rates is not as strict), where most of 
the prior art comes from. 
One class of relevant algorithms maximizes accuracy of rank- 
ing in top τ -quantile, which can be viewed as prioritizing the ma- 
licious samples over the legitimate ones. These algorithms (opti- 
mizing for example Prec@k [16] or Normalized Discounted Cumu- 
lative Gain [17] ) frequently lead to non-convex optimization prob- 
lems that are diﬃcult to solve eﬃciently or lead to sub-optimal so- 
lutions [18] like ours. A notable exception is SVM- perf [19] method 
optimizing a convex upper bound on the number of errors among 
the top k items, but still the training is computationally intensive 
due to a large number of constraints of the quadratic program. 
Another class of relevant algorithms like RankBoost [20] max- 
imize area under ROC curve, which is equivalent to optimizing 
ranking. Since only top τ -quantile matters, Inﬁnite Push [21] and 
Top Push [22] concentrate on the higher-ranked negatives and try 
to push them down. 
From the above list of supervised methods RankBoost, SVM- perf 
and Top Push are compared to our method in the experimental 
section. 
4. Experimental evaluation 
The proposed combination technique was evaluated and com- 
pared to prior art using two existing network intrusion detec- 
tion systems, both implemented as an ensemble of anomaly detec- 
tors with mean being the default combination function. The ﬁrst 
one, described in Section 4.2 , uses NetFlow [23] records, while the 
second one, described in Section 4.3 , uses logs from HTTP proxy 
servers. 
To compare algorithms, we use measures from information re- 
trieval, namely precision and recall . Assuming that malware sam- 
ples have positive labels, precision is the fraction of the number 
of malware samples classiﬁed as positive and the total number of 
samples classiﬁed as positives, and recall is the fraction of mal- 
ware samples classiﬁed as positives and the total number of mal- 
ware samples. To highlight that the detection threshold is set to 1% 
of the most anomalous samples, we abbreviate both measures as 
Prec@1% and Rec@1% . The use of precision and recall is preferred 
over the popular area under the Receiver Operating Characteris- 
tic curve (AUC ROC) [24] , because the latter compares the algo- 
rithms in areas which are outside the region of the interest (top 
1% anomalies). Moreover, precision and recall are better suited for 
problems with highly imbalanced classes [25] . 
The use of machine learning methods in security is frequently 
hindered by the lack of fully labeled dataset. While samples la- 
beled as malicious are most of the time connected to some ma- 
licious behavior, it can frequently happen that some background 
samples are actually malicious, but the labelling oracle (analyst) 
has failed to recognize them. Experiments described below aim to 
simulate three types of noise in labels (and of course the noise-less 
case denoted as Non.) to investigate their effect on the learning of 
the combination function. The types of considered label noise are: 
• The training data contains samples of all types of malicious ac- 
tivities, but 50% of the samples of each activity type were not 
recognized as malicious by the oracle (human), and therefore 
they are labeled as a background. This case is denoted below 
as anomaly label noise ( ALN ). 
• Samples of some (50%) types of malicious activities are com- 
pletely missing in the training data, but they are present in the 
testing data. Samples of remaining types of malicious activities 
are present in the training set, but as in the previous case the 
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labeling oracle did not recognize 50% of such samples. This case 
is denoted as missing anomaly types ( MAT ). 
• Samples of all types of malicious activities are present in the 
training data, but the oracle did not know 50% of types, and la- 
beled them as background. On samples from the remaining 50% 
of types of malicious activities present in the training set the 
oracle again made a mistake and labeled them as background. 
This type of noise is further denoted as anomaly label noise 
with type mislabeling ( MLT ). 
The testing set was always noiseless to allow for fair compari- 
son and evaluate the effects. 
Datasets for each intrusion detection engine are described in 
corresponding subsection. The available data were split so that 50% 
of samples were used to learn the combination of anomaly detec- 
tors and the rest for testing. This split has been repeated ﬁve times 
to account for the variance of the estimate. 
4.1. Compared algorithms 
The experimental comparison involves four unsupervised com- 
bination rules ( mean, max, rank BFS [6] , mean rank [6] ), and four 
combination rules trained by supervised methods (SVM- perf [19] , 
TopPush [22] , RankBoost [20] , and the proposed method). SVM- perf 
used L1-slack algorithm with constraint cache setting, so that 1% 
of positive examples was used as value of k for Prec@k . Regular- 
ization constant in TopPush was set to one. The proposed method 
( Acc@Top ) was set to optimize the accuracy in top 1% of most 
anomalous samples, which means τ = 0 . 99 . 
Algorithms chosen for comparison enabled comparing unsu- 
pervised methods among themselves (repeating the experiment 
in [3] ), relevant supervised methods among themselves, and also 
the gain one can expect when using supervised methods even 
though the labels are not perfect. 
4.2. Evaluation on NetFlow anomaly detection 
The NetFlow anomaly detection engine [26,27] processes Net- 
Flow [23] records exported by routers or other network traﬃc 
shaping devices. The anomaly detection engine identiﬁes anoma- 
lous traﬃc using an ensemble of anomaly detection algorithms. 
Some of them are based on Principal component analysis [28–30] , 
others detect abrupt changes in the behavior [31] or even use ﬁxed 
rules [32] . Furthermore, there are detectors designed to detect spe- 
ciﬁc type of unwanted behavior like network scans [33] or mal- 
ware with domain generating algorithm [34] . In total the NetFlow 
anomaly detection engine uses 16 anomaly detectors. Thus the goal 
is to ﬁnd a linear combination of these 16 anomaly detectors max- 
imizing the accuracy in the top 1% quantile. 
The evaluation used several datasets from traﬃc captured on 
the network of Czech Technical University (CTU) in Prague. The 
datasets and labels especially were created by three different ap- 
proaches: manual labeling, infecting virtual machines, and per- 
forming real attacks against our computers within the network. In 
manual labeling, experienced network operator was able to suc- 
cessfully identify malicious activities that generated almost 10% of 
the total number of the connections (samples). In datasets with 
manually infected virtual machines 3 all their connections were la- 
beled as malicious, whereas the rest was labeled as background. 
In the ﬁnal dataset a network specialist run several attacks against 
one computer in the network. The attack vector consisted of a hor- 
izontal scan to discover open SSH ports, followed by SSH brute- 
force attack to break the password, and ﬁnished by SSH login and 
data download simulating data theft. 
3 Neeris, FastFlux and RBot were used to infect the machines [27] . 
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Fig. 1. PR curve comparison of algorithms with different types of label noise (de- 
scribed in Section 4 ) using the NetFlow anomaly detectors. Curves represent pre- 
cision and recall values for all possible thresholds. The threshold corresponding to 
the 1% quantile is marked on each line with a ﬁlled circle. 
Fig. 1 shows precision-recall curves for eight compared algo- 
rithms. The graphs demonstrate that the combination found by the 
proposed method ( Acc@Top ) most of the time dominates all other 
methods and ﬁxed combination rules. Notable exceptions are cases 
when some types of malicious activities are completely missing in 
the training data (MAT) or they are incorrectly labeled (MLT). In 
these cases unsupervised mean rank combination is better on the 
lower recall part of the curve. This behavior suggests that differ- 
ent anomaly detectors detect different types of malicious activities 
and the supervised combination has slightly overﬁtted. In practi- 
cal applications combining supervised and unsupervised combina- 
tion rules should be used to ensure good accuracy on known ma- 
licious activities and simultaneously some generalization on un- 
known alerts, where the precision will be substantially smaller. 
Also notice that the proposed algorithm is the most robust with 
respect to noise from all supervised ones. SVM- perf is good in the 
noiseless case, but poor when noise of any kind is present. The 
TopPush is slightly more robust, but still it performed poorly with 
noise of MAT and MLT types, both of which are also the hardest 
cases. Unsupervised combination function mean rank performed 
the best among unsupervised combination functions and it was 
surprisingly close to supervised ones at low recall. 
Precision and recall in top 1% quantile are shown in Table 1 . It 
shows that the presented algorithm has the best or close to the 
best precision if we compare the supervised combination rules. As 
discussed above, the unsupervised mean rank is better in the pres- 
ence of severe noise. The low recall of all algorithms except unsu- 
pervised maximum is caused by the high volume of malicious ac- 
tivities which have amounted up to 10% of the total volume of the 
traﬃc. This means that they cannot all ﬁt into the top 1% quantile. 
At the ﬁrst sight RankBoost achieves the best recall of all al- 
gorithms, but a closer inspection reveals that it returns 20% of 
samples as those that belong in top 1%. This highly undesired 
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Table 1 
Comparison of various combination techniques as applied to the NetFlow anomaly detectors described in 
Section 4.2 . Each column represents precision or recall in percent for various types of noise deﬁned at 
the beginning of Section 4 . The best-scoring algorithm is boldfaced. Small numbers in braces below rates 
show the fraction of samples returned in top 1% quantile of anomaly scores. Technically this value should 
be equal to one, but if many samples have the same value, the algorithm returns all of them, which can 
results to values signiﬁcantly higher than 1.0%. 
Prec@1% Rec@1% 
Method Non. ALN MAT MLT Non. ALN MAT MLT 
Mean 0.9 0.9 1.4 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
Maximum 19.8 19.8 25.4 19.8 71.8 71.8 69.6 71.8 
(48.8%) (48.7%) (49.8%) (48.8%) (48.8%) (48.7%) (49.8%) (48.8%) 
Mean rank 88.3 88.5 92.3 88.8 7.4 7.5 5.7 7.8 
(1.4%) (1.5%) (1.4%) (1.5%) (1.4%) (1.5%) (1.4%) (1.5%) 
Rank BFS 15.0 15.0 18.5 15.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
RankBoost 53.4 53.5 56.6 63.7 65.9 65.9 34.8 29.2 
(16.6%) (16.6%) (9.8%) (7.3%) (16.6%) (16.6%) (9.8%) (7.3%) 
TopPush 99.7 84.1 43.5 24.2 9.5 6.9 2.9 1.9 
(1.3%) (1.3%) (1.4%) (1.7%) (1.3%) (1.3%) (1.4%) (1.7%) 
SVM- perf 76.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(1.2%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.2%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
Acc@Top 98.3 96.7 29.1 76.9 9.7 6.8 1.2 5.2 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
behavior is caused by assigning the same score to multiple sam- 
ples. The same phenomenon can be observed in the case of Maxi- 
mum aggregation function. 
4.3. Evaluation on HTTP network anomaly detection 
The Cisco Cognitive Threat Analytics (CTA) [35] engine ana- 
lyzes HTTP proxy logs (typically produced by proxy servers located 
on a network perimeter) to detect infected computers within the 
network. Although the logs do not contain all host traﬃc (only 
HTTP(S) requests), the information is richer than the NetFlow as 
each entry contains the following information extracted from HTTP 
headers: time of the request, source IP address, destination IP ad- 
dress, url, MIME type, downloaded and uploaded bytes, User-Agent 
identiﬁer, etc. CTA contains more than 30 different anomaly detec- 
tors detecting anomalies according to empirical estimates of (con- 
ditional) probabilities such as P(country), P(domain|host), P(User- 
Agent|second level domain), etc.), time series analyses (models of 
user activity over time, detection of sudden changes in activity, 
identiﬁcation of periodical requests, etc.), and HTTP speciﬁc detec- 
tors (e.g., discrepancy in HTTP User-Agent ﬁeld [36] ). 
Evaluation data were collected from networks of 30 different 
companies of various sizes and types with collection period rang- 
ing from six days to two weeks. The data contains more than seven 
billion HTTP connections, in which Cisco analysts identiﬁed 2 6 6 6 
infected users with 825 different families of malware. In total the 
number of HTTP connections created by the malware has reached 
more than 129 million. Malware connections usually represent less 
than 2% of the network total traﬃc, with a notable exception of 
networks with hosts infected by ZeroAccess malware [37] . ZeroAc- 
cess creates many HTTP connections that can easily reach 20% of 
the volume of network traﬃc. The other most present malware 
families were: Cycbot, QBot, SpyEye, BitCoinMiner, and Zbot. Mal- 
ware connections were identiﬁed using multiple approaches start- 
ing with an analysis of the most anomalous HTTP logs as reported 
by the anomaly detection engine, malware reported by the indi- 
vidual network administrators, matching blacklists and other pub- 
lic feeds or third-party software. The rest of the logs remain unla- 
beled, though we are almost certain there are malware connections 
that have been missed. 
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Fig. 2. PR curve comparison of various algorithms with various label noise using 
the HTTP anomaly detectors. Again, threshold corresponding to the 1% quantile is 
marked on each line with the dot. 
As before, we show PR-curves of all evaluated detector combi- 
nations and types of noise in Fig. 2 . We observe that the proposed 
Acc@Top method outperforms all other techniques in all cases of 
studied noise. Contrary to the above experiments with NetFlow an- 
alytic engine, noise does not have signiﬁcant impact on supervised 
methods. This indicates that malicious behaviors of different types 
are similar in the space induced by the CTA HTTP(S) anomaly de- 
tectors. This is probably caused by the fact that all labeled mali- 
cious behaviors were in some sense connected to malware activity, 
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Table 2 
Comparison of various combination techniques as applied to the HTTP anomaly detectors described in 
Section 4.3 . The best-scoring algorithm is boldfaced. Small numbers in braces below rates show the frac- 
tion of samples returned in top 1% quantile of anomaly scores. Although this value should be equal to 
one, if many samples share the same value, the algorithm returns all of them, which can results to values 
signiﬁcantly higher than 1.0%. 
Prec@1% Rec@1% 
Method Non. ALN MAT MLT Non. ALN MAT MLT 
Mean 17.9 18.4 22.0 17.1 7.6 7.8 6.2 7.3 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
Maximum 10.6 10.6 15.8 10.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(20.0%) (19.9%) (20.9%) (19.9%) (20.0%) (19.9%) (20.9%) (19.9%) 
Mean rank 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
Rank BFS 20.9 21.3 24.7 20.7 9.1 9.3 7.1 9.1 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
RankBoost 81.7 81.6 87.2 81.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(2.6%) (2.6%) (3.8%) (2.6%) (2.6%) (2.6%) (3.8%) (2.6%) 
TopPush 100.0 93.8 96.7 95.6 42.6 39.9 27.3 40.7 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
SVM- perf 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
Acc@Top 100.0 99.6 99.7 97.6 42.6 42.4 28.2 41.5 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
for which CTA engine is designed. The curve of the Acc@Top sug- 
gest that even if less or more samples than 1% are requested by 
the operator, the precision will remain high in all scenarios. In con- 
trast, the curve of the RankBoost method starts at high recall with 
lower precision suggesting that almost all malicious samples and 
around 20% legitimate were scored with the same maximal value. 
Also notice that the mean rank unsupervised combination function, 
dominating in the previous section, was in this experimental sce- 
nario superseded by simple mean . 
Precision and recall at the top 1% are shown in Table 2 , and as 
in the previous section RankBoost and maximum achieve the best 
recall. The causes are the same. RankBoost and maximum have re- 
turned 2.6% and 20% of samples, respectively, which is far away 
from the required 1%. This is again caused by assigning the same 
value to many samples. Contrary, the proposed Acc@Top meets the 
1% requirement with really high precision. Its seemingly low recall 
is partially caused by the fraction of malicious samples being 2% of 
the total number of all samples. This means that the best achiev- 
able recall while meeting the requirements on returning 1% of the 
total number of sample is 50%. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has proposed a new algorithm for ﬁnding a con- 
vex combination of anomaly detectors maximizing accuracy at τ - 
quantile of returned samples, which is a scenario frequently ap- 
pearing in the security ﬁeld. The algorithm assumes labeled data, 
which are diﬃcult to obtain and rarely perfect in security domains. 
Therefore, an emphasis was put on the experimental study, involv- 
ing two different types of intrusion detection systems, eight types 
of combination functions, 34 different network captures contain- 
ing more than 20 million of samples of behavior of different algo- 
rithms under different types of noise. 
The experimental results show that the proposed method is 
more accurate than prior art in ﬁnding a good combination of de- 
tectors with high accuracy in returned samples. The results also 
show that supervised methods can easily overﬁt if some type of 
malicious behavior is completely missing in the training data or is 
incorrectly labeled (mistake of labeling oracle). The severity of the 
overﬁtting depends on how much different types of malicious be- 
havior are similar to each other. The comparison of unsupervised 
combination functions did not have a clear winner, since in one 
experimental setting mean rank was the best while in the second 
one it was mean . 
The presented experimental results show that future effort s 
should be directed toward ﬁnding methods combining good prop- 
erties of both supervised and unsupervised combination functions. 
Appendix A. Scaling outputs of anomaly detectors 
Generally, individual anomaly detectors need not generate 
anomaly scores of the same scale. This causes problems during the 
combination process, since one or more detectors could be inad- 
vertently favored. Therefore, the anomaly scores of the individual 
detectors are normalized using the gaussian scaling proposed by 
Kriegel et al. [11] : 
˜ h (x ) = max 
{
0 , erf 
(
h (x ) − μh 
σh 
√ 
2 
)}
, (A.1) 
where the ˜ h (x ) is the normalization of the anomaly score h ( x ) as- 
signed to the observation x ∈ X by anomaly detector h . The used 
Gaussian Error Function erf () is monotone and thus ranking stable. 
The μh and σ h are the mean and the standard deviation of the 
anomaly scores returned by the anomaly detector h . This trans- 
forms the anomaly scores of individual anomaly detectors into 
probability estimates, where the probability of zero represent nor- 
mal observation, aligned with the predictive model, whereas one 
indicates highly anomalous observation. These are therefore di- 
rectly comparable and can be aggregated using a number of com- 
bination techniques [11] . 
Appendix B. Optimizing only false positives or false negatives 
To demonstrate the advantage of minimizing both false posi- 
tive and false negative rates in the objective function ˆ R exp (H α) (5) , 
we have evaluated two additional variants of the objective function 
with only the false negative part ˆ R 
f n 
exp ( Acc@Top-FN ) and false posi- 
tive part ˆ R 
f p 
exp ( Acc@Top-FP ) using both NetFlow ( Table B.3 ) and CTA 
( Table B.4 ) anomaly detection systems. As can be seen in Table B.3 , 
using only one part of the criterion results in substantially de- 
creased eﬃcacy in the NetFlow scenario. Additionally, the false 
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Table B3 
Comparison of three variants of the proposed criterion, each used to train an ensemble for the NetFlow 
anomaly detection system. Small numbers in braces below rates show the fraction of samples returned 
in top 1% quantile of anomaly scores. Although this value should be equal to one, if many samples share 
the same value, the algorithm returns all of them, which can results to values signiﬁcantly higher than 
1.0%. 
Prec@1% Rec@1% 
Method Non. ALN MAT MLT Non. ALN MAT MLT 
Acc@Top 98.3 96.7 29.1 76.9 9.7 6.8 1.2 5.2 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
Acc@Top-FP 13.4 13.4 18.1 13.4 100 100 100 100 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 
Acc@Top-FN 0.1 0.1 15.7 21.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.6 
(1.9%) (1.9%) (1.4%) (2.4%) (1.9%) (1.9%) (1.4%) (2.4%) 
Table B4 
Similarly to Table B.3 , the table presents a comparison of three variants of the proposed criterion used 
on the CTA anomaly detection system. 
Prec@1% Rec@1% 
Method Non. ALN MAT MLT Non. ALN MAT MLT 
Acc@Top 100 99.6 99.7 97.6 42.6 42.4 28.2 41.5 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.0%) 
Acc@Top-FP 98.1 1.2 52.7 0.6 41.7 11.2 19.3 25.4 
(1.0%) (11.7%) (7.8%) (26.2%) (1.0%) (11.7%) (7.8%) (26.2%) 
Acc@Top-FN 87.2 87.5 88.5 86.0 37.1 37.2 29.2 38.6 
(1.0%) (1.0%) (1.2%) (1.1%) (1.0%) (1.0%) (1.2%) (1.1%) 
positive variant ( Acc@Top-FP ) results in all the samples having the 
same, zero value anomaly score. The results on the CTA anomaly 
detection engine ( Table B.4 ) are slightly better, but still the pro- 
posed Acc@Top outperforms both other variants in all label noise 
scenarios. 
Appendix C. Comparison with state-of-the-art 
Although the algorithm of Boyd et al. [12] is currently consid- 
ered to be the state of the art for optimizing the accuracy at top, 
it is not guaranteed to ﬁnd the global minimum. Its biggest ad- 
vantage is in ﬁnding the solution by solving series of convex sub- 
problems; therefore it is bound to always ﬁnd the same solution. 
But this limits the algorithm to be applicable only to small prob- 
lems, since its complexity grows as of O ( n 4 ), where n is the num- 
ber of training samples, and the solver of the convex sub-problems 
has the complexity of O ( n 3 ). In contrast, the proposed algorithm is 
essentially a stochastic descent algorithm, which has been proved 
to work well on problems with large number of samples. 
In order to investigate how the solutions of both algorithms dif- 
fer, we have created an artiﬁcial problem, which we think well 
models the application scenario of ﬁnding a convex combination of 
outputs of anomaly detectors. The problem was set to ﬁnd the op- 
timal combination of two anomaly detectors to optimize accuracy 
at the 20% quantile. The anomaly scores of the anomaly detectors 
for both, training and testing data, were generated using a set of 
normal distributions. 4 
The decision boundaries corresponding to solutions of both al- 
gorithms (shown in Fig. C.4 ) are very different, since Boyd et al.’s 
algorithm uses the output of one anomaly detector whereas ours 
uses both detectors. Corresponding PR-curves, shown in Fig. C.3 , 
4 The legitimate samples were drawn from uniform distribution (100 sam- 
ples) to simulate noise of the anomaly detectors and N ( [ 0 . 4 , 0 . 4 ] , [ 0 . 01 , 0 . 01 ] I 2 ) 
(300 samples), where the I 2 denotes the 2 × 2 identity matrix. The mali- 
cious samples were drawn from N ( [ 0 . 6 , 0 . 7 ] , [0 . 03 , 0 . 003] I 2 ) (100 samples) and 
N ( [ 0 . 7 , 0 . 4 ] , [0 . 003 , 0 . 03] I 2 ) (100 samples). 
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Fig. C3. Visualization of the artiﬁcial problem containing two anomaly detectors. 
The position of both anomalous and malicious samples is given by the anomaly 
score of the both A and B anomaly detectors. The solid and dashed lines represent 
decision boundaries of Acc@Top and Boyd algorithms respectively. 
further reveal that on the training set (solid lines) Boyd et al.’s al- 
gorithm ( Boyd ) is better at the point of the interest, but the pro- 
posed method ( Acc@Top ) is better on a wider range of operating 
points, which suggests that it would behave better on unknown 
data. This is experimentally conﬁrmed by PR-curves on the testing 
data (dashed lines), where the proposed algorithm dominates. Al- 
though, theoretically, this can be due to overﬁtting which can be 
solved by training on a larger training set, if available, this solution 
would be diﬃcult in practice due to the prohibitive complexity of 
Boyd et al.’s algorithm. 
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Fig. C4. PR-curves of the Acc@Top and the optimum found by the Boyd algorithm 
using the training (solid line) and testing (dashed line) data generated from the 
artiﬁcial problem. Threshold corresponding to the 20% quantile is marked on each 
curve. 
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1Anomaly Explanation with Random Forests
Martin Kopp, Toma´sˇ Pevny´ Martin Holenˇa
Abstract—Anomaly detection has become an important topic in many different domains with many different solutions proposed until
now. Despite that, there are only a few anomaly detection methods trying to justify or explain how the sample differs from the majority.
Since in many domains knowing why a sample is considered anomalous is absolutely critical, this work partially fills this gap. The
proposed solution uses a specific type of random forests to extract rules explaining the difference, which are then filtered and
presented to the user as a set of association rules or in a disjunctive normal form. A comparison of the proposed solution to the state of
the art algorithms on 36 real world datasets shows a superior performance. Moreover, the explanation is more complete than that of
the prior art, which identifies only features in which the given sample is different.
Index Terms—Anomaly Detection, Anomaly Explanation, Association Rules, Feature Selection, Random Forests
F
1 INTRODUCTION
ANOMALY detection algorithms identify samples devi-ating from the majority of data so much that they raise
a suspicion they have been generated by a different process.
Because anomalies are, by definition, rare and they can
substantially differ from each other, the problem poses very
different issues and challenges than standard supervised
classification. Citing [1], the most important differences are
following:
• Determining a region of all possible normal samples
is very difficult.
• The boundary between normal and anomalous sam-
ples is often not precise and highly depends on the
considered application. For example, in the med-
ical domain, a small deviation from the average
(e.g., fluctuations in body temperature) might be
an anomaly, while a similar deviation in the stock
market domain (e.g., fluctuations of the stock value)
might be normal.
• The data generating distribution may be non-
stationary, which means that the currently valid no-
tion of normal samples might not be valid in the
future.
• Anomaly detection is usually applied to domains
or problems where labels are scarce or difficult to
obtain.
Despite the above challenges, anomaly detection algo-
rithms were successfully applied in many domains, for
example: network security [2], bioinformatics [3], astron-
omy [4], space exploration [5]. With the increasing volume
of mostly unlabelled data presently generated, it receives
more and more attention, as it helps to identify interesting
samples without human intervention.
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E-mail: martin@cs.cas.cz
Due to a wide interest and the fact that each application
domain has its own definition of anomaly and application
constraints, a plethora of diverse algorithms have already
been proposed. An interested reader is encouraged to read
a recent book [6] and a recent comparison [7], where is
demonstrated that there is not a single best algorithm for
all scenarios. Furthermore, identifying an anomaly is only
a half of the problem, and the second, equally important,
is the interpretation of found anomalies, because humans
have more trust in obtained results if they understand why
it was returned. In the high dimensional and complicated
application domains like network security or bioinformatics,
where hundreds or even thousands of features are common,
a good interpretation is even more important. Every piece of
additional knowledge about the anomaly provides invalu-
able help to users evaluating the suspicious samples. Fur-
thermore, it helps to gain insights into why an anomalous
sample is different from the rest of data, which can reveal
something about its properties. Despite the extensive prior
art in anomaly detection, very few works even mention
the explanation of detected anomalies. This is surprising
because in practice, any detection is usually followed by a
deeper investigation. Furthermore, the pioneering works in
the non-parametric anomaly detection by [8], [9] explicitly
consider anomaly explanation.
This paper partially fills this gap by proposing an al-
gorithm called Explainer, which explains why a sample
identified as an anomaly by some detector is different from
the majority. The explanation is presented as a set of decision
rules which are commonly considered easily understand-
able by humans, e.g. [10]. One of the main Explainer’s
advantages is that the anomaly detection algorithm used to
find anomalies is treated as a black-box, which means that
the Explainer can be employed as an additional step for a
vast majority of the state of the art algorithms.
The Explainer is based on an ensemble of specifically
trained decision trees (random forest), which in this par-
ticular case are very small. Since the construction of those
specific trees is extremely fast, the Explainer is lightweight
and therefore, it can be used effectively with minor memory
requirements on large databases and data-streams to pro-
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2vide explanations nearly in the real time.
The experimental section compares the Explainer to the
relevant prior art on 36 benchmark anomaly detection prob-
lems obtained using the approach proposed in [11]. The
comparison was done for explanations of anomalies pro-
vided by three different anomaly detection algorithms and
also for ground truth anomalies. According to the Friedman
test with Nemenyi post-hoc analysis [12], the Explainer sig-
nificantly outperforms all the prior art. Occasional cases
where it is inferior are discussed, so that its shortcomings
are known and a practitioner can better choose the right
algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews related work with a short overview of anomaly
detection algorithms followed by a deeper presentation of
the state of the art in the explanation of anomalies. The
Explainer is described in Section 3. Section 4 presents results
of its comparison to state of the art algorithms on 36 datasets
from different domains. The same section also shows the
robustness of the Explainer with respect to the setting of
its parameters and recommends an overall good choice.
Section 5 summarizes the advantages and limitations of the
proposed approach and suggests possible extensions and
future work.
2 RELATED WORK
This section first briefly reviews the anomaly detection
domain and then surveys anomaly explanation techniques.
2.1 Anomaly detectors
Most unsupervised anomaly detection methods can be clas-
sified as being either model-centric or data-centric.
Model-centric methods learn some model from data, and
then during detection, they measure how a given sample
deviates from that model. Their training phase is usually
computationally expensive while the detection is rather
cheap. The most basic models represent data by parameters
of some statistical distribution. The first work that has used
the term anomaly detection, [13], belongs to this class. For ex-
ample, a popular class of methods based on principal com-
ponent analysis [14] or deviations from linear regression [15]
assumes multivariate normal distribution although they do
not state it explicitly. Methods, such as one-class support
vector machines [16] or kernel fisher linear discriminant [17]
tries to overcome the discrepancy between real data and
rigidity of parametric distributions, but at the expense of
introducing hyper-parameters that needs to be tuned and to
which the methods are sensitive. We note that for one-class
support vector machines there is a proof of their asymptotic
convergence to optimum [18].
A rather special case of model-centric methods are those
that employ clustering. Their training phase (model) con-
sists of grouping samples into clusters. In the detection
phase, samples far from all clusters are considered to be
anomalous, [19] . An interesting variation is the subspace
clustering method proposed by [20], where clusters are
formed in sub-spaces. Sub-spaces in which anomalies are
identified can be viewed as a very basic explanation, al-
though this is not explicitly stated.
Data-centric methods use data instead of a model and
measure the difference of a sample from the majority, as-
suming some similarity or distance function. Contrary to the
previous, their training phase is usually very cheap consist-
ing only from storing all samples, while their classification
phase tends to be very expensive, typically due to a nearest-
neighbour type of search. This category includes one of the
first methods for a non-parametric anomaly detection, [8],
[9], defining and identifying anomalous samples as those
that are far from the rest. A plethora of methods were
proposed differing in the used distance [21] and also in
the way of selecting the samples with respect to which
that distance is measured. The main drawback of distance
based algorithms is related to the curse of dimensionally,
as in high dimensions almost all points are equidistant.
[22] proposed a method of anomaly detection using reverse
nearest neighbours, with appealing performance especially
for high dimensional data. Another variation of data-centric
methods are those that estimate (local) probability density
and define anomalies as points having very low probability.
The popular Local Outlier Factor (LOF) by [23] and Local
Correlation Integral (LOCI) by [24] are prime examples of
this type of anomaly detection methods.
2.2 Explainers
The previous section suggests that there is a rich prior art
on anomaly detection, yet few works address the problem
of our interest — the explanation of detected anomalies.
The first work considering anomaly explanation was [8],
defining an explanation as: ”provision of a description or
an explanation of why an identified anomalous sample is
exceptional”. The method first detected all distance based
anomalies in the whole attribute space. Then, it has iterated
over all possible subspaces and identified the smallest sub-
space in which was the considered anomaly still detected.
This smallest subspace was considered its explanation. In
the terminology used, here it has identified those features in
which the sample deviates. Also, the method verified if there
are other samples that are anomalies only within certain
subspaces, and according to this property anomalies were
classified into weak and strong, see [9] for further details.
The main drawback of their method is its computational
complexity because all possible subsets of features to must
be screened for anomalies, which renders the methods un-
usable for high-dimensional data.
[25] proposed an algorithm simultaneously identifying
and explaining anomalies. The method uses Fisher Linear
Discriminant (FLD) to separate each anomalous candidate
from samples in its neighbourhood. The anomaly score is
derived from the value of the objective function optimized
in FLD. Coordinates with the largest magnitude found by
FLD are then used to determine the most important features
explaining anomality of the respective candidate. The detec-
tion process is computationally very expensive, therefore,
the authors have proposed several heuristics to make it
faster. Nevertheless, the complexity prevents from using the
method on larger datasets. Another drawback is that the
explanation is entangled with the anomaly detection.
In a more recent work [26] have extended the previous
approach by replacing FLD with a variant of large-margin
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3nearest neighbour algorithm by [27] to find a projection
matrix W onto a low-dimensional space which approxi-
mately preserves the local neighbourhood of the sample
in question. The anomaly score is calculated in this low-
dimensional space (different for each sample), and from
the projection matrixW, features important for separation
of the sample from its neighbourhood are extracted and
returned as an explanation. As in the previous approach, the
explanation is tightly connected to the anomaly detection.
It is also quite computationally intensive because to find
projection matrix W in each point requires singular value
decomposition, which makes the method impractical for
large-scale data.
[28] propose to convert the problem of anomaly detec-
tion to binary classification, which is to some extent similar
to the anomaly detector of [29]. For each sample x, their
method creates artificial samples in its vicinity, trying to
train a classifier to separate the artificial samples from the
rest. If x is an anomaly, then artificial samples should be
easily separable from non-artificial ones, which would mean
the classifier will have a low error. Conversely, if x is a
true inlier, then the classifier will have a high error. [28]
used the linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier to
estimate the classification error. Features contributing to the
separation of samples correspond to the largest-magnitude
coordinates of the normal vector of the separating hyper-
plane and are returned as an explanation (similarly to [25]).
Drawbacks of the method include a high computational
complexity and a difficulty to correctly generate artificial
samples.
The last method explaining anomalies we are aware
of, was proposed by [30]. It is designed for categorical
variables, but with a proper quantization, it can be used
for real variables as well. The anomaly score is derived from
the frequency of histogram bins, from which the method
also extracts context and explanation of the anomaly. An ex-
ample of the context would be ”The sample x is an anomaly
because from all samples having attribute1 = value1 it is
only one having attribute6 = value2”.
Compared to the prior art, the Explainer is more general
than [25], [26] and [9] because it can explain the output of an
arbitrary anomaly detector. It is compatible with both cate-
gorical and numerical features or their mix. Although [30]
can also use both type of features, it is effective only on
categorical data or small sets of integers due to its com-
putational demands. The approach of [28] can explain the
output of an arbitrary anomaly detector, but its performance
depends on used feature selection method and the proposed
anomaly score needs balanced sets of normal and artificially
generated anomalous samples. The Explainer follows a com-
pletely different approach than the prior art and is designed
to handle imbalanced data.
All recent prior art stops the explanation after identify-
ing the set of features in which the anomaly is visible, which
means that the algorithms are essentially used as a feature
selectors for extremely imbalanced datasets. Contrary to this
Explainer returns more complex explanation presented as a
set of association rules or in the disjunctive normal form.
Last but not least, Explainer is fast and lightweight,
therefore well suited for nearly real time processing of data
and for data-streams.
3 THE Explainer ALGORITHM
The goal of the Explainer is to explain, why a point xa ∈ X
is an anomaly with respect to the rest of points in X .
Explainer does not impose constraints on the anomaly de-
tection algorithm that has identified xa, but assumes that
the anomalous point xa deviates from the rest in a subset of
features (corresponding to dimensions of X ). The space X
where the data lies is general in the sense that its dimensions
can be real, categorical or mixed variables, or any other type
of variables where an ordering operator, allowing to use
rules of type xi > θ, can be defined1.
The optimal explanation depends on user’s prior knowl-
edge and experience. Despite this subjectivity, decision trees
are, according to the [10], considered understandable for
humans. In fact, understandability of not only tress but
rules in general, i.e., Boolean implications, is the reason why
they have been for many decades used as the most common
means of the knowledge representation.
To explain the anomality of xa, the Explainer trains a set
of decision trees (a random forest) to separate xa from X .
From this random forest, it extracts individual rules, which
are then assembled into a set of the association rules or
into the disjunctive normal form. Since each tree is trained
to separate a single point xa from X , its training set is
extremely imbalanced and its height is very small. The
idea of using decision trees is further supported by the
anomaly detection method called Isolation Forest by [31],
which according to the recent extensive comparison in [7]
is one of the best anomaly detector. The key steps of the
Explainer are summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Summary of the Explainer algorithm for a single
anomaly xa.
Input:
data - input dataset; xa anomalous sample; size training
set size; nT number of trees to be trained.
Output:
rules - rules explaining xa
1: Forest← ∅
2: for i← 1 . . . nT do
3: T ← createTrainingSet(data, size, xa)
4: t← trainTree(T )
5: Forest← Forest+ t
6: end for
7: rules← extractRules(Forest)
In the rest of this section, the individual parts of the
Explainer are discussed in detail, specifically, training of
individual trees, construction of datasets, and extraction of
the rules forming the minimal and maximal explanation. The
section concludes with examples of explained anomalies.
3.1 Training a single tree
This section assumes that the reader has a basic knowledge
of decision trees and random forests, a suitable references
being, e.g., [32] or [33].
There exist many variants of the basic algorithm to train
a single tree, differing mainly in: (i) criterion to select a node
1. The rule should be read as ith feature of x is greater than θ.
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4to be split; (ii) set of hypotheses (decision rules) assigned to
the inner nodes of the tree; (iii) criterion to select the hypoth-
esis in the selected inner node; and (iv) training termination
criterion. Since the Explainer trains decision trees with the
goal of identifying rules explaining how xa differs from X ,
its training set contains only one positive sample xa, which
makes some of the above choices straightforward while
others very different from what is typical in supervised
classification.
Selection of the splitting node: Since the training set
contains only one positive sample, there is only one leaf
containing this positive sample in every iteration of the
training algorithm. Therefore, this leaf is selected to be split.
Set of hypotheses: In line with the goal of maximum un-
derstandability, the set of hypotheses contains only decision
rules of the type xj > θ (or xj < θ), which can be read as
the jth feature is greater (or smaller) than θ.
Criterion to select the hypothesis: Let S denotes the set
of samples reaching a leaf containing the anomaly and H
denotes set of candidate hypothesis to split the leaf. Classi-
fying samples from S according to hypothesis h creates two
subsets Sa(h) and Sn(h), where Sa is assumed to contain
the positive sample.
The Explainer chooses the hypothesis h splitting a partic-
ular leaf such that the size of the set |Sa(h)| is as small as
possible, i.e.
arg min
h∈H
|Sa(h)|, (1)
which can be effectively calculated. Moreover due to the
above described way of the training it is equivalent to the
popular information gain [32] and Gini impurity [34], as it
is proved in the Appendix.
If two or more hypotheses {h1, . . . , hl} ∈ H split the
leaf so that resulting Sa(·) are of the same size, the train-
ing algorithm resolves this tie by selecting the hypothesis
maximizing the robust estimate of the margin defined as
arg min
h∈{h1,...,hl}
Q0.05 ({|xh − xah||x ∈ Sn(h)}) , (2)
where Q denotes the empirical quantile, corresponding to
the subscript, of the set in its argument, where xh denotes
the feature used in hypothesis h. The rationale behind this
robust estimate of the margin is that the set of normal
samples may contain anomalous samples missed by the
anomaly detection algorithm. The choice of 5% quantile is
justified by the assumption that anomalies are rare and there
should be less than 5% of them. Note that for this algorithm
to work properly, samples should be normalised to zero
mean and unit variance.
Termination criterion: The training of a tree finishes
when the leaf containing the anomalous sample is of size
one.
3.2 Training set selection
To achieve robustness against noise in the training set, the
Explainer trains set of trees on randomly selected subsets T
of the training data. Since the training set always contains
the same single positive sample, xa, only the normal (non-
anomalous) samples from X are sampled. The construc-
tion of the training set T influences the properties of the
Explainer, which can be configured to provide either mini-
mal explanation returning minimal set of rules for features
needed to identify the anomaly, or maximal explanation
returning all rules for features in which anomaly can be
detected.
Minimal explanation To extract minimal set of rules
explaining the anomaly, the training sets for individual
trees are sampled independently of each other. A traditional
approach is bootstrapping used in [32], where each training
set contains k samples selected from X randomly with
replacement. Due to its low computational complexity of
O(|X |) and overall good results, it is used here as well.
We also tried a local approach, where the normal samples
were chosen only from the neighbourhood of the anomaly
xa, but the time complexity grown significantly while the
explanation did not improve.
Training set for maximal explanation
Definition 3.1. k-nn distance of a sample x to the set S is
the average distance of x to its k nearest neighbours in S ,
i.e.
knnDist(x,S) = 1
k
∑
xi∈NNk(x,S)
d(x, xi),
where d(x, xi) denotes distance of x to xi and NNk(x,S)
denotes the set of k nearest neighbors of x in S.
Definition 3.2. k-nn distance of the set S1 to the set S2 is
the set of average distances of all samples in S1 to their k
nearest neighbours in S2, i.e.
knnDist(S1,S2) = {knnDist(x,S2)|x ∈ S1}
Note that, in general knnDist(S1,S2) 6=
knnDist(S2,S1).
To identify all features in which xa deviates from the
majority, the Explainer starts by creating two random
training sets T a and T n similarly to the minimal
explanation variant. The first training set T a containing
the anomalous sample xa is used for the training of the
tree, and the second, which contain only normal samples, is
used in the termination criterium. Then the Explainer enters
a loop, where in each iteration it trains one tree on T a,
extracts and stores the decision rule used in the root of the
trained tree, and then it removes the feature used in this
rule from the training sets T a and T n to be used in the next
iteration. This loop terminates, when the knnDist(xa, T n)
is smaller than max (knnDist(T a, T n)) . The rationale
behind the stopping criterion is that a typical anomaly
deviates from the rest of data only in few features and
in remaining features it behaves like a normal sample.
Therefore, if all anomalous features were identified and
removed from the feature space, the anomaly should be
undetectable.
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
3.3 Explanation by association rules
Once the random forest for a given anomaly has been
trained, it is used for the explanation by turning forest’s
decision rules into a more readable form.
Should the forest contain only a single tree, the expla-
nation would be easy consisting of all rules on the path
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5Algorithm 2 Summary of the Explainer algorithm for maxi-
mal explanation of a single anomaly xa.
Input:
data - input dataset; xa anomalous sample; size training
set size; nTnumber of trees to be trained.
Output:
rules - rules explaining xa
1: Forest← ∅
2: T a ← createTrainingSet(data, size, xa)
3: Tn ← createTrainingSet(data, size,¬xa)
4: G ← allFeatures
5: repeat
6: t← trainTree(T a,G)
7: Forest← Forest+ t
8: G ← G \ topSplitFeature(t)
9: until knnDist(xa, T n) < max(knnDist(T a, T n))
10: rules← extractRules(Forest)
from the root node to the leaf with the anomalous sample
assembled into conjunction of atomic conditions as
c = (xj1 > θ1) ∧ (xj2 > θ2) ∧ . . . ∧ (xjd > θd). (3)
This conjunction can be read as “the sample is anomalous
because it is greater than the threshold θ1 in the feature j1
and greater than θ2 in the feature j2 and . . . than majority of
samples.” Because the tree is of small height, the explanation
is compact.
When the random forest contains more than one tree,
which is essential for improving the robustness, a conver-
sion of its rules into set of atomic conjunction becomes
more complicated. Since returning all decision rules of all
trees would hamper the comprehensibility of the resulting
ruleset, they are filtered so that only important ones are
used.
Rules from all trees are grouped such that each set Hi
contains rules with the same type of inequality {< . >}
and concerning the same feature. If the input space have d-
features, there will be at most 2d sets. Sets {Hi}2di=1 are then
sorted according to their size in descending order and then
only the first k sets such that their cumulative frequency
is greater than a threshold τ (recommended to be 0.90 or
0.95) are retained. Using the adopted notation, the number
of retained sets rs is determined as
rs = arg min
k′
1∑2d
i=1 |Hi|
k′∑
i=1
|Hi| > τ, (4)
where it is assumed, that sets {Hi}2di=1 are already sorted
by their size. Finally, from each set Hi the rule with the
threshold closest to the median is selected.
θ¯ = median (∀θ|θ ∈ Hi) (5)
Resulting rs rules are presented to the user as associative
rules, i.e.:
(xj1 > θ¯1) ∧ (xj2 > θ¯2) ∧ . . . ∧ (xjk > θ¯k)⇒ anomaly (6)
Explaining multiple anomalies The Explainer was de-
signed to naturally handle multiple anomalies at once.
To produce a consistent explanation, anomalies should be
analysed in groups of one similar type or caused by a
similar process. The process of clustering anomalies was
studied in our previous work focused on preserving the
interpretability [35]. The clustering of anomalies based on
voting of individual trees and deviations in selected features
were proposed. The effect of using only features proposed
by the Explainer for the clustering was also studied in that
paper.
When the clustering is done, trees trained for all anoma-
lies of one group are aggregated into one forest and then
explained in the same way as a forest for a single anomaly.
We believe that such an additional analysis of anomalies
via clustering is justified as it enables the interpretation of
similar anomalies at once, saving time and human efforts.
It can also help to uncover larger scale anomalies. For
example, multiple measurements of an anomaly can end in
the same cluster.
3.4 Examples of explanation
For illustration we present two examples of explanation
from real word datasets.
Multiple features The first example concerns a dataset
called Multiple features from the UCI machine learning
repossitory [36]. It is a classification dataset of hand-written
digits, which contains six families of features. Among them,
the averaged pixels family was chosen because of an easy
to understand graphical representation of both inputs and
outputs. Every digit is represented by 16x15 averaged pixels
resulting in a vector of 240 features with values 0..6. These
values represent the number of black pixels within the 2x3
rectangle. With this setting, the Explainer was used to explain
how digits ”0” differ from digits ”1”. The digit ”0” and the
digit ”1” averaged over 100 samples are shown in Figure 1a
and Figure 1b.
Figures 1c and 1d show a graphical representation of the
minimal and maximal explanation. The minimal explana-
tion shows that there are 2-3 features which are sufficient to
clearly distinguish digits ”1” and ”0”. In the case of max-
imal explanation we can see increased amount of selected
features, which, in addition to pixels in the middle, form a
silhouette of a zero.
TABLE 1
The antecedents of the association rules extracted during the minimal
explanation of differences between digits ”1” and digits ”0”, when ”1”s
were considered anomalous. Rules are sorted in order as return by the
Explainer.
rule recall precision
x8,7 > 4.5 93.0 100
x8,8 > 1.5 93.0 100
x8,6 > 4.5 93.5 97.9
x15,1 > 3.8 9.0 90.0
Rules extracted from the minimal explanation are listed
in Table 1 together with precision and recall of classifying
the digit ”1” using only the single rule. Because the con-
sequent of all those rules would be “⇒ anomaly” it was
omitted. It can be seen that those rules correspond to the
features highlighted in Figure 1. The first two features x8,7
and x8,8 represent the two bright pixels int the middle of
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Fig. 1. The averaged digit ”0” (top-left) and digit ”1” (top-right) from the
hand-written digits recognition dataset called Multiple features from the
UCI repository. The minimal explanation of difference between hand-
written digits ”1” and ”0” (bottom-left) and maximal explanation (bottom-
right), when we consider zeros as normal samples and ones as anoma-
lies. The colour scale shows the relative frequency of using a particular
feature during explanation.
the zero and the feature x15,1 is the one in the upper right
corner. Interestingly, the first three rules alone are enough
to cover more than 90% of all samples labeled as digit ”1”,
using only three features out of 240.
The output in the DNF for this particular example look
like:
(x8,7 > 4.5) ∨ (x8,8 > 1.5) ∨ (x8,6 > 4.5) ∨ (x15,1 > 3.8)
Network security The second example is a dataset from
the network security domain. The goal was to identify
domains used by the Bedep and Vittalia2, malwares show-
ing advertisements against the user’s will. The data set
contains approximately 460 000 benign unique URL’s and
6667 URL’s used by Bedep or Vittalia. Each URL is treated
as an individual sample. Examples of malware URLs are:
olpofraskolfa.com/ads.php?sid=1926
bionookersako.in/ads.php?sid=1929
ads.under-myscreen.be/cgi-bin/advert/
getkws.cgi?did=11727.
To convert URL to a vector of fixed dimension, URL is first
split into the tokens using natural separators for each part
of URL (dots for domain, slashes for path and ampersands
and equal signs for query3). To decrease the total number of
tokens, some tokens are replaced by meta tokens, e.g. <n>
for numbers, instead of the exact value of the answer. After
the tokenization, the above urls looks like
2. All samples of both, Bedep and Vittalia, were captured during the
summer 2015. Presented patterns are likely to be different from patterns
used by the malware presently.
3. The query part contains pairs of query and answer, which is used
as a variable and value.
olpofraskolfa com ads php sid <n>
bionookersako in ads php sid <n>
ads under my screen be cgi bin advert
getkws cgi did <n>
To further decrease the total number of tokens, a hash
function proposed by [37] is used to convert each token
to an integer in the range [1, . . . , 2048]. Each URL is then
represented as a vector of length 2048 by bag of words en-
coding with one word corresponding to one hashed token.
The complete set of steps is outlined at the Figure 2.
somepage
com
folder
index
php
uid a6
lang en
somepage.com/folder/index.php?uid=a6&lang=en
domain path query
URL
split URL to tokens
compute hash function for each token
32
16
87
3
14
52 36
8 21
reduce to chosen size e.g. 16
0
0
7
3
14
4 4
8 5
resulting vector
2 0 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Fig. 2. Schematics of transformation of a URL to a fixed length vector of
integers.
The Explainer was used to identify the most important
(minimal explanation) tokens explaining the differences be-
tween malware, taken as anomalous, and benign URLs,
taken as normal. It was set to train 5 trees per each malware
URL with training set size 500 URLs. The top rs extracted
rules are shown in Table 2. Only the antecedents of the
association rules are presented in the table as the consequent
would be “⇒ anomaly” in all cases.
TABLE 2
Example of antecedents of the association rules extracted by the
Explainer explaining differences between adware and benign URLs
sorted according to their precision.
rule recall precision
gmsd > 0 17.8 100
advert > 0 39.9 99.5
kws > 0 39.9 99.3
screen > 0 39.6 94.2
sid > 0 ∧ ads > 0 21.5 94.2
ers > 0 9.2 94.1
json > 0 32.3 66.1
Identified tokens like ads, advert, sid and screen
reveal their purpose, since tokens screen identifies the
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7key informing the server about resolution of clients screen,
sid is a key of device identifier, and ads and advert are
apparently related to advertisements. Tokens gmsd, ers,
kws were found exclusively or almost exclusively in adware
domains, yet the concrete purpose is unknown to authors.
The only controversial token is json, which is a file for-
mat used for structured data and is completely legitimate.
From almost 500 000 URLs used in this experiment it was
contained in 3243 samples and 2143 of them were adware,
which means that 32.3% of adware URLs use the json
token whereas it was used only in 0.23% of legitimate URLs.
According to the setting of the experiments, where only 500
legitimate samples were selected to explain each anomaly, it
is evident why it was identified as a discriminative feature
in so many cases.
3.5 Algorithm complexity
The computational complexity of the Explainer is
O (nT · Tsel · Ttrain). nT is the number of trees trained for
each anomaly, which is a user given parameter for the
minimal explanation and nT = O(d − 1) for the maximal
explanation, where d is the number of features. The term
Tsel stands for the complexity of training set selection which
is O (|Xn|) where |Xn| is the number of normal samples in
the data. The last term Ttrain represents training of a single
tree and is equal to O
(
d · |T |2) for the minimal explanation,
and O
(
d2 · |T |2) for the maximal explanation, where |T | is
the size of the training set which is the second parameter
that needs to be given in advance, typically much smaller
than |Xn| (see Section 4.3 for details).
4 EXPERIMENTS
This section presents an experimental comparison of the Ex-
plainer to the state of the art algorithms by [25], [26] and [28]
on 36 classification datasets from the UCI machine learning
repository [36], with the number of features ranging from 4
to 5000 and number of samples from 22 up to nearly 100k.
Since there is a lack of the prior art on explaining anoma-
lies, the methodology to measure quality of an explanation
has not been established yet. Therefore, this work measures
how the area under the receiver operating characteristic
(AUC) of an anomaly detector improves if the anomaly
detection uses only features used in the explanation in
comparison to the baseline when all features are used.
The rationale behind is that the explanation should contain
only features in which the anomaly is most different from
the remaining data. Therefore, the AUC in the reduced
space should be comparable or even higher than the AUC
computed on the full space. Also recall that all recent prior
art to which the Explainer is compared stop the explanation
after identifying the set of features in which anomaly is
visible, which further justifies the choice of using AUC for
the comparison.
The algorithms are also compared on the basis of the
number of returned features and scalability, which is impor-
tant for contemporary large data.
4.1 Experimental settings
The Explainer is compared to the algorithms of [25], [28]
and [26]. The implementations of the first two algorithms
were kindly provided by their authors, while the last algo-
rithm was implemented by ourselves. The compared algo-
rithms tried to explain anomalies identified by Local Outlier
Factor (LOF) by [23], a k−nearest neighbor (knn) classifier
by [38] and the Isolation Forest (iForest) by [31]. To avoid
the influence of incorrect detections, the perfect detector
scenario was simulated by explanation of the ground truth
(GT) anomalies.
As mentioned above, the performance of anomaly detec-
tors was measured by the area under the receiver operating
characteristic (AUC) of an anomaly detection algorithm us-
ing only the features selected by the explanation algorithm.
The reported AUC values were measured by the anomaly
detector under investigation, e.g. LOF was used to measure
AUC in all LOF related experiments. For the evaluation
of experiments with ground truth anomalies the Isolation
forest detector was used because it is the fastest detector
with very good overall performance.
The anomaly detection algorithms were set as follows.
The Isolation forest was set to create 100 trees using
256 samples for each, the thresholds between normal and
anomalous samples were estimated from data, separately
for each dataset. The size of local neighbourhood for the
LOF detecter was set to 10 and detection threshold was set
to 2, in accordance with the recommendation in [23]. The
k-nn used only k = 4, while the threshold on a distance to
the average of the k nearest neighbours was estimated from
data, separately for each dataset.
The Explainer used training sets of size |T | = 100. The
number of trained trees was set to nT = 5 for minimal
explanation, whereas it is determined automatically during
the run of the algorithm for maximal explanation. The other
algorithms were set up as recommended by the authors in
the respective papers. In [25], the neighbouring set size k
varied from 10 to 40, in [26], the regularization parameter
was set to α = 0.1 and the neighbourhood sizes varied from
5 to 25. Finally, [28] has two parameters and according to
the authors, the algorithm should be robust to their setting,
which our experiments with α varied from 0.1 to 0.7 and
k from 20 to 50 have confirmed. The reported results were
obtained with the setting α = 0.5 and k = 50.
The experimental comparison used 36 different datasets
from UCI machine learning repository, [36], covering many
application domains. Since they are designed for supervised
classification, they were converted to anomaly detection
problems as recommended by [11]. The LOF alone showed
to be the worst of all tested detection algorithms as it did
not found any outliers in 6 out of 36 datasets. Therefore, the
comparison was done using only 30 datasets.
4.2 Experimental results
Quality of explanation measured by the AUC At first,
the quality of explanation was compared by measuring the
aforementioned improvement in AUC. Due to the large
number of problems on which the algorithms are compared,
the results are summarized by critical difference diagrams
as proposed by [12]. Figure 3 shows the average rank of
each algorithm over all 36 problems, groups of algorithms
that are not significantly different according to the Nemenyi
post-hoc analysis are connected. Table ?? contains all results
for ground truth labels in detail.
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Fig. 3. Critical comparison of explainers when ground truth anomalies
(top-left) and anomalies discovered by Isolation forest (top-right), k-nn
(bottom-left) and LOF (bottom-right) were explained.
The Explainermin performs consistently the best regard-
less the anomaly detector used to identify the anomalies,
though the margin of the improvement over the prior
art depends on that detector. For anomalies identified by
Isolation Forest and k-nn, the statistical test did not reject
the hypothesis that the Explainermin and Dang 2013 and
Dang 2014 are statistically different. Still, in both cases
the Explainermin achieved the lowest rank. For anomalies
identified by the LOF, the Explainer was significantly better
than prior methods.
When the effect of an anomaly detector is removed
by explaining the ground truth, both the Explainermin and
Explainermax are significantly better than all of the prior
art according to the [39] test and the post-hoc tests with
the corrections for simultaneous hypotheses testing by [40].
Precise results are shown in Table 3.
The algorithm of [28] didn’t work well with the k-nn
detector as it didn’t return any features as an explanation in
17 out of 36 cases, despite the algorithm has been executed
with a wide range of parameters.
Further investigation, of the cases where the Ex-
plainermin performed worse revelled that in multiple fea-
tures, waveform-1 and waveform-2 datasets in combination
with k-nn anomaly detector, the Explainermin has removed
features responsible for clustering normal samples together,
which misleads the k-nn detector to create new anomalies
that were not present in the full space version of the dataset.
Yet authors believe that the explanation was correct and the
worse performance is due to the detector rather than due to
the Explainer. The Explainermin excels on high dimensional
datasets like gissete, madelon, libras and on noisy datasets.
the Explainermax seems to be more susceptible to mistakes
in detection than the Explainermin. While the explanations
were reasonable, anomaly detection on more features was
typically worse (see Table 6) since more features increase
the signal to noise ration to which anomaly detectors are
sensitive, and which explains the worse AUC.
To conclude this comparison, the performance of [28]
algorithm strongly depends on the particular dataset. The
[26] improved the [25] and is the closest prior art to the
Explainer in the terms of identification of features in which
the anomaly is detectable.
The compactness of explanation by number of features
TABLE 3
Results of the statistical test of [39] and its post-hoc tests with the
correction for simultaneous hypotheses testing by [40]. The rejection
thresholds are computed for the family-wise significance level α = 0.05
algorithms p rejection threshold
Explainermin vs. Micenkova 2013 1.52e-15 0.005
Explainermin vs. Dang 2013 2.45e-12 0.008
Explainermax vs. Micenkova 2013 6.15e-12 0.008
Explainermax vs. Dang 2013 1.81e-12 0.008
Explainermin vs. Dang 2014 1.27e-6 0.008
Dang 2014 vs. Micenkova 0.0017 0.013
Explainermin vs. Dang 2014 0.0022 0.013
Dang 2013 vs. Dang 2014 0.0306 0.017
Explainermin vs. Explainermax 0.0736 0.025
Dang 2013 vs. Micenkova 0.3325 0.050
Figure 4a shows the median of selected features used in
explanation of the ground truth anomalies. Since the Ex-
plainermin was designed to select as few features as possi-
ble, it consistently selects the minimal number of features
among all tested methods. Taking into account that it also
outperforms all prior art in terms of the AUC, it can be con-
cluded that its explanations are more compact and therefore
more precisely specifying root causes of anomalies, which
was its goal. Surprisingly, even though the Explainermax
should return all relevant features (and therefore returns
more features than the Explainermin), their number is still
considerably lower than in case of all prior art methods,
especially for large datasets.
The comparison of running times The last compar-
ison was done with respect to the computational com-
plexity, measured as a total time to explain all ground-
truth anomalies. As in the previous experiment, the last
two datasets are missing for both Dang’s algorithms and
one for Micenkova´, because of their excessive memory and
computational requirements. Figure 4b show running times
averaged over 20 runs. On smaller datasets, the algorithm
of [26] clearly outperformed all other algorithms, but for the
larger datasets, it is evident that the Explainer methods are
much more efficient. The break point is approximately 1000
samples for low dimensional datasets or 200 samples for
high dimensional datasets.
Comparison with Isolation forest:
The Explainer and Isolation forest are both based on
a random forests trained only on a small sub sample of
data, so they may seem similar. This section shows that
not only their main purpose but also their outcomes differ
substantially.
Isolation forest is an ensemble of random trees. More
specifically, both the feature and threshold are selected
randomly for each splitting node. The main idea is that
anomalies differ strongly from the normal samples, there-
fore, they should be separated with fewer splits. There is
no focus on identifying key features or any other way of
explanation or description of findings.
The main goal of the Explainer is to identify features
responsible for the anomalous nature of the sample under
analysis. Therefore, each split uses the feature and threshold
that produces the best possible separation of an anomaly
and normal samples. Features used in spilt nodes are then
assembled into classification rules.
Similar rules can also be extracted from Isolation forests.
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Fig. 4. The comparison of the number of selected features per dataset.
The curve marked as all features shows the number of features of a
particular dataset (left). The comparison of the running times (right).
Please notice that number of features as well as running times are
plotted in logarithmic scale.
One of the basic properties indicating the comprehensibility
of a rule is its length. A comparison of the average rule
length for each dataset is depicted at Figure 5 and sum-
marised in Table 4.
TABLE 4
The average length of rules extracted from Explainermin, Explainermax
and Isolation forest over all datasets.
Explainermin Explainermax Isolation forest
2.47 4.06 5.79
The rules produced by Isolation forests are not only
longer (even against the Explainermax) but they have also
other problems, caused by the random nature of this
method. First, extracted rules are inconsistent and used fea-
tures vary every time a forest is trained. Secondly, rules ex-
tracted from a random tree can contain a rule on one feature
many times, even in succession, or contain rules without
any impact on resulting set. Therefore, rules extracted from
Isolation forests are not suitable for the explanation.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the average length of the rules extracted from the
Explainerand the Isolation forest anomaly detector.
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Fig. 6. AUCs of anomaly detection on datasets with more than 1000
samples (14 of all used dataset) using only features suggested by the
Explainer with varying training set sizes when ground truth anomalies
were explained (top-left) and when anomalies identified by Isolation
forest were explained (top-right). The reported values are the average
of 10 runs training 10 trees per anomaly. The Explainer was used
to explain the ground truth anomalies (bottom-left) and the anomalies
identified by the Isolation forest detector (bottom-right). The AUCs are
average of 10 runs using only features suggested by the Explainer with
the varying number of trees trained per anomaly and fixed training set
size to 100 samples.The results for each setting were sorted according
to their AUC, showing general performance rather than performance on
specific datasets. The interpretation is simple, the line of the setting
leading to better average AUCs will be higher than the line representing
the setting leading to lower average AUCs.
4.3 Sensitivity to parameters
The Explainer is controlled by two parameters: by the train-
ing set size |T | and by the number of trees trained per
anomaly nT . In this section we show the robustness of
the Explainer to the setting of those parameters, effectively
making the Explainer almost a non-parametric method.
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TABLE 5
Results of the Friedman’s statistical test with the correction for
simultaneous hypotheses testing by [40], calculated while testing the
training set size of the Explainermin for explanation of the ground truth
anomalies. The rejection thresholds are computed for the family-wise
significance level α = 0.05
settings p rejection threshold
|T | =200 vs. |T | =1000 0.325 0.0023
|T | =10 vs. |T | =1000 0.407 0.0025
|T | =20 vs. |T | =1000 0.437 0.0026
|T | =100 vs. |T | =1000 0.468 0.0028
|T | =50 vs. |T | =200 0.501 0.0029
|T | =200 vs. |T | =500 0.534 0.0031
|T | =10 vs. |T | =50 0.604 0.0033
|T | =20 vs. |T | =50 0.641 0.0036
|T | =10 vs. |T | =500 0.641 0.0038
|T | =50 vs. |T | =100 0.678 0.0042
|T | =20 vs. |T | =500 0.678 0.0045
|T | =100 vs. |T | =500 0.717 0.0050
|T | =500 vs. |T | =1000 0.717 0.0056
|T | =50 vs. |T | =1000 0.756 0.0063
|T | =100 vs. |T | =200 0.795 0.0071
|T | =20 vs. |T | =200 0.835 0.0083
|T | =10 vs. |T | =200 0.876 0.0100
|T | =10 vs. |T | =100 0.917 0.0125
|T | =50 vs. |T | =500 0.958 0.0167
|T | =10 vs. |T | =20 0.958 0.0250
|T | =20 vs. |T | =100 0.958 0.0500
At first, the Explainermin was executed with the number
of trees per anomaly nT = 5 while varying the training
set size T ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100, 500, 1000}, for that reason
the experiment was performed only on datasets with more
than 1000 samples. AUCs of different configurations, mea-
sured by the Isolation forest detector, are shown for ground
truth anomalies in Figure 6a and anomalies discovered
by the Isolation forest 6b. According to these results, the
Explainer does not seem to be sensitive to the size of the
training set, as all AUCs are very similar. Results of the
Friedman’s test and its post-hoc tests are all in 5. When
explaining ground truth, training sets as small as 50 - 100
samples were sufficient. When explaining anomalies identi-
fied by a real anomaly detector, larger training sets like 100–
200 samples seems to be more appropriate. The finding that
even a small training set is sufficient for good explanations
is especially important for data-streams, where all samples
needed for explanation have to be stored in memory.
Fixing the size of the training set to T = 100,the Ex-
plainermin was executed with different number of trees per
anomaly nT ∈ {1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50}. AUCs of all configura-
tions, measured by the Isolation forest detector, are shown
in Figure 6c for ground truth anomalies and in Figure 6d for
anomalies identified by Isolation Forests. Similarly to the
size of the training dataset, the Explainer does not seem to
be sensitive to this setting. Results of the Friedman’s test
and its post-hoc tests are all in the Appendix C. According
to the results using 5-10 trees per anomaly is recommended
because its stable while still being computationally efficient.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a novel approach to explaining the
deviation of a sample, identified by an arbitrary anomaly
detection algorithm, from the rest of data. The proposed
approach relies on specifically trained random forests to
identify rules explaining the anomaly. Those rules are then
assembled into the explanation in the form of a set of
association rules or in the disjunctive normal form and
presented to the user. The set of association rules is easy
to read and understand by humans, whereas the disjunctive
normal form was chosen because it is compact and practical
for further machine processing.
The proposed approach has been extensively compared
to the relevant prior art on 36 UCI machine learning
repository datasets while explaining anomalies identified by
multiple anomaly detection algorithms. The results show a
superiority of the proposed solution, as it provides tighter
and more accurate explanations. In addition, our testing
has shown that it is also superior with respect to the time
complexity, especially on the high dimensional datasets.
As to the theoretical fundamentals of our approach, we
proved that our simplified splitting criterion used during
the specific training of random forest is for this kind of ran-
dom forest equivalent to the common best practice splitting
criteria based on information gain or Gini impurity.
APPENDIX
LetH denotes the space of all possible splitting rules defined
as:
H = {hj,θ|j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, θ ∈ R} ,
where
hj,θ(x) =
{
+1 if xj > θ
−1 otherwise
with xj being the jth feature of x and θ representing a
threshold. The most popular criteria to select the splitting
function h ∈ H of a new internal node are information gain
defined as
IG(S, h) = H(S)−
∑
b∈{L,R}
|Sb(h)|
|S| H(S
b) (7)
and Gini impurity defined as
GI(S) = 1−
∑
b∈{L,R}
f2(Sb(h)), (8)
where S is the subset of the training set T reaching the leaf
being split, SL(h) = {x ∈ S|h(x) = +1} and SR(h) = {x ∈
S|h(x) = −1}, H(S) is the Shanon entropy of S and f is
the fraction of samples of the specified class in the set.
In the following lemma, we show that when training set
T contains exactly one anomaly, both criteria (7) and (8) are
equivalent and equal to
arg min
h∈H
|Sa(h)|, (9)
where |Sa| is the size of the set containing the anomaly after
splitting. This splitting criterion is easy to interpret and can
be calculated more effectively than information gain or Gini
impurity.
Lemma A.1. Denote Tq(p1, . . . , pk) the Havrda-Charva´t en-
tropy with index q ≥ 1, up to a multiplicative constant coinciding
with the more recently introduced Tsallis entropy, [41]) for a
finite-dimensional probability distribution (p1, . . . , pk), i.e.,
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TABLE 6
The table shows the area under ROC curves of the Isolation forest detector executed on the full feature space baseline (captioned “all”), and that
of executed on sub-spaces spanned by features used to explain ground truth anomalies identified by the Explainermin,Explainermax, the better of
two Dang’s algorithms and algorithm of Micenkova. The smaller numbers in brackets behind each AUC are the number of used features, averaged
over 10 runs, in the respective case. Finally, the last column captioned l shows the number of samples.
id dataset all Explmin Explmax Dang14 Micenkova l
1 breast-tissue 0.61 (9) 0.83 (2) 0.82 (2) 0.77 (6) 0.62 (4) 22
2 libras 0.42 (90) 0.60 (2) 0.64 (4) 0.50 (64) 0.50 (12) 24
3 iris 0.57 (4) 0.84 (2) 0.85 (2) 0.84 (3) 0.49 (3) 50
4 wine 0.65 (13) 0.93 (3) 0.88 (3) 0.84 (8) 0.66 (3) 71
5 glass 0.43 (9) 0.99 (1) 0.98 (1) 0.48 (7) 0.59 (6) 76
6 synthetic-control-chart 0.68 (60) 0.75 (2) 0.75 (4) 0.81 (42) 0.55 (22) 100
7 sonar 0.46 (60) 0.77 (2) 0.72 (5) 0.67 (42) 0.42 (6) 111
8 ecoli 0.65 (7) 0.80 (2) 0.73 (4) 0.59 (3) 0.49 (5) 143
9 parkinsons 0.48 (22) 0.80 (2) 0.72 (3) 0.53 (17) 0.58 (4) 147
10 multiple-features 0.63 (649) 0.78 (2) 0.74 (4) 0.70 (466) 0.59 (67) 200
11 vertebral-column 0.56 (6) 0.61 (3) 0.60 (4) 0.60 (5) 0.54 (2) 200
12 spect-heart 0.26 (44) 0.59 (2) 0.56 (3) 0.41 (30) 0.30 (12) 212
13 statlog-vehicle 0.54 (18) 0.65 (3) 0.61 (5) 0.63 (13) 0.58 (3) 218
14 haberman 0.66 (3) 0.69 (2) 0.56 (2) 0.62 (3) 0.71 (2) 225
15 ionosphere 0.74 (34) 0.97 (3) 0.89 (8) 0.89 (23) 0.72 (2) 225
16 isolet 0.41 (617) 0.58 (2) 0.55 (4) 0.53 (443) 0.40 (250) 240
17 statlog-segment 0.57 (19) 0.79 (4) 0.76 (6) 0.76 (14) 0.41 (7) 330
18 breast-cancer-wisconsin 0.80 (30) 0.96 (3) 0.95 (4) 0.92 (20) 0.75 (9) 357
19 yeast 0.44 (8) 0.56 (2) 0.56 (4) 0.43 (5) 0.47 (4) 463
20 pimaIndians 0.60 (8) 0.74 (2) 0.72 (5) 0.67 (7) 0.64 (3) 500
21 blood-transfusion 0.53 (4) 0.61 (2) 0.60 (3) 0.58 (2) 0.57 (2) 570
22 letter-recognition 0.39 (16) 0.59 (2) 0.57 (3) 0.53 (4) 0.38 (12) 813
23 pendigits 0.72 (16) 0.85 (4) 0.88 (6) 0.81 (12) 0.66 (14) 1144
24 madelon 0.44 (500) 0.55 (3) 0.54 (4) 0.49 (358) 0.43 (72) 1300
25 abalone 0.53 (8) 0.52 (3) 0.52 (4) 0.51 (6) 0.55 (5) 1528
26 statlog-satimage 0.60 (36) 0.85 (2) 0.84 (2) 0.77 (24) 0.55 (18) 1533
27 cardiotocography 0.46 (21) 0.86 (1) 0.83 (2) 0.61 (19) 0.32 (9) 1655
28 waveform2 0.67 (40) 0.67 (2) 0.74 (6) 0.72 (16) 0.61 (17) 1692
29 waveform1 0.67 (21) 0.69 (2) 0.66 (4) 0.68 (16) 0.62 (17) 1696
30 wall-following-robot 0.55 (24) 0.73 (2) 0.73 (5) 0.68 (18) 0.54 (15) 2205
31 gisette 0.42 (5000) 0.72 (8) 0.69 (16) 0.52 (3576) 0.32 (92) 3000
32 page-blocks 0.85 (10) 0.94 (3) 0.95 (5) 0.82 (8) 0.78 (2) 4913
33 musk2 0.40 (166) 0.66 (1) 0.66 (2) 0.50 (118) 0.43 (28) 5581
34 magic-telescope 0.67 (10) 0.80 (4) 0.79 (4) 0.68 (9) 0.58 (6) 12332
35 statlog-shuttle 0.77 (8) 1.00 (1) 1.00 (1) nan (nan) nan (nan) 45586
36 miniboone 0.62 (50) 0.86 (3) 0.79 (2) nan (nan) 0.66 (50) 93565
Tq =
1
q − 1
(
1−
k∑
i=1
pqi
)
if q > 1, T1 = lim
q→1+
Tq =
k∑
i=1
pi ln pi.
In particular, T1 is the (ln 2)-multiple of the Shanon entropy, and
T2 is the Gini impurity. Let now S be a set of samples (feature
vectors) that reached a given inner node of a given tree, such
that S contains only one anomaly xa ∈ S and all vectors from
S \ {xa} are normal. Let S be split into disjoint subsets Sa,Sn
such that xa ∈ Sa.
Then the decrease ∆Tq of Tq for the empirical distribution of
anomalies and normal vectors after the split of S into Sa and Sn,
i.e.,
∆Tq = Tq
(
1
|S| ,
|S| − 1
|S|
)
−
(|Sa|
|S| Tq
(
1
|Sa|
,
|Sa| − 1
|Sa|
)
+
|Sn|
|S| Tq(0, 1)
)
is a decreasing function of |Sa|.
Proof. To simplify the notation, denote p = 1|Sa| and
c = Tq(
1
|S| ,
|S|−1
|S| ), which is a constant with respect to |Sa|.
Then, being a decreasing function of |Sa| is equivalent to
being an increasing function of p on the set { 1|S| , . . . , |S|−1|S| },
for which it is sufficient to prove that ∆Tq is an increasing
function of p on (0, 1) .
1) The case q > 1.
∆Tq = −|Sa||S| Tq
(
1
|Sa|
,
|Sa| − 1
|Sa|
)
+ c
=
1
q − 1
pq + (1− p)q − 1
|S|p + c.
Consequently, on (0, 1),
d∆Tq
dp
=
1
q − 1
ϕ(p)
|S|p2 , (10)
where ϕ : (0, 1)→ R is a function defined
(∀p ∈ (0, 1)) ϕ(p) = (q − 1)pq + 1− (1− p)(q−1)((q − 1)p+ 1).
Computing the derivative of ϕ yields
(∀p ∈ (0, 1)) ϕ′(p) = q(q − 1)p(p(q−2) + (1− p)(q−2)) > 0,
which entails ϕ being strictly increasing on (0, 1).
Therefore,
(∀p ∈ (0, 1)) ϕ(p) > lim
p′→0+
ϕ(p′) = 0.
Combining this with (10) implies that ∆Tq is indeed
an increasing function of p on (0, 1) .
2) The case q = 1.
∆Tq = −|Sa||S| Tq
(
1
|Sa|
,
|Sa| − 1
|Sa|
)
+ c =
1
|S|
ϕ(p)− ϕ(0)
p
+ c,
(11)
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where ϕ is the negentropy on 〈0, 1) defined
ϕ(p) =
{
p log p+ (1− p) log(1− p) if p ∈ (0, 1),
limp′→0+ ϕ(p′) = 0 if p = 0.
(12)
Computing the second derivative of ϕ yields
(∀p ∈ (0, 1)) ϕ′′(p) = 1
p
+
1
1− p > 0,
which entails the strict convexity of ϕ on (0, 1). This
together with its right-continuousity in 0 (cf. (12))
implies that ϕ(p)−ϕ(0)p is an increasing function of p
on (0, 1), and due to (11), this holds also for ∆Tq .
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